September 4, 2018

Lisa Scruggs  
Special Assistant Attorney General  
Office of the Illinois Attorney General  
100 West Randolph Street, Floor 12  
Chicago, Illinois 60601

SUBJECT: City of Chicago Police Department Independent Monitoring Proposal

Dear Ms. Scruggs,

The Police Foundation respectfully submits the attached proposal to the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago detailing our experience, qualifications, and approach to serving as Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department.

The Police Foundation is the oldest nationally known, independent, nonprofit, non-partisan, and non-membership-driven organization dedicated to advancing policing through innovation and science. Our organization has worked with local, state, and federal government officials; law enforcement and public safety agencies; and, communities across the country for over 45 years providing guidance on issues including collaborative reform; incident reviews following mass demonstrations; community policing and enhancing community-police relations; conducting organizational, operational, technological, and administrative analyses; and, studying the extent to which evidence-based approaches are, or could, be leveraged to enhance community safety.

We believe that the depth and range of our team’s experience, our national perspective and reach of our network, our expertise in providing guidance and technical assistance, and our commitment to advancing policing nationwide makes us uniquely qualified to serve as monitors for the City of Chicago Police Department.

The Police Foundation looks forward to the potential to work with the Office of the Illinois Attorney General and the City of Chicago to serve as Independent Monitor for the consent decree regarding the Chicago Police Department and to assisting the CPD in becoming a model police agency, trusted by the community to deliver impartial, Constitutional, community-based policing, with a healthy, well-trained and high morale workforce.
Please do not hesitate to contact us with any questions. Our legal contact information is:

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Email: jbuieermann@policefoundation.org

Thank you for your time and consideration of our proposal.

Jim Bueermann
President
Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department

Chicago, Illinois

Submitted By:
Police Foundation
1201 Connecticut Avenue, NW, #200
Washington, DC 20036

Submitted To:
Office of the Attorney General for the State of Illinois and The City of Chicago

September 4, 2018
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Executive Summary

The Police Foundation (PF) respectfully submits this proposal to the State of Illinois Office of the Attorney General and the City of Chicago (the Parties) to serve as Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department (CPD). Our task will be to determine and report to the Court and to the public on the extent to which the agreement is being implemented as required. The goal of our work is to assist the CPD in becoming a model police agency, trusted by the community to deliver impartial, Constitutional, community-based policing, with a healthy, well-trained and high morale workforce.

The scope, scale and importance of this work is unprecedented. No law enforcement agency of comparable size has been subject to a consent decree for over a decade. And since the time of the Los Angeles agreement, the tools and methods of policing, and those for observing and reporting on police behavior have changed dramatically and irreversibly. At a time of intense public scrutiny of police forces around the country, the Parties are making a bold move to dramatically reshape the CPD and police-community relations.

The Police Foundation (PF) is the oldest independent, non-profit, non-partisan, and non-membership driven organization dedicated to improving public safety in America, and from the founding days, has been research-based, and practitioner-driven. We are deeply committed to evidence-based policing and policing reform, and to advancing the cause of community-based policing. In fact, the Police Foundation has been on the forefront of researching and providing guidance on community policing practices for decades. The Police Foundation is responsible for much of the research that led toward a new view of policing—one emphasizing a community orientation, and our commitment to research and technical assistance continues to this day.

The Police Foundation has unequalled access to insight and talent in the law enforcement field, with a team of 30 full-time professionals as well as 78 Executive Fellows, 26 Policing Fellows and 14 Research Fellows. Our team members have led departments that have faced significant challenges with all of the relevant areas for oversight on this project from use of force and impartial policing to officer wellness. With a national footprint, we provide broad, objective external perspective on how CPD measures up to the evidence-based practices shown by research to be effective. As Independent Monitor, we can marshal researchers and practitioners who are passionate about advancing policing, across all areas of oversight indicated in the consent decree.

Our Independent Monitor, Chief Rick Braziel (ret.) has experience not only as a law enforcement leader himself, he is also an experienced outside monitor of law enforcement operations, having completed numerous external organizational evaluations of police agencies, and also in his role as Inspector General of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. Our Co-Monitor, Brian Maxey currently serves as Chief Operating Officer of the Seattle Police Department where he focused the department on exceeding the requirements of the consent decree with the U.S. Department of Justice, ultimately resulting in a finding of full and effective
compliance. He brings a unique perspective as a lawyer and a law enforcement executive who has successfully used the consent decree process to bring about positive organizational change.

The methodologies we deploy are time-tested and our results can be reviewed in the sample work products provided. We believe that our team has the right skills and dedication to create lasting impact. As noted by the complaint, some of the issues to be addressed date back a half century. Further complicating change is the open opposition of the local Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) who have deemed the work “wholly unnecessary.” Making change in these circumstances will take considerable effort, insight, and patience. We chose a team with diverse skills and deep experience with that challenge in mind. The result will be a fundamental change in the way the community and its police interact and will establish a roadmap and best practice example for other departments.

While the research on consent decrees is not fully established, some scholars note that once the attention of an independent monitor is gone, departments may return to pre-oversight practices.\(^1\) One of the keys to our approach is to focus on building infrastructure, such as transparency and accountability systems, that will outlast our work and sustain positive change for future generations of Chicagoans.

As detailed in the cost proposal and based on our current understanding of the required scope, we estimate that the five-year cost of providing this service to the Parties, the Court and the people of Chicago is $14,249,693.82.

**Personnel**

In order to serve as Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department (CPD), the Police Foundation (PF) proposes a Monitor, Co-Monitor and Deputy Monitors responsible for key subject matter areas, along with an Independent Monitoring Team of highly qualified staff and subject matter experts. Our carefully chosen team has the judgement, independence and experience to deliver needed oversight of CPD and to provide accountability to the State of Illinois Office of the Attorney General and the City of Chicago (the Parties). The team will be supported by PF research, financial, and administrative staff, and as necessary by additional subject matter experts from our vast network. Our inter-disciplinary team of law enforcement operations leaders and researchers has extensive expertise and experience in monitoring, auditing, evaluating, and reviewing the performance of local law enforcement agencies, with particular focus on community engagement and policing, critical incident response, and collaborative reform.

The proposed Independent Monitor, Co-Monitor and Independent Monitoring Team of staff and subject matter experts has extensive experience with and understanding of policing and law enforcement best practices, monitoring the performance of law enforcement agencies, communicating with diverse public audiences, collaborating with city and state agencies, law enforcement, and the communities they serve.

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\(^2\) Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
and civil rights, engaging with diverse community stakeholders, knowledge of Chicago communities, project and change management, municipal budgeting, and data analysis and information technology. Members of the proposed team have worked together on similar projects over the course of many years. We believe with a project as important and high profile as this one, it is critical to have a team that can hit the ground running with established working relationships, norms and practices so that no time is lost in this challenging task.

**Organization of the team and summary of team member background**

In deference to the page limitations, we have integrated two sections asked for in the RFP, with the organization of the team and summary of team member background provided on the following pages. As shown in the chart below, our team is organized to provide a combination of outstanding expertise and an efficient management structure for the Parties and the Court.

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**Independent Monitoring Executive Team Organization**

Our team is led by long-time Police Foundation Executive Fellow **Chief Rick Braziel (ret.)**, who will serve as **Independent Monitor** for the CPD. He will draw from his extensive experience overseeing police operations as chief in Sacramento and now as the Sacramento County Inspector General, his experience as a member of a team conducting the review of riots in Ferguson, Missouri, and his insights from service on the St. Louis County Police Collaborative Reform Initiative team. His integrity, his experience with investigations, police recruitment and retention studies, and his work on analyzing officer-involved shootings all give him the depth of expertise to be an outstanding Independent Monitor for the CPD. He will be the single point of contact for the project and will be available to and accountable to the Parties in monitoring the progress of CPD in carrying out the requirements of the consent decree. He will lead all public events addressing the progress of the CPD in meeting the requirements of the consent decree (also referred to as the Agreement).
Directly supporting Chief Braziel is Co-Monitor Brian Maxey, Chief Operating Officer of the Settle Police Department. Co-Monitor Maxey is a policing reform expert and accomplished police executive with experience in administrative operations, extensive community and governmental engagement and collaboration, and measurable success implementing 21st Century Policing principles into practice. In his role as COO, he has focused the department on exceeding the requirements of the federal consent decree with the Department of Justice ultimately resulting in a finding of full and effective compliance. He is a seasoned attorney, with experience in hundreds of police and corrections lawsuits, employment matters, disciplinary actions, and labor negotiations.

Supporting the Monitor and Co-Monitor, our Independent Monitoring Team will include a project-wide Management Team as well as the subject matter teams as described below.

The Management Team is led by Deputy Monitor for Management Blake Norton, who as Police Foundation Senior Vice President currently leads all policing reform efforts for the foundation. With significant executive experience leading the foundation, and with prior senior executive roles at the Council of State Governments and the Boston Police Department, she has the expertise, judgment and fresh perspective needed to manage the operations of the project, and to effectively marshal the resources of Police Foundation staff and subject matter experts assembled for this Independent Monitoring Team. The project-wide Management Team will provide foundational support to all aspects of the project on policy, research, analytic and management tasks. This team will develop the project management tracking tools and processes needed to assure that all key dates and milestones are achieved by CPD as well as by the Independent Monitoring Team. This team will also develop a schedule of public meetings and reports and will oversee the project web site and all communications. They will lead regular project meetings, via telephone, to discuss the status of tasks and activities, and to ensure that the project is progressing on time and on budget. Reporting to Blake Norton are the following additional members of the Management Team:

- **Project Director.** The Monitor, Co-Monitor and Management Team will be supported by a full-time Project Director based in Chicago. The Project Director will be the on the ground coordinator for the team and will manage all public communications on behalf of the Monitor and Co-Monitor. At project kickoff, we will staff this from our existing team in Washington DC, but within the first six months of the contract will have a full-time person in place in Chicago.

- **Community Collaboration Manager.** The Project Director will be supported by a full-time Community Collaboration Manager to be based in Chicago. The Community Collaboration Manager will be responsible for organizing and executing engagement and collaboration within the community and all stakeholders. They will also be responsible for internal and external project status tracking and will support the development, sharing and management of project status tracking tools. They will handle logistics for team members traveling into Chicago for on-site meetings and will be responsible for project documentation (including public documents and internal team documents). The person hired for this role will be bilingual in English and Spanish. As of project kickoff, we will staff this from our existing team in Washington DC, but within the first six months of the contract will have a full-time person in place in Chicago.

- **Jennifer Zeunik,** Police Foundation Director of Programs will oversee any training and technical assistance provided to CPD and will work to support and facilitate the work of the Independent
Monitoring Team by ensuring that all of the team’s work is grounded in research and data, to the extent possible. She will also provide writing, editing and quality control leadership for monitoring products.

- **Rebecca Benson**, Police Foundation Senior Policy Analyst will support the Management Team as well as the entire Independent Monitoring Team with her analytics talents. She brings to this project her experience with crime analysis, CompStat reporting and crime mapping from the Los Angeles Police Department and Boston Police Department.

- **Ben Gorban**, Police Foundation Policy Analyst brings research, writing, policy analysis and technical assistance experience on projects related to countering violent extremism, community policing, and the role of social media in law enforcement. Mr. Gorban served as the policy analyst for the Critical Incident Review Team for the Orlando Pulse Nightclub Terrorist Attack and as a writer and editor for the resulting report *Rescue, Response, and Resilience.*

- **Joyce Iwashita**, Police Foundation Project Assistant, brings the experience of support, communications and coordination for the Police Foundation’s organizational assessment and technical assistance projects. She will provide support in research, writing, data management and visualization, and use of other technology to foster communication. Her strong data and technical skills make her able to support a broad range of project management tasks.

- **Financial and Administrative Manager.** Recognizing the importance of complete fiscal transparency, the PF will devote a full time financial and administrative manager to this project.

The **Use of Force Team** is led by **Independent Monitor Chief Rick Braziel (ret.),** a long-time Police Foundation Executive Fellow has many years of experience collecting and analyzing data on use of force and knows well the challenges CPD will likely face in implementing its new public reporting requirements for this aspect of the Agreement. The Use of Force team has expertise in understanding the use of force, reporting on the use of force, analyzing use of force data, de-escalation of incidents, policies regarding vehicle and foot pursuits, and policies related to less lethal methods and tactics. Additional team members include:

- **Chief Darrel Stephens (ret.)** brings to this team 50 years of law enforcement experience. His career began as a police officer in Kansas City in 1968 and concluded with 22 years as a senior executive, including nine years as the Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). He is committed to using data to reduce the use of force; he has been inducted into the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame and received the Sir Robert Peel Medal for Evidence Based Policing from the Police Executive Program at Cambridge University.

- **Superintendent Lisa Holmes (ret.)** is a subject matter expert on police training, internal affairs, hiring and recruitment and last served as Chief of the Bureau of Professional Development at the Boston Police Department (BPD), where she was responsible for all the training and educational requirements of the BPD. She was previously the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Professional Standards, which includes the Internal Investigations Unit, Anti-Corruption Unit, Recruiting Investigation Unit and the Audit and Review Unit.

The **Community Policing Team** will be led by **Deputy Monitor Chief Daniel Isom (ret.), Ph.D.,** whose focus on community policing was evident as he worked his way up through the ranks at the St. Louis Police Department rising to Commissioner from 2008-2013. As police commissioner, Chief Isom developed and implemented community policing approaches and developed impartial policing best practice insights. He now studies community and impartial policing in his role as an activist academic. After retirement, he was appointed to the Ferguson Commission and served as the co-chair of the commission task force on police community
relations. This team will address all areas of the consent decree related to integrating community and impartial policing principles into CPD operations, creating structure and oversight for CPD officers in Chicago schools, improving CPD interactions with diverse communities, facilitating access for individuals with disabilities, and institutionalizing the inclusion of community input into key CPD decisions and operations. Additional team members include:

- **Rev. Jeffrey Brown**, subject matter expert on community engagement has over 20 years of experience in gang mediation and intervention and in developing police/community dialog. His work builds on the idea that in many urban areas, relations between the urban, often minority community and law enforcement is poor, which inhibits effective policing and prevents the community from getting the quality of life it deserves. Rev. Brown has worked in Boston, MA, Camden, NJ, Salinas, CA, as well as with Fortune 25 corporations and the World Bank. In October of 2014, Rev. Brown traveled to Ferguson, MO to participate in and serve as a buffer between residents and the police during protests. Rev. Brown currently supports the USDOJ-funded technical assistance effort with the North Charleston Police Department.

- **Francine Tournour** is a subject matter expert on police accountability and serves as Director of the Sacramento Office of Public Safety Accountability with the authority to investigate misconduct complaints against officers, to evaluate the quality of employee performance and the authority to encourage systemic change through improved training and new policies. She works to improve the relationship between the City’s public safety departments and the community they protect and serve, promoting trust, excellence, transparency and accountability through independent and impartial oversight of complaints related to public safety employee misconduct.

The Accountability, Transparency, and Data team will be led by **Deputy Monitor Jason Johnson**, who last served as Deputy Police Commissioner for the Strategic Services Bureau with the Baltimore Police Department. In this role, Johnson led key reforms in professional accountability, training, recruiting, technology and data management; as well as the development of organizational policies and practices reflective of progressive, constitutional policing. This team will monitor CPD progress in implementing data systems that support accountability and transparency - internally and to the public - of CPD activities, including for use of force incidents, misconduct investigations, particularly officer-involved domestic violence or sexual misconduct allegations. This team also addresses the internal CPD processes and staffing models that relate to managing the complaint and investigations process, as well as addressing cultural issues related to the officer code of silence. Additional team members include:

- **Roland Corvington** is Chairman of the St. Louis County Board of Police Commissioners, a civilian oversight board invested with authority for the control and supervision of the St. Louis County Police Department. He was formerly Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation St. Louis Division. During his 23-year career in the FBI he was responsible for investigations and the training of new recruits. He was incident commander at the scene in Pittsburgh where hijacked United Flight 93 crashed during the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

- **Jane Wiseman**, subject matter expert on government data analytics will provide advice on best practices for using data for management and using digital tools to engage the public and on making complex data understandable and useful to the public. She writes and speaks
The Human Capital Management Team will be led by Deputy Monitor Chief Ganesha Martin (ret.) who last served as Chief for the Baltimore Police Department, leading the department’s USDOJ Compliance, Accountability, and External Affairs Division where she identified reforms and best practices that enhanced BPD’s internal capacities and external relationships with the community. She brings a deep understanding of how to build successful community partnerships. As a lawyer with civil rights experience she will be a key player in advancing constitutional policing at CPD. The team will be responsible for reviewing CDP progress with recruitment, hiring and promotion, training and supervision, and the implementation of officer wellness programs. Officer recruitment monitoring will address the effectiveness of diversity efforts as well as the fairness and transparency of supervisor promotions. This team will also review CDP progress in improving the Field Training Program, annual in-service training and supervisor training and ratios. Finally, this team will assure that CDP meets the requirements related to destigmatizing officer wellness programs, developing and implementing a comprehensive suicide prevention initiative, and growing the number of licensed mental health professional staff from three to at least 10. Additional team members include:

- **Dr. Karen L. Amendola** is Police Foundation Chief Behavioral Scientist and holds a Ph.D. in Industrial and Organizational Psychology. She is a subject matter expert on officer safety and wellness with over two decades of experience in public safety research, testing, training, technology, and assessment. With the PF for over 20 years, she was the principal investigator for the widely cited ‘Police Shift Length Experiment.’ Dr. Amendola was Associate Editor for Psychology and Law for the ten-volume Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice published by Springer Verlag, New York (2014).

- **Dr. Joan Sweeney**, subject matter expert on Organizational Development and Strategic Planning will support this team in identifying the linkages between training and practice in the field and will help CPD with efforts to understand the organizational challenges to destigmatizing officer willingness to access wellness programs.

- **Melissa Reuland**, subject matter expert for Crisis Intervention and is one of the nation’s leading experts on law enforcement responses to people with mental illness and has published a recent handbook on best practice. She is currently managing a large-scale project at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine to integrate behavioral health care in primary care settings. Reuland will lead the monitoring of CDP efforts to provide crisis intervention training for all CDP officers and to provide at least eight hours of crisis intervention training every three years as well as to document and track all service calls involving individuals in crisis and adopt a demand-driven model for staffing crisis intervention-certified officers.
Special Advisors
Our team includes several outstanding special advisors who will provide tactical expertise on an as-needed basis to one or more of the Deputy Monitors and their teams.

- **Stephen Goldsmith** is Professor of Government and Director of the Innovations in American Government Program at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He is an internationally recognized expert on the use of data to drive transparency and improve civic engagement. Professor Goldsmith will provide strategic advice on interoperability of systems and best practice platforms for public dashboards and data visualizations. He previously served as Deputy Mayor of New York and Mayor of Indianapolis, where he earned a reputation as one of the country's leaders in public-private partnerships and using technology to drive operational excellence. Prior to his time as mayor, he served as the three term Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County where he advanced transparency and accountability through the use of technology and information sharing. He maintains a residence in the City of Chicago.

- **Dr. Stacy Blake-Beard,** subject matter expert on Bias-Free Policing, will provide advice on how CPD can improve interactions with diverse communities, leveraging her deep expertise on mentoring relationships and the unique challenges for women in a workforce that is increasingly diverse. Dr. Blake-Beard's research focuses on mentoring relationships and workforce diversity. She is currently the Deloitte Ellen Gabriel Chair of Women and Leadership at the Simmons College School of Management, where she teaches organizational behavior. She has given seminars for and consulted on a wide range of topics, including effectively leveraging diversity, gender and leadership, bystander awareness training, and unconscious bias.

- **Superintendent Ronal W. Serpas, (ret.), Ph.D.,** is Professor of Practice, Criminology and Justice, Loyola University. While Superintendent of Police in New Orleans, Dr. Serpas worked with the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights, the U.S. Attorney, and the FBI to investigate several Federal Criminal Civil Rights cases and other criminal violations of police officers related to Hurricane Katrina. This work included the negotiation of the New Orleans Police Department Consent Decree and early implementation of its requirements. Dr. Serpas has published articles on police accountability systems, police disciplinary systems, challenges in crime following natural disasters, implementing procedural justice and police legitimacy, and use of force.

- **Rachel Harmon** is a Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and is an expert on policing, including consent decrees and civil rights litigation. She currently serves on the National Academy of Sciences committee on proactive policing. She previously served in the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia where she investigated and prosecuted hate crime cases and cases of excessive force and sexual violence by police officers and other government officials nationwide.

Note that the brief biographical overviews of each member of our team above describe their role on the project and selected experience demonstrating their capacity to deliver in their proposed role. Our team includes individuals whose decades of experience cannot be adequately summarized in a brief bio. In consideration of the page limit, we err on the side of brevity here and refer reviewers to the resumes provided in the appendix. The chart below provides a brief overview of the range of expertise of our Independent Monitoring Team.
### Capabilities of the Independent Monitoring Team

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<th>Areas of Expertise</th>
<th>Executive Team</th>
<th>Subject Matter Experts</th>
<th>Special Advisors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation, Enforcement and Monitoring</td>
<td>Rick Braziel, Brian Maxey, Blake Norton, Dr. Daniel Isom, Ganesha Martin, Jason Johnson, Dr. Karen Amendola, Rev. Jeffrey Brown, Dr. Breanne Cave, Roland Covington, Lisa Holmes, Melissa Reuland, Darrel Stephens, Dr. Joa Sweeney, Francine Tournour, Jane Wiseman, Stephen Goldsmith, Dr. Stacy Blake-Beard, Dr. Ronal W. Serpas, Rachel Harmon</td>
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<td>Crisis Intervention</td>
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Dark blue signifies an area of expertise.

### Examples of work products

Example work products from the Police Foundation and the Independent Monitoring Team included as attachments to this proposal include the following:

- Frank Straub, Hassan Aden, Jeffrey Brown, Ben Gorban, Rodney Monroe, and Jennifer Zeunik, *Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the*


Commitment to diversity and inclusion
Our team reflects the rich diversity of the urban environment that is the City of Chicago, including experience and perspectives that span gender, racial, cultural and ethnic groups. Equally important, the diverse experience of our team shows a breadth of involvement and leadership in local and national efforts to continually advance impartial policing in diverse communities. Respect for diversity and inclusion serves as a backdrop for all of the work of the Police Foundation and our team members. Finally, several members of our team have identified as woman- or minority-owned businesses, including:
  - Ganesha Martin owns GMM Consulting, a certified small, woman and minority owned business.
  - Jane Wiseman owns the Strategic Thinking Group, a certified woman-owned business with certification from the Supplier Diversity Office of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

Accessibility of our team to the City, the CPD and the Chicago community
Our proposed Independent Monitoring Team includes esteemed subject matter experts with many demands on their time. However, in signing on to this project each has committed to prioritizing the needs of the Parties and the people of Chicago. Making a difference in the lives of the people of Chicago while supporting sustainable reform of the CPD is a legacy our team is committed to. For this reason, being available to the City, the CPD and the Chicago community to the extent necessary to assure success over the five-year span of the project is a priority. The percent of time each team member has allocated to this project is indicated in the budget narrative.

Plan to work collaboratively with the Parties in a cost-effective manner
Our proposed Independent Monitoring Team is comprised of seasoned professionals who are skilled at facilitating collaborative engagement with stakeholders. We plan to engage routinely with the Parties and provide both formal and informal channels for feedback and dialog. To achieve results in the most cost-effective manner possible, our team has two significant advantages. First, our experts have established working relationships that they will continue to cultivate throughout this engagement. Secondly, our team already has insight into the culture and current challenges at CPD owing to our recent work conducting focus groups that gathered officer opinions about the consent decree. We also employ several approaches that will help manage the overall cost of the program:
  - The PF financial team is constantly monitoring expenditure data and tracking progress of projects so that they are delivered on time and on budget. We will be vigilant in reviewing monthly status reports to assure that the project is completed as cost-effectively as possible.
• We plan to leverage subject matter experts on an as needed basis rather than placing anyone on a retainer with a guaranteed fee. We will deploy resources sufficient to deliver high quality results and no more than necessary.
• Recognizing that for sensitive, complex conversations there is no substitute for in-person meetings, we will maximize our use of telephone, email and remote communications, and when important to conduct the conversation in person, we will proactively work to minimize travel costs via hotel savings and advance planning of air travel as consistently as possible.

Qualifications

About the Police Foundation (PF)
The Police Foundation (PF) is the oldest independent, nonprofit, non-partisan organization dedicated to improving public safety in America. The PF has been engaged in conducting empirical research and delivering technical assistance on community policing and community engagement for half a century. The PF is committed to assisting departments with evaluation and continual improvement, providing analysis, training, and technical assistance. No project fits that mission more directly than helping CPD meet the requirements of the consent decree.

The Police Foundation has unequalled access to insight and talent in the law enforcement field, with a team of 30 full-time professionals as well as 78 Executive Fellows, 26 Policing Fellows and 14 Research Fellows. From this group, we have assembled a team that we believe best responds to the needs of this project. If at any time additional expertise is needed we can tap this vast network of expert researchers and practitioners. Our team members have led departments that have faced significant challenges with all of the relevant areas for oversight on this project from use of force and impartial policing to officer wellness.

The PF is responsible for much of the research that led toward a new view of policing—one emphasizing a community orientation. It was in Kansas City (1974) that the PF learned that random patrol may not be the best way to deter crime. The PF was among the first to learn that shortening police response time may have little effect on the chances of a burglar or robber being caught. It was also the PF, working jointly with the police in Houston and Newark, that began to see the advantages of foot patrol and door-to-door surveys as a way of dealing with the public’s fear of crime and disorder. PF understands that to flourish, police innovation requires an atmosphere of trust, a willingness to experiment and exchange ideas both within and outside the police structure, and a recognition of the common stake of the entire community in better police services.

Summary of Independent Monitoring Team Qualifications
The individuals on the Independent Monitoring Team have deep experience and expertise in each of the required area of qualification, as described below. Due to the page limit, we refer the evaluation team to our attachments which demonstrate the range and quality of our work products and to the resumes of our Independent Monitoring Team members.
Policing and Law Enforcement Practices. The PF has a long history of providing formal and informal feedback, technical assistance, training, and guidance to law enforcement agencies on law enforcement best practices, including community policing and engagement, use of force and force investigations, crisis intervention and de-escalation techniques, impartial policing, intake, investigation, and adjudication of complaints of officer misconduct, civilian oversight, police-youth interactions and policy development and officer and staff training, review of policies, procedures, manuals, and other administrative orders or directives and training programs related to law enforcement practices. Our subject matter experts have unparalleled experience in law enforcement, review of law enforcement operations and development of research-informed practices to address officer stress and to prevent unnecessary use of force.

Current and past PF projects involve working with police leadership and officers, government leaders and managers, community members, businesses and other locally-relevant stakeholders in a diverse range of departments across the country. Our team is skilled in managing complex stakeholder environments and providing competent and independent analysis in tense and contentious situations.

Monitoring. Our team has unparalleled experience monitoring, auditing, evaluating, assessing and reviewing the performance of law enforcement agencies through critical incident reviews, organizational assessments, and our work on collaborative reform. Our Independent Monitor’s experience as Inspector General and our Co-Monitor’s experience guiding the Seattle Police Department successfully through the consent decree process provide our team with the unique combination of the perspective of an objective outsider and an informed insider.

The Independent Monitor and Team have experience monitoring and ensuring compliance with settlement agreements, private agreements, consent decrees or court orders and management or oversight of law enforcement personnel. Our assessments are comprehensive and data-driven, resulting in action-oriented recommendations. Aligning agency programs, strategies, and tactics with evidence-based practices is the key focus. The PF specializes in making recommendations for improvement and identifying best practices to be replicated. In addition, our work providing TA to the Baltimore Police Department has provided extensive experience with working with consent decree requirements, timelines and the Court.

Communication. The PF has an outstanding Communications staff who will support the Independent Monitoring Team. Our skilled communications team members are writers, editors, web designers and social media managers. The PF is experienced in engaging the print and broadcast media, releasing reports, creating visualizations like infographics, and expanding our reach through social/non-traditional media and platforms including Twitter, Facebook, multimedia StoryMaps, and more. The Police Foundation also maintains a series of web sites for active projects underway:

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Our sophistication in reaching a wide audience, including digital natives who consume information in new ways, offers a unique benefit to the public of Chicago in understanding the progress of CPD in reaching compliance with the consent decree. Our communications team and subject matter experts are accustomed to being at the center of contentious and high-profile events and are skilled at quickly preparing and distributing accurate and timely summary information for public audiences.

**Demonstrated ability to collaborate with government entities, the City, CPD, and the State.**

The Independent Monitoring Team have all worked in intense collaborative partnerships with government agencies, including municipalities, elected officials, civilian oversight bodies, collective bargaining units, and other stakeholders interested in policing issues. As police chiefs, many of our team members have negotiating experience with collective bargaining units.

The PF often works with federal and local entities simultaneously, as when our work is funded by the federal government for the benefit of a state or local law enforcement agency. We have learned to effectively collaborate with multiple levels of government and to balance competing perspectives while pursuing and objectively reporting on facts, and believe this will be of value to the Parties in selecting a Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding CPD.

**Law and Civil Rights.** As law enforcement agency leaders, the Independent Monitoring Team has experience interpreting and executing constitutional and other legal requirements, and our executive leadership includes Co-Monitor Brian Maxey, a lawyer with significant civil rights experience. Further, our Deputy Monitor, Ganesha Martin is a lawyer with civil rights experience and monitoring experience at the Baltimore Police Department. We have experience with mediation and dispute resolution, especially mediation of police complaints.
The Independent Monitoring Team has a great deal of familiarity with federal, state and local laws related to police use of force and to the other areas of the consent decree. As former police chiefs, and as researchers, our team has knowledge and understanding of constitutional and other civil rights legal protections of the public and of officers. Our team has significant experience serving as expert witnesses and providing other types of court testimony.

**Experience working with various constituencies.** The Independent Monitoring Team has experience engaging effectively with diverse community stakeholders in large and small cities to promote active and engaged civic participation. Numerous members of our team are bilingual or have experience working with individuals with Limited English Proficiency, and our to-be hired Community Collaboration Manager will be bilingual in English and Spanish.

**Knowledge of Chicago communities.** We plan to hire a Project Director and a Community Collaboration Manager who will be based in Chicago. Our work with the CPD to assess officer opinions on the consent decree is our most recent project in the City of Chicago. Individual team members have also engaged in other projects in Chicago, including anti-violence and community building work in local neighborhoods. We seek to partner with the Coalition to assure that we have a complete picture of local experience within Chicago’s African American and Latino communities, and with the issues and challenges facing those communities.

**Project and Change Management.** The Independent Monitor and Independent Monitoring Team have led enterprise-wide organizational change efforts and will be able to navigate the organizational issues with advancing reform at the CPD. In particular, our team members have led organizational change, not only in their own police agencies, but also in police departments engaged in collaborative reform efforts (such as those in St. Louis County and North Charleston) as well as those subject to external oversight (such as Seattle and Baltimore). Our team is experienced at applying qualitative and quantitative analyses to assess progress and to develop concrete and actionable performance targets. We are experienced with assessing progress toward outcomes. Our team has led the development of effective quality improvement practices, and as police executives, have been responsible for evaluating, developing, and implementing processes for supervisors and managers to oversee accountability efforts.

Our Independent Monitor has a track record of delivering projects on time and on budget and as a leader of organizational change both as a chief and as an outside evaluator or investigator.

**Budgeting.** Many of our Independent Monitoring Team members have had distinguished careers in public service. As such, and particularly for those who have served in the role of Chief, the municipal budgeting process is well known and understood.

**Data Analysis and Information Technology.** The PF team has been at the forefront of research and assessment of the use of technology for law enforcement, including work on open data and analytics, GPS data for investigations, and aerial surveillance tools. Our team includes crime analysts familiar with the latest analytical tools and methods, as well as researchers with deep understanding of the data collection and management required for statistical analysis of law
enforcement practices. Our team includes renowned government technology expert Stephen Goldsmith who speaks internationally on the “new operating system” for government based on integration of data across systems and platforms. He will provide thought leadership for envisioning 21st century data and technology at CPD with a focus on transparency and accountability.

**Selected relevant project examples**
The examples that follow describe selected relevant experience of our team. Please refer to their resumes and to the PF web site for more complete discussion of our team qualifications.

**Projects with Local Law Enforcement Oversight and Monitoring Focus**

**Baltimore Police Department, Technical Assistance for Consent Decree Compliance**
The PF is providing technical assistance (TA) to the Baltimore Police Department (BPD) to facilitate consent decree compliance. The PF is currently providing TA in several areas, including a comprehensive staffing study, a technology resource assessment, and improved communication and engagement with the community. The goal is to improve policing and relationships with the Baltimore community, particularly those historically disenfranchised communities. To date, accomplishments include completion of a technology resource study, execution of a staffing study, providing training and peer to peer technical assistance. The PF team is assisting in developing a community policing and engagement strategy for the department as well. The development of the community engagement strategy will include developing focus group methodology, planning and executing focus groups, both internal to the police department and with community groups.

**Sacramento County Inspector General**
Independent Monitor Rick Braziel currently serves as the Sacramento County Inspector General, responsible to receive public complaints and to conduct fact finding, audits, and other inquiries pertaining to administrative or operational matters of the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. The Inspector General Office may also:

- Conduct fact finding pertaining to select allegations of Sheriff employee behavior;
- Audit investigations and conduct systemic reviews of the disciplinary system;
- Provide complainants with timely updates on the status of investigations; and
- Make recommendations for process changes to the Board of Supervisors and the public.

The Inspector General issues reports on audits and investigations quarterly and makes public the reports of investigations of officer-involved shootings which include assessment of the degree to which use of force, use of less lethal force and de-escalation align with evidence-based best practices. The most recent report on an officer involved shooting is included as an attachment to this proposal. Other reports can be found at: http://www.inspectorgeneral.saccounty.net.

**St. Louis County Police Department, Collaborative Reform Assessment/Technical Assistance**
The PF completed a collaborative reform assessment of and technical assistance for the St. Louis County (MO) Police Department. Completed shortly after the death of Michael Brown in
neighboring Ferguson (MO), the assessment resulted in a comprehensive report (included in our sample work products) with recommendations to help the department improve policies and practices that institutionalize community policing. The PF also provided follow up assistance to the department as they implemented the identified recommendations.

North Charleston Police Department Collaborative Reform Technical Assistance
The PF is completing technical assistance following an assessment of the North Charleston (SC) Police Department under the collaborative reform program. During the initial phase, PF gathered and analyzed data from the department, as well as local government, nonprofit, and community stakeholders. Data analysis included, but was not limited to, use of force, traffic and pedestrian stops, arrests, and civilian complaints. Data analysis insights are now being used to provide technical assistance for recruitment, hiring and personnel practices; training; use of force; traffic and pedestrian stops; civilian complaints, accountability and transparency; violence prevention and reduction; and strengthening of police-community relationships.

Chester, PA Collaborative Reform Community Policing Training
As part of a team led by IIR, Rick Braziel provided training for community policing to the Chester, PA Police Department. The engagement came at the request of the City and Chester Police Department to provide assistance in the areas of officer involved shootings, community policing and building trust, training and development, and data collection and crime analysis.

Independent Audit of Meridian, Mississippi Police Department
The PF served as the Independent Auditor to observe, assess, review, and report on implementation and compliance with the remedial measures outlined in the settlement agreement entered into between the U.S. Department of Justice and the City of Meridian, MS.

Projects with Law Enforcement Organizational Assessment Focus
Washington State Trooper Recruitment and Retention Study
At the request of the Washington State Joint Transportation Committee, Rick Braziel conducted the Washington State Patrol Trooper Recruitment and Retention Study (included as a sample work product). This project required interviews with current and former troopers, surveys, process mapping and evaluation, benchmarking against comparable agencies, detailed data analysis of salary and retention data, and resulted in a detailed report with recommendations to enable the Washington State Patrol to transform into a 21st century police force.

San Rafael, CA Police Department, Organizational Assessment
Rick Braziel was asked by the San Rafael, CA Police Department to conduct an organizational assessment addressing policies and procedures and the degree to which national best practices were being implemented. Recommended areas for improvement included internal communications; workload analysis; internal affairs process, including community accessibility, record keeping, investigation, and oversight; leadership training; and supervisor accountability.

\[2\] In September 2017, DOJ announced changes to the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance, which included discontinuing assessments.
Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy
The PF partnered with Vigilant Resources International to analyze crime data and propose crime-reduction strategies for the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission. The Commission was created by the Delaware legislature to address high levels of violent crime in the state’s largest city. A detailed data analysis identified hot-spots, crime trends, etc. A report with 110 recommendations was approved by the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission. The PF is currently assessing the status of the adoption of the recommendations.

Projects with Critical Incident Review and Organizational Learning Focus

Minneapolis Police Department, After-Action Assessment
This assessment focuses on the Minneapolis Police Department’s response to the protests and 4th precinct occupation following the fatal shooting of Jamar Clark in November 2015. The assessment includes analyses, document collection and review, observations, and interviews with government officials, community groups and various stakeholders. Read the assessment, *Maintaining First Amendment Rights and Public Safety in North Minneapolis: An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department’s Fourth Precinct.*

Orlando Police Department, Critical Incident Review, Pulse Nightclub Shooting
The PF conducted its after-action assessment of the law enforcement and public safety response to the Pulse nightclub attack of June 12, 2016 which injured more than 100 people and resulted in the loss of 49 lives. The assessment determined that the Orlando Police Department and their law enforcement partners responded to the attack in a manner consistent with recognized practices. Read the report, *Rescue, Response, and Resilience: An incident review of the Orlando public safety response to the attack on the Pulse nightclub.*

Kalamazoo Police Department, Critical Incident Review
This assessment focuses on the shootings of eight people on one night in February 2016, and addresses individual and multi-agency responses to the incident with recommendations to better monitor, evaluate, and support the response to such incidents. Read *Managing the Response to a Mobile Mass Shooting: A Critical Incident Review of the Kalamazoo, Michigan, Public Safety Response to the February 20, 2016 Mass Shooting Incident.*

San Bernardino Police Department, Critical Incident Review
This after-action assessment focuses on the response to the terrorist attack in San Bernardino, CA, on December 2, 2015. The report identifies lessons learned for the responding agencies’ policies, procedures, tactics, systems, culture, and relationships; and guides other agencies and first responders as they plan to respond to similar incidents. Read the technical report *Bringing Calm to Chaos: A Police Foundation Review of the San Bernardino Terrorist Attacks* and view the interactive report on the Police Foundation Critical Incident Review website.

Southern California Regional Response, Los Angeles CA, After-Action Assessment
This assessment explores the response of multiple Southern California law enforcement agencies to the attacks by a former Los Angeles Police Department officer in 2013. The assessment examines policies and practices that policing agencies should consider modifying for regional responses and large-scale incidents. Read the technical report *Police Under Attack: Southern California Law Enforcement Response to the Attacks by Christopher Dorner* and view the interactive report on the Police Foundation Critical Incident Review website.

**Stockton Police Department, After-Action Assessment**
This after-action assessment focuses on the Stockton Police Department (SPD) response to the robbery of the Bank of The West and subsequent hostage taking and vehicular pursuit in July 2014. Read the technical report “A Heist Gone Bad: A Police Foundation Critical Incident Review of the Stockton Police Response to the Bank Of The West Robbery and Hostage-Taking.”

**Projects with Research Focus**
**Opinions of Officers of the Chicago Police Department on the Upcoming Consent Decree**
The PF recently completed 13 focus groups of 170 CPD police officers as well as an anonymous officer survey to collect qualitative information from CPD officers on their perceptions of the department’s challenges and areas of change needed under the consent decree. CPD focus groups were facilitated by PF Executive Fellows, Police Chief (ret.) Darrel Stephens, and Police Chief (ret.) Daniel Isom II, Ph.D., both of whom are joining the Independent Monitoring Team.

**National Research Platform**
The National Institute of Justice (NIJ) has awarded the PF the responsibility of directing the National Law Enforcement Applied Research and Data Platform (Platform). Established in 2008, the Platform utilizes validated surveys to gather and analyze standard sets of data from law enforcement agencies and communities across the country. We intend to use the Platform’s Community-Police Interaction Survey and the Police Department Organizational Culture and Practice Survey in our work with CPD, as detailed in our Activities Section below.

**Police Data Initiative**
The PF operates the Police Data Initiative, the central clearinghouse for accessing, visualizing and analyzing local and national law enforcement and public safety open datasets. Open data promotes transparency, accountability and legitimacy in police departments, and provides an opportunity to address broader community concerns in communities served. PF staff provide technical assistance to support police departments interested in releasing open data. As part of a focus on transparency and accountability, we will leverage those assets.

**Projects with Community Focus**
**My City at Peace, Westhaven Community Building**
My City at Peace, co-founded by team member Rev. Jeffrey Brown, has contracted with Brinshore-Michaels to engage in anti-violence and community building work in the Westhaven housing development in Chicago from September 2018 through March 2019. My City at Peace builds alliances between constituencies traditionally in conflict to find peace and the end of the
era of violence. The approach is based on local relationships between the community and its police force and the ability to see local gangs as part of the solution to violence reduction.

**Research report on the value of Foot Patrol, *Engaging Communities One Step at a Time***
Nothing is more important in policing than gaining the trust of the community, particularly those most affected by crime and violence. This recent PF report provides optimism for how foot patrol can help law enforcement agencies build strong, mutually supportive relationships with their communities. The study found that foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between the police and the community while also enhancing the enforcement and problem-solving efforts of law enforcement. As one community member said, “The key to policing, no matter where you are in the country, is building relationships. It’s not rocket science.”

**Collaboration with New York University Policing Project for Community Engagement**
Police officials and community leaders know that true community engagement is more than just conversation: it means giving members of the public a voice in how they are policed. The Policing Project at NYU, the PF, and the National Urban League conducted a nationwide study of police-community engagement best practices. We found that although most police agencies are taking steps to connect with the public, much more needs to be done, and we plan to identify best practices and document them to advance the state of practice nationwide.

**Potential Conflicts of Interest or Bias**
The PF and all team members are free from both actual and apparent conflicts of interest. In the interest of full disclosure, the team has had two recent Chicago-based projects:

- PF subject matter expert Rev. Jeffrey Brown has contracted with Brinshore-Michaels, a Chicago-area developer, to engage in anti-violence and community building work in Chicago. This work involves collaboration with CPD but will be concluded before Rev. Brown’s engagement as part of the Monitoring team would begin and does not constitute a conflict of interest.
- The Police Foundation recently completed a project for the State of Illinois Office of the Attorney General which resulted in the July 2018 report, “Opinions of Officers of the Chicago Police Department on the Upcoming Consent Decree: A Report to the State of Illinois Office of the Attorney General.” This project is complete and does not constitute a conflict of interest.

**Proposed Activities and Methodology**
Our overall approach to serving as Independent Monitor is to model the professional ethics, proactive engagement and transparency in our work that we are seeking to promote at CPD. We plan to communicate early and often with the Parties, and to consistently share progress updates in a way that can be made public, at least portions not deemed law enforcement sensitive. We believe that this will advance public trust and foster greater access to information for CPD staff, which should in turn improve employee morale—issues of which we were made decisively aware during focus groups with officers. We believe our approach will further the goal of providing the public in the City of Chicago with policing that respects the individual, abides by the Constitution and results in greater safety and fairness for all.
Activities

Task 1: Developing a Monitoring Plan and submitting it to Parties for review and approval
Upon contract award, the PF will deploy our Monitor, Co-Monitor, Management Team Leader, and other key executives from the team to Chicago for a preliminary meeting with the Parties and representatives of the Coalition. This initial site visit will provide an opportunity for key members of the Independent Monitoring Team to meet with and hear from interested stakeholders so that as we develop the Monitoring Plan, it is informed by the appropriate voices. This initial meeting will help establish working relationships with the Parties and the Coalition. We will develop and agree on information-sharing protocols for both secure data and document sharing, and for the cadence of telephone and in-person status meetings. We will set the schedule for publication of updates to the public via the project web site and other media. We will discuss preliminary recommended metrics that we propose to track to monitor CPD progress in each of the categories in the Consent Decree.

As required, the Monitor will provide the Monitoring Plan to the Parties no later than 75 days after contract execution. We intend to work in a collaborative fashion with the Parties throughout this and all phases of the project.

Task 2: Reviewing and commenting on CPD policies, procedures, and training materials
Throughout the term of this project, the Independent Monitor and Independent Monitoring Team, in collaboration with Police Foundation Policy Analysts, will collect, review and comment on CPD policies, procedures, and training materials to determine if they are aligned with the requirements of the consent decree and with best practices in law enforcement. The Independent Monitor will be the single point of contact for the CPD team in providing materials to us for review. The Independent Monitor will determine which of our Subject Matter Experts is best suited to review each new or revised CPD policy, procedure or training document.

All reviews will be completed within the required 30-day turnaround period. Materials submitted for review will be shared in editable electronic format except as otherwise agreed. As the Monitor is not subject to the Freedom of Information Act requirements in its position as contractor to the Court, our reviews will provide the opportunity for open and frank comment that advances best practice for the CPD.

Task 3: Reviewing and approving implementation plans
The Independent Monitor and Independent Monitoring Team will review and provide comments on CPD implementation plans for each aspect of its work in satisfying the conditions of the consent decree. Once the implementation plans sufficiently address the conditions of the consent decree, the Monitor will approve them. The Independent Monitor will be the single point of contact for the CPD team in providing materials for review, and will determine which of our Subject Matter Experts will review each new or revised CPD implementation plan.

Task 4: Conducting compliance reviews and audits to determine whether the City and CPD have complied with the requirements of the Agreement
Drawing on his experience as Inspector General in Sacramento County, our Independent Monitor will lead all compliance reviews and audits. The Independent Monitoring Team will draw from its experience in Seattle, Baltimore, North Charleston and St. Louis County in reviewing and assessing compliance of the CPD with requirements of the consent decree. The purpose of our compliance reviews and audits will be to determine whether the City and CPD have substantially complied with the requirements of the consent decree, with compliance defined as “that the City and CPD: (a) have incorporated the requirement into policy; (b) have trained all relevant personnel as necessary to fulfill their responsibilities pursuant to the requirement; and (c) are carrying out the requirement in actual practice.”

Using best practice academic and practitioner resources, as well as data collected, documents reviewed, and direct observation of CPD operations, the Independent Monitoring Team will assess compliance with each of the areas of the consent decree. Compliance reviews will be completed in a fair manner with reliable means and methods. We will use sampling and compilation data based on standard and reliable methodologies under the direction of our statistical and sampling research experts. For all reviews, we will share our sampling methodology in advance with the Parties, including the schedule, focus areas and criteria.

We anticipate that to complete our reviews, we will request and collect documentation, materials, and data, to include: policies and procedures, training curricula and documentation, traffic and pedestrian stop and field contact data, use of force data, incident and internal affairs complaint investigation processes and records, communication protocols and practices related to the implementation of community and impartial policing, organizational strategies and plans, hiring and recruitment data, training materials and schedules and participation data along with any participant feedback on training particularly for crisis intervention training, promotional policies and data, budget documents, internal directives, job descriptions, program brochures or documents, minutes and reports from community meetings, officer wellness program information and program usage statistics, and other relevant documentation from CPD.

We anticipate performing direct observations of CPD operations, including observing CPD trainings, interactions with community members during regular ride-alongs, and interactions between CPD school resource officers (SROs) and students, observation of day-to-day workflow, observation of departmental use of data, and observation of how CPD staff interact with members of the community and the local media. Independent Monitoring Team members will also observe command staff meetings and roll call sessions, as well as a sampling of other internal meetings in an effort to identify the translation of policies into everyday practice and to better understand the internal CPD culture.

**Task 5: Conducting representative and comprehensive community surveys**

Leveraging existing surveys, tools and methods, within the first 180 days of the agreement, our team will conduct a survey of community perceptions of, and satisfaction with, CPD. We will share the survey methodology with the Parties for review in advance of administering the survey. The methodology will describe the multi-tiered channels used (mail, email, social media, telephone, etc.) for gathering community input and the schedule for collecting, analyzing and
publishing the data insights. The methodology will address the challenges of receiving adequate survey response to achieve a representative sample of Chicago residents, and will identify outreach strategies that will assure responses are received in sufficient number from groups of individuals less likely to respond to government surveys (individuals with limited English proficiency, individuals whose lack of respect for CPD may impede their participation, individuals with a mistrust of government, those with limited access to technology, etc.).

Surveys will be conducted in English and in Spanish, and in other languages if agreed by Monitor and the Parties. Our Chicago-based Community Collaboration Manager will work with the Coalition to assure that individuals and groups typically underrepresented in surveys are heard from in this process. We plan to hire for this position someone who is bilingual in English and Spanish, and who will be responsible for coordinating with our statistical, survey, and sampling experts to assure responses from across all communities in the City of Chicago.

The data is collected for the purpose of shedding light on the degree to which the conditions of the consent decree are being met. As such, we will share data so that the overall insights are clear, but personally identifiable information is inaccessible to safeguard officer privacy.

Per the consent decree, the survey will examine perceptions of “overall police services, trustworthiness, community engagement, effectiveness, responsiveness, handling of misconduct complaints and investigations, and interactions with members of the Chicago community, including interactions with individuals who are people of color, LGBTQI, in crisis, youth, members of religious minorities, or have disabilities.”

Our survey design process begins from a large base of experience. We will begin by reviewing existing survey data regarding citizen perceptions of police, police-community relations, or police-citizen interaction (including survey data collected through the ICMA Citizen Survey, and other survey data collected by the City and by CPD). We will use the validated National Law Enforcement Applied Research and Data Platform (Platform) police-citizen interaction survey to measure the experiences of citizens with recent interactions with CPD (note that CDP has recently joined the Platform facilitating this work). As we did for our recent research project on officer opinions of the consent decree, we will augment the survey data collection via an anonymous comment form on the Monitoring website.

To complement information gathered via community surveys, we will seek input from CPD staff themselves about the organization. We will work in tandem with the existing ongoing efforts to conduct a validated online employee survey, focused primarily on community engagement topics and the experiences and practices of CPD employees. The Independent Monitoring Team will support CPD’s use of the Police Department Organizational Culture and Practice Survey, a validated Platform survey instrument, to solicit input from CPD employees regarding

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3 The Police Foundation administers the Platform under a grant from the National Institute of Justice. There is no cost for agencies that become members of the Platform community and participate in the surveys. Through the Platform, the Police Foundation has already administered multiple different types of surveys to law enforcement agencies and communities across the U.S. including community surveys and surveys internal to departments.
organizational culture and CPD practices. This survey is administered online, using an online survey tool that is secure and confidential, allowing controls that guarantee anonymity and security to ensure that each employee completes only one survey. The Platform is offered to and used by police departments across the U.S., allowing for comparisons, in various data elements, with similarly-sized departments.

Throughout the life of the project, the Independent Monitoring Team will review social media sentiment as it relates to CPD to determine if trends not discernable in the periodic surveys are present and if any improvement in public trust and confidence in CDP can be documented.

**Task 6: Preparing and filing semiannual Monitor reports**
The Independent Monitor will prepare semiannual reports on the progress of CPD in meeting the terms of the Agreement. The report will describe the work of the Independent Monitor during the reporting period and will describe each Agreement requirement assessed during the reporting period. The report will indicate which requirements have been incorporated into policy, the subject of sufficient training for all relevant CPD or City personnel, and/or carried out in actual practice. The semiannual report will also include the methodology and specific findings for each compliance review conducted. For any requirements that were reviewed or audited and found not to have been implemented, recommendations regarding the necessary steps to achieve compliance will be included. Finally, the report will provide a summary of principal challenges or concerns related to the City’s achieving full and effective compliance with this Agreement. For examples of the high-quality work products of the Independent Monitor and team, please refer to the Examples of Work Products section of this proposal.

**Task 7: Maintaining a public website for posting monitor reports and other public information**
The Police Foundation has deep technical expertise in hosting open web sites for the public and private sites for confidential information sharing for law enforcement. Our main web site (policefoundation.org) receives annual traffic of 420,000 page views and built-in surge capacity for days of particularly high traffic, such as after the release of a high-profile report. We routinely publish reports to our web site and have the capacity to respond to quick turnaround requirements for web development. We look forward to using our skills to improve the transparency and accountability of the CPD.

**Task 8: Maintaining regular communications with the Parties and convening monthly meetings with the Parties’ representatives**
The Independent Monitor will meet on a monthly basis with the Parties and will include members of the Independent Monitoring Team as needed to assure that complete information is provided to the Parties by the subject matter experts most directly engaged in the work. Meetings will be conducted in person or via teleconference as mutually agreed upon to balance the time and cost efficiency of remote communications with the candor and immediacy of in-person meetings. Based in Washington, DC and with experts spread across the country and the globe, the PF is accustomed to functioning as a virtual organization. We regularly convene meetings, collaborate on deliverables and communicate with team members across the country.
via various media including GoToMeeting and other communication tools. We are also adept at quickly deploying team members on-site to address issues as necessary in a timely manner.

**Task 9: Conducting regular meetings with community members, members of the Department, and the Department members’ bargaining representatives**

The Independent Monitor will meet on a quarterly basis with the Coalition and will include members of the Independent Monitoring Team as needed to assure that complete information is provided to interested stakeholders. The schedule for meetings with the Department and the Department members’ bargaining representatives will be established during the development of the Monitoring Plan but will be adapted as necessary as monitoring progresses. While the Chicago-based team will be available to hold on-site meetings at any time, we anticipate that remote members of the team will spend a considerable amount of time in Chicago holding meetings during the first two years of the engagement, and will gradually reduce their time onsite as CPD increases their capacity to undertake reform efforts independently.

**Task 10: Offering technical assistance and recommendations to the Parties regarding measures necessary to ensure timely full and effective compliance with the Agreement**

The Independent Monitoring Team will review each area of the consent decree, comparing observed and analyzed data about CPD to model law enforcement policies, best practices, and national standards. Any topics not covered by current written policies and procedures, areas that are insufficient or not aligned with best practices, and areas where inappropriate informal policies inhibit adherence to written policies will be identified. Recommendations for technical assistance to address these areas will be developed, based on best or promising practices. Areas of alignment with best practices will be highlighted and affirmed.

The Independent Monitoring Team will use a broad set of resources, including: The Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing; best practices and lessons learned from the law enforcement community and criminal justice research communities (including those across public and private sectors, such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), National Criminal Justice Resource Service (NCJRS), and academia); and national and international research. The PF has a long history of successful delivery of technical assistance to law enforcement and has the tools and management systems in place to track progress and assure results meet stated objectives.

Recognizing that the research⁴ on consent decrees indicates some departments fail to maintain gains after oversight ends, our intent in delivering TA to the CPD is to build capacity within the department to create sustainable change that can continue and grow even after reaching full compliance and our role as Independent Monitor is completed. For lasting change, our TA will work to ensure that the change is woven into the fabric of the department. Our organizational change specialists will specifically to address this important challenge.

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TA will be provided through PF’s extensive network of subject matter experts, including our Executive, Research and Policing Fellows programs, as well as our tailored CPD TA SME pool developed specifically for this engagement.

Methodology
The methodologies applied by the PF are all based in scholarly best practice and in years of law enforcement executive experience. The chart below describes our methodology for collecting and analyzing data for each area requested in the RFP.

| Methods for obtaining, analyzing and reporting information | The quantitative and qualitative research methods for our data collection work are described in the Activities section above. Our reporting will be both directly to the Parties on the scheduled basis, and also to the public via our Monitoring website. |
| Frequency of proposed activities | The frequency of data collection is described in the Activities section. The frequency of our reporting to the Parties and to the public is as stated in the consent decree. |
| Personnel Responsible | The personnel responsible for each task are described in the Personnel section and in the organizational chart, and described in more detail in the cost proposal. |
| Coordination with the Parties and CPD | We look forward to an open relationship of collaboration and healthy skepticism in working with the Parties and with CPD, with the goal that all are held accountable to the public and the Court for the duties assigned by the consent decree. We anticipate frequent and honest communication and will rely on the CPD for a considerable amount of support in providing necessary documentation in a timely fashion for our review and comment. |

We anticipate that to complete our reviews, we will request and collect documentation, materials, and data, to include: policies and procedures, training curricula and documentation, traffic and pedestrian stop and field contact data, use of force data, incident and internal affairs complaint investigation processes and records, communication protocols and practices, organizational strategies and plans, hiring and recruitment data, promotional policies and data, budget documents, internal directives, job descriptions, program brochures or documents, minutes and reports from community meetings, and other relevant documentation from CPD.

We anticipate performing direct observations of CPD operations, including observing CPD trainings, interactions with community members during regular ride-alongs, and interactions between CPD school resource officers (SROs) and students, observation of day-to-day workflow, observation of departmental use of data, and observation of how CPD staff interact with members of the community and the local media. Independent Monitoring Team members will also observe command staff meetings and roll call sessions, as well as a sampling of other internal meetings in an effort to identify the translation of policies into everyday practice and to better understand the internal CPD culture.

We will rely on CPD and members of the community to provide honest input to surveys and other data and information requests.

Conclusion
In summary, we believe that our team could bring to the Parties, the Court and the people of the City of Chicago independence, experience, and a strong dedication to Constitutional, fair and impartial policing reflecting research-based best practices, and that we can help the CPD become a model for 21st century policing.
Appendix A. Cost Narrative

Summary of costs
Our proposed total budget for this project is approximately $14.25 million—approximately $2.85 million annually—and includes all operating costs, labor and expenses for the Police Foundation staff and subject matters experts on the Independent Monitoring Team and their travel expenses for monitoring the progress of the Chicago Police Department in meeting the requirements of the consent decree. We have based our cost estimate on our current best guess of the level of effort required and have made certain assumptions regarding both the level of effort required and the amount of time that will need to be spent on site.

We look forward to discussion with the Court and the Parties to determine if the assumptions in our cost estimate accurately reflect the degree of engagement and oversight required to successfully achieve the requirements of the consent decree. If selected as Monitors, we will work with the Parties on development of the Monitoring Plan, and we can further refine the scope estimate and the associated cost.

Hourly billing rates
The hourly billing rates for our Independent Monitoring Team members are as follows. Police Foundation staff are billed out at the actual rate of their salary plus fringe and overhead. Our Independent Monitor, Co-Monitor, Deputy Monitors and subject matter experts are billed at an hourly rate of $200-$250 depending on their number of years of experience and their area of specialty. The consultant budget reflects a blended rate of $250.00 per hour currently.

Detailed annual budgets
The detailed annual budgets on the pages that follow provide costs for Police Foundation staff as well as for sub-consultant/contractor services, travel costs overhead, and supplies. Again, if selected as Monitor for the City of Chicago, we will closely track costs during the first year and plan to reevaluate Years 2 thru 5 cost estimates with the Parties based on spending and results achieved in the first year, as well as desired level of effort for the remaining years of monitoring.

Spreadsheet 1, Police Foundation Budget Summary, provides a five-year cost estimate (year by year) broken down by key task areas as defined by the consent decree, and subtasks.

Spreadsheet 2, Police Foundation Budget – Consultant Hours and Rates, provides a five-year cost estimate (year by year) broken down by key task areas as defined by the consent decree and assigned Monitoring Team subject matter experts’ time and cost breakdown.
Police Foundation Budget Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Year 1</th>
<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labor</strong></td>
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<td>$252,000.00</td>
<td>$244,500.00</td>
<td>$202,000.00</td>
<td>$1,340,000.00</td>
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<td>$76,292.00</td>
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<td><strong>Monitoring Plan Development/Updates</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Labor</strong></td>
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<td>$130,000.00</td>
<td>$130,000.00</td>
<td>$130,000.00</td>
<td>$130,000.00</td>
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<td><strong>Travel</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Travel</strong></td>
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<td>$-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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$14,249,693.82
### Police Foundation Budget – Consultant Hours and Rates

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<th>Year 2</th>
<th>Year 3</th>
<th>Year 4</th>
<th>Year 5</th>
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<td>$230.00</td>
<td>$61,000.00</td>
<td>$290.00</td>
<td>$155,000.00</td>
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### Consultant/Task Details

#### Police Foundation Budget

- **Police Foundation Proposal:** Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
- **Police Foundation Budget – Consultant Hours and Rates**

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<th>Hours</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Cost</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Monitoring:</strong></td>
<td>290.00</td>
<td>$61,500.00</td>
<td>$230.00</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consultant/Task</th>
<th>Hours</th>
<th>Rate</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Monitoring:</strong></td>
<td>290.00</td>
<td>$61,500.00</td>
<td>$230.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Consultant/Task Details

- **Consultant/Task:** Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
- **Police Foundation Budget:** Consultant Hours and Rates

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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
### Team member time commitments and availability for project

Below, we describe the other professional undertakings for each team member, noting the team member’s time commitments for each and the estimated percentage of time available to work on this matter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Team Member</th>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Projected Allocation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief Rick Braziel (ret.)</td>
<td>Independent Monitor</td>
<td>As the President for Rick Braziel Consulting, Inc., Rick Braziel is in a position to select, decline or delegate work and or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 95 percent of his time to being the Independent Monitor and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community, both on site and remotely. Current other consulting/work commitments include general leadership instruction and the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, involve 5 percent of his available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Maxey</td>
<td>Co-Monitor</td>
<td>As the Chief Operating Officer for the Seattle Police Department, Brian G. Maxey is in a position to select, decline or delegate consulting engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 40 percent of his time to serve as Co-Monitor and be appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments involve 0 percent of his available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blake Norton</td>
<td>Deputy Monitor for Management</td>
<td>As Senior Vice President of the Police Foundation, Blake Norton directs the team and has full control over her time. There will be no problem with her committing the amount of time required for this project to be successful. As the leader of policing reform for the Foundation this project will be among her top priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Daniel Isom II (ret.), PhD</td>
<td>Deputy Monitor for Community and Impartial Policing</td>
<td>As the Owner of Daniel Isom Consulting LLC, Daniel Isom is in a position to select or decline work and or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 20 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments with the Regional Justice Information Service, US Department of Justice, and the University of Missouri-St. Louis involve 60 percent of his available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commissioner Jason C. Johnson (ret.)</td>
<td>Deputy Monitor for Accountability, Transparency, and Data</td>
<td>As the Principal for Johnson Law LLC, Jason Johnson is in a position to select, decline or delegate work engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 30 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other work commitments involve 70 percent of his available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Ganesha Martin (ret.)</td>
<td>Deputy Monitor for Human Capital Management</td>
<td>As the Principal for GMM Consulting, Ganesha Martin is in a position to select, decline or delegate work and or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 40 percent of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments include the Cleveland Monitoring Team and various commitments with non-profits, and that requires 50 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karen Amendola, PhD</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Officer</td>
<td>As the Chief Behavioral Scientist for the Police Foundation, Dr. Karen L. Amendola is in a position to select, decline or delegate work engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 40 percent of her time to participating in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments include general leadership instruction and the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training, involve 5 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Member</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Projected Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Safety and Wellness</td>
<td>engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 40 percent or more of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other work commitments include: Research Platform (National Institute of Justice), Program Evaluation (Concerns of Police Survivors), and Assessment of Dog Shootings (National Canine Research Council) result in a combined commitment of 40 percent of her available time but the latter two will be completed in October, leaving just 10 percent committed time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rev. Jeffrey Brown</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Community Engagement</td>
<td>As the owner of Jeffrey Brown Consulting, Rev. Brown is able to select, decline or delegate work engagements. After March 2019, there would be no problem with him committing 30 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City CPD and the Chicago community. Following projects to be completed in March 2019, other work commitments involve 70 percent of available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breanne Cave, PhD</td>
<td>Senior Research Associate, Police Foundation</td>
<td>Dr. Cave is a full time employee of the Police Foundation and will have no problem allocating sufficient time to this project to assure its success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roland Corvington</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Impartial Policing</td>
<td>As the owner for NoviSpectus LLC, Roland Corvington is in a position to select, decline or delegate work and/or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 15 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments involve 85 percent of his available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Lisa Holmes (ret.)</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Police Training, Internal Affairs, Hiring, and Recruitment</td>
<td>As an independent contractor and retired police executive, Lisa Holmes is in a position to select, decline or delegate consulting engagements for herself. There would be no problem with Ms. Holmes committing the amount of time necessary to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments include serving as a Lecturer at the University of Massachusetts, Harbor Campus, which requires 35 percent of her available time during the semesters in which she is scheduled to teach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Melissa Reuland</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Crisis Intervention</td>
<td>As an independent consultant, Melissa Reuland is able to select or decline consulting engagements. There would be no problem with Ms. Reuland committing 10 percent of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting and work commitments (with Johns Hopkins and Vera Institute of Justice) involve 80 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Darrel Stephens (ret.)</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Community and Impartial Policing and Use of Force</td>
<td>As the owner of the Darrel Stephens Group LLC, Darrel Stephens is able to select, decline or delegate work and consulting engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 20 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current ongoing consulting commitments include Axon, Police Foundation and Council of State Governments involve 30 percent of his available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joan Sweeney,</td>
<td>Subject Matter</td>
<td>As the Principal and Lead Senior Consultant for Strategic Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Member</td>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Projected Allocation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD</td>
<td>Expert for Organizational Development and Strategic Planning</td>
<td>DesignWorks, Dr. Sweeney is in a position to select, decline or delegate consulting engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 25 percent of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting commitments related to leadership development and organizational change projects for the Skirball Cultural Center in Los Angeles, CA involve 45 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Francine Tournour</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Community Engagement and Accountability</td>
<td>As the Principle for FT Consulting, Francine Tournour is in a position to select, decline or delegate work and or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 35 percent of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments are nonexistent (outside of work week) and involve 0 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jane Wiseman</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Government Data Analytics</td>
<td>As the Principal of Strategic Thinking Group, Jane Wiseman is able to select, decline or delegate consulting engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 20 percent of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community both on site and remotely. Current other consulting/work commitments include supporting a network of chief data officers at Harvard University and managing innovation program grants involve 50 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stacy Blake-Beard, PhD</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Bias-Free Policing (Special Advisor)</td>
<td>As the Owner of Shukriya LLC, Dr. Stacy Blake-Beard is able to select, decline or delegate work and or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with her committing 5-10 percent her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Current other consulting/work commitments involve 90 percent of her available time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stephen Goldsmith</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Data and Technology (Special Advisor)</td>
<td>As Professor at Harvard University Stephen Goldsmith is able to select, decline or delegate work and or consulting engagements. There would be no problem with him committing 5 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. He maintains a residence in the city of Chicago and will be accessible locally when needed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superintendent Ronal W. Serpas (ret.), PhD</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Use of Force and Community and Impartial Policing (Special Advisor)</td>
<td>As the principal sole proprietor, Ronal W. Serpas, Ph.D., is in a position to select, decline or delegate consulting engagements. There would be no problem with me committing 20 percent of his time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community. Dr. Serpas is currently a tenured faculty member at Loyola University New Orleans and is allowed to consult under the rules of the University and this commitment would be consistent with those rules.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rachel Harmon</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert for Use of Force and Impartial Policing (Special Advisor)</td>
<td>As the F.D.G. Ribble Professor of Law at the University of Virginia Law School, and as a private consultant, Rachel Harmon is in a position to select, decline or delegate work and consulting engagements. There would be no problem with her committing up to 10 percent of her time to participation in the Independent Monitoring Team and being appropriately accessible to the City, CPD and the Chicago community.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Team Member</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jennifer Zeunik</td>
<td>Director of Programs, Police Foundation</td>
<td>Jennifer Zeunik is a full time employee of the Police Foundation and will have no problem allocating sufficient time to this project to assure its success. As one of the leaders of the policing reform practice this project will be a high priority for her and as such she will make available whatever time is necessary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rebecca Benson</td>
<td>Senior Policy Analyst, Police Foundation</td>
<td>Rebecca Benson is a part time employee of the Police Foundation and will have no problem allocating sufficient time to this project to assure its success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ben Gorban</td>
<td>Policy Analyst, Police Foundation</td>
<td>Ben Gorban is a full time employee of the Police Foundation and will have no problem allocating sufficient time to this project to assure its success.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joyce Iwashita</td>
<td>Project Assistant, Police Foundation</td>
<td>Joyce Iwashita is a full time employee of the Police Foundation and will have no problem allocating sufficient time to this project to assure its success.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix B. Resumes

Resume Overview
This appendix provides resumes for members of the Police Foundation Independent Monitoring Team for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department. Resumes are grouped by category with the executive team first as listed in the proposal narrative, followed by the Subject Matter Experts, Special Advisors, and Management team as displayed in the organizational chart below.

Independent Monitoring Team Organization

Management
- Police Foundation
  - Project Director
- Community Collaboration Manager
- Jennifer Zeunik, Director of Programs
- Rebecca Benson, Senior Policy Analyst
- Ben Gorban, Policy Analyst
- Joyce Nashita, Project Assistant
- Financial and Administrative Manager

Monitor / Use of Force Team Lead
Nick Braziel, Chief (ret.)

Deputy Monitor for Management
Blake Norton

Deputy Monitor for Community Policing
Daniel Ioann, Chief (ret.), PhD

Deputy Monitor for Accountability, Transparency, and Data
Jason Johnson, Deputy Commissioner (ret.)

Deputy Monitor for Human Capital Management
Gansha Martin, Chief (ret.)

Monitoring Team Subject Matter Experts
- Karen Amendola, PhD
- Rev. Jeffrey Brown
- Breanne Cave, PhD
- Roland Corvington
- Lisa Holmes, Superintendent (ret.)
- Melissa Reuland
- Darrel Stephens, Chief (ret.)
- Joan Sweeney, PhD
- Francine Tournour
- Jane Wiseman

Monitoring Team Special Advisors
- Stephen Goldsmith
- Stacy Blake-Beard, PhD
- Ronal W. Serpas, Chief (ret.), PhD
- Rachel Harmon

Each resume begins with a brief biographical sketch describing specifically how the skills and experience of the individual will contribute to the Independent Monitoring Team. Resumes include a list of experience for members of the team relevant to the monitoring duties and responsibilities. At the end of the resumes, we provide references, including the name of the organization, contact person, title, address, e-mail address and telephone number as available. Most resumes also include a list of non-confidential work products that are similar to the reports required for this project.

As demonstrated in the resumes on the pages that follow and in the matrix below, our Independent Monitoring Team has a wide range of skills and experience to complete the assessment of the degree to which the CPD meets the terms of the consent decree.
### Capabilities of the Independent Monitoring Team

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Areas of Expertise</th>
<th>Executive Team</th>
<th>Subject Matter Experts</th>
<th>Special Advisors</th>
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<tr>
<td>Implementation, Enforcement and Monitoring</td>
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<td>Communication Among the Monitor, the Parties, and the Public</td>
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<td>Interactions with Youth</td>
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*Note: The table indicates the expertise and involvement levels of the Independent Monitoring Team.*
### Areas of Expertise

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<th>Areas of Expertise</th>
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<th>Subject Matter Experts</th>
<th>Special Advisors</th>
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<td>Rick Brazil</td>
<td>Brian Maxey</td>
<td>Dr. Joan Sweeney</td>
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<tr>
<td>School-Assigned Officers</td>
<td>Blake Norton</td>
<td>Dr. Karen Amendola</td>
<td>Dr. Styke Beatt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing Assessment and Improvement</td>
<td>Dr. Daniel Isom</td>
<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. R. W. Serpas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartial Policing</td>
<td>Dr. Ganesha Martin</td>
<td>Rev. Jeffrey Brown</td>
<td>Jane Weeann</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impartial Policing Policies and</td>
<td>Dr. Jason Johnson</td>
<td>Dr. Breanne Cave</td>
<td>Francine Tournour</td>
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<td>Stephen Goldsmith</td>
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<td>Dr. Stacy Blake-Beard</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hate Crimes</td>
<td>Blake Norton</td>
<td>Darrel Stephens</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing Assessment and Improvement</td>
<td>Dr. Blake Norton</td>
<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Rachel Harmon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability and Transparency</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Daniel Isom</td>
<td>Dr. Karen Amendola</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receiving and Tracking Misconduct</td>
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<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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<td>Dr. Karen Amendola</td>
<td>Rachel Harmon</td>
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<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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<td>Dr. Karen Amendola</td>
<td>Rachel Harmon</td>
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<td>Community Mediation of Complaints</td>
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<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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<td>Final Disciplinary Decision</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Daniel Isom</td>
<td>Dr. Karen Amendola</td>
<td>Rachel Harmon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staffing and Equipment Needs</td>
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<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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<td>Rachel Harmon</td>
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<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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<td>Lisa Holmes</td>
<td>Dr. Dr. Rona W. Serpas</td>
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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
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<th>Areas of Expertise</th>
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<th>Special Advisors</th>
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<td>Special Advisors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified CIT Officer Designation</td>
<td>Rick Brazel, Brian Maxey, Blake Norton, Dr. Daniel Isom, Ganesha Martin, Jason Johnson, Dr. Karen Amendola, Rev. Jeffrey Brown, Dr. Bremie Cavé, Roland Corvington</td>
<td>Lisa Holmes, Melissa Reuland, Darrel Stephens, Dr. Joan Sweeney, Francine Tournour, Jane Weisman, Stephen Goldsmith, Dr. Stacy Blake-Beard, Dr. Ronal W. Serpas, Rachel Harmon</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certified CIT Officer Implementation Plan and Response to Incidents</td>
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<td>CIT Coordinator</td>
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Dark blue signifies an area of expertise.
Chief Rick Braziel (ret.)
Independent Monitor
Police Foundation Executive Fellow
916-996-0614; BrazielConsulting@gmail.com

CAREER BRIEF
Our team is led by long-time Police Foundation Executive Fellow Chief Rick Braziel (ret.), who will serve as Independent Monitor for the CPD. He will draw from his extensive experience overseeing police operations as chief in Sacramento and now as the Sacramento County Inspector General, his experience as a member of a team conducting the review of riots in Ferguson, Missouri, and his insights from service on the St. Louis County Police Collaborative Reform Initiative team. His integrity, his experience with investigations, police recruitment and retention studies, and his work on analyzing officer-involved shootings all give him the depth of expertise to be an outstanding Independent Monitor for the CPD. He will be the single point of contact for the project and will be available to and accountable to the Parties in monitoring the progress of CPD in carrying out the requirements of the Consent Decree. He will lead all public events addressing the progress of the CPD in meeting the requirements of the Consent Decree.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2015-2018
Inspector General
County of Sacramento
Independently monitor and evaluate high profile or serious complaints, serve as community liaison, and prepare reports of findings to the Board of Supervisors.

2015-Present
Commissioner, Vice Chair
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training

Sacramento Police Department, 1979-2012
Police Chief, January 2008 – December 2012
Leader of an organization, with over 1,200 employees (65% sworn – 35% civilian) and a $132 million budget, responsible for working in partnership with the community to identify priorities in the delivery of police services.

Using evidence-based practices, academic research, and private sector results driven strategies refocused SPD mission including redesign of crime reduction strategies, staff deployment, and resource allocation resulting in the reduction of Part I Crime by over 21% while reducing department staffing by 28%. Strategies included collaborating with unique partners to develop creative concepts, expanding research and analysis capacity, and improving regional efforts.

Increased transparency and community involvement through the creation of a Police Advisory Committee, Youth Advisory Committee, and redesigned website including interactive features. Conducted 14 Town Hall meetings as well as an on-line survey to identify community expectations designed to realign staffing to improve service delivery.

Deputy Chief, August 2002 - January 2008
**Police Foundation Proposal:** Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department

**Office of Operation and Office of Investigations** – Chief responsible for Patrol, Problem Oriented Policing (POP), Neighborhood Crime Prevention, SWAT, Parole Intervention Team, Air Operations, Traffic, K-9, Bikes, Regional Transit Police Services, Marine, Mounted, EOD-Bomb Squad, Reserves, Court Liaison, Major Crimes, Property Crimes, Narcotics, Vice, School Resource Officers, Magnet Schools, Forensic Identification and CSI.

**Office of Technical Services** – Chief responsible for Personnel, Training, Communications, Records, Property, Fleet, Technology and Information Divisions. Directed the overhaul of the recruiting, hiring, retention, and training process for police officers and dispatchers. The “Train to Success” and “Grow Your Own” models have received national attention.

**Office of Emergency Services and Homeland Security** – Created the Sacramento Regional Office of Homeland Security with federal, regional and local law enforcement, regional fire services, emergency services and public health partners. Office Chief of a multidiscipline, multi-agency team responsible for regional planning, training, and logistics related to Homeland Security.

*Captain, April 1994 - August 2002*

*Lieutenant, August 1990 - April 1994*

*Sergeant, December 1987 - August 1990*

*Police Officer, May 1981 - December 1987*

*Community Service Officer, October 1979 - May 1981*

**Education**

2006 MA in Security Studies, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

1993 MA in Communication Studies, California State University, Sacramento

1986 BA in Communication Studies, California State University, Sacramento

**Critical Incident Assessment**


**Organizational Assessment**
Collaborative Reform Initiative – An Assessment of the St Louis County Police Department – September 2015. Assessment areas include use of force, internal affairs, fair and impartial policing, racial profiling, recruitment, retention, diversity hiring, and community engagement. [https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p316-pub.pdf](https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p316-pub.pdf)


San Rafael Police Department – Organization health, leadership, and issue identification and prioritization.

Pasadena, CA Police Department – Death in-custody review, use of force review, change of command audit and leadership development.

Chester, PA Collaborative Reform – Assist with Community Oriented Policing strategies and training.

Lodi Police Department – Issue identification and prioritization, community recruitment, technology efficiency review.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation – Comprehensive review of training with a focus on cultural change and leadership.

**INSTRUCTOR/FACILITATOR**
- Humboldt State University 2002- present- Developed curriculum and instructs in the College of Professional Studies, Leadership Studies program. Also instructs in the California Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Management Course in the following topics: leadership, communication skills, leader’s role in community policing, ethics, media relations and marketing.
- Trainer – Critical incident leadership, community engagement, organizational development, and communication.
- Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Presenter to executive level participants from multiple disciplines from across the country regarding organizational development and change.
- California Peace Officer Association. Instruct critical incidents and leadership.

**PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE**
*Commissioner, Vice Chair of the California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training*

Reference: Manny Alvarez
Executive Director
California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
860 Stillwater Road, Suite 100
West Sacramento, CA 95605
Manny.Alvarez@POST.CA.Gov
916-227-2803

Instructor, Humboldt State University

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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Reference: Carl Hansen  
Dean  
College of Extended Education and Global Engagement  
Humboldt State University  
1 Harpst Street  
Arcata, CA 95521  
Hansen@Humboldt.edu  
707-826-5877  

Consultant with the Institute for Intergovernmental Research, including as a team member for the After-Action Assessment of the Police Response in Ferguson, Missouri  
Reference: Gina Hartsfield  
President, Chief Executive Officer (CEO)  
Institute for Intergovernmental Research  
Post Office Box 12729  
Tallahassee, FL 32317  
GHartsfield@IIR.com  
850-385-0600  

Led the Police Foundation Assessment of Stockton Police Response to the Bank of the West Robbery and Hostage Taking, September 2015  
Reference: Eric Jones  
Chief of Police  
City of Stockton  
22 East Market Street  
Stockton, CA 95202  
Eric.Jones@Stocktonca.gov  
209-937-8218
Brian Maxey  
Co-Monitor  
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert  
bmaxey@belnord.org

**CAREER BRIEF**

Directly supporting Chief Braziel is Co-Monitor Brian Maxey, Chief Operating Officer of the Seattle Police Department. Co-Monitor Maxey is a policing reform expert and accomplished police executive with experience in administrative operations, extensive community and governmental engagement and collaboration, and measurable success implementing 21st Century Policing principles into practice. In his role as COO, he has focused the department on exceeding the requirements of the federal consent decree with the Department of Justice ultimately resulting in a finding of full and effective compliance. He is a seasoned attorney, with experience in hundreds of police and corrections lawsuits, employment matters, disciplinary actions, and labor negotiations.

**PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND**

October 2015 – present  
*Chief Operating Officer (Deputy Chief)*  
November 2014 – October 2015, *General Counsel (Executive)*  
Seattle Police Department, Seattle, WA

- Managed 2000 employee (1300 sworn), $321M major city police department, including budget and finance, human resources, labor relations, professional standards, public affairs, 911 communications center, information technology, administrative services, risk management, and fleet and facilities.
- Executive lead for implementation of federal consent decree, including drafting and negotiation use of force policy, crisis and de-escalation programs, and force review processes, resulting in finding of full and effective compliance for the City of Seattle.
- Worked extensively with community groups, including precinct and demographic advisory committees, Community Police Commission, and ACLU, and government partners, including FBI/ATF/Sheriff.
- Executive sponsor for development of Data Analytics Platform, an advanced business intelligence system.
- Implemented body worn camera program, including intensive public engagement.
- Led hiring and staffing study leading to 200 officer increase; leading staffing equity analysis.
- Oversaw systemic overhaul of 911 call center leading to one-minute decrease in response times.

September 2010 – October 2014  
*Supervising Assistant City Attorney, Police Action Team*  
Seattle City Attorney’s Office, Seattle, WA

- Represented City of Seattle, Seattle Police Department, and SPD Officers in 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights cases.
- Supervised team responsible for advice & litigation, including: representation interviews, written discovery, depositions, motion practice, settlement negotiations, trials, post-trial motions, and Ninth Circuit Appeals.
- Obtained jury defense verdicts in *Aresenaut v. City of Seattle*, 11 CV 1200 (JLR) (plaintiff alleged negligent use of force) and *Morales v. City of Seattle et al.*, 12 CV 2235 (JCC) (plaintiff alleged...
  • Represented the City and SPD in investigation, negotiation, and implementation of the consent decree with the Department of Justice, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §14141.

January 2007 – August 2010
Assistant Corporation Counsel, Special Federal Litigation Division
New York City Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel
  • Represented NYPD and NYDOC in 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights cases in Southern and Eastern Districts of NY in all aspects of litigation.
  • Obtained jury defense verdicts in Cooke-Harris et al. v. Police Officer Longo, 05 CV 2081 (SC) (plaintiffs alleged false arrest, excessive force, and unlawful search during exigent entry into home) and Woodrow Flemming v. Edward Velardi, et al. 02 CV 4113 (RLC) (plaintiff alleged false arrest and excessive force during arrest).

November 2003 – December 2006
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Justice Division
Washington State Office of the Attorney General
  • Represented WA DOC in 42 U.S.C. §1983 civil rights cases in Western and Eastern Districts of WA, WA Superior Courts, and Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, WA Courts of Appeals, and WA Supreme Court.
  • Obtained jury defense verdict in Mahone v. Lehman et al, 98 CV 5412 (RBL)(plaintiff alleged due process and Eighth Amendment violations when placed on modified confinement).
  • Represented Criminal Justice Training Commission (police academy) regarding employment, certification standards, public records, Public Meetings Act, and decertification proceedings for WA law enforcement.

December 2002 – August 2003
Founding Partner
The Education Media Project
  • Legal, financial, and administrative partner for development of national educational media project focused on using cable and internet to deliver educational programming for school, teacher, and student development.

October 2001 – October 2002
Executive Director
Friends of Hudson River Park
  • Managed all corporate affairs for 501(c)(3) park advocacy organization, including budgeting, fundraising, event planning, general administration, staff hiring and management, community outreach, publications, board development and legal compliance.
  • Executed policy of diverse Board of Directors to promote and monitor development of a 550-acre park along Manhattan’s West Side, and develop community-based events and forums.
  • Worked cooperatively with Hudson River Park Trust, Economic Development Corporation, New York City Planning, and other government agencies to promote park development.

March 2000 – October 2001
Director

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Citizens Jury Project

- Secured and administered $300K NY State contract to run/maintain jury Ombudservice.
- Transitioned project from Vera Institute of Justice to Fund for Modern Courts.
- Worked cooperatively with Administrative Judges, County Clerks, and Chief Jury Clerks.
- Wrote analyses of juror trends in Manhattan and Brooklyn for the Office of Court Administration.
- Managed staff, interns, database systems, and web pages.
- Coordinated annual fund-raising campaign to law firms, corporations, and directors.

September 1998 – March 2000

*Legal Program Coordinator, Citizens Jury Project / Family Court Service Project*

The Vera Institute of Justice

- Interviewed and counseled jurors on rights and procedures.
- Co-authored reports to Unified Court System on Jury Reform/ NY County Family Court.
- Administered survey of over 600 NY County Family Court users.
- Created and maintained database, web page, and data analysis systems.

**EDUCATION**

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<tr>
<td>Class 758</td>
<td>WA Peace Officer Certification, Washington State Criminal Justice Training Commission</td>
<td>2017</td>
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<td>1999</td>
<td>JD, Fordham University School of Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>MPA, Robert F. Wagner School of Public Service, New York University</td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>ABA, Occidental College</td>
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**BAR ADMISSIONS**


**SELECT PRESENTATIONS, WORKGROUPS, COLLABORATIONS**

International Association of Chiefs of Police

- 2016 Convention, “Marijuana: Up in Smoke”
- 2016 Legal Officer Section, “Crisis Intervention: Lessons from Seattle”

Major City Chiefs

- Technology Committee
- Legal Officers Committee

Police Executive Research Forum

- “An Integrated Approach to De-Escalation and Minimizing Use of Force”
- “Hiring for the 21st Century Law Enforcement Officer: Challenges, Opportunities, and Strategies for Success”

King County Regional E911 Strategic Plan Leadership Committee 2016-present

Prior Relevant Experience and Reference
Chief Operating Officer, Seattle Police Department
Reference: Kathleen O’Toole
Former Chief of Police
Seattle Police Department
Available upon request

Reference: Chief Hassan Aden (Seattle Monitoring Team)
The Aden Group
aden@theadengroup.com
571-274-7821

Reference: Lisa Daugaard
Director/Co-Chair
Public Defenders/Seattle Community Police Commission/Law Enforcement Assisted Diversion
110 Prefontaine Place South, Suite 502
Seattle, WA 98104
lisa.daugaard@defender.org
206-392-0050

Reference: Rev. Harriett Walden
Mothers for Police Accountability/Seattle Community Police Commission
P.O. Box 22886
Seattle, WA 98122

Reference: Becca Boatright
Senior Police Counsel
Seattle Police Department
610 5th Avenue
Seattle, WA 98104-1900
Rebecca.boatright@seattle.gov

Reference: Ian Warner
Counsel to the Mayor City of Seattle
600 4th Ave, 7th Floor
Seattle, WA 98104
ian.Warner@seattle.gov
Blake Norton
Deputy Monitor for Management
Police Foundation Senior Vice President
202-833-1460; bnorton@policefoundation.org

CAREER BRIEF
The Management Team is led by Police Foundation Senior Vice President Blake Norton, who currently leads all policing reform efforts for the foundation. She will serve as Deputy Monitor for Management. With significant executive experience leading the foundation, and with prior senior executive roles at the Council of State Governments and the Boston Police Department, she has the expertise, judgment and fresh perspective needed to manage the operations of the project, and to effectively marshal the resources of Police Foundation staff and subject matter experts assembled for this Monitoring Team.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
March 2014 – present
Senior Vice President
Police Foundation; Washington, DC
Oversees the daily operations of the Foundation in its mission to improve American policing and enhance the capacity of the criminal justice system to function effectively. Supervises 15 staff, to include research, program, and support staff. Is the lead architect of the Police Foundation’s recently expanded technical assistance work. Oversees the Police Foundation Executive Fellows program.

2011 - 2014
Division Director, Local Initiatives
2007 – 2011
Program Director, Law Enforcement Initiatives
Council of State Governments Justice Center; Bethesda, MD
Project management: Managed all local government–related Justice Center projects, including the Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partnership Program, Justice Reinvestment Law Enforcement efforts, Second Chance Act, local government initiatives, and the School Discipline Consensus Building Project. Advised Justice Center staff on public safety implications of project ideas and trajectories. Oversaw all project deliverables, to include management of consultants, as well as publication and webinar development. Identified new project leads, developed project proposals, and coordinated grant applications.
Technical assistance provision: Provided technical assistance to local government offices and law enforcement agencies across the country, working with on-site personnel to develop and enhance strategies to ensure the successful reentry of people returning to the community from prisons and jails. Worked closely with both law enforcement and state/local corrections agencies to provide targeted technical assistance plans to be executed at the community level.

1998 – 2007
Director, Public Affairs & Community Programs (Office of the Commissioner)
Community Relations Manager, Public Affairs (Office of the Commissioner)
1988 – 1992
Program Coordinator, Civil Rights Video Project (Bureau of Special Operations)
Boston Police Department; Boston, MA
Coalition Building, Community Partnerships, and Program Development: Developed key coalitions and built crucial relationships throughout Boston by creating and managing all community programs and systems development, partnership building, proposal writing, and program administration. Examples include:

- Boston Re-Entry/Value Based Initiative: In partnership with the Suffolk County Sheriff’s Department, Boston Community Centers, Boston Ten Point Coalition, and Ella J. Baker House, expanded Re-Entry program resources to include transitional housing, career centers, and adult educational opportunities. Between 2001 and 2007, held 40 Re-Entry Panels that supported 600 ex-offenders returning to Boston’s neighborhoods.
- Comprehensive Community Safety Initiative (CCSI): Served as the lead contact and convener for the process management initiative for the 3 tiers of the CCSI project, a public safety-driven process that strives to find new ways to coordinate services, which are already delivered to families by CCSI social service and law enforcement partners in order to determine if better management of these public resources can reduce harm to individuals, families and communities.

Corporate Partnership Creation: Oversaw all aspects of the Department’s community affairs programming, including program creation and design, management, and corporate funding. Some examples include:

- Summer of Opportunity: Co-created the “Summer of Opportunity” program. Awarded 12 consecutive years of corporate funding from John Hancock Financial Services in the amount of $1,300,000, the largest single grant given by John Hancock. Trained 480 court-involved inner city youth in job development and leadership skills, expanded employer base 75 percent to include 30 private and non-profit sites, placed 340 youth in jobs and recruited 48 participant mentors.
- Kids At Risk Scholarship Fund: Raised $500,000 working with Tea Party Concerts/Don Law Company and local area radio stations to support Boston Police youth programs that provided summer camp scholarships to over 3,000 students and $460,000 in direct grants to community-based organizations for youth programming since program inception.

Public Affairs Administration: Periodically acted as a chief spokesperson for the five core public affairs initiatives of the Department. Worked with the Media Relations Office to craft press releases and marketing plans. Researched and wrote policy statements and speeches for Chief of Staff and Police Commissioner. Managed a municipal budget of $2,000,000 and oversaw expenditures for the Office of the Police Commissioner’s six cost centers. Maintained a balanced budget for five consecutive fiscal years. Managed a direct and indirect staff of ten people. Worked with volunteers on complex tasks, and generated support among staff and volunteers.

2004 – 2007
Junior Professor/Facilitator, Distance Learning Program
Boston University Metropolitan College, Master of Criminal Justice Program; Boston, MA
Provided instruction and academic counseling to graduate students on course topics including: Criminal Justice History, Youth Crime Problems, White Collar Crime, Terrorism, and Neighborhood Policing

Education
2006 Police Executive Research Forum
Senior Management Institute for Police

1996 Master of Education in Policy, Planning, & Administration
Boston University, School of Education

1988 Bachelor of Arts: Sociology; Minor: Economics
University of Massachusetts

**SELECTED PRESENTATIONS**

2011
American Parole and Probation Spring Conference
Reentry Start To Finish, Partnering with Law Enforcement

2009
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Annual Conference
Law Enforcement Reentry Partnerships

2004
National League of Cities Annual Meeting
Investing in Youth: Reducing Juvenile Crime

2004
Department of Justice Comprehensive Approach to Reentry Conference
Role of Law Enforcement in Offender Re-Entry, Re-Integration and Successful Case Management for Offenders—Best Practices in Partnership: Boston Re-Entry Initiative

**COMMUNITY LEadership & Selected Awards**

2007-2012
Boston Police Foundation, Board of Directors

2005
Mayor’s Transitional Employment Working Group

2004-2006
Mayor’s Committee on Ex-Offender Re-Entry

2004-2005
Boston Private Industry Council / Youth Transition Funders Group

2001
Boston Private Industry Council, PIC Achievers Award

2000-2006
Mayor’s Youth Advisory Council on Workforce Development

2000-2001

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Habitat for Humanity (Boston), Marketing and Event Committee

1999
New England Women's Fund, Board of Directors

1996 – 2006
Boston University Alumni Association

1994 – 1998
Mayor Menino’s Youth Advisory Council 1994–1998

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE
The Police Foundation completed a collaborative reform assessment of the St. Louis County (MO) Police Department.
Reference: Colonel Jeff Bader
St. Louis County Police Department
7900 Forsyth Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63105
636-529-8210
JBader@stlouisco.com

The Police Foundation is providing technical assistance to the Baltimore Police Department to facilitate movement toward consent decree compliance.
Reference: Chief Michelle Bloodsworth-Wirzberger, Esq.
Baltimore Police Department
Bishop L. Robinson Senior Police Administration Building
601 East Fayette Street
Baltimore, MD 21202
michelle.wirzerberger@baltimorepolice.org
**Career Brief**

The Community and Impartial Policing Team will be led by Deputy Monitor Chief Daniel Isom (ret.), who as a police chief has developed and implemented community policing approaches and developed best practice insights, and who now studies community and impartial policing in his role as an activist academic. Chief Isom worked his way up through the ranks at the St. Louis Police Department rising to Commissioner from 2008-2013. After retirement, he was appointed to the Ferguson Commission and served as the co-chair of the commission task force on police community relations.

**Law Enforcement Background**

- **2008 - 2013**
  - Chief of Police
  - St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department; St. Louis, MO

- **2007 - 2008**
  - Special Projects Manager for the Chief of Police
  - St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

- **2004 – 2007**
  - Internal Affairs Division Commander
  - St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

- **1995 – 2003**
  - Supervision and Command
  - St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

- **1988 – 2003**
  - Patrol Officer
  - St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

**Academic Background**

- **2013 – present**
  - Professor
  - University of Missouri-St. Louis; St. Louis, MO

- **2004 – 2008**
  - Adjunct Professor
  - Harris Stowe University; St. Louis, MO

- **1995 – 2003**
  - Instructor
  - St. Louis Community College – Forest Park; St. Louis, MO

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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
2001 – 2002
*Police Academy Director*
St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

1996 – 1998
*Continuing Education Coordinator*
St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

1993 – 1995
*Police Academy Instructor*
St. Louis Police Department; St. Louis, MO

**EDUCATION**

2008 Ph.D, University of Missouri – St. Louis
Criminology and Criminal Justice

2003 Master of Arts, University of Missouri – St. Louis
Criminology and Criminal Justice

1999 Master of Arts, St. Louis University
Public Administration

1994 Bachelor of Arts, University of Missouri – St. Louis
Criminology and Criminal Justice

**ACADEMIC RESEARCH**


**SELECT PRESENTATIONS**


**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

*Undergraduate*

Urban Justice and Community Relations

Juvenile Justice

Criminology and the Criminal Justice System

Topic in Higher Education (Study Skills Course)

*Law Enforcement*

State and Constitutional Law

Cultural Diversity

Police Policy and Procedures

*Private Security*

Basic Training for Security Officers

Executive Security Officers Training

**ACADEMIC SERVICE**

- Co-Chair, University of Missouri-St. Louis Jubilee Celebration Committee
- Member, University of Missouri-St. Louis College of Arts and Science Leadership Council
- Member, St. Louis University Prison Program Board
- Past Member, St. Louis University School of Education and Public Service Advisory Board
- Past Member, St. Louis Community College Criminal Justice Program Advisory Council

**PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT**

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS

- Member, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Executives
- Member, Police Executive Research Forum
- Member, International Association of Chiefs of Police
- Past Member, Missouri Police Chief’s Association
- Past Member, Major City Chief’s Association
- Past Member, St. Louis Area Police Chief’s Association

COMMUNITY SERVICE

- Member, Salvation Army Advisory Board
- Member, Crisis Nursery Advisor Board
- Member, Incarnate Word Funding Review Committee
- Member, St. Patrick’s Center Board
- Member, Boy Scouts of America Board
- Member, Neighborhood Ownership Model Board
- Member, St. Louis Gateway Classic Sports Foundation Board
- Member, Police Standards and Training Commission
- Member, ChildCare Aware of Missouri Board
- Member, St. Louis University High School Board
- Member, Loyola Academy Middle School Board
- Member, St. Louis Initiative to Reduce Violence Board
Deputy Commissioner Jason C. Johnson (ret.)
Deputy Monitor for Transparency, Accountability and Data
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert
301-919-3666; jason@jcjohnsonlaw.com

Career Brief
The Accountability, Transparency, and Data team will be led by Deputy Monitor Jason Johnson, who last served as Deputy Police Commissioner for the Strategic Services Bureau with the Baltimore Police Department. In this role, Johnson led key reforms in professional accountability, training, recruiting, technology and data management; as well as the development of organizational policies and practices reflective of progressive, constitutional policing.

Professional Background
July 2016 – March 2018
Deputy Police Commissioner
Baltimore Police Department; Baltimore, MD
• Executive leadership of one of three main bureaus (Strategic Services) of the 8th largest municipal police department in the United States.
• Direct accountability for developing and implementing key policing practice reform throughout the organization.
• Leadership of Special Operations; Policy, Planning & Best Practices; Forensic Sciences & Evidence Management; Professional Responsibility; Data & Technology; Training & Professional Development, Recruiting & Staffing, Human Resources, and Fiscal Management.
• Served as principal agency representative in negotiation of current consent decree with the United States Department of Justice.

October 2015 – July 2016
Director of Strategic Development
Baltimore Police Department; Baltimore, MD
• Examine organizational policies and practices for conformity with professional best practices.
• Collaboratively develop and implement key organizational and operational policies.
• Oversee the organization’s discipline process, including serving as Chair of the Discipline Review Committee; representing the police commissioner in compromising or otherwise resolving disciplinary matters, and ensuring the efficient functioning of departmental administrative hearing boards.

July 2013 – September 2015
Commander
Prince George’s County Police Department, Internal Affairs Division/Major; Landover, MD
• Overall, department-wide command responsibility for internal auditing, investigation, and employee discipline.
• Led all investigations of alleged misconduct by departmental employees, including: allegations of public corruption and other criminal activity; serious uses of force, including officer-involved shootings, and; complaints of misconduct and/or policy violations.
• Provide regular briefings to agency chief executive, elected officials, oversight organizations, and legislative bodies.
• Assist in development of media messaging and strategies for high-profile use of force and criminal misconduct incidents.
• Modernized internal investigative practices, resulting in drastically reduced time to completion and higher quality investigations.
• Developed records management procedures which promote transparency, but ensure confidentiality of shielded information.
• Engaged peer internal affairs leaders in local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. Created an organizational structure for information sharing, networking, and mutual assistance. Served as this group’s first chairperson.

2010 – 2015
Agency Legislative Liaison, Collateral Duty Assignment
Prince George’s County Police Department; Landover, MD
• Act as departmental liaison to the Maryland General Assembly and the Prince George’s County Council.
• Prepare draft legislation and amendments for consideration by elected officials and staff.
• Serve on Legislative Committee, Maryland Chiefs of Police Association.
• Testify in hearings before legislative committees to provide support for agency’s position on pending legislation.

January 2012 – July 2013
Assistant Commander
Prince George’s County Police Department, Special Investigation Division/Captain; Landover, MD
• Command responsibility of Auto Theft, Fugitive Recovery, Electronic Investigation, Gang Enforcement and Intelligence, Violent Crime Recidivist, and Retail Crime units.
• Established inter-jurisdictional auto theft task force, which led to the dismantling of multiple auto theft organizations, including some operating internationally.
• Transitioned to intelligence-led gang enforcement by creating a gang-specific intelligence unit.
• Managed grant programs with annual budgets totaling over $3.5 million.

November 2009 – January 2012
Commander
Prince George’s County Police Department, Office of Legal Affairs/Captain; Landover, MD
• Provide general legal and policy advice to Chief of Police and executive command staff.
• Draft correspondence, including advice and opinion memoranda.
• Respond to requests for public information made pursuant to the Maryland Public Information Act.
• Represent the department at employee-initiated grievance and mediation proceedings.
• Act as departmental prosecutor and counsel at employee disciplinary hearings conducted pursuant to the Maryland Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights.
• Provide legal counsel to internal investigators, in connection with the conduct of disciplinary investigations.

October 2008 – November 2009
Patrol Shift Commander / Lieutenant
Prince George’s County Police Department; Landover, MD
- Direct patrol operations for the most densely-populated and ethnically-diverse patrol district in Prince George’s County.
- Manage police response to complex and rapidly-evolving emergency incidents.
- Maintain operational liaison with other departmental components and allied public safety agencies during assigned shift.

2000 – 2008
_Crisis Negotiator, Collateral Duty Assignment_
Prince George’s County Police Department, Conflict Management Team; Landover, MD
- Respond to high-risk hostage and barricade incidents; manage on-scene intelligence gathering function; brief executive commanders; communicate with barricaded individuals and hostage-takers.

October 2006 – October 2008
_Special Assignment Team Supervisor / Sergeant_
Prince George’s County Police Department; Landover, MD
- Supervise small squad of carefully selected officers, known as a Special Assignment Team.
- Develop tailored policing solutions to address particular trends in street-level criminal activity.
- Supervise the initiation and conduct of street crime investigations.

June 2005 – October 2006
_Police Academy Instructor / Corporal_
Prince George’s County Police Department; Landover, MD
- Served as principal instructor of criminal and constitutional law to approximately 300 entry-level police officer trainees.

1998 – 2005
_Patrol Officer_
Prince George’s County Police Department; Landover, MD
- Uniformed police patrol assignment. Recipient of Chief’s Award, Award of Merit, Good Conduct Award; as well as several Letters of Commendation.

TRAINING
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Quantico, VA
FBI National Academy, Session #251, December 2012

Greater Baltimore Committee, Baltimore, MD
“The LEADERship,” 2017 Civic Leadership Cohort, Commencement: November 2017

EDUCATION
2005 Juris Doctor, with honor, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

1998 Bachelor of Science, University of Maryland Baltimore County
Emergency Health Services Management, Cum Laude

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE
Deputy Police Commissioner, Baltimore Police Department, and Commander, Prince George's County Police Department, Internal Affairs Division/Major
Reference: Commissioner Kevin Davis (ret.)
Baltimore Police Department
242 W. 29th St.
Baltimore, MD 21211
Chief Ganesha Martin (ret.)
Deputy Monitor for Human Capital Management
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert

CAREER BRIEF
The Human Capital Management Team will be led by Deputy Monitor Chief Ganesha Martin (Ret.) last served as Chief for the Baltimore Police Department, leading the department’s USDOJ Compliance, Accountability, and External Affairs Division where she identified reforms and best practices that served to enhance BPD’s internal capacities and external relationships with the community. She brings to this project a deep understanding of how to build successful community partnerships. As a lawyer with civil rights experience she will be a key player in advancing constitutional policing at CPD.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2018 – present
President and CEO
GMM Consulting LLC
• Project manager for Cleveland Police Department’s Consent Decree monitoring team
• Advisor to Scott Plank, CEO & Founder at War Horse Cities on public-private partnerships
• Subject matter expert & public speaking on all matters related to DOJ Consent Decrees, police reform and accountability and community capacity & engagement.
• Advisor to national nonprofit organizations, private corporations and local governments

2015 – 2018
Baltimore Police Department, Baltimore, MD
Chief, DOJ Compliance, Accountability & External Affairs
• Direct report to the Police Commissioner
• Created a new division that exclusively interacted with DOJ Civil Rights Division attorneys during their patterns or practice investigation of the Baltimore Police Department
• Primary liaison between DOJ’s Civil Rights Division, Police Commissioner, Mayor of Baltimore, outside counsel, elected officials, corporate leaders, local college & university presidents and community leaders
• Chief negotiator of the Consent Decree between the City of Baltimore and the DOJ following the publishing of a Findings Report and during a presidential transition power at the White House that included great debate and significant media interest
• Built a Consent Decree implementation budget and successfully lobbied and testified for its approval with the Mayor, City Council President and City Council
• Constructed a training curriculum introducing best practices in the areas of crisis intervention, relationships with youth, interactions with persons suffering from mental illness, use of force, de-escalation, body-worn cameras, mobile data computer technology, hiring & recruitment, community engagement and officer wellness & early intervention
• Expanded partnerships and identified funding streams with nonprofit organizations and foundations around change management, organizational development, diversity, inclusion, equity and social justice issues

2015, Chief, Community Engagement and External Affairs
• Counseled the Police Commissioner on policy matters
• Led the Community Partnership, Media Relations, and Legislative Affairs Divisions
• Designed strategy to enhance community/police relations and outreach initiatives

2015, Director, Legislative Affairs
• Served as lead representative for the police department at the Maryland General Assembly in Annapolis during the 2015 legislative session
• Collaborated with elected officials, Mayor’s Office and Maryland Chiefs and Sheriffs to craft and manage the Public Safety legislative agenda
• Lobbied legislators regarding public safety and reform efforts
• Reviewed and edited legislation
• Prepared witnesses to testify
• Partnered with community entities to draft and pass legislation

2014-2015, Chief of Staff
• Managed the daily affairs and briefings for the Police Commissioner
• Coordinated the introduction and execution of strategic plans and organizational initiatives
• Managed Media Relations and Legislative Affairs Divisions

2014
Assistant Deputy Mayor, Public Safety and Emergency Management
Office of the Mayor for Baltimore City
• Interacted with police, fire and emergency management agency heads
• Tracked progress on strategic initiatives
• Administered a collaborative interagency crime fighting strategy

2012-2014
Special Assistant
Office of the Mayor for Baltimore City
• Performed various support and staff duties for Mayor Stephanie Rawlings-Blake
• Synchronized events between the Mayor, staff members, executive cabinet members and executive protection unit
• Communicated on behalf on behalf of the Mayor to various city agencies, constituents and community organizations
• Edited and proofread all speeches
• Created a policy & procedure manual for staffing the Mayor’s events and daily appearances

2005-2011
Litigation Associate and Managing Attorney
Fadduol, Cluff & Hardy, P.C., Albuquerque, NM
• Interviewed clients and conducted legal/factual research to determine merits of case; interviewed witnesses; made recommendations on instituting litigation; drafted and filed complaints; drafted and responded to discovery; extensive document review/analysis; conducted legal research and prepared interim prosecutorial and responsive motions; drafted memoranda in support of motions; prepared clients/witnesses for depositions; conducted and defended depositions across the country; identified and coordinated with experts; participated in ADR: mediation/arbitration; prepared for and represented clients’ interests at motion
hearings; negotiated terms of settlement/release; developed and executed a trial strategy in District and Federal Courts; enforced judgments
• Supervised, advised and managed support staff in pre-litigation procedures, including but not limited to: negotiations, drafting/editing of documents, client interaction, discovery disputes, scheduling and settlement of cases
• Coordinated HR interviewing, hiring, training, promotion and termination of employees (attorneys and support staff)
• Represented New Mexico Trial Lawyers Association’s interests annually at Committee Hearings at the State Legislature
• Acted as firm representative at various community, charity and political events, including acting as liaison between firm’s upper management and Lt. Governor’s office

Education
2004 JD, Texas Tech University School of Law
2000 BS in Journalism/Asian Studies (Business minor), Baylor University

Associations, Activities, and Awards
• International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) - Member
• Phi Beta Kappa – Member
• Governor’s Human Trafficking Task Force, Victim Services Subcommittee
• Alliance of Black Women Attorneys – Community Engagement Co-Chair
• Maryland Bar Association – Member
• Monumental Bar Association – Member
• Co-Founder, Educated Exposure Foundation – providing an opportunity for underserved children to be exposed to the global economy through classroom education and international travel
• Overcoming Poverty Together – Board Member
• Links, Inc. – Financial Secretary and National International Trends Committee Member
• Scott Hawkins Leadership – Fellow
• Leadership Maryland – Fellow
• GEM, Girls Empowerment Mission – Board Member
• Daily Record Top 40 Under 40 – 2015
• Daily Record Top 100 Women - 2017
• Baltimore Sun Top 25 Women to Watch - 2017
• IACP, Top 40 Under 40 – 2017

Prior Relevant Experience and Reference
Chief, DOJ Compliance, Accountability & External Affairs, Baltimore Police Department
Reference: Commissioner Kevin Davis (ret.)
Baltimore Police Department
242 W. 29th St.
Baltimore, MD 21211
Karen Amendola, PhD  
Subject Matter Expert for Officer Safety and Wellness  
Police Foundation Chief Behavioral Scientist  
202-721-9780; kamendola@policefoundation.org

**Career Brief**
A subject matter expert for officer safety and wellness, Karen L. Amendola has 25 years of experience in public safety research, training, testing, technology, and assessment. With the Police Foundation for over 20 years, Dr. Amendola currently serves as the Chief Behavioral Scientist, and has worked with numerous local, state, and federal agencies. Recently elected President of the Division of Experimental Criminology (DEC) of the American Society of Criminology (ASC), Dr. Amendola also served as Associate Editor for Psychology and Law for the ten-volume Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice published by Springer Verlag, New York (2014). With her colleagues, Amendola won the 2012 award for Outstanding Experimental Field Trial from the DEC. Currently, Amendola is the Principal Investigator for a study of the impact of Mindfulness Training on health, safety, and wellness of 911 personnel and a study of health, safety, and wellness among correctional officers. She is also conducting an evaluation of the programs of Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.) and is conducting research on the contributing factors to police shootings of dogs in routine encounters.

**Professional Background**
February 1993 – present  
Police Foundation; Washington DC

*Chief Behavioral Scientist*—Direct research and technical assistance projects related to applied psychology in policing. Currently serve as Principal Investigator for a study of mindfulness among police dispatchers and emergency communications operators. Also serve as Principal Investigator of a study of inmates’ and correctional officers’ health, safety, and wellness, and another evaluating the National Concerns of Police Survivors (C.O.P.S.) program.

*Chief Operating Officer*—Served as Deputy to the President for managing operations (2012 – 2013) upon the appointment of the new President in October, 2012. Served until 2013, until becoming the Chief Behavioral Scientist and beginning to work remotely from North Carolina.

*Chief Operating Officer/Director*—Division of Research, Evaluation, and Professional Services  
Oversee all functions for three area Directors including Research, Professional Services, and Crime Mapping and Problem Analysis. (2003 – 2012)

*Chief Operating Officer*—Institute for Integrity, Leadership, & Professionalism  
Established new area focused on the development of leadership. Obtained and directed several grants for research and management studies. (2000 – 2003)

*Senior Consultant* (1997 – 2000)—(non staff, see Fields Consulting Group below)  
Provided professional services including conducting a national review of management strategic plans, and developing and delivering training.

*Director*—Division of Technology/Technical Assistance (1994 – 1997)
Developed grants and contracts and directed all activities including overseeing of the development of a national human resources performance database, directing training and consulting projects, and initiating a police fellowship and student internship program.

Senior Organizational Analyst—Division of Technology/Technical Assistance. Assisted with a variety of technical assistance and training projects including a diversity training program and management studies. (1993 – 1994)

December 1997 – June 2000 (while also serving as a consultant to the Police Foundation)
Vice-President
Fields Consulting Group (FCG); Fairfax, VA

Directed all training and career development programs for this public safety testing company in its three year start-up phase. Directed projects for public safety and public sector clients, including promotional testing for the Drug Enforcement Administration’s group supervisors and Assistant Special Agents in Charge.

May 1999–June 2000 (while also serving as a consultant to the Police Foundation)
President
Professional Development Associates; Washington, DC

Presided over FCG-affiliated company designed to support training and career development needs of clients. Focused on providing preparation courses for promotional assessment centers.


Extensive experience developing training curricula, training, and public speaking, often as an invited or keynote speaker, and over 10 years of adjunct teaching experience. Also developed both a fellowship and internship program at the Police Foundation that ran them for approximately 15 years, hiring, mentoring and supervising the undergraduates as well as mid-level police personnel.

Training: Curriculum Development and Facilitation (20+ years)


Leadership; Detroit, Michigan Police Department (March, 2005). Newark, New Jersey Police and Fairfax City, Virginia Fire Departments (1995–2000). Developed and presented classes on leadership for law enforcement and fire personnel. Detroit class was several days in length.

Early Warning and Intervention Systems and Federal Consent Decrees; Preferred Training Solutions, LLC, Phoenix Police Department, (2003, 2004, 2006). Developed and presented courses on existing consent decrees and/or investigations, as well as implementation of early warning systems for managing personnel at risk.

Grant Writing Skills; Detroit, Michigan Police Department (May, 2004). One day course.


Community and Neighborhood Policing; Atlantic City, New Jersey Police Department (1995). As part of a program to provide housing incentives for officers who chose to live in the city, developed a community policing program and conducted training.

Conducting Performance Appraisals; United States Secret Service (1995). As part of Fields Consulting Group, developed course, and assisted in facilitating it.


Community Policing; Milwaukee, Wisconsin Police Department (1993 - 1994); developed scenario-based training and facilitated training with hundreds of law enforcement officers.

EDUCATION

1996 Doctor of Philosophy
Psychology, George Mason University
Specialization in Industrial/Organizational Psychology
Focus: Assessment Centers, Promotional Practices, Measurement

1991 Master of Arts
Psychology, George Mason University
Specialization Industrial/Organizational Psychology

1989 Master of Arts
Human Resources Management, Webster University
Outstanding Graduate Student Award

1984 Bachelor of Arts
Humanities, Barat College, Illinois
Minor in Management; Magna Cum Laude

SELECT PUBLICATIONS


https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11292-015-9227-x


http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/schedule-matters/

**SELECT HONORS, AWARDS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

*President; Division of Experimental Criminology, American Society of Criminology. (elected 2017).*

*2012 Outstanding Field Trial; Division of Experimental Criminology, American Society of Criminology with colleagues Weisburd, Hamilton, Jones, et al. The Shift Length Experiment.*

*Leadership in Education Award; Washington Semester Program, American University, Washington, D.C. (2007). Made numerous presentations over a period of almost ten years to classes of undergraduates from around the country who were enrolled in the program.*

**SELECT VOLUNTEER AND COMMITTEE SERVICE**

*President, Division of Experimental Criminology, American Society of Criminology (current).*

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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Appointee; Third Circuit Task Force on Eyewitness Identification (2016 – present). Included appointment to the Scientific Research Committee and Jury Instructions Sub-Committee.


Member; Research Advisory Board; The Innocence Project, New York, NY. (April 2009–present).
**CAREER BRIEF**

Rev. Jeffrey Brown, subject matter expert for community engagement has over 20 years of experience of gang mediation and intervention and developing police/community dialog. His work builds on the idea that in many urban areas, the relations between the urban, often minority community and law enforcement is poor, which inhibits effective policing and prevents the community from getting the quality of life it deserves. Rev. Brown has worked in Boston, MA, Camden, NJ, Salinas, CA, as well as with Fortune 25 corporations and the World Bank. In October of 2014, Rev. Brown traveled to Ferguson, MO to participate in and serve as a buffer between residents and the police during protests. Rev. Brown currently supports the USDOJ-funded technical assistance effort with the North Charleston Police Department.

**PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND**

March 2012 – present

*President*
National RECAP Group
  Developing anti violence business by establishing and nurturing relationships between faith/community groups, law enforcement and social service agencies.

January 2000 – present

*Owner*
Jeffrey Brown Consulting
  Worked with Peter Senge (Society of Organizational Learning) and William Isaacs (Dialogos) and Robert Hanig (RLH Consulting) to bring change management solutions to Fortune 100 companies. Leveraged experiences as a faith leader and co-founder of an anti-violence organization to help emerging, mid-level and senior managers to lead in a changing, fluid environment.

November 2009 – May 2013

*Executive Director*
Boston Ten Point Coalition
  One of the co-founders of BTPC, led a highly successful faith-based organization that teamed clergy and churches with law enforcement, the private sector and social service agencies in a multi-stakeholder collaborative effort to reduce violence in Boston.

April 1987 – November 2009

*Senior Pastor*
Union Baptist Church, Cambridge, MA
  Pastored for 22 years a vibrant, socially progressive and spiritually active Baptist Church in the Central Square area of Cambridge, MA.

2005

*“Mayor”*
Katrina Response at Camp Edwards

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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
In charge of state of Massachusetts response to Katrina crisis. Appointed by MA Gov. Mitt Romney, presided over a coordinated, 50+ Agency service provision for survivors from New Orleans, primarily from the lower 9th Ward. Provided health, social, humanitarian and relocation services for over 1100 people who came to the Center. We had a budget of 3.5 million, housing survivors at the Camp Edwards AFB on the Cape.

January 2000 – June 2004
Consulting Associate
Dialogos
Worked with William Isaacs (owner) to help Fortune 50 managers to leverage change in fluid environments. Also created a 501(c)3 for Dialogos to work with Non-Profit leaders as they faced changing environments.

Education
1990 American Church History, Harvard Divinity School
1987 Master of Divinity, Andover Newton Theological School
1984 Master of Education, Indiana University of Pennsylvania
1982 Bachelor of Arts, East Stroudsburg University of Pennsylvania

Prior Relevant Experience and Reference
The Police Foundation completed technical assistance following an assessment of the North Charleston (SC) Police Department under the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services' (COPS) collaborative reform program.
Reference: Chief Reggie Burgess
North Charleston Police Department
City of North Charleston, 2500 City Hall Lane
North Charleston, SC 29406
rburgess@northcharleston.org
843-740-2831
Breanne Cave, PhD  
Senior Research Associate  
Police Foundation  
202-833-1460; bcave@policefoundation.org

**CAREER BRIEF**  
Dr. Breanne Cave is a Senior Research Associate at the Police Foundation with over five years of experience working on research projects funded by the National Institute of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Institutes of Health. Her research focuses on police use of force, public safety, and health in crime hotspots. She has published peer-reviewed research on crime and place, policing, and security. She has a strong interest in quantitative spatial analysis, and has pursued coursework in geography and geoinformation science. While on active duty as a combat engineer officer in the Marine Corps, she worked in intelligence and security roles in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom; as a reservist, she carried out oral history research with History Division, Marine Corps University. Her research interests include policing, evidence-based policy, research translation, place-based research, terrorism and homeland security.

**PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND**  
2016 – Present  
*Senior Research Associate*  
Police Foundation; Washington, DC

2009 –2015  
*Graduate Research Assistant*  
Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy; Fairfax, VA

2012 – 2015  
*Field Historian*  
Oral History Division, Marine Corps University; Quantico, VA

2007 – 2008  
*Executive Officer*  
Marine Wing Support Squadron 274, US Marine Corps; Arlington, VA

2006 – 2007  
*Intelligence Officer*  
Marine Wing Support Squadron 271, US Marine Corps; Arlington, VA

2005 – 2006  
*Project Officer*  
College of Continuing Education, United States Marine Corps; Arlington, VA

**EDUCATION**  
2016  
PhD, Criminology, Law, and Society  
George Mason University

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Dissertation: *Policing places: The influence of street segment context on police behavior.* Degree conferral date May 2016.

2014 Graduate certificate, Geography and GeoInformation Science
George Mason University

2009 Master’s in Justice Administration
*Cum laude*
Norwich University

2005 Bachelor’s in Criminal Justice
*Summa cum laude*
Norwich University

**CURRENT PROJECTS**
Principal Investigator. *Officer-Involved Shooting Situations, Responses and Data: An Analysis of Information from Major City Police Organizations.* Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Total Funding: $254,627

Project manager for David Weisburd (PI, George Mason University, Hebrew University) Cody Telep (Co-PI, Arizona State University), and James Bueermann (Co-PI, Police Foundation). *Enhancing Procedural Justice in Hot Spots Policing: A Multi-Site Random Trial.* Laura and John Arnold Foundation. Total Funding: $1,797,680


Research partner. *The Hayward Attendance Project.* City of Hayward/ Department of Justice, Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation. Total Funding: $51,921

Principal Investigator. *The effect of a public ridesharing service on crime: A micro-geographic perspective.* Lyft Inc. Total Funding: $40,000

**PEER-REVIEWED PUBLICATIONS**


doi:10.1057/s41284-017-0092-3


**Book Chapters and Practitioner Articles**


**Research Reports**


Presentations


Cave, B. Telep, C., and Grieco, J. (2012). Rigorous evaluation research among U.S. police departments: Special cases or a representative sample? Presented at the American Society of Criminology Conference: Chicago, IL


Practitioner Tools Developed
License Plate Recognition Technology Web Portal
With Cynthia Lum, Linda Merola, and Julie Hibdon
See: http://cebcp.org/lpr/

Statistical and Coding Skills
Software programs and coding languages:
ArcGIS, Python, SAS, SPSS, Stata, SQL
Training:

Longitudinal data analysis using SAS. Statistical Horizons Course, completed April 2016.

Introduction to geoprocessing scripts using Python. ESRI instructor led training course, completed August 21, 2014.

HONORS, AWARDS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS
George Mason University
  Presidential Fellowship
  Dean’s Challenge Award
  Criminology, Law, and Society student training award
  George Mason University Team Excellence Award (for the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy)

Norwich University (graduate)
  Distinguished Norwich University Scholar
  Alumni Scholarship

Norwich University (Undergraduate)
  Norwich University Academic Scholarship
  General I.D. White Scholarship, David & Dixie Hollis Scholarship
  Community Service Scholarship
  W.E. Sweester Scholarship
  Navy/ Marine Corps ROTC Scholarship
  Colby Military Writer’s Symposium Scholarship

Professional:
  Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
  Iraq Campaign Medal (2)
  Sea Service Deployment Ribbon (2)
  National Defense Service Medal
  Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal

PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS
2014 – Present
  Member, Division of Policing, American Society of Criminology

2009 – Present
  Member, American Society of Criminology
Roland Corvington
Subject Matter Expert for Impartial Policing
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert

CAREER BRIEF
Roland Corvington serves as Chairman of the St. Louis County Board of Police Commissioners, a civilian oversight board invested with the final authority for the control and supervision of the St. Louis County Police Department. He was formerly the Special Agent in Charge of the Federal Bureau of Investigation St. Louis Division. During his 23-year career in the FBI he was responsible for investigations and the training of new recruits. While assigned to Pittsburgh, he was the incident commander at the scene where the hijacked United Flight 93 crashed during the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

APPOINTMENTS
• Commissioner & Chairman, Board of Police Commissioners, St. Louis County Police Department
• Member, Board of Advisors, Chesterfield, YMCA
• State of Missouri Medal of Valor Review Board (term ended)

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
April 2013 – Present
Director, Global Security Service
Edward Jones; Des Peres, Missouri
Responsible for the delivery of security services for a financial services firm which employs 40,000+ associates. A majority of these associates work in 13,000 branch offices located in the United States and in Canada. Presently providing leadership and oversight to the implementation of a number of initiatives to include, 1. e911, 2. Computer Aided Dispatch/Records Management, and 3. Emergency Communications.

September 2010 – Present
Assistant Vice President
Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Saint Louis University; St. Louis, MO
Responsible for the protection of Saint Louis University (SLU) personnel and property. With a student population of approximately 14,000, SLU occupies over 140 buildings located on approximately 250 acres of land in Midtown St. Louis. This includes three museums, eleven residence halls, Chaifetz Arena, School of Medicine, Simon Recreation Center, College Church, Doisy Research Center, etc. Provided leadership to a team of over 100 personnel, to include 95 armed uniformed and armed plainclothes security personnel. Also provided oversight to unarmed contract security personnel and the fire and intrusion alarm maintenance and inspection contract.
• Developed strategy to advance initiatives and aligned budget and personnel to strategy.
• Established and published department policies and procedures.
• Afforded substantial training to department personnel.
• Successfully persuaded the St. Louis Chief of Police to seek change to a state regulation to enable licensed uniformed security officers to carry double action pistols.
• Successfully persuaded SLU leadership to invest in increasing the pay of the security officers to enable hiring of better candidates; invest in new space for the department, to include a new communications center; invest in radio system upgrades; invest in networking
surveillance cameras to a central location; invest in the procurement of a new emergency notification system; invest in the procurement and installation of additional emergency phones; invest in the procurement of new patrol vehicles to replace old vehicles; invest in replacement bicycles; invest in the procurement and implementation of a law enforcement battery to screen candidates for the security officer position; invest in the procurement of personal mobility vehicles to increase visibility; invested in computer aided dispatch and computer aided record keeping; and invest in the procurement of double action pistols.

- Successfully persuaded SLU leadership to create two Assistant Director positions. Also successfully persuaded the elimination of several positions and hiring of a Technology Manager (Security and Fire Protection) and a supervisor responsible for crime prevention, equipment, and training.
- Implemented community policing to enhance interaction with residence halls.
- Increased security awareness through collaboration with student, faculty and staff organizations and collaboration with the University News and University Communications.
- Created safety and security brochures for faculty, staff and students, to include a brochure translated to Chinese mandarin.
- Improved tracking of Clery Act statistics and procured and implemented online training for those designated as Campus Security Authorities.
- Persuaded SLU leadership to approve a University policy which served to create the collateral position of Building Emergency Coordinator in each University building.
- Reduced the expenditure of overtime and the use of sick leave.
- Reduced incidents of car clotting and criminal property damage on campus.

October 2009 – September 2010
*Special Agent in Charge*

FBI; St. Louis, MO

August 2007 – October 2009
*Assistant Director in Charge*

FBI Security Division; Washington, D.C.

Security Program Manager/Chief Security Officer responsible for the protection of FBI personnel, information, operations, and facilities. The FBI occupies over 500 facilities in 50 states, and Washington, D.C. Provided leadership to full-time and part-time Security Division Program personnel located in all 50 states, and Washington D.C.

- Advanced strategic initiatives, process improvements, and aligned budget and personnel to strategy;
- Realigned resources from within the division to understaffed priority programs;
- Significantly improved customer service and implemented a customer feedback program;
- Reorganized personnel security sections to improve business processes;
- Initiated a review of the background investigation processes leading to changes that reduced cycle time without compromising investigative quality;
- Automated background investigation workflows;
- Established an applicant screening unit which resulted in cost savings of millions of dollars by ensuring that background investigations are only initiated on the most viable candidates;
- Reorganized the Information Assurance Section to enhance management accountability, improve program management and ensure greater focus on priorities;
• Developed and implemented a communications plan to ensure personnel within the division as well as external to the division are informed;
• Significantly improved productivity through improved program management, performance management, employee engagement, and contract monitoring;
• Automated security incident reporting and facility certification and accreditation;
• Improved property management as evidenced by property inventory;
• Developed and published policy to ensure standardization and compliance; and
• Significantly improved employee morale as evidenced by climate and leadership survey results.

April 2005 – August 2007
Special Agent in Charge
FBI; St. Louis, MO
Chief executive responsible for the productivity, effectiveness, efficiency, strategic emphasis, and welfare for an FBI field division comprised of Special Agents, support personnel, task force officers and contract employees located in seven offices within the Eastern Federal Judicial District of Missouri.

• Directed and accountable for all FBI investigative, national security, intelligence, security, financial, administrative, technical and automotive operations in the Eastern District of Missouri.
• Established and maintained relationships to ensure improved understanding of the FBI’s mission; managed an effective community relations campaign;
• Effectively, managed and executed a budget and the functionality and maintenance of a multi-facility plant;
• Set performance expectations for programs and devised effective program management methods to ensure accountability and productivity;
• Provided leadership by managing work towards specific mission-oriented goals and objectives;
• Effectively managed the formulation and implementation of strategies and tactics, in conjunction with the use of relevant intelligence information, to facilitate achievement of overall mission objectives and expectations of FBI Headquarters; and
• Developed the division’s continuity of operations and security program to address potential risks and to provide a safe and secure work environment for FBI personnel.

January 2004 – April 2005
Section Chief
New Agent’s Training Program, FBI Academy; Quantico, VA
Directed the New Agents Training Program and National Firearms Program. Ensured the provision of training to approximately 1,200 new Agent candidates.

• Augmented an understaffed work force with temporary duty and contractor personnel to handle the unprecedented volume of trainees;
• Retooled the new agent’s training curriculum to include greater focus on national security and intelligence;
• Reassigned personnel to improve efficiency and morale;
• Revised firearms training curriculum to improve learning and safety; and
• Refined practical applications training to afford trainees more exposure to scenarios.
February 2001 – January 2004
Assistant Special Agent in Charge (GS-15)
FBI; Pittsburgh, PA

Program manager for criminal programs in Allegheny County and the City of Pittsburgh; and criminal and national security operations in eight offices located the Western District of Pennsylvania and the Northern and Southern Federal Judicial Districts of West Virginia. Accountable for the division’s Support Services Section.

- Ensured the effective and efficient use of investigative resources to advance investigations to logical conclusion;
- Supervised investigations of employee misconduct;
- Improved efficiency of the Support Services Section which provided all administrative, financial management, automotive, and technical support for the division;
- Established and maintained relationships to ensure improved understanding of the FBI’s mission and elicit cooperation;
- Initiated an effective applicant recruitment campaign utilizing community outreach, print media, billboards, radio, and television; and
- Provided oversight of FBI resources assigned to the United Flight 93 crime scene, Shanksville, PA.

September 1996 – February 2001
Office of Inspections, Inspection Division, FBI Headquarters; Washington, D.C.
Unit Chief (GS-15)

- Derived cost savings by reducing number of personnel traveling to conduct inspections of a field office;
- Refined pre-inspection process to enable the completion of more review and analysis by inspection staff personnel at FBIHQ resulting in less time on site;
- Revised inspection audit interrogatories for relevance.

Assistant Inspector (GS-15)

- Supervised teams of GS-14 Assistant Inspectors during on site inspections of 13 field offices, Legal Attaché Moscow, and Legal Attaché Kiev;
- Reviewed programs as assigned by the Inspector in Charge, identified and recommended findings to the Inspector in Charge and made recommendations for program improvement.

Supervisory Special Agent (GS-14)
Drug Section, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI Headquarters; Washington, D.C.

- Provided program oversight and program support to regional field offices as assigned.

December 1987 – September 1996
FBI; Kansas City, MO
Supervisory Special Agent (GS-14), White Collar Crime,

- Supervised a squad of Special Agents and support personnel who investigated Financial Institution Fraud and Economic Crime matters

Supervisory Special Agent (GS-14), Safe Streets Task Force

- Supervised a squad of Agents, task force police officers, and support personnel who investigated Violent Crime and Gang matters

Special Agent (GS-10 to GS-13)

- Investigated Drug Program and Police Corruption matters

Special Agent Candidate, FBI Academy, (09/1987 – 12/1987)

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department

**EDUCATION**
1982 Master of Arts, Western Illinois University
   Political Science/Public Administration

1980 Bachelor of Science, Western Illinois University
   Law Enforcement Administration

**PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE**
*Chairman of the St. Louis County Board of Police Commissioners*
Reference: Chief Jon Belmar
St. Louis County Police
7900 Forsyth Blvd
Clayton, MO 63105
jbelmar@stlouisco.com
314-615-4260

Reference: Jeff Jensen
United States, Attorney, Eastern District of Missouri
111 S. 10th Street, 20th Floor
St. Louis, MO 63102
terri.daugherty@usdoj.gov
314-539-2200
Superintendent Lisa Holmes (ret.)
Subject Matter Expert for Police Training, Internal Affairs, Hiring and Recruitment
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert

CAREER BRIEF
Superintendent Lisa Holmes (ret.), is a subject matter expert for police training, internal affairs, hiring and recruitment and last served as Chief of the Bureau of Professional Development at the Boston Police Department, where she was responsible for all the training & educational requirements of the Boston Police Department, as well as other local police agencies that train there. She was previously the Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Professional Standards, which includes the Internal Investigations Unit, Anti-Corruption Unit, Recruit Investigation Unit and the Audit & Review Unit. Superintendent Holmes has over 33 years of experience as an officer, an investigator, and a supervisor. She is dedicated to partnering with the community through creative problem solving, strong leadership, and ensuring the highest quality police services.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND

Boston Police Department, Boston, MA
2014 – 2018
Superintendent, Bureau of Professional Development
Chief of the Bureau of Professional Development, which includes the Boston Police Academy, the Cadet Unit & the Firearms Training Unit. This Bureau is responsible for all the training and educational requirements of the Boston Police Department, as well as other local police agencies that train there.

2012 – 2014, Deputy Superintendent, Bureau of Professional Standards
Assistant Chief of the Bureau of Professional Standards, which includes the Internal Investigations Unit, Anti-Corruption Unit, Recruit Investigation Unit and the Audit & Review Unit

2009-2012, Sergeant Detective, Internal Investigations Unit
Responsible for investigation the allegation of violations of Boston Police Department Rules & Regulations by members of the Boston Police Department and recommending appropriate disciplinary actions.

2007-2009, Sergeant, Safe Street Team
Assigned to the Area B-2 District (Roxbury) and responsible for the supervision of a team of officers as part of a Community Policing Unit called the Safe Street Team. This team was responsible for patrolling the Grove Hall section of Roxbury both on foot and on mountain bikes; problem solving; addressing quality of life issues; and building relationships with the community and non-profit agencies such as Project RIGHT, the Grove Hall Community Center and Grove Hall Library. In 2009, co-created the Prom Dress Drive, to provide dresses to young women in the Grove Hall area, enabling them to attend their high school proms. This successful event is now an annual event.

1998-2007, Detective
1985-1994, Police Officer
**Education**

2012  Graduate Certificate Program in Public Safety Leadership and Management, Moakley Center for Public Management, Suffolk University

2005  MS in Counseling Psychology, Northeastern University

2002  BA in Criminal Justice, Curry College

1985  Boston Police Recruit Academy

**Teaching Experience**

2007 – present
Part-time lecturer on criminology
University of Massachusetts

2009
Part-time lecturer on Criminal Law
Roxbury Community College

**Community Involvement**

- Vice Chairperson, John A. Shelburne Community Council, Inc.
- Member, Boston Ten Point Coalition
- Volunteer, Boston Center for Youth & Families
- Volunteer, Big Sister Boston

**Honors, Awards, and Achievements**

- 2016: Received The Boston & Vicinity Club Community Service Award
- 2002: Received a Commissioner’s Commendation from then Boston Police Commissioner Paul Evans for work within the Community
- 2000: Introduced then President William Jefferson Clinton at the Orchard Gardens Housing Development
- 1997: Received the Downtown Boston Business & Professional Women’s Club Woman of Achievement Award
- 1989: Received the American Legion Certificate of Commendation
- 1988: Received the Boston Police Medal of Honor, the Boston Police Relief Association Thomas Sullivan Memorial Award and the Boston Bank Award for role during an armed robbery

**Professional Associations**

- National Association of Women Law Enforcement Executives
- National Association of Black Law Enforcement Officers
- Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)
- International Association of Chiefs of Police
- Massachusetts Association Minority Law Enforcement Officers
- Massachusetts Association of Women In Law Enforcement
PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE

Superintendent, Bureau of Professional Development, Boston Police Department
Reference: Chief Michael A. Cox
Boston Police Department
1 Schroeder Plaza
Roxbury Crossing, MA 02120
(617) 343-4500
Melissa Reuland
Subject Matter Expert for Crisis Intervention
Police Foundation Research Fellow

CAREER BRIEF
Melissa Reuland, subject matter expert for Crisis Intervention is one of the nation’s leading experts on law enforcement responses to people with mental illness and has published a recent handbook on best practice. She is currently managing a large-scale project at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry to integrate behavioral health care in primary care settings. Ms. Reuland also works with the Council of State Governments Justice Center and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) on the Bureau of Justice Administration-funded Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partnership Project. Reuland will lead the monitoring of CDP efforts to provide crisis intervention training for all CPD officers and to provide at least eight hours of crisis intervention training every three years as well as to document and track all service calls involving individuals in crisis, and adopt a demand-driven model for staffing crisis intervention-certified officers.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
December 2012 – present
Program Manager
Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry; Baltimore, MD
Manage and coordinate new health care initiative to integrate behavioral health care in primary care settings as part of the Johns Hopkins Community Health Partnership project, funded through the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI).
Responsibilities include: program design and implementation; qualitative and quantitative data collection; community collaboration facilitation; and health care provider education.

September 2004 – present
Senior Research Consultant
Police Research Consulting; Baltimore, MD
Direct, coordinate and manage national research and technical assistance projects involving police and mental health collaboration. Responsibilities include: proposal writing; research project design; qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis; community collaboration facilitation; and report writing. Projects Include:
• Council of State Governments Justice Center; Bethesda, MD
  Funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, U.S. Department of Justice.
    • Improving Law Enforcement Data Collection: Conducting research to develop practices and tools for valid and reliable data collection in law enforcement agencies engaged in improving their responses to people with mental illnesses
    • Statewide Implementation of Specialized Policing Responses (SPR) to People with Mental Illnesses: Explored and documented the structure of eight states’ implementation of SPRs throughout local and county law enforcement agencies statewide.
    • Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partnership Project. Conducted multidisciplinary research and developed suite of materials designed to support expansion of Specialized Policing Responses to people with mental illnesses. Provided on-site
technical assistance to more than ten communities funded by BJA to plan and implement SPRs.

- Detroit-Wayne County Community Mental Health Agency; Detroit, MI
  Facilitated Mental Health and Law Enforcement Task Force convened to develop a Mental Health/Police collaboration program. Presented information on national training and practice models, facilitated focus group discussion on model strengths and weaknesses, and identified ways to adapt those models to Detroit-Wayne County.

- Department of Mental Health; Washington, DC
  Facilitated Task Force convened to develop a Mental Health/Police collaboration program. Attended task force meetings and advised participants on national training and practice models, their strengths and weaknesses, and on adapting those models to Washington DC.

June 1995 – August 2004
Senior Research Associate
Police Executive Research Forum; Washington, DC
Direct, coordinate and manage national research and technical assistance projects for police. Responsibilities include: proposal writing; research design; curriculum development; qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis; budget analysis and monitoring; and report writing. Projects Include:

- Police Response to People with Mental Illnesses, funded by Disabilities Rights Section, U.S. Department of Justice. Developed model policy and training curriculum to promote law enforcement’s voluntary compliance with the ADA in providing service to people with mental illnesses. Conceptualized, scripted and co-produced a training video.

- Community Policing Partnerships for Domestic Violence: Documentation and Assessment, funded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. Collected and analyzed qualitative and quantitative data from several communities across the U.S. to identify effective police-community partnerships for responding to domestic violence.

- Explaining the Prevalence, Context, and Consequences of Dual Arrest in Intimate Partner Cases. Collected national incident-level data and data from individual departments in four states on intimate partner abuse cases. Analyzed these data to determine factors related to dual arrest and strategies for reducing unwarranted arrests.

- Kansas City Together – a Community-Police Partnership, funded by the Hall Family Foundation and the Marion Ewing Kauffman Foundation. Facilitated Kansas City Police Department discussions regarding ways to improve minority relations. Identified best practices and implemented recommendations.


December 1989 – May 1995
Research Project Coordinator
University of Maryland School of Medicine, Division of Gerontology; Baltimore, MD
Coordinated a series of large prospective epidemiological studies of recovery from hip fracture and hip replacement in the elderly. In addition, collaborated with law school
faculty to explore the relationship between domestic violence and partner notification of HIV.

September 1987 – August 1989
Research Associate
University of Michigan Medical School, Department of Postgraduate Medicine; Ann Arbor, MI
Maintained survey fieldwork for the Health Risk Factor Study and coordinated implementation of Alcohol Misuse Prevention Curriculum in 350 tenth-grade classrooms.

Volunteer Experience
2006-2012
Board of Trustees President, 2010 – 2012
Board of Trustees member at large, 2009 – 2010

Religious Exploration Council Head, 2006 - 2009
Towson Unitarian Universalist Church; 1710 Dulaney Valley Road, Lutherville, MD 21093

Patient Support Volunteer in Imaging
Participant in Avon Walk
Johns Hopkins Avon Breast Cancer Center
Johns Hopkins Outpatient Center

Education
1994 Master of Science, University of Baltimore
Criminal Justice

1987 Bachelor of Arts, The University of Michigan
Psychology

Publications


**Peer-reviewed publications**


**Book chapters and practitioner articles**


**Research Reports**


**Presentations**

- International Academy of Law and Mental Health Congress in Germany: panel presentation in 2011.
- Policing and Mental Health Symposium in Australia: keynote and plenary speaker in 2010.
- Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance Regional Meetings: panel presentations in 2007 and 2008.
- Psychiatrists in Blue: Canadian Conference on Police/Mental Health Systems: keynote speaker, 2006

**Curricula**


**Prior Relevant Experience and Reference**

*Program Manager, Johns Hopkins School of Medicine*

Reference: Dr. Quincy Samus

Associate Professor and Director of Translational Aging Research Core at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine

5200 Eastern Avenue
Baltimore MD 21224

gmiles@jhmi.edu
Chief Darrel Stephens (ret.)
Subject Matter Expert for Community and Impartial Policing and Use of Force
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert
704-814-7378; dstephens@carolina.rr.com

Career Brief
Chief Darrel Stephens (ret.) brings to this team 50 years of law enforcement experience. His career began as a police officer in Kansas City in 1968 and concluded with 22 years as a senior executive, including nine years as the Chief of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). He is committed to using data to reduce the use of force, and has been inducted into the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame and received the Sir Robert Peel Medal for Evidence Based Policing from the Police Executive Program at Cambridge University.

Professional Background
June 2008 – present
CEO
Darrel Stephens Group, LLC

October 2010 – October 2017
Executive Director
Major Cities Chiefs Association

June 2008 – June 2013
Public Safety Leadership Program Faculty
Johns Hopkins University; Baltimore, MD

September 1999 – June 2008
Chief of Police
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department; Charlotte, NC

December 1992 – September 1999
Chief of Police / City Administrator
City of St. Petersburg; St. Petersburg, FL

July 1986 – December 1992
Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum

March 1983 – July 1986
Chief of Police
Newport News Police Department; Newport News, VA

December 1979 – March 1983
Chief of Police
Largo Police Department; Largo, FL

July 1976 – December 1979
Assistant Chief of Police
Lawrence Police Department; Lawrence, KS

October 1968 – July 1976
Commander/Sergeant/Officer
Kansas City Police Department; Kansas City, MO

EDUCATION
1977 Master of Science, Central Missouri State University
Public Services Administration

1975 Bachelor of Science, University of Missouri
Administration of Justice

FBI, Leadership in Counter Terrorism - 2007-08 (Syndicate Director) Harvard University, Executive
Session - Policing - 2008 -2014

Harvard University, Executive Session - Domestic Terrorism - 2000-2003 FBI, National Executive Institute
Quantico, Virginia – 1993-1994

Harvard University, Senior State and Local Government Executives – July 1992 Harvard University,
Executive Session - Community Policing – 1986-1992

MILITARY
United States Marine Corps Reserve - Honorable Discharge - 9/73

SELECT PUBLICATIONS
Hill, Julia, Sean Whitcomb, Paul Patterson, Darrel W. Stephens, and Brian Hill. 2014. Making Officer
Community Oriented Policing Services.

Justice, Washington, DC.

Executives. Community Oriented Policing Services, Washington, DC.


Stephens, D. (2010)'Enhancing the impact of research on police practice', Police Practice and Research, 11: 2,
150—154


**SELECT PRESENTATIONS**

- Public Confidence in the Police – Major County Sheriffs Association - 2015
- MCCA National Summit on Violence – Facilitator – 2015
- MCCA Roundtable on Implementation of the President’s TF Recommendations (Facilitator) 2015
- MCCA/ICMA Strategy Summit on Police Community Relations (Facilitator)
- Council of State Governments School Discipline – 2013
- ACJS Panel – Harvard Executive Session – Police Discipline - 2011
- CSG State Corrections Directors – Policing Practices 2011
- BJA Conference – Police Leadership – 2010
- Strategic Communications: Law Enforcement Management Institute of Texas – 2010
- Leadership Development: Dallas Police Department Caruth Institute – 2009
- Police Chief Leadership Challenges: Senior Management Institute for Police - 2009
- Compstat: Maryland Chiefs Regional Meetings – 2009

**SELECT HONORS, AWARDS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

- Major Cities Chiefs Association Leadership Award - 2017
- Sir Robert Peel Medal for Evidence Based Policing - Police Executive Program at Cambridge University - 2017
- 2016 Penrith Award – National Executive Institutes Associates
- University of Missouri Kansas City Alumni Spotlight Award – 2016
- Distinguished Achievement Award - Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, GMU - 2010
- Evidence Based Policing Hall of Fame – Center for Evidence Based Crime Policy, GMU - 2010
- United States Secret Service – Director’s Honor Award – 2008
- US BATF Charlotte Division – Outstanding Leadership – 2008
- Major Cities Chiefs Association – Outstanding Leadership - 2008
- Honorary Doctorate of Laws – Central Missouri State University - 2006
• Police Executive Research Forum – Leadership Award – 2005
• Optimist International – Leadership Award - 2001
• Charlotte Center City Partners – Leadership Award - 2000
• IACP - Contributions to Law Enforcement Award – 1999
• ACJS - O. W. Wilson Award Leadership in Policing – 1996
• Florida Association of Chiefs of Police Director's Choice Award – 1996
• Police Executive Research Forum – Life Membership - 1992

**Professional Associations**

- MCCA Police Executive Leadership Institute – Co-founder and Faculty Member 2013 - present
- American Law Institute - Policing Principles of Law 2016 – present
- FBI Task Force on Use of Force Data Collection 2016-2017
- ABA Task Force on Body Worn Cameras 2015-2016
- Innocence Project – Board of Directors 2011 to 2016, Appointed to Founder’s Circle 2017
- President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Technical Advisor) – 2015
- Expert Panel on The Future of Canadian Policing Models (Member) – 2013-2014
- Ferguson Missouri – Advisor to City Manager and Police Chief on Community Engagement Strategy - 2014
- COPS/BJA Officer Safety and Wellness Group 2012-2017
- Director of National Intelligence Partner Board – 2010 – 2017
  - Study Panel Member:
    - FBI Organizational Structure Study (2006)
    - DHS Firefighters Grants Assessment (2006)
    - Citizenship and Immigration Services – Background/FBI Name checks (2008)
    - ONDCP Study (2008)
- Police Executive Research Forum 1983 – present
- Police Futurists International
- International Association of Chiefs of Police 1976 – present, Life Member 2010
- National Executive Institute Associates 1993
- Academy of Criminal Justices Sciences – Police Section
Joan Sweeney, PhD
Subject Matter Expert for Organizational Development and Strategic Planning
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert
JLS@changeconsortium.org

CAREER BRIEF
Dr. Joan Sweeney, subject matter expert for Organizational Development and Strategic Planning will support this team in identifying the linkages between training and practice in the field and will help CPD with efforts to understand the organizational challenges to destigmatizing officer willingness to access wellness programs.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
January 2015 – present
Principal / Owner and Lead Senior Consultant
Strategic Change DesignWorks, LLC, Boston, MA
As Principal & Owner, responsible for business development, fiscal management and development and management of client relationships. As Lead Senior Consultant, responsible for selecting and managing teams for client assignments; collaborating & coordinating with clients in the design, development and implementation of complex change initiatives involving systems change, change management, strategic thinking and action planning, executive and leadership development and leadership succession, and innovative applications of methodologies for organizational development and change.

October 2011 – June 2014
Co-Director
US Department of Justice COPS Office Cooperative Agreement
Teaching Police Department Initiative (TPDI)
Roger Williams University – School of Justice Studies, Bristol, RI
Responsible for development of multi-year, multi-stage collaborative partnership involving Brown University Medical School, School of Justice Studies RWU, Providence [RI] Police Department, Cambridge [MA] Police Department and Burlington [VT] Police Departments and other relevant educators and police practitioners. Led team of educators and police practitioners in conceptualizing the potential adaptation and application of the medical model of professional development to the design, development and pilot implementation of a new paradigm for transforming police leadership and police departments. Co-designed, developed and implemented pilot of 12-week Innovators Development Program for Police Leaders and co-authored curriculum for program.

July 2005 – September 2001
Executive Director and Lead Senior Consultant
Strategic Change Consortium, Inc., Cambridge, MA
Responsible for business / contract development, fiscal management and overall design and management of public and private sector consulting on change initiatives with a broad range of clients, as well as selection and management of consultant teams for projects and overall leadership of the organization.

September 1992 – June 2005
Director, Public Safety Consulting

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Boston Management Consortium, Inc., Boston, MA

Responsible for development of new public safety consulting practice, development and management of client relationships and fiscal management of consulting practice. Development of private sector / business community relationships and brokering of pro bono resources to assist with public safety and community policing initiatives. Development of conceptual frameworks to adapt and apply leading edge change methodologies to leadership / management development, training and professional development, strategic thinking, community mobilization and action planning challenges in police departments and related public safety organizations. Served as Boston Police Commissioner’s lead consultant and facilitator on organizational change initiatives, change management and complex systems change, community policing implementation and local and regional initiatives related to ethics and integrity.

**EDUCATION**

1985
PhD, University of Massachusetts / Amherst
Doctoral Dissertation: Risk Taking as a Necessity for Growth
Specializations in Organizational Psychology, Human Systems Design, Systems Intervention, Social Ecology and Community Psychology

1983
MS, University of Massachusetts / Amherst

**TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

- Bentley University - Waltham MA
- Boston Police Academy - Boston MA
- CUNY John Jay College Leadership Development Academy – New York, NY
- Curry College – Criminal Justice Studies Program - Milton, MA
- Hampshire College - Amherst MA
- Harvard Business School – Cambridge MA
- Harvard University Kennedy School of Government – Cambridge MA
- Long Term Credit Bank of Japan Research & Management Institute – Tokyo, Japan
- MIT Sloan School of Management – Cambridge MA
- New Hampshire College Graduate School of Business
- Northeastern University – Boston MA
- Regional Community Policing Institutes – Florida, New England, New Jersey
- Justice Systems Training and Research Institute – Roger Williams University – Bristol RI
- Simmons College – Boston, MA
- Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences – Shanghai, China
- University of Massachusetts / Amherst MA
- Yale University Graduate School of Organization & Management – New Haven CT

**PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE**

Reference: Commissioner Paul F. Evans (ret.)

Boston Police Department
1 Schroeder Plaza
Roxbury Crossing, MA 02120
Available upon request
Francine Tournour
Subject Matter Expert for Community Engagement and Accountability
Police Foundation
Ftournour@Cityofsacramento.org

CAREER BRIEF
Francine Tournour is the Director of the Sacramento Office of Public Safety Accountability, and has the authority to investigate misconduct complaints against officers, to evaluate the overall quality of employee performance and the authority to encourage systemic change through improved training and the implementation of new policy. She works to improve the relationship between the City’s public safety departments and the community they protect and serve, promoting trust, excellence, transparency and accountability through independent and impartial oversight of complaints related to public safety employee misconduct. Her work has resulted in improved department policies and increased police transparency. Reporting directly to the Mayor and City Council, Tournour provides independence from public safety chains of command. The Office specifically tracks and monitors high profile or serious complaint cases to conclusion, reviews completed investigations, and advises the Chief of any deficient investigations. Tournour’s office takes public complaints and ensures a thorough and fair investigation, and then has the power to recommend improvements to policies and procedures based on insights gained from the investigation. Tournour helps to keep Sacramento’s public safety agencies accountable to the communities they serve by auditing the investigations into claims of misconduct. To promote awareness of the power of her team to address misconduct and hold public safety agencies accountable, Tournour provides outreach to a wide spectrum of community groups, schools, neighborhood meetings, civic organizations, State and National professional agencies and associations.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2008 – present
Director, Office of Public Safety Accountability (OPSA)
City of Sacramento, Sacramento, CA
Receive and forward complaints of potential misconduct by the City’s public safety employees. Interview complainants to access the possible policy violation and appropriate allegation. Meet with community members that want to offer suggestions of improvement; therefore, freeing up police staff for more pressing work. Present an annual report to the City Manager, Mayor and council, outlining trends, concerns and recommendations for improvement.

2006 – 2008
Deputy Director, OPSA
City of Sacramento, Sacramento, CA
Assisted the Director with the daily complaint auditing functions. Attended community forums and neighborhood meetings to inform the public about the purpose and function of OPSA and the work of the City’s public safety departments. Continuously built and improved relationships with community leaders and public safety management. Assisted the police and fire departments with the development, updating and implementation of their policies and procedures.

2005 – 2006
Reserve Police Officer
City of Sacramento, Sacramento, CA
Worked in the recruiting unit and assisted the department in finding suitable candidates. Attended job or recruitment fairs as a representative of the department in an effort to find those candidates. Assisted the department in all phases of the hiring process.

1997 – 2005
Deputy Sheriff
Contra Costa County, Sacramento, CA
Worked in Custody Service Bureau as an intake and module deputy. Worked in Patrol Division as a patrol deputy and school resource officer. Responded to calls for service, investigated reported crimes, interviewed witnesses and suspects and prepared police reports. Gave drug prevention presentations to local elementary and middle school students.

EDUCATION
MS in Emergency Management, California State University Long Beach, Long Beach, CA
  • Emergency Response Training

BS in Criminal Justice, Madonna University, Livonia, MI

SELECT CAREER HIGHLIGHTS
• Governor Appointed Board Member for the California Board of State Community Corrections
• Established 2 Mayor and Council directed Community Police Review Commissions
• Audited over 3,500 misconduct complaints against public safety personnel including excessive force, discourtesy, and discrimination complaints
• Community liaison on over 1,200 concerns related to the City’s public safety departments
• Provided 35 recommendations to improve officer policy and procedures following critical incidents such as officer involved shootings and death in-custody incidents
• Participated in over 100 public forums explaining the City’s process for complaint resolution and transparency. These forums provided conflict resolution opportunities for the community which reduced police and community tension.
• Enhanced the relationship with the Sacramento Police Department and the grieving families of critical incident victims by starting the process of post critical incident family interaction
• Instrumental in improving policies and procedures in the City’s public safety departments through collaboration skills and long standing positive working relationships
• Enhanced ability to evaluate police response to critical incidents by receiving certification for police Crisis Intervention Training
• Continuously working with the Chiefs to provide impartial findings to strengthen integrity of police and fire departments while improving public perception
• Experienced law enforcement officer; Deputy Sheriff with Contra Costa County with clear understanding and knowledge of Title 15, Labor Laws, Federal and State Penal Codes
• Provided detailed analysis and recommendations on biased policing stops as a standing member on the City of Sacramento’s Community Racial Profiling Commission

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE
Django Sibley
Assistant Inspector General
Los Angeles Police Department
213-893-6400

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Jane Wiseman
Subject Matter Expert for Government Data Analytics
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert

CAREER BRIEF
Jane Wiseman, subject matter expert for government data analytics will provide advice on best practices for using data for management and using digital tools to engage the public and on making complex data understandable and useful to the public. She writes and speaks internationally on data-driven government and is a Senior Fellow at the Ash Center for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard Kennedy School.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2013 – present
Consultant
Institute for Excellence in Government, Boston, MA
Provide consulting services to government and non-profit clients, including:

• Urban Chief Data Officer Network. With Harvard University, created national network of urban Chief Data Officers for sharing best practices to advance data-driven government. Wrote white paper describing current environment and proposing framework for creating a new CDO organization.

• Operational Excellence. With Harvard University, created website sharing existing studies of improving operational efficiency in government. Wrote all content for narrative and for success cases.

• City Innovation Coaching. For Bloomberg Philanthropies, provide planning and coaching support to cities receiving innovation grant funding from Mayors Challenge ideas competition.

• Research and Writing. Provide technology research and writing services to Inter-American Development Bank. Topics include 311 centers as a platform for civic engagement and integration of information systems across government agencies.

2012-2013
Senior Director
Oracle Consulting, Burlington, MA
• Provided strategy consulting services to public sector clients.
• Developed market strategy and solution offerings for justice and public safety market.
• Advised Chicago Police Department, San Francisco Police Department and San Francisco District Attorney on technology implementation and predictive analytics.

2006-2011
Consultant
Strategic Thinking Group, Private Management Consulting Practice, Boston, MA
Provided management consulting services to public and private sector clients on strategy development and organizational change issues. Selected client engagements include:

• Federal agency – Conducted training for senior managers on strategic planning, measuring outcomes, leadership, and effective organizational change.
• University of Massachusetts Medical Center – Provided competitive positioning advice to consulting group. Created strategic planning toolkit for opportunity assessment and proposal development.
• IBM Global Business Services -- Provided positioning and strategy advice for business development efforts in state and local government law enforcement and public safety practice.
• Beacon Consultants Network – Conducted cost benefit analysis for reduction of carbon dioxide emissions that would result from the purchase of new technologies and switching to hybrid vehicles.
• Small business - Analyzed costs and developed cost cutting scenarios. Developed financial models and business overview for potential funders. Advised on organizational and management issues.

2003-2006
Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, Boston, MA
• Led strategy development and implementation of signature policy initiatives of the administration including homeland security preparedness and the study of racial bias in traffic stops.
• Responsible for $100 million in justice, homeland security and education grants. Led turnaround for Grant Programs Division from federal investigation to national best practice. Highlights include:
  o Tied strategy development to grantmaking for all grant programs.
  o Created Research Division for statistical and policy research to drive decision-making.
  o Implemented first-ever electronic grant application process for homeland security grants.
  o With aggressive data-driven targeting of grant funds, increased seat belt usage each year.
• Developed research-based best practice approach for new anti-gang grant program. Created research partnership program to foster collaboration and to inspire innovative approaches based on data.
• Developed performance measurement framework for $1 billion agency, later adopted statewide.

1998-2003
Senior Manager
Accenture Strategic Services for Government, Wellesley, MA
• Helped United States Department of Commerce move from lowest ranked to highest ranked federal agency for performance management.
• Developed eProcurement Strategic Plan for State of Michigan. Created financial model for cross-subsidy and self-funding of projects for Accenture state government eProcurement practice.
• Performed cost-benefit analysis for Massachusetts eGovernment strategy.
• Developed Business Continuity Strategy for United States Postal Service anticipating millennium.

1995-1998
Assistant to the Director for Strategic Planning
National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC
• Wrote agency funding proposals for DNA technology, drug and family violence research.
• Created process to develop first ever agency performance measures.
• Led re-engineering project that decreased grant processing time from 350 days to 65 days.

1997
Staff Assistant
U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations
Detail assignment from U.S. Department of Justice. Provided quantitative analysis in support of $21 billion appropriations bill.

1991-1995
Manager
Price Waterhouse Office of Government Services
• Conducted cost-benefit analysis for first-ever performance audit of U. S. House of Representatives.
• Delivered technical assistance and training to economic development and housing service agencies.

1987-1989
Analyst
The First Boston Corporation, New York, NY, and Boston, MA
• Performed debt capacity analysis and developed bond repayment scenarios for public projects.
• Created innovative bond program to enable social service agencies to fund capital costs.

Education
1991 Master of Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Voted Class Marshall by peers in recognition of commitment to public service.

1987 Bachelor of Arts in Government, Smith College

Select Research and Policy Papers
• To advance data-driven government, and in response to growing trend of government chief executives naming Chief Data Officers, developed framework for organization and management of Chief Data Officer function. Wrote white paper describing current environment for chief data officers and sharing best practices from leading cities. (in the process of being translated into Russian) http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/lessons-from-leading-cdos-966.
• Developed analytical framework for how state and local government can become more data driven, laying a foundation of open data and then gradually using data more and more in everyday decision-making. http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/analytics-excellence-roadmap-866.
• Conducted research and wrote on government use of customer input to improve programs and processes: http://datasmart.ash.harvard.edu/news/article/customer-driven-government-721
• At request of Inter-American Development Bank, conducted research and documented best practices for the integration of information systems across government agencies, https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/8224.
• At request of Inter-American Development Bank, wrote about the possibilities of government innovation through a single view of the customer (in Spanish), https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/7971?locale-attribute=en
• For United States Department of Justice SMART office, prepared research summary on incidence and prevalence of sex offending, https://www.smart.gov/SOMAPI/sec1/ch1_incidence.html
• For United States Department of Justice, National Institute of Justice, created advice manual for law enforcement agencies on how to strategically manage budgets to deliver best results during challenging economic times, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/232077.pdf

SELECT PRESENTATIONS
• Plenary presentation at the biannual meeting of the National Congress of Political Scientists (Buenos Aires, August 2017).
• Delivered the keynote address to the kick-off meeting of Latin American grantees of the Inter-American Development Bank in their Data Smart government grant program (Washington DC, June 2017).
• Addressed the inaugural Conference on the Use of Evidence in Government, sharing lessons from the leading Chief Data Officers in the Civic Analytics Network (Buenos Aires, December 2016).

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE
Assistant Secretary for Strategic Planning, Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety
Reference: Susan Prosnitz
Former General Counsel, Executive Office of Public Safety
Deputy Chief Counsel for Regulations and Security Standards
Office of Chief Counsel
Transportation Security Administration
Available upon request

Detail assignment from U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations
Reference: Therese McAuliffe James, Staff, Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives (retired)
Available upon request
Stacy Blake-Beard, PhD  
Subject Matter Expert for Bias-Free Policing  
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert  
617-521-3833; stacy.blakebeard@simmons.edu

**Career Brief**

Dr. Stacy Blake-Beard, subject matter expert for Bias-Free Policing will provide advice on how CPD can improve interactions with diverse communities, leveraging her deep expertise on mentoring relationships and the unique challenges for women in a workforce that is increasingly diverse. Dr. Blake-Beard's research focuses on mentoring relationships and workforce diversity. She is currently the Deloitte Ellen Gabriel Chair of Women and Leadership at the Simmons College School of Management, where she teaches organizational behavior. She has given seminars for and consulted on a wide range of topics, including effectively leveraging diversity, implementing formal mentoring programs, gender and leadership, bystander awareness training, and unconscious bias.

**Professional Background**

2016  
*Deloitte Ellen Gabriel Chair of Women and Leadership, School of Management Research Faculty, Center for Gender in Organizations*  
Professor, School of Management  
Simmons College

1996  
*Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Education*  
Harvard University

**Education**

1996  
PhD in Organizational Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
Thesis: The Changing Face of Mentoring in Diverse Organizations

1996  
MA in Organizational Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor  
Thesis: The Effect of Participation in Upward Bound on the Occupational Aspirations of Black Youth

1989  
BS in Industrial/Organizational Psychology, University of Maryland, College Park

**Select Presentations**

Blake-Beard, S.D. “Central Questions and Evolving Answers: A Conversation on the Dilemmas and Opportunities in Mentoring Research.” Invited keynote speaker for the Compact for Faculty Diversity 22nd Institute on Teaching and Mentoring. Arlington, VA.


Blake-Beard, S.D. “Confronting Paradox: Insights from the Mentoring Experiences of Professional Indian Women.” (October, 2015). Invited keynote speaker for the University of New Mexico 8th Annual
Mentoring Conference: New Perspectives in Mentoring—A Quest for Leadership Excellent & Innovation. Albuquerque, NM.


Blake-Beard, S. D. “Mentoring Relationships: Skills for Effective Team Interactions.” (September, 2015). Speaker at the Mount Saint Mary’s University Women’s Leadership Conference, Los Angeles, CA.


Blake-Beard, S. D. “Mentoring as a Forum for Deepening Our Skills in Working across Difference.” (May, 2015). Invited speaker for the Leadership and Faculty Development Program hosted by the Harvard Medical School Office for Diversity Inclusion and Community Partnership, Boston, MA.


SELECT PUBLICATIONS


**HONORS, AWARDS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS**

- Janet Chusmir Distinguished Service Award, Gender and Diversity in Organizations Division, 2015
- Fulbright Award, 2010-2011
- Simmons School of Management Presidential Fund, 2009
- The Compact for Faculty Diversity Award for Distinguished Service, 2007 The Robert Toigo Foundation Thought Leadership Award, 2006

**SELECT PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES**

- Board of Governors Representative, Academy of Management, 2016-2019.
- Advisory Council Member, Marie Fielder Center for Democracy, Leadership and Education, Fielding Graduate University, 2015-2017.
- Member, Delta Sigma Theta Sorority National Institutional Research Task Force, 2015-2017
- Past Division Chair, Academy of Management’s Gender and Diversity in Organizations Division, 2014-2015.
• Division Chair, Academy of Management’s Gender and Diversity in Organizations Division, 2013-2014.

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE

Trains for the Senior Management Institute for Police.
Reference: Chuck Wexler
Executive Director
Police Executive Research Forum
1120 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036
202-466-7820

Provided Unconscious Bias Training as part of the Police Foundation’s technical assistance engagement with the North Charleston (SC) Police Department under the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services’ (COPS) collaborative reform program.
Reference: Chief Reggie Burgess
North Charleston Police Department
City of North Charleston, 2500 City Hall Lane
North Charleston, SC 29406
rburgess@northcharleston.org
843-740-2831
Stephen Goldsmith
Subject Matter Expert for Data and Transparency
Police Foundation Subject Matter Expert

CAREER BRIEF
Stephen Goldsmith is Professor of Government and Director of the Innovations in American Government Program at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government. He is an internationally recognized expert on the use of data to drive transparency and improve civic engagement. Professor Goldsmith will provide strategic advice on interoperability of systems and the best practice platforms for public dashboards and data visualizations. He previously served as Deputy Mayor of New York and Mayor of Indianapolis, where he earned a reputation as one of the country's leaders in public-private partnerships and using technology to drive operational excellence. Prior to mayor he served as the three term Prosecuting Attorney of Marion County where he advanced transparency and accountability through the use of technology and information sharing. He currently directs Data-Smart City Solutions, a project to highlight local government efforts to use new technologies to reshape governance. He previously edited a journal for the National Institute of Justice on applied research and served as a member of numerous boards and peer review panels for the Office of Justice Programs. He maintains a residence in the City of Chicago.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2001 – present
Daniel Paul Professor of Government
Director, Innovations in Government Program
Director, Data-Smart City Solutions
Director, Project on Municipal Innovation
Fellow in Criminal Justice & Management
Harvard Kennedy School; Cambridge, MA

2010 – 2011
Deputy Mayor for Operations
New York City; New York, New York

1992 – 1999
Mayor
City of Indianapolis; Indianapolis, IN

1979 – 1990
Prosecuting Attorney
Marion County, IN

1972 – 1978
Attorney
Private Practice

OTHER ACADEMIC APPOINTMENTS

103
Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
• Fox Leader in the School of Arts and Sciences and the Law School, University of Pennsylvania (2000)
• Fellow, Harvard Kennedy School, Program in Criminal Justice (1985-1998)
• Adjunct and Assistant Professor–Indiana University (1986-1991)

**Part-time Professional Activities (selected)**
• 2000-2009: Consultant on state and local public/private partnerships
• 1999-2000: Chief Domestic Policy Advisor, Bush for President Campaign

**Education**
- 1971 JD, with Honors, University of Michigan
  Associate Editor, University of Michigan Law Review
- 1968 AB, Wabash College
  Honorary Doctor of Laws, 1993

**Select Columns, Essays, Op-Eds**

**Select Peer-Reviewed Publications**
BOOK CHAPTERS


BOOKS


**ADVISORY BOARDS, COMMITTEES, AND AWARDS**

- What Works Cities Advisory Board (2016-Present)
- National Resource Network Advisory Board (2015- Present)
- National League of Cities University Board (2013-2014)
- The Federal 100 (Technology Leadership) Award, 2009
- Fellow, National Academy of Public Administration, 2006
- Voices for National Service, Outstanding National Service Advocacy Award, 2006
- National Academy of Public Administration, Louis Brownlow Book Award for *Governing By Network*, 2005
- Price Waterhouse Coopers, Outsourcing World Achievement Award, 2001
- The Nonprofit Times Power and Influence Top 50, 2001
- Indianapolis Business Journal, Indianapolis’ Most Influential Leader, 1999
- The Archdiocese of Indianapolis, Community Service Award, 1999
- Governing Magazine, Public Official of the Year, 1995
- Council for Urban Economic Development, President’s Award, 1995
- National Council for Public–Private Partnerships, Distinguished Leadership Award, 1993
- Citizens Against Government Waste, Taxpayers’ Hero Award, 1992

**PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS**

- Corporation for National and Community Service, (Chairman 2001-2010)
- America’s Promise: The Alliance for Youth, (Board Member, 2007-2010)
- Smith Richardson Foundation, Domestic Board of Advisors, (2006-2010)
- Fannie Mae Foundation (Board, 2003-2008)
- Homes for Working Families (Board, 20006-2008)
- National Campaign to Prevent Teen Pregnancy (Board Member 2001-2007)
- Council for Excellence in Government (Board Member, 2003-2007)
- Anacostia Waterfront Redevelopment Corporation, (Chair, 2005-2006)
- Special Advisory to President G.W. Bush on Faith and Nonprofit Initiatives (2001-2005)
- Chairman, Manhattan Institute Center for Civic Innovation, (1997-2004)
- White House Task Force on Disadvantaged Youth (2004)
- Department of Defense’s Defense Reform Group (1999)
- American Prosecutors Research Institute (Board Member, 1984; Founding Member, 1992)
Superintendent Ronal W. Serpas (ret.), PhD
Subject Matter Expert for Use of Force and Community and Impartial Policing
Police Foundation
504-865-2665; rserpas@loyno.edu

CAREER BRIEF
Ronal W. Serpas, Ph.D., is Professor of Practice, Criminology and Justice, Loyola University New Orleans. While Superintendent of Police in New Orleans, Dr. Serpas worked with the U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights, the U.S. Attorney, and the FBI to investigate several Federal Criminal Civil Rights cases and other criminal violations of police officers related to Hurricane Katrina. This work also included the negotiation of the New Orleans Police Department Consent Decree and early implementation of its requirements. Dr. Serpas has published articles on police accountability systems, police disciplinary systems, challenges in crime following natural disasters, implementing procedural justice and police legitimacy, and use of force.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2014 – present
Professor of Practice
Loyola University New Orleans, New Orleans, LA
Dr. Serpas joined the Loyola University of New Orleans Criminal Justice Department as a Professor of Practice in the fall of 2014, teaching graduate and undergraduate courses. Dr. Serpas has also served as an Adjunct and an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice, Extraordinary Faculty, Loyola University New Orleans, teaching graduate and undergraduate courses from 1993 to 2001. He has also taught graduate courses at Southern University New Orleans and Tennessee State University.

2010 – 2014
Superintendent of Police
New Orleans Police Department, New Orleans, LA
Following a nationwide search, appointed Superintendent of Police of the New Orleans Police Department (NOPD) by Mayor Mitchell Landrieu. The NOPD had an authorized staff of 1,490 (1,260 sworn) personnel and operated with an annual budget in excess of $135 million. Oversee the day to day management of the Field Operations Bureau, the Investigative Support Bureau, the Public Integrity Bureau, the Management Services Bureau, Consent Decree Compliance Bureau and the Chief of Staff. The City of New Orleans and the NOPD are in the preliminary stages of implementing a Federal Consent Decree to correct the post Katrina transgressions of the NOPD. Significant reforms had already been implemented to ensure a successful transition to a modern Community Policing oriented agency.

2004 – 2010
Chief of Police
Metropolitan Nashville Police Department, Nashville, TN
Following a nationwide search, appointed the sixth Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (MNPD) by Mayor Bill Purcell. The MNPD employed a total staff of approximately 1,800 (1,365 sworn) personnel with an annual budget in excess of $160 million. Oversee the day-to-day management of the Field Operations Bureau, Investigative Services Bureau, the Administrative Services Bureau, the Office of Professional Accountability, the Behavioral Health Services Division and the Public Information Office.
2001 – 2004
Chief
Washington State Patrol, Olympia, WA
Appointed the 19th Chief of the Washington State Patrol (WSP) by Governor Gary Locke after a nationwide search, and was unanimously confirmed by the Washington State Senate. The WSP is the largest public safety, law enforcement agency in the state. The WSP is a statewide general authority Washington law enforcement agency employing over 2,200 (1,100 sworn and 1,100 professional staff) personnel with a biennial budget of $362.4 million. Oversee the day-to-day management of the agency’s six bureaus: Field Operations Bureau, Fire Protection Bureau (State Fire Marshal), Forensic Laboratory Services Bureau (Statewide Crime Lab), Investigative Services Bureau, Management Services Bureau, and Technical Services Bureau, and the Audit/Inspections, Labor Attorney/Risk Manager, Government/Media Relations, and Department Psychologist.

2001 – 2004
New Orleans Police Department, New Orleans, LA
Assistant Superintendent of Police and Chief of Operations, 1996-2001
Police Major – Special Operations Commander, 1995-1996
Interim Assistant Superintendent of Police, 1994-1995
Police Captain – Commander Crime Lab, 1989-1990
Police Lieutenant, September 1988-1989
Police Sergeant, 1985-1988
Police Officer I & II, 1980-1985

Teaching Experience
2009 – 2009
Adjunct Faculty Member
Tennessee State University, Nashville, TN
Responsible for delivering graduate level instruction in the course titled “Leadership in Organizations.”

1993 – 2001
Assistant Professor
Loyola University New Orleans, New Orleans, LA
Responsible for the preparation and presentation of the following lecture classes: Community Policing Theory; Community Policing - Implementation/Management/Evaluation; Organizations and Administration (Behavioral Management); Introductions to Criminal Justice Systems; Introduction to Law Enforcement; Community Relations; Urban Issues and Violence. Additional duties include developing and teaching the Criminal Justice Administration Track of the new Executive Masters in Criminal Justice. Graduate courses created and presented for the new Master’s Degree include: Criminal Justice Administration I (Budgeting) and II (Leadership, Community Policing), and Seminar in Police Administration: Technology Applications.

Education
1998 PhD in Urban Studies (Specializing in Urban Crime), University of New Orleans
Dissertation: Common-Sense Approaches with Contradictory Results: Does Defensible Space Curb Crime?

1988 MS in Administration, Central Michigan University

1987 BS in Applied Behavioral Sciences, Our Lady of Holy Cross College

SELECT PUBLICATIONS AND PRESENTATIONS

• 2010, February. Appointed by Governor Phil Bredesen to the Governor’s Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, representing Police Chiefs of Incorporated Municipalities
• 2009, November. FBI-HQ, Inaugural Speaker to the “FBI-Strategy Management System” Speaker Series
• 2009, October. Appointed - Executive Committee of the International Association of Chiefs of Police
• 2009, April. Appointed by the Director of the National Institute of Justice as a Technical Review Team member to assist and provide oversight to a first of its kind longitudinal study solicited by the NIJ entitled, “Advancing Knowledge and Practice in Policing: A Longitudinal Platform for National Research.”

AWARDS

• Founding Board Member – Eden House New Orleans
• Public Service Award – National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
• “Lion of Zion Award” Nashville, TN
• “Freedom’s Light Award” presented by the Washington Newspaper Publishers Association
• Charles E. Dunbar, Jr., Louisiana Career Civil Service Award.
• Algiers Kiwanis’s Lawman of the Year
• Our Lady of Holy Cross College, Brother Andre Career Achievement Award
• Victim & Citizens Against Crime, Inc., Law Enforcement Award
• Louisiana Jaycee’s State and Local Law Enforcement Man of the Year
• Numerous Departmental Medals and Letters of Commendation

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE

Reviewed selected agencies for examples of 21st Century Policing practices with the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

Reference: Vince Talucci
Executive Director/CEO
The International Association of Chiefs of Police
44 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 200
Alexandria, VA 22314
talucci@theiacp.org
703-836-6767

Reference: Charles F. Wellford
Professor Emeritus
University of Maryland
7251 Preinkert Drive
College Park, MD 20742
wellford@umd.edu

Professor of Practice, Loyola University New Orleans
Reference: Michael A. Cowan, PhD
Chair
Common Good NOLA
6363 St. Charles Ave
New Orleans, LA 70118
mcowan@loyno.edu
Rachel Harmon
Subject Matter Expert for Use of Force and Impartial Policing
Police Foundation
434-924-7205; rharmon@virginia.edu

CAREER BRIEF
Rachel Harmon is the Frederick D.G. Ribble Professor of Law at the University of Virginia School of Law and is an expert on policing, including consent decrees and civil rights litigation. She currently serves on the National Academy of Sciences committee on proactive policing. She previously served in the United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section, and the United States Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Virginia where she investigated and prosecuted hate crime cases and cases of excessive force and sexual violence by police officers and other government officials nationwide.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
2016 – present
Frederick D.G. Ribble Professor of Law
Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law, 2012-2015
Professor of Law, 2011-present
Associate Professor of Law, 2006-2011
University of Virginia School of Law, Charlottesville, VA

1998 – 2006
Trial Attorney
United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section
Investigated and prosecuted hate crime cases and cases of excessive force and sexual violence by police officers and other government officials nationwide. Worked with multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies and U.S. Attorney’s Offices throughout the country. Received special achievement award for sustained superior performance of duty.

1998 – 1999
Special Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Virginia

1997 – 1998
Law Clerk
The Honorable Stephen G. Breyer, United States Supreme Court

1996 – 1997
Law Clerk
The Honorable Guido Calabresi, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

EDUCATION
1996
JD, Yale Law School, graduated with Honors in all graded classes (highest grade available)
Activities: Yale Law Journal, Articles Editor; Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Articles Editor

Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
1991-1993 London School of Economics
M.Sc. in Political Theory, Awarded with Distinction (highest awarded honors), 1993
M.Sc. in Political Sociology, Awarded with Distinction (highest awarded honors), 1992

1990 BS, Civil Engineering
Honors: MIT Stewart Award for community service; Burchard Scholar for excellence in the humanities; Chi Epsilon, the Civil Engineering Honor Society, member

**PUBLICATIONS**

*Lawful Orders* (in progress)


*Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry* (with Andrew Manns), 15 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 49 (2017) (symposium issue)

*Evaluating and Improving Structural Reform in Police Departments*, 16 Criminology & Pub. Pol’y 617 (2017)

*Legal Remedies for Police Misconduct*, in Reforming Criminal Justice (Erik Luna ed., 2017)

https://knightcolumbia.org/content/policing-protesting-and-insignificance-hostile-audiences

Proactive Policing: Effects On Crime And Communities (National Academies Press, 2017) (as member of Committee on Proactive Policing) (David Weisburd and Malay Majmundar eds.)


*Legal Control of the Police*, in 6 Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal Justice 2898 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014)

*Why Do We (Still) Lack Data on Policing*, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 1119 (2013) (symposium)


Courses Taught:
- Criminal Law
- Criminal Investigation
- Criminal Procedure Survey
- The Law of the Police
- Police Misconduct
- The Supreme Court and Criminal Law
- Supreme Court seminar

Selected Service
- Academic Placement Committee, Chair, 2016-2017
- Ad Hoc Committee to Advise University President on Sexual Assault Policy, 2015
- Faculty Appointments and Tenure Committee, Vice Chair, 2014-2015
- Faculty Appointments and Tenure Committee, 2013-2014
- Junior Faculty Development Committee, Chair, 2012-2013
- Grading Policy Committee, 2011-2013
- ABA Reaccreditation Self-Study Committee, 2010-2011
- Academic Placement Committee, 2010-2011
- Workshop & Faculty Retreat Committee, 2009-2010
- Clerkship Committee, 2008-2010
- Academic Review Committee, 2006-2009
- Faculty Liaison to the FBI National Academy, 2008-present

Select Invited Speeches and Presentations
Lawful Orders, Legal Theory workshop, University of Michigan Law School, April 4, 2018

Lawful Orders, faculty workshop, University of Georgia School of Law, February 26, 2018

Lawful Orders, University of Texas School of law, Faculty Colloquium, February 15, 2018

Community Policing and the Future of Police Reform, public event, University of Virginia School of Law, February 6, 2018

Policing Protests and the Limits of the First Amendment, The First Amendment Under Fire: A Symposium on Speech, Protest, and the Role of State Actors, co-sponsored by the ACLU of Virginia and William & Mary Law School, February 2, 2018
**Proactive Policing and the Legacy of Terry**, American Association of Law Schools, Annual Conference, San Diego, California, January 6, 2018

**Maintaining Momentum for Policing Reform**, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Annual Civil Rights Training Institute, October 13, 2017

**How We Govern the Police**, talk for Charlottesville community, Congregation Beth Israel, January 29, 2017


**Police Chiefs and Accountability**, Shachoy Symposium on Police Accountability, Villanova University, Charles Widger School of Law, October 28, 2016

**Lawful Orders and Police Uses of Force**, St. John’s University School of Law, faculty workshop, October 26, 2016

**Lawful Orders and Police Uses of Force**, American University, Washington College of Law, faculty workshop, October 7, 2016

**Accountability of the Police Chief**, National Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia, September 21, 2016

**Socio-Legal Model of Police/Citizen Encounters**, National Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia, September 20, 2016

**Harm-Efficient Policing**, National Executive Institute, Charlottesville, Virginia, September 20, 2016

**Lawful Orders and the Legal Authority for Police Coercion**, CrimFest 2016, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, July 11, 2016


**Safe Arrests**, Impact Justice, Oakland, California, May 25, 2016

**Why Arrest?**, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law Faculty Workshop, April 15, 2016

**Prosecuting Police Officers**, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, April 8, 2016

**Police Bias and the Courtroom**, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, April 8, 2016

**Prosecuting Police Officers**, University of Virginia School of Law, April 7, 2016

**Why Arrest?**, University of Chicago Constitutional Law Workshop, October 22, 2015

**Why Arrest?**, CrimFest 2015, Yeshiva University, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, July 21, 2015
**Why Arrest?**, 2015 Soll Lecture, University of Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law, March 24, 2015

**Use of Force, Ferguson, and the Possibility of Reform**, University of Virginia, February 24, 2015

**Select Additional Professional Activities**
- Baltimore Police Department Consent Decree Monitoring Team, court-appointed subject matter expert (2017-2018)
- National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, member of the Committee on Proactive Policing: Effects on Crime, Communities, and Civil Liberties, 2015-2017
- American Law Institute, Associate Reporter, Principles of Law: Policing, and Member 2014-present
- Leadership in Academic Matters Fellow, University of Virginia, Fall 2015
- National Research Council, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, member of the Committee on the Illicit Tobacco Market, 2013-2015
- Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, member of Law Enforcement Course Advisory Committee, 2014-present
- American Association of Law Schools, Scholarly Paper Competition Selection Committee, 2013
- FBI National Academy, University Liaison, 2008-present
- Special Assistant U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Virginia, 2007-2014
- National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, expert committee member, 2007
- ABA Criminal Section Council Member, 2001-2002

**Non-Profit Boards**
- The Fountain Fund, founding Board Member, 2016-present
- Peabody School, Board Member, 2014-2017
- Charlottesville Police Foundation, Board Member, 2007-2015
- Rosemount Center, Board Member, 2001-2003 and Vice Chair, 2003-2005

**Prior Relevant Experience and Reference**

*Associate Reporter, American Law Institute Principles of Policing Project*
Reference: Barry Friedman
Director, NYU Policing Project
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012
Barry.friedman@nyu.edu
212-998-6293

*Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Criminal Section*
Reference: Robert J. Moosy
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Robert.moosy@usdoj.gov
202-514-0621

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Police Foundation Proposal: Independent Monitor for the Consent Decree regarding the Chicago Police Department
Jennifer Zeunik  
Director of Programs  
Police Foundation  
202-833-1460; jzeunik@policefoundation.org

**Career Brief**

Jennifer Zeunik is the Director of Programs for the Police Foundation, where she provides project design, leadership and oversight, as well as project and staff management for the Police Foundation portfolio of technical assistance projects, including Critical Incident Reviews and Organizational Assessment Services. Throughout her career, Ms. Zeunik has worked closely with all levels of government in law enforcement program and policy. In her previous role as a law enforcement consultant, Ms. Zeunik provided strategic management expertise to federal, state and local criminal justice clients. Her work focused on justice policy research, program management, strategic planning, publications development, training and technical assistance management, business development and strategic communications.

**Professional Background**

2015 – present  
*Director of Programs*  
Police Foundation; Washington, DC

- Provide overall management and strategic guidance to the Police Foundation portfolio of technical assistance programs. Manage work performed by program staff, fellows, consultants, and contractors. Manage relationships with clients and partner organizations. Develop qualitative and quantitative programmatic evaluation metrics. Cultivate business development opportunities. Oversee the effective and efficient execution of programmatic budgets. Oversee the development of publications and other deliverables, such as *Bringing Calm to Chaos*, a critical incident review of the public safety response to the San Bernardino terrorist shooting and *Rescue, Response and Resilience*, a critical incident review of the public safety response to the Pulse Nightclub terrorist attack. Serve as quality control for all Programs Team products.

2008-2015  
*Principal/ Independent Consultant*  
Jennifer Zeunik Consulting LLC; Bronxville, NY

- Provided strategic management and policy consulting to criminal justice government and non-profit clients on numerous projects. Services included justice policy research; program design, implementation and management; development and dissemination of publications; business development activities (including grant writing); strategic planning; training and technical assistance management.

2006-2008  
*Vice President, Programs*  
Atlanta Police Foundation; Atlanta, Georgia

- Responsible for the entire APF program portfolio (Recruitment Program, Reestablishment of the Atlanta Police Department’s (APD) Mounted Patrol Unit, Scholarship Program, Training Program, Crime Stoppers Atlanta, Housing Program and Operation Shield) designed to enhance safety in the city of Atlanta and expand services of the Atlanta Police Department (APD). Program and policy outcomes include, assisted APD in increasing recruitment by 82%, decreasing vacancy rate from an average of 25% to less than 3%; launched and managed Crime Stoppers Atlanta that facilitated 34
arrests, 66 cases cleared and the inclusion of 20 metro law enforcement agencies during its first year in existence; dispersed over $200,000 in scholarships to approximately 100 officers working to achieve a college degree; and designed Operation Shield policy and management, enabling improved sharing of crime prevention and response information between APD and the Atlanta business community. Oversaw the effective and efficient execution of a $3.3 million programmatic budget. Managed program staff, collaborative relationships with law enforcement command staff, and contractual relationships with business partners, improving program efficiency and responsiveness. Developed qualitative and quantitative programmatic evaluation metrics. Responsible for all programmatic communication to stakeholders including city and police officials, board members, and donors. Provided ongoing input and support to all Foundation fundraising activities and events.

2001-2005

Project Manager, Law Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council
International Association of Chiefs of Police; Alexandria, VA

Directed activity of U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) grant funded, multi-association law enforcement projects. Managed budgets up to approximately $2.1 million. Led development of standardized functional specifications for computer aided dispatch (CAD) and records management systems (RMS) designed to assist local law enforcement agencies nationwide in procurement of CAD and RMS. Developed continuation funding strategies, including annual proposals to USDOJ. Negotiated and managed subcontracts worth approximately $1.1 million, and directed activities of contract staff. Represented IACP policy positions in national forums (on national advisory boards, as well as at meetings and conferences) shaping national law enforcement information technology policy. Repeatedly served as guest editor and contributor for Police Chief Magazine. Served in leadership and staff positions for the planning, execution and oversight of a diverse array of IACP projects and events. Provided training and technical assistance to hundreds of local law enforcement agencies across the United States. Earned IACP Special Incentive Award on four occasions for exceptional performance. Left position to pursue full time education, working toward Master of Public Administration (MPA) degree.

1999-2001

NIBIN/DRUGFIRE Program Support Manager
Computer Sciences Corporation/ Nichols Research Corporation; Washington, DC

Managed team of employees tasked with NIBIN/DRUGFIRE Configuration Management, Documentation Management, Inventory Control and Internal Training. Oversaw daily operations of approximately 180 networked Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) sponsored ballistic imaging and correlation systems (DRUGFIRE) across the U.S. Delivered Program Support and Site Support project status presentations to Program Manager and/or FBI (client) representatives. Provided training to the NIBIN/DRUGFIRE users - approximately 500 local, state and federal law enforcement personnel. Revised Action Request Management process, reducing length of time necessary to resolve users’ technical problems by 40%.

1996-1999

Crime Laboratory Technician Team Lead
Florida Department of Law Enforcement; Tampa, FL

Directed activity of crime laboratory technician team serving as liaison to federal, state and local law enforcement agencies across a 16 county region in the submission of criminal evidence to the crime
laboratory for over 10,000 investigations. Responded to assigned crime scenes to collect, secure and submit physical evidence to the laboratory for analysis. Ensured section compliance with standards set by American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors (ASCLD), securing Laboratory re-accreditation each year. Testified to the chain-of-custody of evidence in various judicial proceedings including trial and depositions. Transitioned all chain-of-custody legacy data from antiquated computer system to new Evidence Management System.

**Education**

2007 Master of Public Administration, focus in Public & Non-Profit Management, The University of Georgia, School of Public and International Affairs

1995 Bachelor of Science in Psychology, minor in Criminology Florida State University

**Select Publications**


**Upcoming Publications**


**Professional Associations**

- Peer Reviewer for U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 2015 to present
- Member American Society of Criminology (ASC), 2016 to present
- Member, American Society of Public Administrators (ASPA), 2005 to present
- Member, The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), 2002 to present
- Member, Pi Alpha Alpha, Public Administration Honor Society, 2007

**Prior Relevant Experience and Reference**

*The Police Foundation is providing technical assistance to the Baltimore Police Department to facilitate movement toward consent decree compliance.*

Reference: Chief Michelle Bloodsworth-Wirzberger, Esq.
Baltimore Police Department
Bishop L. Robinson Senior Police Administration Building
601 East Fayette Street
Baltimore, MD 21202

[ michelle.wirzerberger@baltimorepolice.org ](mailto:michelle.wirzerberger@baltimorepolice.org)
Rebecca Benson  
Senior Policy Analyst  
Police Foundation  
202-833-1460; rbenson@policefoundation.org

**Career Brief**
Rebecca Lott Benson is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Police Foundation with experience in analysis of local-level law enforcement policies, procedures, and practices both internal to local police departments, and as a consultant. As a Crime and Intelligence Analyst with the Los Angeles Police Department, Olympic Division, she provided analytical support to the development of the new division by creating new area boundaries, mapped and documented community resources, activities and special locations, and analyzed personnel resources and shift schedules. She often coordinated unified responses to crime problems with neighboring divisions and bureaus as well as other local law enforcement agencies. She was also greatly engaged in preparation of monthly CompStat reports and presentations and participated in research, development and testing of systems and processes with the CompStat Division. She received numerous commendations and was awarded Civilian of the Year in 2009.

**Professional Background**

*Senior Policy Analyst*  
January 2015 to Present  
Police Foundation; Washington, DC  
Act as liaison between police practitioners and researchers. Coordinate and lead teams of expert consultants conducting technical assistance, research and data collection in state and local jurisdictions. Provide in-depth analysis of relevant law enforcement policy, procedures, and practices. Develop proposals and fundraising efforts for foundation related projects and initiatives.

*Crime and Intelligence Analyst*  
10/2008 – 07/2011  
Los Angeles Police Department, Olympic Division; Los Angeles, CA  
Researched, compiled, and analyzed crime trends. Prepared maps, statistics, and reports demonstrating trends and patterns on a daily, weekly, monthly and annual basis for meetings/presentations with and for Command and Detective staff. Disseminated appropriate information to patrol, detective, and administrative staff as well as conducted Crime Control meetings and Roll Call presentations to assist with deployment of resources. Developed and maintained databases for special projects (Parole/PACT). Partnered with neighboring law enforcement partners to share best practices by cross training and assisting in development of intelligence units.

*Program Manager*  
01/2002 – 06/2005  
Office of the Police Commissioner, Boston Police Department; Boston, MA  
Intelligence Unit, Boston Police Department; Boston, MA  
Performed intelligence reviews and reports for several interagency programs- Boston Reentry Initiative (BRI), Street Violence Suppression Project, Parole Initiative, Gang Assessment, Department of Youth Services (DYS) Reentry Project, Grove Hall Initiative, Federal Reentry Project. Participated in
critical database creation, development and maintenance. Acted as intelligence liaison between BPD and other local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies and partners. Produced critical intelligence bulletins and disseminated approved reports to appropriate internal and external law enforcement teams. Collected and analyzed data for grant proposals and reports. Provided intelligence support for the multi-agency law enforcement team for the 2004 Democratic National Convention

Program Coordinator
08/2005 – 12/2005
Savannah Impact Program (SIP), Savannah Chatham Police Department; Savannah, GA
Supervised programming staff. Prepared grant proposals and developed new programs. Tracked SIP client progress and produced monthly production reports. Consulted with incoming Chief on policy changes to SIP programs, processes, and systems.

Program Coordinator
07/2001 – 06/2005
Summer of Opportunity, Boston Police Department; Boston, MA
John Hancock Corporation; Boston, MA
Managed program payroll/budget. Coordinated SOO intern placements and prepared review.

Research Assistant
09/2000 – 07/2001
Criminal Justice Center for Policy Research
Northeastern University; Boston, MA
Collected and analyzed data. Prepared statistics and reports for projects.

EDUCATION
2002 Master of Science, Criminal Justice, Northeastern University
1998 Bachelor of Science, Brigham Young University

HONORS, AWARDS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS
• Awarded LAPD divisional Civilian of the Year for 2009.
• Received numerous LAPD Bureau and Area Commendations.
• Experienced with diverse corporate, governmental and academic settings.

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE
The Police Foundation completed a collaborative reform assessment of the St. Louis County (MO) Police Department.
Reference: Colonel Jeff Bader
St. Louis County Police Department
7900 Forsyth Blvd.
St. Louis, MO 63105
JBader@stlouisco.com
636-529-8210
Ben Gorban
Policy Analyst
Police Foundation
202-833-1460; bgorban@policefoundation.org

CAREER BRIEF
Ben Gorban is a Policy Analyst who works on Critical Incident Reviews, Collaborative Reform, operational assessments, and other law-enforcement related projects. He has over nine years of experience supporting national-scope law-enforcement related projects, including the provision of technical assistance and policy analysis support on projects related to community policing and the role of social media in law enforcement, countering violent extremism, cyber crime, school security, and traffic safety. His areas of expertise include research, resource development, and information dissemination.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
April 2016 – Present
Policy Analyst
Police Foundation; Washington, DC
Provide research, policy analysis, and data collection support to Police Foundation research, training and technical assistance, and operational assessment projects. Contribute to Police Foundation social media platforms and website. Support proposal development and fundraising efforts.

July 2010 – April 2016
Acting Manager
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP); Washington, DC
State Associations of Chiefs of Police: Served as the dedicated point of contact for the Division of State Associations of Chiefs of Police (SACOP). Facilitated communication between SACOP and IACP, planned the annual conference and midyear meeting, and managed the budget for the division.
IACP Center for Social Media: Oversaw IACP’s training, technical assistance, and resources related to law enforcement use of various social media platforms; researched issues and emerging trends related to law enforcement; maintained the IACP Center for Social Media website and blog. Also served as subject matter experts for news media on law enforcement use of social media.
The Role of Community Policing in Countering Violent Extremism: Developed key principles, awareness briefs, roll-call training videos, and social media posts to raise awareness of law enforcement regarding the role of community policing in homeland security. Also began the development of online training for all levels of law enforcement regarding indicators of violent extremism, different extremist groups and individuals, and key principles of community policing and countering violent extremism.
Grant Writing and Sponsorships: Wrote and directly contributed to IACP grants awarded by the U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and U.S. Department of Transportation (responsible for $2.9 million). Fostered new partnerships with sponsors resulting in additional funding (responsible for $10,000).

August 2009 – April 2010
Full Time Technical Assistant Specialist
American University; Washington, DC
Worked at the Justice Programs Office assisting in development and delivery of a curriculum on caseflow management improvement programs including Differentiated Case Management (DCM) and Case Management Conferences (CMCs) for state and local courts across the nation. Coordinated and attended site visits for technical assistance in association with the case flow management curriculum. Provided assistance to court systems on continuity of operations (COOP) and pandemic planning.

**Education**

2011 Master of Science in Justice, Law and Society
Specialization in Justice and Public Policy
American University

2009 Bachelor of Arts in Justice, School of Public Affairs
American University

2009 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, College of Arts and Sciences
American University

**Publications**


**Upcoming Publications**


**Prior Relevant Experience and Reference**

*The Police Foundation conducted an independent review of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) actions on January 20, 2017, regarding interactions with First Amendment assembly demonstrators in the District of Columbia.*

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CAREER BRIEF
Joyce Iwashita is a Project Assistant at the Police Foundation where she supports a variety of Police Foundation projects, including Collaborative Reform, Critical Incident Reviews, and the Police Data Initiative. A Harry S. Truman Scholar, she has interned at the U.S. Senate, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, and National Criminal Justice Association, and has done work for the Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship. She received her Bachelor of Arts in Economics from Lewis & Clark College in Portland, Oregon, and is currently pursuing her Master of Arts in Security Studies with a concentration in Technology and Security from Georgetown University in Washington, DC.

PROFESSIONAL BACKGROUND
4/4/2016 – present
Project Assistant
Police Foundation; Washington, DC
Responsible for supporting day to day project management of selected projects across various research and programs within the Police Foundation. Provides general administrative support and project coordination of both on site and off site work as directed by Senior Staff. Participates in project related meetings and site visits with Police Foundation staff, funders, and law enforcement experts across the country. Supports research, writing, graphics development, and layout for selected publications and websites.

Processing Associate
Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellowship; Washington, DC
Processed, organized, and tracked hundreds of spring and fall applications for the U.S. peace and security fellowship. Updated content on the Fellowship’s website.

EDUCATION
Expected 2020 MA in Security Studies, Georgetown University
2015 BA in Economics, Lewis & Clark College

PUBLICATIONS


HONORS, AWARDS, AND ACHIEVEMENTS

- Phi Beta Kappa, 2015
- Departmental Honors in Economics, Lewis & Clark College, 2015
- Harry S. Truman Scholar, 2014

PRIOR RELEVANT EXPERIENCE AND REFERENCE

The Police Foundation conducted a critical incident review of the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center for the State of Delaware.

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Appendix C. Examples of Work Products

Example 1
Rick Braziel, Officer Involved Shooting Review Mikel McIntyre, Incident Date May 8, 2017 (Sacramento, CA: Sacramento County Office of Inspector General).
OFFICER INVOLVED
SHOOTING REVIEW
MIKEL MCINTYRE

Incident Date
May 8, 2017
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INTRODUCTION
The Inspector General reviews certain critical incidents involving the Sacramento Sheriff’s Department personnel to evaluate their response to the incident, departmental policies, tactics, equipment, and training as compared to contemporary law enforcement standards. These reviews result in the identification of lessons learned regarding the incidents and specific recommendations for the Sheriff’s Department intended to enhance the safety of the community and deputies. It is important to note that this review was conducted with the benefit of hindsight and the knowledge of all concurrent events. The ability to review reports, photographs, video, and audio allows for the critical review of the incident that is not available to deputies and witnesses at the time of the incident.

The findings and recommendations in this review are those of the Inspector General and do not represent the findings and recommendations of the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office or the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department. The District Attorney’s Office is responsible for conducting a separate independent review to determine whether the officers involved committed any violations of criminal law. The Sheriff’s Department’s conducts a review to determine if there are violations of policy.

The District Attorney’s review was not completed at the time of this report. The Sheriff’s Department completes their administrative review after receiving the District Attorney’s legal finding.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This review concerns an incident where, on May 8, 2017, three Sheriff’s Deputies used deadly force against Mikel McIntyre, resulting in his death. The use of deadly force, and the related tactics, departmental policies and practices were compared against best practices in policing. The review included crime reports, statements, evidence, video, audio, and applicable policies. The information and actions considered during this assessment indicate that the Sheriff’s Department policies, equipment, and training related to use of deadly force, de-escalation, and administrative investigation need revision and update. Sixteen recommendations are offered for consideration.

The Sheriff’s Department had two calls for service involving McIntyre on May 8, 2017. The first occurred at 3:32 p.m. when family members called the Sheriff’s Department to a home in the Rosemont area because McIntyre was acting bizarre and attacking them. Deputies responded and determined the best course of action was for McIntyre to leave the home.

The second call was received at 6:47 p.m. when numerous witnesses called 911 to report McIntyre beating and choking a female in the parking lot of the Ross store on Olson Drive in Rancho Cordova. Deputy Wright responded and attempted to detain McIntyre near the Red Roof Inn across the street from the Ross store on Olson Drive. During the scuffle, Deputy Wright fell,
and McIntyre threw a large river rock striking Deputy Wright on the head. Dazed and fearing for his safety, Deputy Wright fired two rounds at McIntyre but did not hit him.

In response to the assault of Deputy Wright, numerous law enforcement personnel responded and flooded the area including canine Deputy Becker and Deputy Rodriguez. Five minutes later, in his attempt to flee, McIntyre threw a large river rock striking Deputy Becker and his canine. Deputy Becker fired several rounds at McIntyre as McIntyre ran past him, then paused, and fired several more rounds as McIntyre fled along the shoulder of US 50 and Zinfandel Drive. Deputy Rodriguez, aware of the assault on Deputy Wright, and seeing the assault on Deputy Becker, fired 18 rounds at McIntyre as he fled along the shoulder of US 50.

This review offers 16 recommendations intended to improve situational awareness, improve decision making on when to transition from deadly force to less lethal force, increase less lethal options, improve decision making in stressful situations, improve command and control, and develop robust after action reviews.

METHODOLOGY

The Inspector General, with cooperation from the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, gathered, reviewed, and analyzed documents from many sources to develop an understanding of these incidents. Policies, procedures, and training related to the activities leading up to and including the uses of deadly force were reviewed and compared to best practices in policing.


To assist in the review, information was examined from the following:

- Documents related to the shooting including witness statements and crime scene diagrams, photographs of the scene, dispatch audio, and vehicle GPS locations.
- Review of involved officer and witness interviews.
- Direct observation of the general area and shooting scene.
- Review of Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department policies and applicable International Association of Chiefs of Police model policies.¹ Sheriff’s policies include:
  - General Order 2/01 (Rev 6/13) Authorized Firearms and Ammunition
  - General Order 2/03 (Rev 5/08) Firearms Training and Qualification Special Weapon Training
  - General Order 2/05 (Rev 12/12 Rev 9/17²) Use of Firearms
  - General Order 2/06 (Rev 10/07) Officer-Involved Shooting Incidents
  - General Order 2/11 (Rev 4/16 Rev 8/17³) Use of Force Policy

¹ [http://www.iacp.org/Model-Policies-for-Policing](http://www.iacp.org/Model-Policies-for-Policing)
² Reviewed policies included the policy that was current at the time of the incident as well as any modifications made prior to the release of this report.
³ Ibid
Officer Involved Shooting Review
Mikel McIntyre

- General Order 2/16 (New 1/06) Weapons Discharge Reporting Incidents
- General Order 2/17 (Rev 3/13) Use of Force – Tactical Review Board
- General Order 10/10 (New 9/07) In-Car Camera Systems

INCIDENT SUMMARY
During the morning of May 8, 2017, Mikel McIntyre went to his aunt’s home in the Rosemont area of Sacramento County. He had been stressed and went to the home to be around family. Shortly after 3:00 p.m., the Fire Department was called to the home by a family member to assess his behavior. The family thought he was acting bizarrely and might need medical help. He had locked himself in a car and was combative with the family. The Fire Department requested the Sheriff’s Department as a precautionary measure, but the Sheriff’s Department did not have any available units. The Fire Department cleared that McIntyre was ok and the Sheriff’s call was cancelled by the Fire Department.

At 3:32 p.m., McIntyre’s family called the Sheriff’s Department and reported that he was getting physical and attacking the family. To keep him away, the family used pepper spray. The phone call to dispatch lasted about 30 seconds before it was disconnected. While deputies were responding to the home, the family reported that McIntyre was outside having a “nervous breakdown.” When asked by the Sheriff’s Department for McIntyre’s description the family noted that he was wearing a Dallas Cowboy’s jersey. A warrant check by a responding deputy revealed a warrant for possession of cannabis.

While at the residence, deputies learned that McIntyre did not live at the home but had come to visit family. During the visit, he became upset and sat in a family member’s car, and refused to get out. When he eventually got out of the car, the doors were locked behind him. That made him upset and an argument started over the keys. The family used pepper spray to get him away and locked him outside of the house.

When deputies arrived, McIntyre was cooperative and declined medical aid for pepper spray exposure. The deputies, including Deputy Gabriel Rodriguez, assessed McIntyre and determined that he did not meet the criteria for a mental health hold. To resolve the argument, it was decided, with McIntyre’s agreement, that it was best for everyone if he left for the day. Deputies advised McIntyre to take care of his warrant and deputies cleared the call at 4:11 p.m.

Later that same day, McIntyre and his mother, Brigett McIntyre, went shopping to get something to eat and buy McIntyre clothes. They parked at the Ross store on Olson Drive and went inside. While inside, McIntyre asked his mother for the cars keys, so he could get his wallet that was inside the car. She gave him the keys and the two returned to the car. While at the car McIntyre’s mother asked for the car keys back but he would not give them to her. To allow him time to cool off, his mother went to the Target store. When she returned, she sat back in the car and slipped the car keys off the key ring and asked her son if he was ok. McIntyre asked for the keys back
from his mother, and when she would not give then back, he became more irritated and then started pulling her hair.

At 6:47 p.m., the California Highway Patrol (CHP) and Rancho Cordova Police /Sheriff’s Department started receiving 911 calls reporting a male beating and choking a female in the parking lot of the Ross Store at 10835 Olson Drive in Rancho Cordova. The callers described a black male in his 20’s, thin build, wearing an “81” dark blue football jersey assaulting a black female and trying to pull her out of a vehicle. The vehicle was registered to Brigett McIntyre.

Deputy Jeff Wright was working patrol and responded to the call. Prior to his arrival, it was reported that the male suspect, later identified as Mikel McIntyre, walked over to the Famous Footwear at 10823 Olson Drive and his mother was still sitting in her car. When Deputy Wright arrived at 6:50 p.m., he saw McIntyre walking across the parking lot wearing a blue Dallas Cowboy’s jersey with number 81 on it and blue jeans. At about the same time, a female witness pointed to McIntyre saying “That’s him. He’s the primary aggressor.” McIntyre was walking south through the parking lot and Deputy Wright drove his marked patrol vehicle toward McIntyre and used his PA system and told McIntyre to stop. McIntyre looked at him, said something Deputy Wright could not understand, and kept walking. Deputy Wright parked his patrol vehicle and got out on-foot and followed McIntyre as he walked near Olson Drive toward Zinfandel Drive.

Figure 1- 911 call location

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4 Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department, through contract, provides policing services for the City of Rancho Cordova.

5 Multiple 911 cell phone calls were placed. Cell phone calls near that location were routed to CHP who then transferred to Rancho Cordova PD/SSD.
Deputy Wright tried to get closer by walking faster, and in response, McIntyre sped up. While trying to catch up to McIntyre, Deputy Wright told him several times to stop and that he needed to talk to him. Deputy Wright started to jog after McIntyre as they crossed Olson Drive toward the Red Roof Inn, 10800 Olson Drive. Reacting to Deputy Wright, McIntyre also started jogging appearing to keep Deputy Wright from getting closer. When they were in the parking lot between the Chevron Gas Station and Red Roof Inn, Deputy Wright ran after him to stop and detain him for the possible assault outside the Ross store.

When Deputy Wright caught up with McIntyre, he tried to grab him, but McIntyre started side stepping and spinning away while the two moved south through the parking lot toward the Hooters restaurant, 10750 Olson Drive. When McIntyre did not comply, Deputy Wright drew his handgun and told McIntyre to get on the ground. McIntyre turned toward Deputy Wright and screamed something like “Aagghh,” and started toward Deputy Wright.

Deputy Wright stated he realized that he had no cause to use deadly force, so he holstered his handgun and attempted to grab McIntyre as they moved around a truck in the parking lot. While attempting to grab McIntyre, Deputy Wright tripped and fell to the ground “pretty hard” on his
left side. While Deputy Wright was on the ground, McIntyre went to the wrought iron fence separating the Red Roof Inn from the parking lot and picked up a “just smaller than a football” size rock. While Deputy Wright was still on his knees, McIntyre threw the rock from about five feet away, striking Deputy Wright in the head, and the rock then bounced off and hit a truck.

While Deputy Wright struggled to get up, McIntyre picked up a second rock. Witnesses at the Red Roof Inn feared that McIntyre would use the second rock to again assault Deputy Wright, so they began yelling at McIntyre to leave the deputy alone. In response, McIntyre turned and started walking south toward the Hooters restaurant. Deputy Wright reported that immediately after being struck, he could not hear anything and that his vision “went really bright” and he temporarily could not see.

Dazed, Deputy Wright got to his feet and saw McIntyre seven to ten yards south of him. Deputy Wright yelled “stop” several times and then fired two rounds at McIntyre who fled toward the Hooters restaurant. As McIntyre fled, Deputy Wright stated the Hooters building became part of the background, so he stopped shooting, thus preventing potential bystander injury due to a stray round. McIntyre continued toward the front of Hooters, and slowed to a walk as he went around the front of the business before he turned south toward US 50.

Several witnesses assisted Deputy Wright until additional deputies and medical aid arrived. Deputy Wright was transported to an area hospital and treated for his head wound.

When Deputy Wright broadcast that he had McIntyre at gun point, several Sheriff’s patrol units started responding. Less than a minute later, when he broadcasted that he had been hit in the head with a rock and had fired shots, many more units responded, including Sheriff’s Department supervisors and patrol deputies, Sheriff’s Department gang units, air support from both the Sheriff’s Department and CHP, CHP patrol officers, and a Sacramento County Regional Parks ranger.

Law enforcement units flooded the area, as McIntyre had made his way south across the Zinfandel Drive off-ramp for westbound US 50 and the Zinfandel Drive on-ramp for northbound Zinfandel Drive to westbound US 50. This placed him on the inside loop of the northeast cloverleaf interchange. As he made his way through the vegetation, he was seen by a Sheriff’s patrol sergeant who was stopped on westbound US 50, along the center divider east of Zinfandel Drive. Less than a minute later, Deputy Rodriguez, who had stopped along the center divider of eastbound US 50 west of Zinfandel Drive, alerted others that he was also watching McIntyre.

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6 McIntyre was about 20-25 yards away from Deputy Wright.
As additional deputies, CHP officers, and a County Park ranger arrived at US 50 and Zinfandel Drive, McIntyre walked up the east side berm of the Zinfandel Drive overpass along a retaining wall. The berm took him to a concrete path that runs under the entire overpass (Figure 4). As McIntyre reached the upper path, a Sheriff’s deputy on-foot followed him up the berm. Not seeing any rocks in McIntyre’s hands, the deputy holstered his handgun and drew his baton. McIntyre walked west on the path as patrol vehicles on US 50 trailed below along the shoulder.
Deputy Ken Becker and his canine had responded to the area and were on-foot on the west side of the Zinfandel Drive overpass near the west end of the retaining wall as McIntyre continued toward them. Deputy Becker was slightly up the side of the berm, in the vegetation, near the end of the retaining wall (Figure 5). Deputy Rodriguez, who was on the eastbound side of the center divider, climbed over the divider onto the westbound traffic side of the center divider. In addition to Deputies Becker and Rodriguez, there were three Sheriff’s deputies, one Sheriff’s sergeant, two CHP officers, and one County Parks ranger for a total of nine law enforcement officers and one police canine near US 50 westbound at Zinfandel Drive.

As McIntyre got to the west end of the retaining wall, he raised his right arm up, and as he started to run down the steep embankment, he threw a softball size rock at Deputy Becker and his canine partner, striking the dog in the muzzle and Deputy Becker in the leg. Deputy Becker was caught by surprise that McIntyre was above him in elevation and not below at road level. When McIntyre threw the rock, Deputy Becker tried to back pedal in the rough terrain and lift his left arm to protect his face. As McIntyre ran past, Deputy Becker fired his handgun several times at McIntyre. A round he fired struck the asphalt in the right lane of westbound US 50. A subsequent round he fired also stuck the asphalt in the right lane of westbound US 50, west of the first round.

After firing several rounds Deputy Becker paused briefly to adjust his aim then continued shooting as McIntyre ran away from him along the shoulder of westbound US 50. In his statement, Deputy Becker believed that he struck McIntyre because of the way McIntyre’s body
moved. When McIntyre was approximately 105 ft away from Deputy Becker he stopped firing, so he could holster his handgun and chase after McIntyre. Deputy Becker fired a total of 8 rounds.7

Prior to McIntyre throwing the rock at Deputy Becker, Deputy Rodriguez had watched McIntyre from the center divider. As McIntyre moved closer to the end of the retaining wall, Deputy Rodriguez started to move across the westbound lanes of traffic. When Deputy Rodriguez stepped into traffic, he observed several vehicles that began to slow as a Sheriff’s sergeant, who was east of Zinfandel Drive, started to do a traffic break to stop traffic. When Deputy Becker fired the second round that ricocheted across US 50, Deputy Rodriguez was in the far-left lane (W-1)8 moving across the roadway. When Deputy Rodriguez was in the middle (W-3) lane, he started firing his handgun as McIntyre fled from Deputy Becker. The distance between Deputy Rodriguez and McIntyre was approximately 58 feet when he started firing (Figure 6). As McIntyre continued to flee westbound, Deputy Rodriguez continued to advance and fire while he moved. About halfway through his volley of rounds, Deputy Rodriguez stopped firing as a light-colored vehicle on the on-ramp passed behind McIntyre. Once the car cleared the area behind McIntyre, Deputy Rodriguez continued to fire until he ran out of rounds. While continuing to advance, Deputy Rodriguez ejected his empty magazine and reloaded. Deputy Rodriguez fired a total of 18 rounds.

McIntyre continued across the westbound US 50 onramp to the shoulder area adjacent to a sound wall as Deputy Becker sent his dog to stop McIntyre. Once at the wall, McIntyre looked back toward deputies, then stopped and started to get on the ground, but appeared to see the approaching canine and stood up. McIntyre continued moving slowly west along the sound wall as the canine bit him and he went to the ground. As the canine was biting McIntyre, multiple officers ran up and briefly struggled with McIntyre to get him handcuffed.

Once McIntyre was handcuffed, the fire department was requested for medical aid and McIntyre was transported to the UC Davis Medical Center where he later succumbed to his injuries.

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7 The round count is approximate. Only four shell casings fired from Deputy Becker’s could be located. He reports that he fully loaded his weapon with 18 rounds and 10 rounds were removed from his weapon after the shooting.
8 Traffic lanes are counted from left to right with the far-left lane designated as the #1 lane. On this section of US 50 there are six westbound lanes, lanes #1-#6.
Figure 6- US 50 and Zinfandel Drive shooting scenes #2 & #3.

1. Deputy Becker when he fired (shooting #2)
2. McIntyre when Deputy Becker started firing.
3. McIntyre when Deputy Becker stopped shooting.
4. Deputy Rodriguez when he started firing (shooting #3).
5. Deputy Rodriguez when he stopped firing.
7. Arrest location.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Distance</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 – 3</td>
<td>105 ft</td>
<td>5 Seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – 4</td>
<td>58 ft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – 6</td>
<td>106 ft</td>
<td>6 Seconds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – 6</td>
<td>79 ft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Locations and distances are approximate and based on crime scene diagrams, photo and video evidence. Distance were measured using Google Earth.

PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

The following is a list of items discovered during the investigation, a summary of the Coroner’s report, toxicology tests, and physical evidence report. This list does not include other items collected such as the rocks used to assault the deputies or personal property of McIntyre.

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9 The report does not use crime scene photos and no reasonable like images were available.
Weapons Involved

The following weapon was used by:

- Handgun - Glock 17 Gen 4 - 9mm pistol – Deputy Wright fired 2 rounds.
- Handgun - Glock 17 Gen 4 - 9mm pistol – Deputy Becker fired 8 rounds.\(^{10}\)
- Handgun - Glock 17 Gen 4 - 9mm pistol – Deputy Rodriguez fired 18 rounds.\(^{11}\)

![Glock 17 Gen 4](image)

\(^{10}\) Only four shell casings fired by Deputy Becker’s weapon were located, but he reported that he was fully loaded with 18 rounds prior to the beginning of shift and 10 rounds were removed from his weapon after the shooting.

\(^{11}\) It was originally reported that Deputy Rodriguez fired 19 rounds. A review of the shell casings discovered at the scene, video and audio recordings from several patrol vehicles, the capacity of his magazines, and the number of live rounds in his possession after the shooting, it was determined that he fired 18 rounds.

Coroner’s Report

The Sacramento County Coroner’s Office conducted an autopsy of Mikel McIntyre and determined the cause of death was multiple gunshot wounds. The information and descriptions below are taken from the Coroner’s Report. Specifically, the report identified five gunshot entry wounds, three gunshot exit wounds, and two tangential wounds:

1. Gunshot entry wound to the right side of the back. The direction of the gunshot wound was back to front, slightly right to left and slightly upward. The projectile was recovered and preserved for testing.
2. Gunshot entry wound to the right arm. The direction of the gunshot wound was back to front. Multiple projectile fragments were recovered and preserved for testing.
3. Gunshot entry wound to the left forearm and exit wound in the left forearm. The direction of the gunshot wound was slightly back to front, right to left, and downward.
4. Gunshot entry wound to the right thigh and exit wound right thigh. The direction of the gunshot wound was back to front and left to right.
5. Gunshot entry wound to the left thigh and exit wound left thigh. The direction of the gunshot wound was back to front, right to left, and upward.
6. Tangential gunshot wound of the head. At the top of the head there was an elongated linear wound consistent with a tangential gunshot wound with no underlying skull fracture or intracranial injury. The direction of the gunshot could not be determined.

7. Tangential gunshot wound of the left little finger. The direction of the gunshot was front to back and right to left.

Toxicology Results
Blood alcohol and toxicology tests were conducted by the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office Crime Lab.

The toxicology report listed the presence of the following:

- Diazepam\(^\text{12}\) 7.6 ng/mL
- Caffeine

Physical Evidence Examination Report
The Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office Crime Lab conducted an analysis of the weapons possessed by Deputies Wright, Becker, and Rodriguez to determine which weapon fired the shell casings recovered from the shooting scenes, and the projectile and projectile fragments recovered from McIntyre. As noted from the Coroner’s report, projectiles were recovered from only two of the wounds, wounds #1 and #2 above.

The report identified:
- Deputy Wright’s weapon fired the two shell casings recovered from the scene near the Red Roof Inn on Olson Drive.
- Deputy Becker’s weapon fired the four shell casings recovered from the vegetation area adjacent to the Zinfandel Drive overpass. Deputy Becker’s weapon also fired the projectile and projectile fragments recovered from McIntyre (wounds 1 & 2 above).
- Deputy Rodriguez gun fired the 18 shell casings recovered from the westbound traffic lanes of US 50.

USE OF FORCE ASSESSMENT

Legal Issues - Background
The 4th and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution provide the foundation for deadly use of force policies in the United States. Federal court guidelines stem from the benchmark 1985 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner. This ruling held that the Tennessee statute that permitted police officers to use deadly force in arresting non-dangerous fleeing felons was unconstitutional. This ruling sanctioned the use of deadly force only to “protect the officer and others from what is reasonably believed to be a threat of death or serious bodily harm,” (or) “if it is necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing violent felon whom the officer

\(^\text{12}\) Common name is Valium. [https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-6306/diazepam-oral/details](https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug-6306/diazepam-oral/details)
has probable cause to believe will pose a significant threat of serious physical injury to the officer or others."13

Injury from Thrown Objects
The rocks McIntyre used to assault Deputies Wright and Becker were weapons of opportunity. The evidence supports that he retrieved rocks from the surrounding area and used them to assault the deputies in an apparent attempt to escape. These types of rocks are occasionally used in landscaping and scattered along the sides of roadways in the area.

The risk of great bodily injury or death from a thrown rock has several variables including mass, velocity, and distance. The kinetic energy generated by mass and velocity, combined with the shape of the rock and location of the injury are associated factors in potential injury or death. A large thrown rock will lose speed and kinetic energy more quickly, and therefore have the greatest potential for serious injury or death at a close distance. Whereas a thrown smaller rock may have more initial velocity and greater potential distance, and therefore more kinetic energy at a certain point than a larger rock. In general, a somewhat lighter object traveling at high speed will cause more damage than a heavier object traveling at low speed.14

When McIntyre struck Deputy Wright in the back of the head with a large rock at a close distance, the likelihood of serious injury or death was high. This is because the severity of injuries inflicted by blunt force trauma is dependent on the amount of kinetic energy transferred and the tissue to which the energy is transferred.15

Although McIntyre had a smaller rock when he assaulted Deputy Becker, the momentum McIntyre had when he threw the rock allowed for greater velocity and the potential for great bodily injury or death.

Adding to the risk associated with a thrown object is the potential to daze or render an officer unconscious, thus leaving them vulnerable to having one or more of their weapons taken from them. The potential loss of a weapon would create a serious risk of death or great bodily injury to the officer, responding officers, and the community.

Incident Analysis
The purpose of this review is to determine issues related to tactics, policies, procedures and training. To complete a comprehensive review, this analysis relied on all information available including facts known and not known to the deputies at the time they used deadly force. This hindsight approach, while not appropriate to determine reasonableness of an officer’s actions,

13 https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e10129513-Collaborative-Reform-Process_FINAL.pdf
15 Batalis, Nicholas.
16 The kinetic energy associated with a moving object is equal to one half the mass of that object multiplied by the velocity of the object squared (1/2 mv^2).
provides a more thorough examination of events resulting in recommendations for change that may not have been identified with a more limited review focused on determining reasonableness based on what an officer knew at the time.

At the center of this analysis is:

- Did McIntyre pose an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death to officers or the community?
- Was there a likelihood McIntyre would escape and if so was it likely he would pose an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or death?

There are two distinctly different set of events and related facts associated with this officer involved shooting review. The first involves the use of deadly force near the Red Roof Inn. After arriving at the scene, Deputy Wright attempted to detain McIntyre while he investigated a reported assault. McIntyre resisted being detained causing Deputy Wright to stumble and fall to the ground. With Deputy Wright on the ground, McIntyre grabbed a large river rock and threw it from a short distance at Deputy Wright striking Deputy Wright in the head. While Deputy Wright was dazed, McIntyre picked up a second rock but did not further assault Deputy Wright when witnesses yelled at him. Deputy Wright stated he was able to get to his feet, and fearing that McIntyre would continue his assault, fired two rounds at McIntyre. Although dazed from a head wound, Deputy Wright had enough awareness to recognize the Hooters restaurant was in the background and stopped firing.

The second set of events surround the uses of deadly force on US 50 near Zinfandel Drive. When Deputy Becker first fired, McIntyre had just thrown a large rock at him with enough velocity that the assault could have resulted in serious injury or death. The immediate reaction from Deputy Wright to the assault was to fire his handgun at McIntyre. The first few rounds were fired as McIntyre passed from Deputy Becker’s left to his right. When Deputy Becker fired, he was slightly above McIntyre shooting downward which resulted in two of his rounds travelling onto the roadway with the first round striking the right lane (W-6) of US 50 and ricocheting across the westbound lanes of traffic. The second of the two ricocheted rounds travelled in the direction of a westbound vehicle and Deputy Rodriguez.

After McIntyre passed by Deputy Becker there was a brief pause in his shooting. When Deputy Becker resumed shooting, he was still slightly above the roadway surface shooting toward McIntyre as he fled. Although westbound traffic had been stopped by responding officers, approximately five vehicles were travelling down range placing them in the general direction Deputy Becker was firing.

Deputy Becker stated that he fired the last 4-5 rounds at McIntyre because he assumed McIntyre choked a “random female,” tried to kill Deputy Wright, assaulted him, and “this isn’t going to stop unless he gets stopped.” Although Deputy Becker believed that his shooting did not create
a risk to other officers or the public, a review of available evidence suggests that multiple vehicles and Deputy Rodriguez were in the background of several rounds fired by Deputy Becker.

Deputy Rodriguez responded to the area because of the assault of Deputy Wright. He also recognized the description of McIntyre from the earlier call he handled in the Rosemont area. When he arrived and parked on the center median of eastbound US 50, he could see McIntyre and he recognized him from the interaction they had earlier that day. He also saw a Sheriff’s sergeant stopped along the center divider of US 50, and he saw a patrol vehicle trailing along the retaining wall below McIntyre. Deputy Rodriguez continued to watch as McIntyre moved west along the top of the retaining wall under Zinfandel Drive. To assist in apprehending McIntyre, Rodriguez started to cross the six lanes of westbound US 50. At this point, he observed McIntyre throw a rock at Deputy Becker and flee west along the roadway shoulder. As McIntyre fled, Deputy Rodriguez began firing when he was in the W-3 lane and continued advancing and firing until he was in the W-5 lane.

Deputy Rodriguez stated in his interview that he was concerned that McIntyre would be able to escape, and based upon the information about the assault on Deputy Wright, and the assault he just witnessed on Deputy Becker, he used his firearm to “disable the threat.” Deputy Rodriguez stated he was worried McIntyre may continue to flee south across the westbound lanes of traffic, into the eastbound lanes, and potentially into the area south of US 50.

After McIntyre passed by Deputy Becker, he reached a distance where options existed to avoid the additional use of deadly force. The distance in this situation was enough to allow the officers to react to any new threats of a thrown rock without placing themselves or others in jeopardy.

The evidence supports that McIntyre was at times an imminent threat to deputies. He was clearly violent in his attempts to escape, and he injured two deputies and a canine. However, his weapon was one of opportunity, and the potential for lethality was influenced by proximity and velocity. He used rocks from the surrounding landscape to throw at deputies in an attempt to escape. When McIntyre was close, and armed with a rock in his hand ready to throw, his was an imminent threat of great bodily injury or death. As the distance between McIntyre and the deputies increased, the risk of serious injury or death decreased, and with it, the need for deadly force. If McIntyre had been able to stop and retrieve another rock from the ground, or while running reached into his pocket and grabbed a rock[1], the deputies had enough distance and time to assess the new set of facts and determine if deadly force was reasonable or if less lethal options were more appropriate.

Additionally, there were adequate resources on the ground with three officers on foot, six officers driving marked vehicles, and a canine for a total of nine law enforcement officers, to isolate and contain McIntyre without firing additional shots, as is evident from the fact that this is how the situation was resolved. There was also a CHP fixed wing aircraft above, a Sheriff’s Department helicopter responding, as well as additional officers. With the number of officers and
police vehicles at the scene, the barriers provided by the freeway sound wall, and the distance McIntyre would have to run to get across the freeway or up the on-ramp, an escape was unlikely.

Not all of these facts were known to the deputies, with each deputy focused on their own actions and unique surroundings. However, continuing to use deadly force and not using the resources available to contain McIntyre demonstrates a need to improve situational awareness, improve decision making on when to transition from deadly force to less lethal force, increase less lethal options, improve decision making in stressful situations, improve command and control, and develop robust after action reviews.

The events surrounding the use of deadly force were fast and chaotic. From the moment Deputy Wright arrived near the Ross store to the time McIntyre was taken into custody was seven minutes. During that time, McIntyre traveled approximately one-third of a mile, resisted and assaulted Deputy Wright, assaulted Deputy Becker and his canine, and fled until he was arrested. During that time, three deputies fired a total of 28 rounds, striking McIntyre seven times. There are instances where the number of rounds fired at McIntyre were excessive, unnecessary, and put the community at risk. While chaos in these situations is a reality, the ability to make sound and reasonable decisions is essential.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The information considered during this review indicates that Sheriff’s Department policies, equipment, and training related to use of deadly force and de-escalation need update and change.

After Action Review
An after-action review (AAR) is a professional discussion of an event, focused on performance standards, that enables deputies to discover for themselves what happened, why it happened, and how to sustain strengths and improve on weaknesses. With a goal of improving future performance the AAR requires:

- Candid insights into specific deputy, supervisor, and department strengths and weaknesses from various perspectives.
- Feedback and insight critical to performance improvement.
- Details often lacking in the current review processes.

The process itself is an active discussion centered around four key questions:

1. What did we intend to accomplish?
2. What actually happened?
3. Why did it happen that way?

4. What will we do for a better outcome in the future?

“An after action review allows you to think better because their purpose is to question any and all previously held assumptions and beliefs, inciting greater curiosity.”\(^{18}\)

An AAR of this incident would seek to identify why some deputies assessed the risk of shooting in a public place differently than others, or why a deputy who observed McIntyre fleeing without a rock in his hand, chose to holster his firearm and transition to less lethal force, while others chose deadly force. Each of the circumstances was different for each deputy, and discussing the differences and similarities would help to better understand the totality of events, and identify areas of strength as well as areas needing improvement or change.

**Recommendation**

1. The Sheriff’s Department conduct robust after action reviews of critical incidents, including officer involved shootings. The after action review is not a Tactical Review Board, but a review designed to analyze what happened, why it happened, and how it can be done better. Included in the after action are participants, supervisors, leaders of the incident, and independent experts.

**Video and Audio**

This review was aided by the ability to view video including in-car camera, aircraft video, videos posted to YouTube, and private surveillance video. While all Sheriff’s patrol vehicles are equipped with in-car video, none of the deputies involved wore the body worn microphones hence, audio was limited to microphones in the vehicles. Body worn cameras would have greatly enhanced the thoroughness of this review.

**Recommendation**

2. The Sheriff’s Department issue body worn cameras to all sworn personnel.

**Training**

Law enforcement is a profession that requires officers to make decisions under rapidly changing conditions, with limited information, that potentially could result in serious injury or death. How officers respond in these situations is influenced by patterns formed through education, training, and experience. The Sheriff’s Department currently requires all sworn personnel attend Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) which includes a 90-minute block of de-escalation training.

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Recommendations

3. The Sheriff’s Department review training curriculum to increase the use of Tactical Decision Games<sup>19</sup> that challenge participants to successfully resolve problems through quick, effective decision making.

4. The Sheriff’s Department review training to ensure the following decisions are included in training sessions involving the use of deadly force:
   - What is the original crime, and would the use of deadly force be justified?
   - What was the weapon and is the weapon still available to the assailant?
   - What is the likelihood of escape?
   - When is the use of deadly force no longer necessary to prevent escape?

5. The Sheriff’s Department use this incident as a case study and increase the number of hours dedicated to de-escalation during CIT courses, or create separate training dedicated to de-escalation. CIT is critical, but it is not always sufficient to produce the best outcomes in situations involving people who have a mental illness, under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, or are otherwise in crisis and behaving erratically or dangerously toward themselves or others. De-escalation training should focus on recognition of persons in crisis, tactical communication, and safe tactics as part of an overall integrated strategy designed to slow the incident and produce better outcomes.

6. The Sheriff’s Department should include scenarios across training curriculum that requires deputies to transition frequently between use of force options. This would include less lethal decisions during firearms training.

7. The Sheriff’s Department should create scenarios during use of force training that include backgrounds that potentially put others at risk.

Equipment

During the investigation, it was determined that both Deputies Becker and Rodriguez had spare ammunition magazines that were not loaded to capacity. While not common, there are instances that the springs in some magazines interfere with a deputy’s ability to fully load the magazine to capacity. Deputy Becker had a spare magazine in his magazine holder that was one round short of capacity. After Deputy Rodriguez ejected an empty magazine and reloaded, his handgun had one round in the chamber and 15 rounds in the magazine. The number of rounds in the weapon implies that Deputy Rodriguez either fired a single round from the second magazine, or failed to fully load the second magazine. Physical evidence supports that Deputy Rodriguez did not fire a single round from the second magazine but failed to fully load that magazine.

---

<sup>19</sup> Tactical Decision Games developed for the military have been used successfully in a variety of professions including law enforcement, fire service, and medicine.
Recommendations

8. The Sheriff’s Department establish a policy that requires verification and documentation that firearms and magazines are either fully loaded, or are not fully loaded, before personnel leave the range or go in-service.

Following the February 2, 2016, fatal shooting of Justin Prescot, the OIG recommended that the Sheriff’s Department should broadly deploy less lethal devices that provide a distance greater than the Taser and pepper spray. Potential options may include impact munitions as well as longer distance applications of chemical agents such as pepper balls. That recommendation was accepted by the Sheriff’s Department and the Department is currently transitioning to less lethal shotguns which will be mandatory for all field personnel to carry once fully trained. General Order 2/15 (Less Lethal Force Weapons) has been revised and training is on-going.

9. The Sheriff’s Department include less lethal options, including shotguns, in all aspects of force training.

10. The Department track the use of all less lethal weapons and conduct regular assessments of their use and effectiveness across the entire department.

Command and Control

Vehicles with data terminals, the communications center, and others can use GPS to locate and track deputies and their vehicles. During a critical incident, the practice is for an uninvolved deputy to use GPS locators to establish perimeters to contain a fleeing suspect. While useful in more stable situations, the dynamic nature of this event required that someone with more information be tasked with assisting the on-scene supervisor with additional situation status, such as the arrival of the CHP airplane, locations of units responding, and any additional information so that field unit awareness is improved.

Recommendation

11. The Sheriff’s Department review protocols and processes to improve overall command and control of complicated events that includes enhanced situational status and awareness.

Administrative Review

The Sheriff’s Department completes two reviews when deadly force is used. The first is an administrative review designed to identify misconduct. This review is conducted by Internal Affairs and initiated by executive staff. There is no written policy requiring an administrative investigation when deadly force is used. In instances when the Sheriff’s Department has conducted an Internal Affairs Investigation related to an officer involved shooting, the Department has waited for the District Attorney office to complete their review of the shooting before completing the internal investigation.

Additionally, the Sheriff’s Department has a Use of Force - Tactical Review Board. The policy clearly states the review board “...is in no way intended to be construed as an Administrative
Investigation. No portion of any finding or recommendation by the Board shall be used in any disciplinary process to establish fault or rebut allegations of fault. This shall also apply to any criminal or civil process.”

The Tactical Review Board is to determine:
1. The need for revisions to policy, procedure, or training;
2. Whether or not there was proper management of the situation by command and supervisory staff;
3. If there is a need for changes or modifications to equipment;
4. Whether or not commendatory actions are warranted.

The Sheriff’s Department also asserts in policy that the review board has privilege under Evidence Code section 1151 and is not subject to public disclosure under government Code section 6254.

Recommendations
12. The Sheriff’s Department require an Internal Administrative Investigation in all uses of deadly force by Sheriff’s personnel, whether on or off-duty. This recommendation is not intended to infer blame or fault, but intended to establish a level of review commensurate with the significances and consequences associated with the use of deadly force.

13. The Sheriff’s Department revise General Order 2/17 Use of Force – Tactical Review Board, so that the Tactical Review Board may consider all relevant information including information discovered during any review or investigation, including administrative, and if the Tactical Review Board determines additional information is required to make a recommendation, it should be allowed to make that request. Additionally, the Tactical Review Board should have an emphasis on the following:
   • Assurance of compliance to all department policies and procedures.
   • Identification and management of liability exposure created by the incident in a manner consistent with the best interests of the community, county, department, and involved personnel.
   • Identification of risk management and training issues that are identified from the incident.
   • Identification and examination of supervision and procedure.
   • Identification and examination of training, tactics, equipment used by employee, and reasonableness of the force.

14. The Sheriff’s Department publish the Tactical Review Board’s findings while complying with the confidentially requirements mandated in the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights. 

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20 General Order 2/17 (Rev 3/13) Use of Force – Tactical Review Board
21 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayText.xhtml?lawCode=GOV&division=4.&title=1.&part=&chapter=9.7.&article=
General Policy Considerations

Recommendations

15. Most of the policies reviewed for this report have not been revised in over three years. The Department should establish a policy review cycle that requires all policies be reviewed and reissued or revised on a cycle no longer than three years.\(^2^2\)

16. The Sheriff’s Department establish a centralized policy unit with full time staff assigned the responsibility of coordinating, writing, reviewing, and disseminating policies.

\(^2^2\) The Sheriff’s Department is reviewing this recommendation to determine a process to ensure a timelier review of policies.
APPENDIX

Timeline of Events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>ACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>First Incident</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:16:26 p.m.</td>
<td>Call received from Fire dispatch requesting SSD as precautionary about an ill psych patient in his 30’s (McIntyre) who locked himself in a vehicle being slightly combative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:25:52 p.m.</td>
<td>Call cancelled by Fire dispatch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:32:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Call received from family reporting that McIntyre was getting physical, attacking family members, and they sprayed him with pepper spray</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:47:14 p.m.</td>
<td>SSD called back to the house and the family reported McIntyre was outside trying to get inside the house and that he was having a nervous breakdown.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3:48:33 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputies arrived and contacted McIntyre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4:11:17 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputies cleared the call. McIntyre and family agreed it was best if he left. McIntyre was evaluated and did not meet the criteria for a mental health hold and he was advised of a misdemeanor warrant. McIntyre left without further issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Incident</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:47:57 p.m.</td>
<td>The first of several calls received by SSD reporting a male assaulting a female, choking her and trying to pull her out of the car. The assault was reported in the parking lot of the Ross Store at Olson Drive and Zinfandel Drive. The male was described as a black adult, 20’s, thin build, wearing a dark blue football jersey with number “81” on the back and front, and jeans. The male was later identified as Mikel McIntyre The female was described as a black adult in a vehicle that was registered to Brigett McIntyre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:48:58 p.m.</td>
<td>A caller reported that McIntyre walked over to the Famous Footwear.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:50:30 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Wright arrived and reported that he was with McIntyre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:50:56 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Wright reported that McIntyre was walking away towards Zinfandel Drive and Olson Drive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:51:26 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Wright reported that McIntyre was fighting, and he had him at gunpoint.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:52:12 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Wright reported shots fired, he had been hit in the head with a rock and needed code three fire. McIntyre ran from the scene west through the</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

23 All times are approximate and based on store video time indicators, 911 phone audio time stamps, and Sheriff’s dispatch logs.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6:53:26 p.m.</td>
<td>A deputy arrived to assist Deputy Wright and reported that McIntyre was last seen behind the Hooters restaurant. He also reported that Wright had a large laceration to the back of his head.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:54:06 p.m.</td>
<td>A witness reported that McIntyre was on the freeway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:55:30 p.m.</td>
<td>A patrol sergeant who was parked on US 50 radioed that he was watching McIntyre along the freeway near the Zinfandel Drive overpass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:20 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Rodriguez who had stopped his patrol vehicle along the center divider of eastbound US 50 just west of Zinfandel Drive reported on the radio that he was watching McIntyre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:32 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre was walking up a berm from the roadway level of westbound US 50 on the east side of the Zinfandel Drive overpass to the top of a retaining wall under the Zinfandel Drive overpass. Multiple Sheriff’s Deputies in patrol vehicles, including a sergeant, CHP officers, and a Sacramento County Park ranger were near the overpass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:38 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre was at the top of the retaining wall under the Zinfandel Drive overpass of US 50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:41 p.m.</td>
<td>A uniformed deputy exited a patrol vehicle and followed McIntyre up the embankment while his partner trailed in the patrol vehicle below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:42 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre started trotting westbound under the overpass on top of the retaining wall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:51 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Rodriguez climbed over the concrete center divider onto the center median of westbound Highway 50. McIntyre was still on the retaining wall above the roadway below the overpass moving west.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:53 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre leaned over the wire security railing toward a patrol vehicle below.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:54 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre neared the west end of the retaining wall and threw a rock at Deputy Becker and his canine, striking both, as McIntyre ran down the steep embankment past Deputy Becker. Deputy Becker was on-foot, partway up the west side embankment of the Zinfandel Drive overpass.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:57 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Rodriguez started crossing the six westbound lanes of US 50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:56:58 p.m.</td>
<td>Becker fired at McIntyre as he ran past. A ricochet round was observed hitting the ground in the right lane of US 50 (W-6) with a southern trajectory across the traffic lanes. A second ricochet round was observed hitting the ground west of the first round with a trajectory toward a vehicle in the W-2 lane and Deputy Rodriguez.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:00 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre was clear of Deputy Becker and continued to run west along the shoulder of US 50. Deputy Becker continued to fire with possibly up to six vehicles in the background in the westbound lanes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:01 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Rodriguez was in the center (W-3 lane) when he started firing at McIntyre as he fled away from deputies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:02 p.m.</td>
<td>When McIntyre was approximately 105 ft from Deputy Becker, near a “merge” traffic sign, Deputy Becker stopped firing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:04 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Rodriguez stopped firing as a vehicle passed behind McIntyre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:05 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Rodriguez resumed firing his handgun at McIntyre after the car passed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:09 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre continued running west along the shoulder of US 50 and as he reached the Zinfandel on-ramp for westbound US 50, Deputy Rodriguez stopped firing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:10 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre crossed over the on-ramp and slowed to a trot as he looked back at the deputies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:12 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Becker sent his canine to stop McIntyre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:18 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre stopped along the sound wall of US 50.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:19 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre started to get on the ground and looked at the approaching dog then stood up.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:20 p.m.</td>
<td>Deputy Becker’s dog contacted McIntyre, biting him as McIntyre moved farther west along the sound wall.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:22 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre went to the ground with the dog continuing to bite him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6:57:50 p.m.</td>
<td>A deputy requested the Fire Department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:01:41 p.m.</td>
<td>Sacramento Metro Fire Department arrived.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:14:00 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre was transported to the UC Davis Medical Center by Sacramento Metro Fire Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7:24:30 p.m.</td>
<td>McIntyre arrived at UC Medical Center.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1 Timeline*
Example 2
COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE

An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department

Blake Norton, Edwin E. Hamilton, Rick Braziel, Daniel Linskey & Jennifer Zeunik
COLLABORATIVE REFORM INITIATIVE
An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department

Blake Norton, Edwin E. Hamilton, Rick Braziel, Daniel Linskey & Jennifer Zeunik
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Letter from the Director

Dear colleagues,

In August of 2014, Chief John Belmar of the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) requested participation in the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRT-TA) process.

CRT-TA is a nonadversarial, voluntary process that can assist law enforcement agencies in strengthening and building mutual trust with the communities they serve. It helps agencies develop long-term strategies for sustainable, positive change through community policing principles. It is a rigorous process that requires a comprehensive assessment of key operational areas within a police department to identify issues that affect public trust, agency effectiveness, and officer safety. In collaboration with a designated technical assistance provider, the COPS Office works with agencies to analyze policies, practices, training, and tactics around specific issues.

This report summarizes the findings of the CRT-TA technical assistance team and their recommendations to help improve their department’s policies and procedures in specific areas.

I applaud Chief Belmar’s courage in making the decision to pursue collaborative reform. Though the benefits are great, a critical examination such as this takes a lot of time and effort. It also takes a commitment to being open and transparent, and in working with us hand in hand throughout this process, the SLCPD has demonstrated their dedication to doing just that. Based upon a thorough assessment of their policies, the COPS Office and SLCPD established goals in the areas of recruitment practices, leadership training, handling mass demonstrations, enforcement stops, use of force, and communication. Each of these goals aims to eliminate racial bias in policing, promote public safety, and support positive community relations. It is now incumbent on the leadership of the police department to embrace the findings and recommendations in this report and lead the department to make the changes necessary to advance the SLCPD and serve as a national model.

In doing so, it is our hope that this report will serve not only as a roadmap of reform for the SLCPD but also as a guide to the 61 police agencies in St. Louis County and a model for police departments facing similar challenges across the country.

In closing, I would like to thank the SLCPD for their efforts in this program and acknowledge their commitment to reform. I also want to thank all of those who gave a great deal of time, effort, and thought to our work in St. Louis County—especially members of the community who volunteered to assist in this process. By working together, we can implement the best practices of community policing and set an example of the collaboration, partnership, and communication that we hope to see going forward.

Sincerely,

Ronald L. Davis, Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
Acknowledgments

The authors of this report wish to thank Director Ronald L. Davis, Robert E. Chapman, Tawana Elliott, Matthew C. Scheider, Deborah L. Spence, and Melissa Fox of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office), without whom this report would not have been possible.

We would also like to thank the following individuals for their continuous support and assistance: James Bueermann, James Burch, Rebecca Benson, Daniel Woods, Michelle Boykins, Chief Jon Belmar, William Howe, and Sergeant John Wall, along with all of the St. Louis County Police Department personnel and the staff at the U.S. Department of Justice COPS Office who supported this work. Last, we would like to thank those residents, faith leaders, community members, nonprofit partners, and business owners from St. Louis County who participated in focus group meetings and conference calls with our team to help the Police Foundation team learn about the unique characteristics of St. Louis County.

Members of the Police Foundation team conducting the CRI-TA assessment with the St. Louis County Police Department include the following:

- Blake Norton, Vice President/Chief Operating Officer, Police Foundation
- Edwin E. Hamilton, Research Manager, Police Foundation
- Rick Braziel, Retired Chief, Sacramento Police Department and Executive Fellow, Police Foundation
- Ronnell Higgins, Chief, Yale University Police Department and Executive Fellow, Police Foundation
- Daniel Linskey, Retired Superintendent-in-Chief, Boston Police Department
- Hassan Aden, Retired Chief, Greenville (North Carolina) Police Department; Executive Fellow, Police Foundation; and Director of Research, International Association Chiefs of Police
- Jiles Ship, Past President, National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Officers (NOBLE)
Executive Summary

The nation was jarred by events that occurred in 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten Island, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and in 2015 in Baltimore, Maryland. These events—which followed officer-involved incidents in these American cities and around the nation—exposed deep divides between communities and their police departments. As the discord reached a fever pitch, law enforcement agencies nationwide began the process of self-evaluation, reflecting on policies and practices and implementing innovative strategies to better engender community policing principles, build trust, and allay fear.

The St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD), with 8551 authorized sworn commissioned officer positions, is responsible for providing police services to an estimated population of approximately 407,000 county residents. The population served increases to approximately 1 million when accounting for the fact that the department also provides contracted law enforcement services to 66 municipalities, 12 school districts, and five other organizations within the county. The department provides both full service contracts—in which the SLCPD is the sole police agency for a municipality and provides all police services—and dedicated patrol contracts that require the SLCPD to provide requested police services.

Approximately 60 departments in the St. Louis region serve 90 municipalities. These 60 departments possess “widely differing resources, and they provide protection across significantly diverse geographic and demographic communities.” This amalgam of departments also creates a web of overlapping jurisdictions, policies, and practices. In addition, the SLCPD operates the St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA), a regional police training facility that provides training to many law enforcement agencies in the area. Finally, mutual aid agreements in the region allow Missouri officers to respond to emergencies outside of their jurisdictions. This interdependent yet fragmented approach to policing in the area creates challenges for the SLCPD in building trusting relationships with the community. The relationship each independent municipal police department has with its community directly affects the relationship the SLCPD has with the community at large.

In its civil rights investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (FPD), the U.S. Department of Justice found heavy police enforcement existed to generate revenue through fines and fees. This culture of heavy, sometimes “aggressive,” enforcement has led to strained community relations because of abusive policing.

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2. There are 1.3 million people in St. Louis City and County. St. Louis County has a little more than 1 million people. The SLCPD is the primary law enforcement agency (including contracts) to approximately 407,000 county residents. That leaves the remaining county residents living in municipalities and receiving police services from their respective municipal police departments. However, the SLCPD also provides specialty police services at municipal police departments (by their request).
3. In addition to 66 municipalities and 12 school districts, the SLCPD provides contract law enforcement services to the Missouri Department of Housing and Urban Development; St. Louis MetroLink; Missouri Department of Conservation; Regional Computer Crime Education and Enforcement Group; and Spirit of St. Louis Airport. St. Louis County Police Department Annual Report, 31 –32 (see note 1). 
4. The SLCPD has dedicated full service patrol contracts with 16 municipalities in addition to two municipalities that hold contracts for requested patrol. It provides dispatch services for 47 municipalities (18 to which it provides patrol services and an additional 29). It also provides computer aided report entry (CARE) services for 59 (18 patrol and 41 other) municipalities. St. Louis County Police Department Annual Report, 31 –33 (see note 1).
and municipal court practices beyond just the FPD. The consequence for the SLCPD is a lack of trust by the community that exacerbated tensions during demonstrations following the shooting death of Michael Brown.

For this reason, Chief Jon Belmar of the SLCPD requested the assistance of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) in identifying ways that the SLCPD could improve its relationship with the St. Louis community. The COPS Office and the SLCPD established the following goals to assess and reform the policies, practices, and related processes in the SLCPD, taking into account national standards, best practices, current and emerging research, and community expectations:

- Improve the recruitment, selection, and hiring processes to address minority underrepresentation in the department (chapter 4).
- Enhance basic academy and supervisor in-service training with a specific focus on fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development (chapters 5–7).
- Strengthen the policies, practices, training, and response for handling protests and mass demonstrations, including de-escalation training (chapter 8).
- Improve the process quality for traffic stops and searches to prohibit racial profiling (chapter 9).
- Reduce use of force and injuries to both officers and citizens (chapters 10–11).
- Develop a comprehensive communication strategy for SLCPD personnel and community partners that will serve to increase transparency about SLCPD police practices (chapter 12).

This report is organized into chapters by goal (listed above); each analysis chapter ends with findings and recommendations made during the assessment of the SLCPD.

**Methodology**

The Police Foundation (PF) Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) assessment team used a number of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze policies, procedures, and practices in the SLCPD.

Our assessment approach involved four modes of inquiry: (1) document review, (2) interviews and focus groups, (3) direct observation, and (4) data analysis.

- The team reviewed departmental policies, manuals, training lesson plans, and strategic plans.
- Throughout the assessment process, we conducted semistructured interviews, focus groups, and meetings with SLCPD command staff and officers and with community members. In total, we interviewed more than 200 individuals for this assessment.
- We directly observed SLCPD operations throughout the assessment, including preparations for the St. Louis County grand jury decision in the case of the shooting death of Michael Brown and the civil disturbances after the announcement. In addition, we conducted ride-alongs with officers and observed recruit and in-service training sessions at the regional police academy.

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7. Ibid.
We collected, coded, and analyzed data from the SLCPD, including the use of force database and investigative reports, officer involved shooting (OIS) data and narrative reports, citizen complaint database and investigative reports, and traffic stop information.

Our team of subject matter experts used their knowledge and experience, findings from our data analysis, reviews of policies and procedures, interviews, and observations of SLCPD practices to address gaps and weaknesses identified. We relied primarily on national standards, evidence-based practices, and research to inform our findings and recommendations.

Key findings and recommendations

The PF assessment team found the SLCPD to be a competent, professional police department, well trained and disciplined in the technical skills necessary to perform police operations. While particularly proficient in the area of tactical operations, the department lacks the training, leadership, and culture necessary to truly engender community policing and to build and sustain trusting relationships with the community.

The assessment team made 50 findings and 109 recommendations for adjustment to SLCPD policy and procedures to improve operations and relationships between the department and the community it serves. Below are some of the key findings and recommendations. Please note that this is an abbreviated list and that each finding and recommendation has been truncated in an effort to highlight key points.

Goal: Improve the recruitment, selection, and hiring processes to address minority underrepresentation in the department.

Finding: The SLCPD does not represent the diversity of the population it serves. Compared to the population of St. Louis County, Blacks are significantly underrepresented in the commissioned ranks of police officer and police sergeant, and while the SLCPD has made efforts to increase minority representation in the command ranks the department remains moderately under representative of the community in the ranks of lieutenant and captain.

Women are also underrepresented in all ranks of the department. Currently, of the 13 SLCPD captains, only one is female. In addition, the department has only three female, in comparison to 26 male, lieutenants. The assessment team also noted the lack of inclusion of female leadership in all executive-level meetings between the assessment team and the SLCPD. (4.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should develop a strategic plan for officer recruitment, focused on race and gender diversity, to include attention to recruiting, promotion, and retention of minorities and women. They should conduct a scan of organizations that have successfully overcome recruiting barriers and develop a plan with goals, objectives, and outcome measures. This plan should be articulated to the rank-and-file officers and reviewed annually to respond to any changing demographics in the metropolitan area. (4.1.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should create a community recruiter program that identifies and trains community leaders to serve as SLCPD recruiters. (4.1.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should track and publicly report, at least annually, demographic information of current employees, employees who have left the organization, and applicants who have applied to the department. (4.1.3)
Recommendation: The SLCPD should consider creating a diversity council representing gender, ethnic, racial, LGBT, and linguistic minorities to serve as advisors and champions for the chief and SLCPD command staff to support recruitment efforts focused on youth, newcomer populations, and gender diversity. (4.1.4)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should create a youth advisory council representing youth from schools throughout the county who will serve as advisors to the chief and command staff on ways to engage the community’s youth and on potential barriers to recruiting St. Louis youth into policing. (4.1.5)

Goal: Enhance basic academy and supervisor in-service training with a specific focus on fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

Finding: The St. Louis CMPA provides insufficient training hours devoted to community engagement, diversity, and community policing elements during SLCPD basic recruit training. Of the 916 hours of basic recruit training, only 14 hours are devoted to these topics. (5.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should include fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development in basic academy curriculum. The foundation of recruit training should be modified to include courses on policing history and professionalism, community policing, and community engagement strategies. (5.1.1)

Finding: The CMPA does not sufficiently use experts in the area of cultural diversity. Most CMPA trainers do not have the expertise necessary to teach officers about cultural diversity, youth issues, and newcomer populations; nor does the SLCPD regularly engage youth or diverse populations as part of the standard recruit training program (or in-service or postpromotional training). (5.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should invite university instructors and members of community-based organizations and other subject matter experts in cultural diversity, youth issues, and newcomer populations to serve as guest lecturers. Instructors who are identified as subject matter experts on cultural diversity should have a curriculum vitae (CV) that reflects the necessary expertise. (5.2.1)

Finding: Based on interviews with instructional staff, instructors at the CMPA are not subject matter experts in areas such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development. The majority of academy instructors are assigned full time and are experts in their assigned areas. However, impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development are key principles that should be woven into nearly every course of instruction. All instructors should be knowledgeable in these principles and their application. (5.4)

Recommendation: All instructors authorized to teach at the St. Louis CMPA should complete train-the-trainer or similar courses in the areas of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development. (5.4.1)

Recommendation: St. Louis CMPA curricula should be modified to create themes relating to police legitimacy, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, community policing, and building community trust that can be woven into all academy classes. All instructors should, where appropriate, attempt to weave these themes through all instructional material. Appropriate evaluation instruments beyond written exams should be used to measure application of the instruction. (5.4.2)
Finding: SLCPD personnel with TAC/SWAT experience are selected for promotion at significantly higher rates than those without. (6.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should review informal and formal reward systems to recognize and promote an increased emphasis on community engagement, problem-solving experience, and trust building with the community. Successes in these areas should be given prominent consideration for assignments and promotion. (6.1.2)

Finding: The SLCPD does not require sufficient mandated in-service training that addresses community engagement or community policing. The in-service training program currently provides the state-required racial profiling information, legal updates, and programs that address current issues such as use (and misuse) of social media. If an officer is interested in any community policing training, they must take a related course provided by the CMPA through continuing education, or seek an outside provider. (7.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should modify its in-service training to adequately address community policing, problem-oriented policing, and the historical impact on police-community relations. (7.1.1)

Goal: Strengthen the policies, practices, training, and response for handling protests and mass demonstrations.

Finding. While SLCPD officers understand NIMS terms and most concepts, they lack organization-wide understanding, experience, and proper application of NIMS. The SLCPD has not fully implemented key concepts of NIMS command and management, including ICS, multiagency coordination systems, and public information. Department General Order (GO) 11-49 identifies the purpose, policy, and procedure for implementation of ICS and also includes training requirements as prescribed in NIMS, yet many employees do not understand NIMS.9 (8.1)

Recommendation: While requirements mandate law enforcement training in NIMS10 and ICS,11 the SLCPD should require that supervisors and incident commanders with actual experience be available to respond to requests for assistance during incidents of civil disorder. (8.1.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should require that ICS, including standardized ICS forms, be used during planned special events such as parades, presidential visits, large-scale gatherings, and sporting events. This will provide opportunities to implement and practice protocols so that they are better deployed during response to events that develop rapidly. In addition, by policy, training, and practice, NIMS should be a day-to-day operational norm for the SLCPD. For example, search warrants should use command and management including an ICS structure and, when appropriate, multiagency coordination and public information. (8.1.2)

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8. The SLCPD uses the term “TAC” to identify what most agencies call “SWAT.” This report uses “TAC/SWAT” in place of “TAC” for the reader’s ease of understanding.

9. Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 11-49 (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2011).


11. The Incident Command System (ICS) is a standardized management tool for meeting the demands of small or large emergency or nonemergency situations. It represents best practices and has become the standard for emergency management across the country. ICS may be used for planned events, natural disasters, and acts of terrorism and is a key feature of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). Incident Command System Training (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 2008), http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/is/icresource/assets/reviewmaterials.pdf.
Recommendation: The SLCPD incident commander should be required to ensure that a comprehensive incident action plan (IAP) is completed as described in NIMS and that any officer who responds to a mutual aid request is well informed of the IAP, including rules of engagement and disengagement and use of force policies. Senior staff should verify dissemination and understanding of this information by those on the front lines. (8.1.3)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should develop a policy that details the deployment of civil disturbance response teams (CDRT). The policy should address the other recommendations and concerns noted in this section. (8.1.4)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should continue to regularly train and exercise with all potential mutual aid responders. (8.1.5)

Recommendation: Department GO 11-49 should be revised to include appropriate recommendations identified in this report. (8.1.6)

Finding: In August of 2014, the SLCPD had difficulty anticipating the extent of concern from communities it does not usually police and therefore did not properly plan for potential resulting protests. By not identifying the potential for large-scale violent protests, officers reacted to problems instead of taking a proactive approach to preventing them. While this improved following the incidents in August, additional attention is required. (8.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should include community leaders in the response planning process and inform and educate the public about potential police response plans. (8.2.1)

Recommendation: As authorized by law, the SLCPD should use social media monitoring programs along with community source(s) development to encourage and enhance real-time actionable intelligence on issues emerging in the community. (8.2.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should use social media to engage the community and protesters before, during, and after events to disseminate accurate information and correct erroneous information. (8.2.3)

Finding: The SLCPD does not have policies that ensure that they always exhaust other de-escalation options before using tactical responses to disorder and protests. (8.5)

Recommendation: SLCPD policy should require that officers familiar with the area and the community deploy before tactical teams. As they did in November 2014, the SLCPD should continue to assign officers who are skilled at community engagement to the front lines as situations develop. This recommendation in conjunction with the tiered approach in finding 8.4 reduces the overreliance on a tactical response by SLCPD. (8.5.1)

Finding: The SLCPD lacks documented comprehensive training in the psychology of crowds and de-escalation. (8.8)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should provide training based on best practices for crowd management issues, including the psychology of crowds, to improve frontline supervisors’ and officers’ decision making. Trainers from outside the department should be considered to assist with delivery of a diverse curriculum. (8.8.1)
Recommendation: The SLCPD should provide training that stresses the safe withdrawal of officers from the scene as soon as the situation allows it as a means to decrease tensions during protests. (8.8.2)

Goal: Improve the process quality for vehicle stops, searches, and arrests to prohibit racial profiling.

Finding: While consistent with Missouri data collection law, the traffic stop analysis procedures employed by the SLCPD are inconsistent across the agency and lack the sophistication necessary for appropriate analysis of stop data. This results in a missed opportunity to fully understand if bias-based profiling is occurring. The SLCPD has established a threshold requiring the review of an officer’s stop activity if 20 percent or more of the officer’s stops during a three-month period are stops of minority drivers. The assessment team’s review of the SLCPD’s efforts described in GO 07-81 revealed a process that lacks appropriate documentation, is inconsistent among divisions, and lacks a review process that demonstrates an understanding of analysis methods necessary for a comprehensive review of traffic stop data. (9.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should conduct a comprehensive and rigorous study of traffic stop practices. (9.1.1)

Finding: The SLCPD does not collect and analyze information on pedestrian stops made by officers. (9.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should collect pedestrian stop data for additional analysis of its stop practices. The SLCPD should also collect data on pedestrian stops to more thoroughly address the potential issue of racially biased policing. Information from pedestrian stops should include, at a minimum, the race or ethnicity and gender of the individual(s) stopped, reason for the stop, whether a search was conducted and contraband found, whether an arrest occurred and reason for the arrest, and the location of the stop. (9.2.1)

Finding: The SLCPD’s General Order (GO) 07-81, which establishes policies and procedures for citizen contacts and traffic stop information, is outdated. The policy needs to be modified to reflect current law enforcement practices that provide guidance for avoiding biased policing. The GO has not been revised since 2007 and lacks sufficient guidance for officers on relevant issues of biased policing. (9.4)

Recommendation: SLCPD executive staff should review and modify the existing GO 07-81. The revised policy should emphasize the specific purpose of the policy to include commitment to treating all citizens in a fair and equitable manner. Definitions of biased policing and racial profiling should be provided in the policy as well as procedures to be followed when initiating enforcement action (stopping, detaining, searching, etc.) to avoid the perception of bias.

The purpose of the policy should state unequivocally that during any encounter with citizens, the officer is responsible for treating the citizen in a fair, equitable, and objective manner, in accordance with the law and without consideration of the citizen’s race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or any other identifiable group.

12. Contraband refers to items (e.g., drugs, weapons) illegally transported as defined by federal, state, or local laws.
The modified policy should include a concise definition of what constitutes biased policing and how it relates to officers’ performance of enforcement duties as well as the delivery of police services. Separate definitions for probable cause and reasonable suspicion should also be more clearly defined in the policy. (9.4.1)

Recommendation: As the SLCPD revises GO 07-81, the SLCPD should ensure that the revised GO is followed by training that mirrors the guidance for officer behavior during encounters, including but not limited to being courteous and professional, providing a reason for the stop, providing the citizen his or her badge number when requested, and offering an explanation if the officer determines that the reasonable suspicion for the stop was unfounded (e.g., investigatory stop). Research on racially biased policing has consistently found13 that minority citizens are more likely to suspect that police stops are racially motivated if officers treated them discourteously or did not inform them of the reason for the stop. Focusing on direct and respectful communication between the officer and citizen during encounters will strengthen perceptions of county residents that SLCPD officers exhibit a high degree of professionalism and accountability in conducting duties. (9.4.2)

Finding: The SLCPD currently does not include analyses of stop data in the annual reports provided for the public. (9.6)

Recommendation: Once improvements have been made to policy and practice governing data collection, benchmarking, and analysis, the SLCPD should include vehicle and pedestrian stop data and analysis with appropriate benchmarking for interpretation in published annual reports. Care should be taken to ensure that data cannot be misconstrued but are presented in their true and honest form. Providing this information in an easily accessible location (in the annual report, on the department’s website, etc.) will increase transparency, accountability, and dialogue with the public. (9.6.1)

Goal: Reduce use of force and injuries to both officers and citizens.

Finding: The SLCPD does not thoroughly investigate the use of deadly force in all situations. In particular, GO 10-29 does not require the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons to investigate the discharge of a firearm by an officer if both (a) it causes no injury and (b) the officer is not the victim of a first-degree assault. (10.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should revise GO 10-29 to require the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons to investigate all uses of deadly force by an officer against another person irrespective of injury. (10.1.1)

Finding: The SLCPD has not yet made full use of the IAPro software that was first implemented in 2012. (10.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should provide officers assigned to the BPS with Blue Team system training on the proper way to document incidents in a more comprehensive and accurate report format. (10.2.1)

Finding: The SLCPD may be unintentionally limiting complaints by not publicizing the acceptance of anonymous complaints and the locations where complaints may be made. The SLCPD accepts and investigates all complaints, including those made anonymously. However, the presence of a signature line on the Citizen Complaint Statement (F-332) may intimidate some citizens and discourage them from making a complaint. (11.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should review all printed material and its website to reinforce the openness of the complaint process including a listing of all locations where a complaint is accepted and the ability of a citizen to make an anonymous complaint.  

(11.1.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should remove the signature line on the Citizen Complaint Statement (F-332). A signature, although not required, appears to be necessary to complete the form. The mere presence of the signature line appears to conflict with the openness of accepting anonymous complaints.  

(11.1.2)

Finding: The SLCPD currently uses a traditional punitive form of punishment in response to a sustained complaint. For serious allegations, this comes in the form of reprimands, suspensions, demotions, and termination. This usually results in an adversarial relationship between the employee and department, which may leave employees bitter and not address the cause of the misconduct.  

(11.2)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should consider moving to an education-based discipline (EBD) process. Many agencies including the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the Sacramento (California) Police Department, and the Lakewood (Colorado) Police Department have successfully implemented EBD and seen reductions in citizen-generated complaints.  

(11.2.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should establish a St. Louis County Police-Community Mediation Program. The program uses a trained independent party to mediate citizen complaints against police employees. The mediation allows both the employee and the citizen to discuss their issues in a safe and impartial environment. The employee and community member are able to collaborate with each other rather than treat each other as adversaries and to have their complaints dealt with in an efficient manner. The goal is to build more understanding and better relations between the community and the SLCPD.  

(11.2.2)

Finding: During the review of Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS) files, the assessment team discovered a pattern of light discipline in investigations involving ethical failings and untruthfulness.  

(11.4)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should establish a disciplinary matrix for officer misconduct to increase consistency. Particular attention should be placed on allegations of ethical failings and dishonesty.  

(11.4.1)

Goal: Develop a comprehensive communication strategy for SLCPD personnel and community partners that will increase transparency about SLCPD police practices.  

Finding: The SLCPD often places more value on technical and tactical proficiency than on investments in community policing such as community engagement and problem solving.  

(12.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should seek out and identify ways to embed the philosophies of community policing, procedural justice, and equity into the culture of the organization.  

(12.1.1)

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15. Depending on the severity and type of the offense, an employee is offered alternatives to punitive discipline that may range from a research paper, courses in subjects such as ethics, additional training, or any creative option the department believes will correct the underlying problem. The original proposed discipline remains on the officer’s record as per department policy.
Recommendation: SLCPD command leadership and union representatives should identify ways to incentivize and reward officer performance in community engagement, problem solving, and trust building beyond the standard crime reduction metrics. (12.1.2)

Finding: The SLCPD does not have an explicit policy or documented philosophy to serve as a set of guiding principles for community policing. The department makes reference to neighborhood policing in public and departmental policies and procedures and has this as one of the key pillars for officer evaluation. (12.2)

Recommendation: SLCPD leadership should conduct a scan of community policing and stakeholder engagement best practices in preparation for defining their community policing strategies. (12.2.1)

Recommendation: SLCPD leadership should conduct outreach to other jurisdictions that have successfully integrated problem solving, prevention, and intervention strategies as part of their overall response to crime and disorder. (12.2.2)

Recommendation: After the environmental scan, SLCPD leadership, line level officers, and community stakeholders should engage in a strategic planning process to develop a formal community policing strategy, policy, and blueprint for implementation across the SLCPD. (12.2.3)

Recommendation: Using this blueprint, the SLCPD should develop a realistic timeline and strategic plan to implement the community policing strategy. This timeline should incorporate community oriented policing throughout the department and enable every officer on patrol and in other units with public contact to provide community policing services. (12.2.4)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should ensure that community policing includes respectful engagement and joint problem solving with members of the community through neighborhood- and block-level partnerships involving adults and youth in the community, through citizen advisory councils, or through expansion of the current neighborhood crime watch program. (12.2.5)

Finding: There is evidence that there are youth in the St. Louis community who fear and distrust the police. The PF assessment team spoke with young people who said they often do not understand police actions and believe that the police do not understand them. The SLCPD has work to do to ensure that the youth of the St. Louis community are regularly and meaningfully engaged. (12.5)
Recommendation: The SLCPD should create and maintain a series of police-youth dialogues. This will allow youth and police officers to potentially curb conflict and increase trust and cooperation in neighborhoods most affected by violence and crime. Bringing together youth and police of racially and ethnically diverse groups to build dialogue guided by professional facilitators could help to break down stereotypes and communication barriers to build mutual respect and understanding. (12.5.1)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should create a board of young adult police commissioners made up of juniors and seniors from several city high schools. This commission would be a group of young people who work with the SLCPD chief to bridge the gap between young adults and SLCPD officers. (12.5.2)

Recommendation: The St. Louis CMPA should consider having youth participate in the community engagement training for academy recruits. This would entail having a panel discussion with youth focused on youth culture and perceptions of police. (12.5.3)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should consider partnering with county schools, faith- and community-based organizations, and other community stakeholders to create youth programs (such as Junior Police Academies) free of charge for children ages seven to 14 years. (12.5.4)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should work with the courts, schools, and other social service entities to create a diversion program for youth offenders. (12.5.5)

**Finding: Community trust in the SLCPD is negatively impacted by the enforcement practices of several municipal police departments within St. Louis County.** The reduced level of trust by those subjected to heavy enforcement practices affects the SLCPD’s ability to develop relations with the community. (12.6)

Recommendation: The SLCPD should take a leadership role in the development of fair and impartial policing practices countywide. This could be accomplished in many ways including education, training, advising, and taking a public stand against agencies that have a perceived or proven unethical culture of abusing the community. (12.6.1)

**Finding: The overall structure of the SLCPD website is difficult to navigate as a user and does not convey clear messages to users.** (12.7)

Recommendation: The website should have a significant redesign to maximize its utility as a public resource. (12.7.1)
Chapter 1. Introduction

Safe and effective delivery of policing services depends on a community’s trust in its police department. Recent events in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten Island, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and, most recently, Baltimore, Maryland, have brought the national spotlight to existing tension between some communities and their law enforcement agencies. Protest mantras such as “Black lives matter,” “Hands up, don’t shoot,” and “I can’t breathe” portray the passionate discord of communities in crisis. Some law enforcement agencies nationwide have begun the process of self-evaluation, reflecting on policies and practices that may have alienated segments of the community and implementing innovative strategies to better engender community policing principles, build trust, and allay fear.

Recently, President Barack Obama convened a special task force to address the issues facing police and the communities they serve. The mission of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was to “examine how to foster strong, collaborative relationships between local law enforcement, and the communities they protect” and to make recommendations to the President on “how policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building public trust.” The task force held listening sessions to hear from experts in the areas of building trust and legitimacy, policy and oversight, technology and social media, community policing and crime reduction, training and education, officer safety and wellness, and the future of community policing. The final report of the task force provides a number of critical recommendations for building communities of trust. The tenets of many of those recommendations and the community policing philosophy on which they are based are echoed throughout this report.

COPS Office Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance

In 2011, the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) developed the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) to work with law enforcement agencies facing challenges—such as use of force and biased policing—in forming trusting, collaborative relationships with their communities. According to the COPS Office, “the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance is an independent and objective way to transform a law enforcement agency through an analysis of policies, practices, training, tactics and accountability methods around key issues facing law enforcement today.” The program provides an opportunity for agencies engaged in operational problems or contentious relationships with their community to remedy their own issues through an intensive, facilitated collaborative reform process.

In 2014, the COPS Office selected the Police Foundation (PF) as a provider for CRI-TA. The purpose of the PF CRI-TA is to provide support to law enforcement agencies in building community relationships and operational capacity through sustainable organizational transformation.

17. Ibid.
Chapter 1. Introduction

Collaborative reform in the St. Louis County (Missouri) Police Department

In August of 2014, a Ferguson (Missouri) Police Department officer shot and killed Michael Brown. During the days, weeks, and months following that officer-involved shooting, members of the Ferguson and surrounding communities showed their outrage over the death of Brown—a young, unarmed Black man—through protests, riots, and demonstrations, often involving violent interactions with police.

Because of its close proximity to Ferguson as well as the intertwined nature of policing in the St. Louis area (including a mutual aid agreement between the agencies, discussed in more detail in chapter 2 of this report), the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) responded during the demonstrations, embroiling it in the expanding rift between police and segments of the St. Louis community.

This interaction brought existing tenuous relationships between the St. Louis community and police into the spotlight and spurred scrutiny of the policies and procedures of the police departments involved. Aware of this scrutiny, SLCPD Chief Jon Belmar voluntarily requested the assistance of CRI-TA to begin the process of self-evaluation of policies and procedures in an effort to begin to rebuild relationships with the St. Louis community.

The intent of CRI-TA in the SLCPD is to review and examine existing policies, practices, and processes in the department and make recommendations for improving the delivery of services internally and externally. To accomplish this, the assessment team conducted a problem assessment (phase I); researched and analyzed data (phase II); produced findings and recommendations (phase III); and will monitor and assist the agency with continued self-evaluation (phase IV).

The COPS Office and the SLCPD established goals to assess and reform policies, practices, and related processes in the SLCPD, taking into account national standards, best practices, current and emerging research, and community expectations. The COPS Office and the SLCPD agreed on the following goals:

- Improve the recruitment, selection, and hiring processes to address minority underrepresentation in the department.
- Enhance basic academy and supervisor in-service training with a specific focus on fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.
- Strengthen the policies, practices, training, and response for handling protests and mass demonstrations, including de-escalation training.
- Improve the process quality for traffic stops, searches and arrest to prohibit racial profiling.
- Reduce use of force and injuries to both officers and citizens.
- Develop a comprehensive communication strategy for SLCPD personnel and community partners that will serve to increase transparency about SLCPD police practices.
Organization of this report

This report is organized around the goals and objectives (listed above) outlined in the SLCPD and COPS Office agreement. During the assessment process, the PF identified a series of issue areas that are also woven into the larger goals.

Chapters 2 and 3 of the report contain introduction and background information detailing SLCPD background and assessment methodology.

Chapters 4 focuses on the goal of improving recruitment, selection, and hiring processes to address minority underrepresentation on the force. It details findings and recommendations on recruitment in the SLCPD.

Chapters 5, 6, and 7 review the goal of enhancing basic academy and supervisor in-service training with a specific focus on fair and impartial policing, community, engagement, and partnership development. Chapter 5 details basic recruit training. Chapter 6 reviews promotions and postpromotional training. Chapter 7 identifies findings and recommendations for in-service training.

Chapter 8 targets the goal of strengthening the SLCPD’s policies, practices, training, and response for handling protests and mass demonstrations. It details findings and recommendations for improving responses to protests and mass demonstrations.

Chapter 9 of this report centers on improving the process quality for vehicle stops and searches to prohibit racial profiling in the SLCPD. It provides a five-year analysis of vehicle traffic stops from 2010 to 2014.

Chapters 10 and 11 explore reducing the use of force and injuries to both officers and citizens. Chapter 10 provides a five-year analysis of use of force incidents from 2009 to 2013. In addition, chapter 11 lays out a three-year analysis of citizen complaints and allegations from 2011 to 2013.

Chapter 12 examines developing a comprehensive communication strategy for SLCPD personnel and community partners that will serve to increase transparency about police practices. It provides findings and recommendations for community outreach.

Finally, chapter 13 provides conclusions and next steps for the SLCPD.
Chapter 2. St. Louis County Police Department Background

Overview

The St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD), with 855 positions, is responsible for providing police services to an estimated population of approximately 407,000 county residents. The population served increases to approximately 1 million when accounting for the fact that the department also provides contracted law enforcement services to 66 municipalities, 12 school districts, and five other organizations within the county. The department provides both full service contracts—in which the SLCPD is the sole police agency for a municipality and provides all police services—and dedicated patrol contracts that require the SLCPD to provide requested police services.

The SLCPD Board of Police Commissioners is a civilian oversight board with five members representing the citizens of St. Louis County. The Board of Police Commissioners is the final authority for the control and supervision of the SLCPD. Board members are selected from the community by the county executive and approved by the county council. The St. Louis County Charter authorizes the SLCPD Board of Police Commissioners to perform a variety of critical functions, including review and approval of all general orders (GO) or policies of the department; appointment and oversight of the chief of police (with the power to dismiss the chief); review of all external complaints (and ability to make recommendations on officer discipline) before they are presented to the chief; holding of hearings for employees appealing discipline or termination by the chief; and hearing appeals from citizens over complaint dispositions. The SLCPD Board of Police Commissioners appointed Chief Jon Belmar to the position of chief of police on January 31, 2014. Belmar has been with the SLPCD for 29 years.

Community and officer demographics

The St. Louis County community and officer demographics are important data to consider, because they lay the landscape for some of the challenges inherent in policing the area. In 2013, as outlined in table 1, the community was 70.3 percent White and 23.7 percent Black. In contrast, the SLCPD’s officers were 87 percent White and 10.2 percent Black, as outlined in table 2. In addition, women made up only 13.1 percent of the SLCPD, while men constituted 86.9 percent of the department (table 3). Finally, neither Black individuals nor women were well represented throughout the ranks of the department (table 4).

19. St. Louis County Police Department Annual Report, 5 (see note 1).
20. There are 1.3 million people in St. Louis City and County. St. Louis County has a little more than 1 million people. The SLCPD is the primary law enforcement agency (including contracts) to approximately 407,000 county residents. That leaves the remaining county residents living in municipalities and receiving police services from their respective municipal police departments. However, the SLCPD also provides specialty police services at municipal police departments (by their request).
21. In addition to 66 municipalities and 12 school districts, the SLCPD provides contract law enforcement services to the Missouri Department of Housing and Urban Development; St. Louis Metrolink; Missouri Department of Conservation; Regional Computer Crime Education and Enforcement Group; and Spirit of St. Louis Airport. St. Louis County Police Department Annual Report, 31 –32 (see note 1).
22. The SLCPD has dedicated full service patrol contracts with 16 municipalities in addition to two municipalities that hold contracts for requested patrol. It provides dispatch services for 47 municipalities (18 to which it provides patrol services and an additional 29). It also provides computer aided report entry (CARE) services for 59 (18 patrol and 41 other) municipalities. St. Louis County Police Department Annual Report, 31 –33 (see note 1).
Table 1. St. Louis County race/ethnicity, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>70.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>23.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic*</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Hispanic individuals may be of any race and are included in applicable race categories. As a result, the total may not add up to 100%.

Table 2. St. Louis County Police Department sworn officers by race/ethnicity, 2013 (N=833)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Race/Ethnicity</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>87.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native American</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. St. Louis County Police Department sworn officers by gender, 2013 (N=833)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>86.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>833</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. St. Louis County Police Department demographics by rank, 2013 (N=821)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>White</th>
<th>Black</th>
<th>Hispanic</th>
<th>Native American</th>
<th>Asian/Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief (N=1)</td>
<td>Male 100%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt. colonel (N=4)</td>
<td>Male 100%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 0%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain (N=13)</td>
<td>Male 92%</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 8%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant (N=29)</td>
<td>Male 90%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 10%</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant (N=91)</td>
<td>Male 92%</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 8%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers* (N=683)</td>
<td>Male 86%</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Female 14%</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>&lt; 1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This figure does not include police recruits attending the academy.

CALEA certification

The Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) is a voluntary, nongovernmental agency that has created a body of standards that seeks to further the professional level of service offered by local law enforcement agencies. CALEA currently offers accreditation in three areas of law enforcement through 800 individual standards of compliance (484 law enforcement, 159 training academy, 157 communications). Professional assessors examine candidate agencies every three years. Nationwide, 641 law enforcement agencies, 28 law enforcement training academies, and 82 law enforcement communications facilities are accredited through CALEA.
The SLCPD achieved initial CALEA accreditation in 1998. In addition, the St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) first received CALEA accreditation in 2008, and in 2010, the St. Louis County Police Bureau of Communications followed with initial CALEA accreditation. The department has maintained compliance with 100 percent of the applicable mandatory and other than mandatory standards for law enforcement and communications and 99 percent of the standards for training academies. In comparison, only 15 agencies in the St. Louis region (25 percent) have obtained accreditation, five through CALEA and 10 through the Missouri Police Chiefs Charitable Foundation (MPCCF).

As a CALEA accredited agency, the SLCPD serves as an example and assists other agencies within the region. The department was recognized as a Flagship Agency in 2010 and received a Meritorious Award in 2014 for having been accredited for 15 years. In addition, the SLCPD received Accreditation with Excellence following a CALEA Gold Standard Assessment in 2014. Because the department has been successfully accredited in all three areas (law enforcement, training academy, and communications), it was awarded the coveted Tri-Arc Award by CALEA in 2010. There are currently only 15 agencies in the world that hold this distinction.

**Impact of St. Louis region police agencies on SLCPD**

Across the St. Louis City and County region, approximately 60 police departments provide service to approximately 1.3 million people in 90 municipalities over 589 square miles. These 60 departments possess “widely differing resources, and they provide protection across significantly diverse geographic and demographic communities.” This amalgam of departments also creates a web of overlapping jurisdictions, policies, and practices.

Police protection is provided in several ways. Fifty-eight municipalities, St. Louis City, and the SLCPD provide police service through their own departments. Thirty-two municipalities in St. Louis County contract police patrol service. A majority (18) of these municipalities contract with the SLCPD for this patrol service. The remaining 14 municipalities contract with neighboring municipalities. Populations served by a single department range from the 298 residents served by the Kinloch Police Department to the approximately 407,000 citizens patrolled by the SLCPD throughout unincorporated St. Louis County and the 18 contracted municipalities.

The SLCPD patrols 265 square miles, including the municipalities of St. Louis County, Black Jack, Clarkson Valley, Dellwood, Fenton, Grantwood Village, Green Park, Hanley Hills, Jennings, Marlborough, Norwood Court, Pasadena Hills, Twin Oaks, Uplands Park, Valley Park, Vinita Terrace, Wilbur Park, Wildwood, and Winchester. The department has 855 authorized sworn officer positions.

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24. Dave Jones (research associate, Planning and Analysis Unit, SLCPD), "CALEA Overview," memorandum, in e-mail from John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD) to Blake Norton, Rick Braziel, and Earl Hamilton (assessment team, Police Foundation), April 3, 2015.
26. Police Report #3 (see note 6).
28. Ibid.
29. St. Louis County Police Department Annual Report (see note 1).
The CMPA, operated by the SLCSD, is a regional peace officer training academy that trains other county municipal police agencies in addition to its own recruits. The CMPA trains members of approximately 125 police departments annually.\(^{30}\) Approximately 92 police departments in the St. Louis region pay an annual tuition to attend any available CMPA classes rather than pay by the class. It averages another 33 law enforcement agencies that do not pay an annual tuition but rather pay to attend a specific class. Those agencies that pay annual tuition may also send their recruits to the CMPA basic academy, and open enrollment allows self-sponsored\(^{31}\) recruits to attend as well. The assessment team confirmed that Ferguson Police Department (FPD) officers received multi-assault counterterrorism action capabilities (MACTAC) phase II civil disturbance response team (CDRT) in-service training from the CMPA in the spring of 2014, as well as CDRT training in the fall of 2014.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) civil rights investigation of the FPD\(^{32}\) documents the focus of police enforcement in Ferguson to generate revenue through fines and fees. This culture of heavy enforcement has led to abusive policing and municipal court practices that affect community relationships beyond just the FPD.\(^{33}\)

Interviews conducted by the assessment team with community members, business leaders, and youth describe abuses similar to those described in Ferguson in many municipal jurisdictions in St. Louis County. SLCSD officers, supervisors, and executive leadership identified similar concerns with municipal police departments. Officers currently employed by the SLCSD who previously worked in other municipalities describe similar policies of enforcement for the purposes of revenue generation. Failure to write citations would result in disciplinary action.

During Police Foundation (PF) assessment team interviews, both community and SLCSD members reported that violations similar to the unconstitutional practices identified in the DOJ investigation of the FPD, including violations of community members’ First and Fourth Amendment rights, also exist in other municipal police departments within St. Louis County. These practices have eroded the trust of the community not only in the abusive departments but also in law enforcement in general. Heavy enforcement within a city also has a direct effect on the community at large. Heavy enforcement has resulted not only in fines and fees but also in a large number of bench warrants. As of June 30, 2014, there were more than 750,000 outstanding arrest warrants in St. Louis City and St. Louis County (including the cities within the county) in 2014, which is nearly three arrest warrants for every four adults.\(^{34}\) When broken down by municipalities, the numbers are more alarming. For the same reporting period, the city of Ferguson had 45,185 outstanding warrants for 21,111 residents. While not all warrants are for city residents, this is more than two arrest warrants for every resident. The city of Kinloch has more than four outstanding warrants per resident. Many of the warrants are for failing to

\(^{30}\) This number can only be approximated because it fluctuates from year to year.

\(^{31}\) Self-sponsored recruits attend the academy on their own without being sponsored by a police department (however, the SLCSD allows them to attend the CMPA at no cost). Once they have successfully completed the academy, a police department with an opening may hire them. Matthew O’Neill (director, CMPA), interview with PF assessment team, January 21, 2014.

\(^{32}\) Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (see note 6).

\(^{33}\) Ibid.

appear in court. While the SLCPD may not have taken the initial enforcement action that resulted in the arrest warrant, it becomes associated with heavy enforcement practices when its officers encounter and arrest an individual for an outstanding warrant. The community’s lack of trust attributed to abusive and at times unconstitutional enforcement practices of a municipal police department is then transferred to the SLCPD.

The consequence for the SLCPD is a lack of trust by the community that exacerbated tensions during the response to demonstrations following the shooting death of Michael Brown. Mutual aid agreements in the area allow Missouri officers to respond to emergencies outside of their jurisdictions. According to the Missouri Council for a Better Economy, “chapter 70 of the Missouri Revised Statutes (RSMo) allows counties and municipalities to enter into mutual aid agreements during an emergency and also permits officers in compliance with Chapter 590 RSMo to respond to emergencies outside the boundaries of the political subdivision.” Such a response occurred during the demonstrations following the shooting of Brown in 2014, embroiling the SLCPD in the fallout from those events and bringing to light deep-seated and long-standing tensions between St. Louis law enforcement and the community.

The close proximity and fragmented nature of policing in the St. Louis region coupled with heavy enforcement by some municipalities in the region has created an environment of distrust and difficulty for the SLCPD and the community it serves.

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35. Police Report #3 (see note 5).
Chapter 3. Methodology

The Police Foundation assessment team used a number of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze policies, procedures, and practices in the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD). Over the course of the assessment, we made five site visits, during which we conducted interviews and focus groups. We also held focus groups with members of the department and community stakeholders, made observations, and collected data. Our assessment approach involved four modes of inquiry: (1) document review, (2) interviews and focus groups, (3) direct observation, and (4) data analysis. Each method is described in more detail later in this section.

The assessment team reviewed departmental policies, manuals, training lesson plans, and strategic plans. Each document was reviewed in an effort to obtain a better understanding of how the department governs policies and practices for conducting traffic stops, how it investigates use of force incidents and citizen complaints, how it administers in-service and academy training, how it manages recruitment efforts to promote diversity within the department, and how it reviews responses and training for handling civil disturbances.

Throughout the assessment process we conducted semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and meetings with SLCPD command staff and officers and community members. In total, we interviewed more than 200 individuals for this assessment.

We directly observed SLCPD operations throughout the assessment, including preparations for the St. Louis County grand jury decision in the case of the shooting death of Michael Brown and the civil disturbances after that announcement. In addition, we conducted ride-alongs with officers and observed recruit and in-service training sessions at the regional police academy.

We collected, coded, and analyzed data from the SLCPD, including their use of force database and investigative reports, officer-involved shooting (OIS) data and narrative reports, citizen complaint database, investigative reports, and traffic stop information.

Through our document review, interviews and focus groups, reviews of policies and procedures, observations, and data analysis approaches, our intent was to identify gaps and weaknesses in SLCPD operations. We attempted to address those gaps and weaknesses through our understanding of the SLCPD’s organizational structure and operations, subject matter experts, and a review of existing research of the topical areas of interest: policy and procedures, training, investigation, recruitment, and responses to civil disturbances. We relied primarily on national standards, evidence-based practices, and research to better inform our findings and recommendations.
Chapter 4. Recruitment and Hiring

Overview

On January 22, 2015, USA Today published an article entitled “Police Forces Often Sea of White.” The article discusses the underrepresentation of minorities in police departments across the United States in comparison to their communities’ populations. Included in the story was the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD).

The diversity of St. Louis County and, more important, the degree of segregation within the county, provides an opportunity for the SLCPD to focus diversity recruiting efforts in targeted areas. Data from 2013 show that the residents of St. Louis County are 70.3 percent White and 23.7 percent Black (as illustrated in table 1 on page 16). By comparison, the SLCPD is 87 percent White and 10.2 percent Black (as illustrated in table 2 on page 16). In addition, Blacks are underrepresented in the commissioned ranks of police officer and police sergeant based on their proportion of the population of St. Louis County and are also underrepresented in the ranks of lieutenant and captain (as illustrated in table 4 on page 17). Women are also underrepresented in all ranks of the department (as illustrated in tables 3 and 4 on pages 16 and 17) when compared to the national average of 17 percent female officers for jurisdictions serving populations of more than 250,000.

The benefits of police departments appropriately representing the diversity of the communities they serve as a means to develop trust has been and continues to be discussed at a national level, including by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. Indeed, the final report of the task force recommends that “law enforcement agencies should strive to create a workforce that contains a broad range of diversity including race, gender, language, life experience, and cultural background to improve understanding and effectiveness in dealing with all communities.”

Yet with years of discussion and attempts by some, police agencies across the country struggle to change the look of their departments. Many cite the lack of interest of minorities and women in law enforcement careers. Others say that diverse candidates are not successfully meeting the minimum standards required by agencies.

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39. Ibid.
Management and administration

The assessment team reviewed SLCPD internal policies, staffing, and methods for attracting and recruiting minority and female candidates to the SLCPD. The team also reviewed the applicant testing process, background investigations, and hiring authority interview. The team conducted interviews with recruiting staff, background investigators, supervisors and executive staff, academy instructors, academy recruits, field training officers, patrol officers, neighborhood police officers, school resource officers, community members, business leaders, and local elected officials. The goal was to identify successes of current recruiting efforts and look for opportunities to recommend creative practices, both public and private, to develop a long-term system and culture of diversity recruitment.

Currently, the SLCPD uses traditional recruiting efforts consistent with many law enforcement agencies across the country. The department attends job fairs that target minority applicants, advertises job opportunities for minority candidates, uses minority officers and command staff in the community for recruiting efforts, and most recently—in March 2015—conducted a large outreach to the faith-based community in the county’s communities of color.40

The SLCPD sponsors police explorer programs at the precinct level. The program, for youth 14–20 years of age, is a volunteer program designed for young adults to serve their community and explore a career in law enforcement.41 Currently only the 7th precinct advertises an explorer program at the precinct-level website.42

The application and testing process for the SLCPD officers includes a written exam, physical test, background investigation, polygraph exam, and employment panel interview for recommendation of employment to the chief. The written exam is an entry-level exam commercially available for law enforcement agencies. The physical test includes a 1.5-mile run, timed push-ups, and timed sit-ups. Each of the physical tests is adjusted for gender and age range. The background investigation is consistent with law enforcement agencies with CALEA certification. Included in the hiring practice is that the polygraph alone cannot be used to disqualify an applicant. All of the standards including the one-year exclusion for use of drugs are posted on the department website.43

The review team attempted an analysis of the entire hiring process for police officers to determine at what points in the process applicants fail or withdraw, potential causes of the failure or withdrawal, and potential impacts on diverse applicants. Data were provided by the SLCPD; however, the level of detail in the information did not allow for an in-depth analysis. While the SLCPD was willing to review all applicant files and hand tabulate necessary data, the time required to complete the task along with competing requests prohibited review in this report. The review team was able to complete a review of applicants and their success, withdrawal, or failure in the hiring process.

SLCPD police officer hiring process

Method

The SLCPD Personnel Services Unit provided data from a computerized tracking system of applications received in 2013–2014. The data set contains information on applicants’ progress through the hiring process to determine their eligibility to become commissioned officers of the SLCPD.

The SLCPD accepts applications for commissioned officers from both experienced officers and those without peace officer experience. Applicants without appropriate prior experience are afforded two tracks with which to complete basic academy training through the St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) Recruit Program:

1. **Open enrollment program.** This program provides free training (recruits pay for uniforms and equipment) to applicants who meet the minimum qualifications for admission to the academy but not necessarily the minimum qualifications for the employment with the SLCPD and who successfully complete the selection process for the academy. While attending the academy, an open enrollment recruit is not an employee of St. Louis County; however, the individual may be proceeding through the hiring process. Admission to the recruit basic training class and completion of the program does not guarantee or automatically qualify an applicant for employment as a police officer.

2. **Commissioned police officer position.** Applicants must meet the minimum qualifications for hire with the SLCPD, including an associate’s degree or 64 semester hours from an accredited college or university, a high school diploma or GED with one-year full-time prior police experience, or two years of active duty military service. Applicants must successfully complete each stage of the selection process in order to be eligible to proceed to the next stage in the process. Applicants are employees of the department while attending the CMPA.

After the Personnel Services Unit has received and reviewed the initial application and required documents, the selection steps can take up to six months for completion.

Analysis of applicants for SLCPD recruit officer position

SLCPD staff interviewed by the Police Foundation (PF) assessment team expressed a desire to recruit and hire diverse candidates that better represent the community. To measure SLCPD efforts in this area, the assessment team conducted a descriptive analysis of applicants for police recruit positions that were processed by the SLCPD Personnel Services Unit in 2013–2014. The assessment included an examination of the ethnicity and gender of applicants, their status in the hiring process at the time of the analysis, and an analysis of candidates given a conditional job offer. The data that SLCPD captured in reference to their...
Applicant pool were limited for the purposes of analysis for this project. As a consequence, the assessment team was unable to analyze each specific step in the selection process to evaluate whether it had an adverse impact on a specific group of applicants.

**Applicant characteristics: Gender and race**

The Personnel Services Unit received a total of 310 applications for SLCPD police recruit positions in 2013–2014. Applicants were predominately male (85.2 percent), and 14.8 percent identified as female, as shown in table 5.

With regard to the race or ethnicity of the applicants, the composition was closer to representing St. Louis County’s population than the current demographics of the SLCPD (table 2 on page 16). According to the 2013 U.S. Census of St. Louis County, 70.3 percent of the population was identified as White; 23.7 percent as Black; and 6 percent as other race. Among the applicants for police recruit positions, 77.1 percent were identified as White; 19 percent as Black; and 3.9 percent as other race.

Table 5. Applicants by gender and race, 2013–2014 (N=310)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>208 (67.1)</td>
<td>46 (14.8)</td>
<td>10 (3.2)</td>
<td>264 (85.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>31 (10.0)</td>
<td>13 (4.2)</td>
<td>2 (0.6)</td>
<td>46 (14.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>239 (77.1)</td>
<td>59 (19.0)</td>
<td>12 (3.9)</td>
<td>310 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Application status by race, 2013–2014 (N=310)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application status</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>101 (32.6)</td>
<td>33 (10.6)</td>
<td>5 (1.6)</td>
<td>139 (44.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional offer*</td>
<td>34 (11.0)</td>
<td>5 (1.6)</td>
<td>3 (1.0)</td>
<td>42 (13.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expired†</td>
<td>12 (3.9)</td>
<td>5 (1.6)</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
<td>18 (5.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not best qualified</td>
<td>58 (18.7)</td>
<td>9 (2.9)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>67 (21.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5 (1.6)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5 (1.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary withdrawal</td>
<td>28 (9.0)</td>
<td>7 (2.3)</td>
<td>3 (1.0)</td>
<td>38 (12.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>239 (77.1)</td>
<td>59 (19.0)</td>
<td>12 (3.9)</td>
<td>310 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Conditional (job) offer: applicant is given an offer of employment pending the successful completion of both a physical and psychological exam. While completing the examinations, the applicant is eligible to attend the basic training academy.

†Expired: application was not worked within one year after the initial screening. Applicants are notified to contact the personnel services unit to continue in the process.


49. The “other” race category includes applicants identified as American Indian/Alaska Native, as Asian, and as being of two or more races.
Overall, 41.6 percent of total applicants were eliminated at some point during the selection process (i.e., expired, not qualified withdrawal, other, or unknown). Nearly 22 percent of applicants were deemed “not best qualified”\textsuperscript{50} to continue in the process, while 12.3 percent voluntarily withdrew their applications.

Among applicants who were ineligible to continue in the process, 80.6 percent were identified as White, 16.3 percent as Black, and 3.1 percent as other race. Ineligible applicants were 86 percent male and 14 percent female.

**Applicants eligible for consideration in the hiring process**

Of the initial applications received in 2013–2014, a total of 181 applicants were given conditional offers or were considered still active in the hiring process. Among those applicants, 74.6 percent identified as White, 21 percent as Black, and 4.4 percent as other race (see table 7). When analyzing applicants within each race category, 56.5 percent of White applicants (N=135; 43.6 percent of all applicants) were either still active or received conditional offers, 64.4 percent of all Black applicants (N=38; 12.2 percent of all applicants) were still active or received conditional offers, and 66.7 percent of all other races (N=8; 2.6 percent of all applicants) were either still active or received conditional job offers.\textsuperscript{51}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application status</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>101 (55.8)</td>
<td>33 (18.2)</td>
<td>5 (2.8)</td>
<td>139 (76.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional offer</td>
<td>34 (18.8)</td>
<td>5 (2.8)</td>
<td>3 (1.6)</td>
<td>42 (23.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>135 (74.6)</td>
<td>38 (21.0)</td>
<td>8 (4.4)</td>
<td>181 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application status</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active/Conditional</td>
<td>135 (43.6)</td>
<td>38 (12.2)</td>
<td>8 (2.6)</td>
<td>181 (58.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ineligible</td>
<td>104 (33.5)</td>
<td>21 (6.8)</td>
<td>4 (1.3)</td>
<td>129 (41.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>239 (77.1)</td>
<td>59 (19.0)</td>
<td>12 (3.9)</td>
<td>310 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall, 84.5 percent of eligible applicants identified as male and 15.5 percent as female. Of the eligible male applicants, 75.2 percent identified as White and 20.9 percent as Black. Of the eligible female applicants, 71.4 percent identified as White and 21.4 percent as Black, as shown in table 9.

\textsuperscript{50} “Not best qualified” (NBQ) as defined by SLCPD means that the applicant did meet the minimum standards of the position, but was not the best qualified on this list of applicants for the position they are applying for and is being rejected but can normally reapply in six months.

\textsuperscript{51} Conditional (job) offer: applicant is given an offer of employment pending the successful completion of both a physical and psychological exam. While completing the examinations, the applicant is eligible to attend the basic training academy.
Table 9. Eligible applicants by gender and race or ethnicity, 2013–2014 (N=181)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Male applicant application status</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>88 (57.6)</td>
<td>27 (17.6)</td>
<td>4 (2.6)</td>
<td>119 (77.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional offer</td>
<td>27 (17.6)</td>
<td>5 (3.3)</td>
<td>2 (1.3)</td>
<td>34 (22.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>115 (75.2)</td>
<td>32 (20.9)</td>
<td>6 (3.9)</td>
<td>153 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Female applicant application status</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
<td>13 (46.4)</td>
<td>6 (21.4)</td>
<td>1 (3.6)</td>
<td>20 (71.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional offer</td>
<td>7 (35.0)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1 (3.6)</td>
<td>8 (28.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>20 (71.4)</td>
<td>6 (21.4)</td>
<td>2 (7.2)</td>
<td>28 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary of hiring process

During the review period (2013–2014), the Personnel Services Unit received 310 applications from individuals interested in becoming commissioned officers of the SLCPD. The majority of applicants were men (85.2 percent), and 14.8 percent of applicants were women. Racial composition of applicants included 77 percent White, 19 percent Black, and 4 percent other race.

At some point in the selection process, 41.6 percent of the applicants were eliminated from the hiring process. A total of 181 applicants remained eligible to continue in the process or were given a conditional offer of employment pending successful completion of both a physical and psychological examination. Of those continuing in the process and yet to receive a conditional offer, 72.6 percent were White and 23.7 percent Black. Of those receiving a conditional offer, 81 percent identified as White, 12 percent as Black, and 7 percent as other races.

The following findings and recommendations are based on national best practices and trends in staff recruitment and hiring in both the public and private sector. In addition, the SLCPD proactively identified the need to change their recruitment, selection, and hiring processes as they relate to increasing minority representation within the department.
Findings and recommendations

Finding 4.1

The SLCPD does not represent the diversity of the population it serves.

Compared to the population of St. Louis County, Blacks are significantly underrepresented in the commissioned ranks of police officer and police sergeant, and while the SLCPD has made efforts to increase minority representation in the command ranks the department remains moderately under representative of the community in the ranks of lieutenant and captain.

Women are also underrepresented in all ranks of the department. Currently, of the 13 SLCPD captains, only one is female. In addition, the department has only three female, in comparison to 26 male, lieutenants. The assessment team also noted the lack of inclusion of female leadership in all executive-level meetings between the assessment team and the SLCPD.

Recommendation 4.1.1

The SLCPD should develop a strategic plan for officer recruitment, focused on race and gender diversity, to include attention to recruiting, promotion, and retention of minorities and women.

Addressing underrepresentation begins with recruiting. The SLCPD should conduct a scan of organizations that have successfully overcome recruiting barriers and develop a plan with goals, objectives, and outcome measures. This plan should be articulated to the rank-and-file officers and reviewed annually to respond to any changing demographics in the metropolitan area.

The SLCPD should create education and training events that assist applicants or those considering becoming applicants in understanding hiring and application requirements, areas of concern during the background process, and common mistakes made by applicants.

In addition, the training program should provide potential applicants with sample written exams and exposure to the fitness test to better prepare them for the application process.

Recommendation 4.1.2

The SLCPD should create a community recruiter program that identifies and trains community leaders to serve as SLCPD recruiters.

Community recruiter training should include education on the hiring process, common candidate exclusions such as felony convictions, resources available to candidates that could improve success, and mentoring skills training so that the community recruiter can support the candidate throughout the hiring process.

Recommendation 4.1.3

The SLCPD should track and publicly report, at least annually, demographic information of current employees, employees who have left the organization, and applicants who have applied to the department.

Reporting for current employees should include rank and areas of assignment. For individuals who left the department, the reason for leaving should be noted. For applicants, the status as identified in table 6 should be included.
**Recommendation 4.1.4**

The SLCPD should consider creating a diversity council representing gender, ethnic, racial, LGBT, and linguistic minorities to serve as advisors and champions for the chief and SLCPD command staff to support recruitment efforts focused on youth, newcomer populations, and gender diversity.

**Recommendation 4.1.5**

The SLCPD should create a youth advisory council representing youth from schools throughout the county who will serve as advisors to the chief and command staff on ways to engage the community's youth and on potential barriers to recruiting St. Louis youth into policing.

The council should involve youth in the police department, fostering relationships with officers and executive staff and exposing them to the work of the department. It will also provide department staff with the opportunity to create relationships with future leaders of the community.

**Recommendation 4.1.6**

The SLCPD should conduct an in-depth review of its hiring process, including the examinations it uses, to determine whether on any step in the process has an adverse impact against any group of applicants and, if so, whether the process is valid and whether there are alternative selection procedures that could meet the county's needs but have less disparate impact.

**Finding 4.2**

The SLCPD recruiting process has not been able to consistently translate existing relationships with high school students and youth programs into employment opportunities.

Relationships developed between department personnel and St. Louis youth offer opportunities for recruitment of diverse populations with strong ties to the community. Often, these meaningful relationships begin with St. Louis County students and their school resource officers (SRO). Unfortunately, many of those employment opportunities are lost when youth graduate from high school and either go to college or enter the job market without the ability to remain connected to law enforcement career opportunities.52

The ability to recruit directly from high schools into the policing profession has been successfully accomplished in agencies throughout the country through cadet or community service officer (CSO) programs. To determine the potential success of similar programs in the SLCPD, the assessment team interviewed students, parents, school administrators, community leaders, county elected officials, and police officers. In addition, the team observed the interaction between students and SROs. Without exception, interviewees strongly believed such efforts would have a positive impact on the community, including the community’s relationship with the SLCPD. The assessment team also noted positive interactions between SROs and students, thus presenting opportunities for recruitment within the high schools served by the SLCPD. During interviews, SROs and neighborhood police officers expressed confidence in their ability to recruit qualified, diverse, graduating high school seniors for employment that would ultimately lead to police officer positions. Community members, school administrators, and teachers interviewed expressed a similar level of confidence in the ability of school resource officers (SRO) to recruit qualified diverse high school graduates into the SLCPD.

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52. At the time of high school graduation, most students are ineligible to become police officers because of the age requirement of 21 years.
Recommendation 4.2.1

The county of St. Louis should identify and create job classifications that allow for entry level employment in the police department designed for individuals who desire a career as a police officer but who do not meet age or college requirements.

For more than 40 years, law enforcement agencies across the country have used police cadet or community service officer job classifications to successfully diversify organizations without sacrificing employment or education standards. Employing youth from within the community strengthens community police relationships and keeps local jobs local.

Many community services officer (CSO)/cadet programs require employees to go to college while working part time at the police department during the school year and full time while on school breaks. The employee would also attend the academy and earn college credits that would apply toward minimum requirements. All of this can be accomplished before the potential applicant meets the minimum age requirement.

Recommendation 4.2.2

Job duties of cadets or community service officers should prepare them for the job of police officer while also reducing the workload of existing officers to allow for more time for engagement in community activities and problem solving.

Duties performed may include nonenforcement functions such as completing crime and accident reports, interviewing witnesses, augmenting neighborhood policing functions, assisting at major crime scenes, or any other non-enforcement function the employee can be or has been trained to perform.

Recommendation 4.2.3

SROs, neighborhood police officers, and other employees whose jobs require high levels of youth contact and community engagement should be trained and evaluated on recruitment techniques so that they are proficient in recruiting efforts.

The recruitment officer should not be the only department staff member to shoulder the entire recruiting responsibility. The job should be divided between all who have the ability to be role models and mentors and to coach youth.

Finding 4.3

The SLCPD website employment link does not inspire viewers to engage, volunteer, or join the department.

The academy site link lacks similar attributes. The Academy Challenge video describes the hiring process and academic challenges appropriately. However, the video is heavily influenced by the use of force and officer safety curriculum. While the latter are important to the safety of officers, the uninformed viewer may perceive the video as representing the primary work officers do in the community.
Recommendation 4.3.1

The SLCPD should redesign its website to interactively engage viewers.

The site not only should serve as a method of informing the audience but also should showcase the department to the community. The department should devote at least one page on the website to recruitment. The page should illustrate the tenets of community policing such as service, volunteerism, and community problem solving to engage potential applicants to the SLCPD. Videos that allow the viewer to experience the daily work of a patrol officer, dispatcher, forensics staff member, SRO, or detective should also be posted. The SLCPD should use the video to highlight the actual work done on a daily basis to make the community a safe place to live, work, and play. The video should not focus on tactical operations of the department; this is a mistake made by many departments across the country.

Finding 4.4

The SLCPD recruitment unit is insufficiently staffed.

It is composed of one officer assigned to the personnel division. This staffing level is insufficient to accomplish the recruitment tasks necessary to identify and select the best officer candidates and to reach desired diversity levels. While the SLCPD is making sincere efforts to diversify the ranks of officers, traditional diversity recruitment efforts with existing staffing levels are not meeting community or department expectations.

Recommendation 4.4.1

The SLCPD should increase staffing levels to support the important job of new officer recruitment.

Finding 4.5

The SLCPD automated system does not allow for in-depth analysis of the hiring process.

Recommendation 4.5.1

The SLCPD should maintain an automated system that tracks applicants through the entire recruitment and hiring process, allowing for real-time access to individual applicant information and for a review of the selection process.

Such a system would allow background investigators and supervisors to identify potential issues with individual applicants and would also allow managers to identify successes or potential flaws in the process.
Chapter 5. Basic Recruit Training

Overview

The purpose of the St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) is to transform uniformed and civilian members of the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) into law enforcement professionals equipped with the necessary academic and tactical knowledge to protect the life, rights, property, and dignity of all the residents of St. Louis County.

Management and administration

The CMPA, operated by the SLCPD with oversight by an eight member board of managers made up of command personnel from several area departments, has the ability to help mold and shape new peace officers as well as experienced officers in the region. It is a regional peace officer training academy that trains police officers for approximately 125 municipal police agencies in addition to basic academy recruits. Approximately 92 police departments pay tuition to CMPA for police officers to attend any available courses offered. The CMPA also averages another 33 law enforcement agencies that pay for officers to attend a specific class.

For the basic academy, a partnership with Lindenwood University and Maryville University enables students in their senior year to attend the academy, and the universities reimburse the academy for tuition. A general background investigation is completed prior to being accepted into the academy, and a more thorough investigation is completed prior to being hired by a department (polygraph, psychological evaluation, etc.).

The CMPA also provides basic recruit academy training to self-sponsored academy recruits who have met the requirements for admission to the academy free of charge. Self-sponsored recruits are not employees of an agency and are therefore not paid a salary. The SLCPD has the right to select self-sponsored recruits for hire before other member agencies.

On average, 25 to 30 recruits are trained during the CMPA 25-week police basic training class. The class composition includes SLCPD hired recruits, self-sponsored recruits (including those who are in a hiring process for a law enforcement agency including the SLCPD), and, at times, recruits who have been hired by a law enforcement agency other than the SLCPD. The graduation rate for the academy is often above 90 percent. As with other police academies, recruits resign for personal reasons or are removed for failure to successfully complete the required curriculum.

54. This number can only be approximated because it fluctuates from year to year.
In addition, the academy provides in-service training for the SLCPD only and continuing education for the SLCPD and tuition-paying municipal police departments. Continuing education courses are published in a catalog and available for registration.55

Academy staff

Academy instructors include five full-time SLCPD officers and three officers from other municipal agencies. Officers assigned as academy instructors are certified by the Missouri Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission as basic or specialist instructors (see chapter 7 “In-Service Training/Missouri POST Requirements”). POST-certified officers apply for CMPA instructor positions as they would for any SLCPD-posted specialized assignment. They first submit a memo with their qualifications. If selected, they participate in an interview with the academy staff, which includes making a presentation to demonstrate their teaching skills. Following a review of their performance and evaluations and recommendations from previous supervisors, the CMPA director makes a recommendation for the applicant officer, which is routed through the chain of command to the chief of police for final approval.

Academy training

A minimum of 470 training hours is required for licensing full-time police officers in Missouri.56 The SLCPD provides 916 hours of basic recruit training. By comparison, the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department provides 1,080 hours of basic training, and Missouri Highway Patrol 1,200 hours.

The Missouri Peace Officers Licensing Exam (MPOLE), which is the measure of proficiency required to become a peace officer in the state of Missouri, is weighted in four key areas and 17 domains:

1. Legal studies (11%)
   1. Constitutional law
   2. Missouri state law
   3. Traffic law
2. Interpersonal perspectives (14%)
   4. Ethics and professionalism
   5. Domestic violence
   6. Human behavior
3. Technical studies (65%)
   7. Patrol
   8. Jail population management
   9. Traffic accident and law enforcement

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10. Criminal investigation
11. Offense investigation
12. Report writing
13. Juvenile justice and procedures
14. First aid

4. Skill development (10%)
15. Defensive tactics
16. Firearms
17. Driving

The state requires 32 hours of constitutional law. The SLCPD has added nine more hours of instruction in this area. In the subject area of human behavior, Missouri POST requires 24 hours of training, and the SLCPD has added 14 more hours, of which two hours are spent on cultural diversity. The SLCPD has also added six hours of instruction in the areas of ethics and professionalism, which includes police ethics, conduct, and behavior. The SLCPD has also added two hours of community problem solving in the technical studies area under patrol.

The St. Louis CMPA basic training curriculum is as follows:

- Administrative procedures—60 hours
  (Orientation, computer skills, etc.)
- Legal studies—95 hours
  (Constitutional law, Missouri state law, traffic law)
- Cultural diversity and interpersonal perspectives—80 hours
  (Ethics and professionalism, domestic violence, human behavior, communication, cultural diversity, etc.)
- Technical studies—373 hours
  (Patrol and jail management, homeland security, traffic, criminal investigation, report writing, juvenile justice, certified first responder, etc.)
- Skill development—308 hours
  (Defensive tactics, firearms, physical training, driver training, practical application, etc.)
- Total—916 hours

The current (2015) CMPA recruit training curriculum allocates only four hours for the topics of community policing and crime prevention. During PF assessment team interview, academy staff (including course instructors) stated that community policing principles are reinforced through other courses. However, courses in fair and impartial policing (a relatively new training standard), community engagement, and partnership development have not been incorporated into the CMPA training curriculum.

57. Police Basic Training Program Curriculum (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy, 2015).
Field training program overview

According to the SLCPD Field Training and Evaluation Program Manual, the field-training program is a “management system with the goal of improving the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the Department.”

Field training objectives include the following:

- To provide a structured probationary officer training process
- To establish a probationary officer evaluation system
- To identify undesirable behavioral traits and provide remediation
- To establish a program review procedure
- To establish a retraining program for the department

Upon graduating from the CMPA, the recruit hired by the SLCPD is given the rank of probationary officer and is assigned a field-training instructor (FTI). New officers are on probation for 18 months from the date of hire. The SLCPD Field Training Program is based on the San Jose model, emphasizing teaching over evaluation.

SLCPD policy requires 15 weeks of field training after graduation from the academy, which is divided into four phases. Field training is followed by a 37-week evaluation phase. During field training, the probationary officer will be assigned to routine patrol duties, to include all shifts and various beats and units. Academy graduates are assigned to a primary precinct for five weeks and then transferred to another precinct for four weeks in an effort to expose the officer to the various workload demands in a particular precinct. They finish the field training at their primary precinct assignment. During field training, officers will spend one day of training with the Crime Scene Unit and the Bureau of Communications, and sometimes they will spend a day with a canine officer.

A probationary officer’s performance is evaluated daily by his or her FTI through daily observation reports. In addition, the FTI completes end of phase reports to evaluate the totality of the probationary officer’s performance for each of phase I, II, III, and IV. The reports recommend whether the probationary officer should move on to the next phase. During the final week of field training, the FTI observes the probationary officer from afar (and out of uniform). Recommended guidelines for end of phase reports are as follows:

- Critical performance tasks
  - Driving skill: Stress conditions
  - Orientation skill: Stress conditions
  - Field performance: Stress conditions

58. Field Training and Evaluation Program: Rules and Procedures (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2007).
59. Ibid.
61. “Phase I (6 weeks)—designed to familiarize probationary officer with routine duties and police functions and to take on functions in conjunction with their primary FTI. Phase II (3 weeks)—probationary officer assigned to 2nd (alternate) FTI to promote more objective evaluation. Officer continues to assume more responsibility and duties. Considered the midpoint where problem areas may surface and remedial training indicated. Phase III (3 weeks)—"polishing period." Probationary officer returns to primary FTI and begins handling most calls. Training to address areas of improvement is completed. Training is considered complete at the end of this phase. Phase IV—evaluation period. Probationary officer is evaluated on his or her ability to apply what has been learned and to function as a patrol officer. The probationary officer is not under the direct supervision of FTI during this phase but is evaluated through observation, statistical analysis, and interviews.” Field Training and Evaluation Program (see note 58).
• Officer safety: General
• Officer safety: Suspects/Prisoners
• Control of conflict: Physical skill

• Routine performance tasks
  • Driving skill: Nonstress conditions
  • Orientation skill: Nonstress conditions
  • Report writing: Organization/Details/Classification
  • Report writing: Grammar/Spelling/Neatness
  • Report writing: Appropriate time used
  • Field performance: Nonstress conditions
  • Self-initiated field activity
  • Problem solving / Decision-making ability
  • Radio: Appropriate use of codes
  • Radio: Comprehends transmission
  • Radio: Articulation of transmission

• Knowledge
  • Department policies and procedures
  • Criminal code
  • Traffic code and ordinances
  • Reflected in field: Performance tests

• Attitude/Relationships
  • Acceptance of feedback: Verbal/Behavior
  • Attitude toward police work
  • Public contacts
  • Employee contacts

• General attributes
  • General appearance
  • Observation of work hours
  • Initiative

Phase V (37 weeks) is an evaluation phase during which probationary officers are not under the direct supervision of the FTI, but the Probationary Review Board assesses officer performance through supervisor evaluations and statistical data. At any point during the training or evaluation, the probationary officer can be recommended for remedial training to address any deficiency. Remedial training plans are designed at the precinct level.
Probationary officers with previous law enforcement experience participate in a modified field-training program that condenses phases I–IV into four to eight weeks. Length and type of training needed is based on previous training, experience, and performance and determined by sergeants, watch commanders, and precinct commanders, then approved by the commanding officer.

**Field training instructor requirements**

An FTI, as defined by the SLCPD, is a commissioned police officer responsible for the instruction and safe practices of a probationary officer.

To be selected as an FTI, SLCPD officers must meet the following criteria:

- Have a minimum of two years police experience, one of which must be with the SLCPD
- Have demonstrated ability to write detailed, clear, and concise reports
- Be recommended by his or her supervisor
- Attend a department-approved 40-hour basic field training instructor seminar before training a probationary officer
- Attend annual advanced training to remain current in rules of search and seizure, criminal law, interpersonal perspectives, and patrol strategies

The precinct commander selects FTI officers based on the minimum qualifications, past performance evaluations, review of the candidates' Bureau of Professional Standards file, and input from sergeants and watch commanders. Once assigned, FTIs receive 1.5 hours of overtime pay per hour (i.e., time and a half) for days spent training an officer.

The FTI's primary responsibility is the safety of the public, as well as of the officers of the department. His or her duties include the following:

- Train the officer during phases I, II, III, and IV and monitor the officer during phase V (the evaluation phase).
- Supervise the officer until the activities related to the tour of duty are completed.
- Ensure that the probationary officer has read and is familiar with all applicable SLCPD written directives.
- Prepare daily observation reports and end of phase reports on the probationary officer’s performance, strengths, and weaknesses.
- Attend evaluation meetings.
- Assist in the development of remedial training that will enable the probationary officer to obtain needed skills.
- Recommend remedial training.
- Make efforts to ensure that the probationary officer assigned is involved in as many different types of incidents as possible during the training phases.
- Bring problems regarding the probationary officer to the attention of the watch commander.  

Findings and recommendations

Finding 5.1

The St. Louis CMPA provides insufficient training hours devoted to community engagement, diversity, and community policing elements during SLCPD basic recruit training. Of the 916 hours of basic recruit training, only 14 hours are devoted to these topics.

Recommendation 5.1.1

The SLCPD should include fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development in the basic academy curriculum.

The foundation of recruit training should be modified to include courses on policing history and professionalism, community policing, and community engagement strategies. They should include case studies on effective alternative policing programs that lead to increased trust by the community. Community oriented policing and community engagement training should be expanded and enhanced. Training should also expand focus on social service agency referrals for citizens who have a need.

Recent literature focusing on creating a culture of “guardians” rather than “warriors” in law enforcement agencies agrees that appropriate training is critical to building communities of trust. Increased attention to training focused on community engagement, fair and impartial policing, procedural justice, and implicit bias can help agencies to move toward “rightful policing” policing that focuses on both constitutional policing and policing aimed at crime reduction while promoting fairness and trust in police among the public. While there are no state requirements for training on fair and impartial policing, community engagement, or partnership development, the assessment team noted that these critical topics should be woven into all instruction with emphasis on areas including ethics, professionalism, constitutional law, and the area of human behavior including communication obstacles, cultural diversity, and community problem solving.

Finding 5.2

The CMPA does not sufficiently use experts in the area of cultural diversity.

Most CMPA trainers do not have the expertise necessary to teach officers about cultural diversity, youth issues, and newcomer populations; nor does the SLCPD regularly engage youth or diverse populations as part of the standard recruit training program (or in-service or postpromotional training).

Recommendation 5.2.1

The SLCPD should invite university instructors and members of community-based organizations and other subject matter experts in cultural diversity, youth issues, and newcomer populations to serve as guest lecturers. Instructors who are identified as subject matter experts on cultural diversity should have a curriculum vitae (CV) that reflects the necessary expertise.

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The St. Louis CMPA has invited speakers from community service organizations such as the Alzheimer’s Association, Deaf Interlink, and the Anti-Defamation League. But they should also invite guest lecturers who actually represent local community populations to complement the CMPA instructors to enhance the recruit experience and understanding of community diversity. This will also involve the community in the police department.65

Finding 5.3

The CMPA trains recruits for a large number of law enforcement agencies with disparate policies and procedures, which creates complexity and added challenges with regard to teaching best practices.

The variety of agency recruits attending the academy requires CMPA instructors to be knowledgeable in the policies for each agency and in certain courses, such as pursuit and use of force reporting, to create separate blocks of instruction unique to the agency recruit(s). The additional workload combined with disparities in department policies and requirements affects continuity of instruction.

Recommendation 5.3.1

The SLCPD should collaborate with the municipal departments trained by the St. Louis CMPA to streamline pursuit, use of force, and other policies to promote uniformity and to prevent instructors from having to teach to the differences in policies and procedures in each individual department.

Recommendation 5.3.2

The SLCPD should take a leadership role in collaborating with municipal agencies in St. Louis County to attempt to gain consensus on semiannual, countywide, standardized training on police legitimacy, fair and impartial policing, procedural justice, and building community trust.

These classes should be facilitated by the SLCPD acting in its capacity as a regional police training provider and using subject matter experts in the identified curriculum.

Finding 5.4

Based on interviews with instructional staff, instructors at the CMPA are not subject matter experts in areas such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

The majority of academy instructors are assigned full time and are experts in their assigned areas. However, impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development are key principles that should be woven into nearly every course of instruction. All instructors should be knowledgeable in these principles and their application.

Recommendation 5.4.1

All instructors authorized to teach at the St. Louis CMPA should complete train-the-trainer or similar courses in the areas of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

Recommendation 5.4.2

St. Louis CMPA curricula should be modified to create themes relating to police legitimacy, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, community policing, and building community trust that can be woven into all academy classes.

All instructors should, where appropriate, attempt to weave these themes through all instructional material. Appropriate evaluation instruments beyond written exams should be used to measure application of the instruction.

Action taken by the SLCPD: The SLCPD has already committed to participating in the Fair and Impartial Policing training program, conducted by Dr. Lorie Fridell of the University of South Florida. The SLCPD conducted the train-the-trainer sessions in the fall of 2014 and summer of 2015.

Finding 5.5

Many FTIs are unfamiliar with and unqualified to train on the latest trends in contemporary police practices such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

Based on the assessment team’s ride-alongs, interviews, focus groups, and review of general department training, the team determined that not all FTIs were familiar with and qualified to train on the latest trends in policing practices.

Recommendation 5.5.1

The SLCPD should provide periodic in-service instructor training to FTIs that will prepare them to train probationary officers on current patrol practices to keep up with new or changing policing trends and state and local laws. Instruction should weave themes of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development throughout all courses.

Recommendation 5.5.2

The SLCPD should require FTIs to be qualified trainers in critical courses of instruction such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

Recommendation 5.5.3

As part of a regular review process, FTIs should be evaluated on their instruction in and daily application of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

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Chapter 6. Promotions and Postpromotional Training

Criteria for promotions

The St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) uses a structured competitive promotion process for the ranks of sergeant and lieutenant. The chief of police selects those advancing to the ranks of captain and lieutenant colonel. SLCPD Departmental General Order (GO) 10-44 outlines the criteria for promotions in the department.67

Sergeants

In order to be considered for promotion to the rank of sergeant, SLCPD officers must have four years of previous service, including two years with SLCPD.

The promotional process consists of the following:

- A written examination
- In-basket exercise—a handwritten exercise that measures comprehension, written communication, planning and organization, problem analysis, judgment, decision making, delegation, and initiative
- Performance rating—accumulated averages68 from the candidate’s six most recent performance evaluation report forms
- Police experience—points assigned for length of service as a commissioned employee
- College credit points
- Chief’s rating—based on a review of the candidate’s personnel file, disciplinary file (if applicable), and related records and reports
- Physical examination

Selections are made based on points assigned for each of the testing phases excluding the physical exam. The chief of police conducts an oral interview with each selected candidate, and a physical exam is conducted prior to assignment.

SLCPD officers promoted to the rank of sergeant receive 40 hours of basic supervisory training.

Lieutenants

SLCPD candidates for promotion to the rank of lieutenant must meet one of the following criteria:

- Five years of experience (as sergeant)
- Four years of experience (as sergeant) and a minimum of 30 semester credit hours
- Three years of experience (as sergeant) and an associate’s degree or minimum of 60 semester credit hours

67. Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 10-44 (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2010).
68. SLCPD annual performance evaluations are reviewed during the promotional review process, and the last six evaluations are assigned a point value for each factor rated and averaged for a total possible score of 30 points. The total performance evaluation score is added to the other promotional process scores (written exam, in-basket, education/training, experience, chief’s points), and the candidates in the top one-third of all scores are eligible for promotion. Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 10-44 (see note 67).
• Two years of experience (as sergeant) and a minimum of 90 semester credit hours
• One year of experience (as sergeant) and a bachelor’s degree or minimum of 120 semester credit hours

The promotional process for lieutenants is the same as the process for sergeants. There is no required training for a newly promoted lieutenant.

Captains

The SLCPD promotional process for the rank of captain is explained in a written announcement provided to the department’s lieutenants. The announcement explains the criteria to be used to evaluate the promotional potential of the candidates, who then submit letters of interest in the position along with a summary of their qualifications. The commander of the Bureau of Staff Services provides the chief of police with a list of all employees who asked to participate and who meet eligibility requirements. The chief evaluates the employees on the list and selects the candidate for promotion; no interview is conducted. The candidate is required to pass a physical exam prior to assignment.

Promotion of commissioned officers with TAC/SWAT experience

During interviews with department employees, the evaluation team heard on many occasions that those who are not “TAC [tactical]/SWAT [special weapons and tactics] guys”69 are considerably less likely to be selected for promotions. The team also heard during interviews with line employees that senior executive staff has said there are two types of cops, “those in SWAT and those who want to be SWAT.” Based on those interviews, the Police Foundation assessment team completed an analysis of promotions of commissioned officers for January 2010 through July 2015. Table 10 shows the findings from this analysis.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Department filled positions</th>
<th>Total TAC/SWAT experience by rank</th>
<th>Total promotions from listed rank to next rank above</th>
<th>Promotions with TAC/SWAT experience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chief</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy chief</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1 (100)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant colonel</td>
<td>4*</td>
<td>3 (75)</td>
<td>2†</td>
<td>2 (100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6 (46.2)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3 (75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3 (10.3)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6 (37.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11 (12.1)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4 (16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>683</td>
<td>31 (4.5)</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>14 (20.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>821</td>
<td>56 (6.8)</td>
<td>114‡</td>
<td>29 (25.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* One lieutenant colonel position was recently added to the department.
† At the time of Chief Belmar’s promotion, the deputy chief position did not exist.
‡ Eleven individuals were promoted twice during the review period; five (41.7 percent) have TAC/SWAT experience.

69. The SLCPD uses the term “TAC” to identify what most agencies call “SWAT.” This report uses “TAC/SWAT” in place of “TAC” for the reader’s ease of understanding.
The review revealed that while 6.8 percent of all commissioned officers have TAC/SWAT experience, more than 25 percent of all individuals promoted have TAC/SWAT experience. Further illustration of the rate disparity can be seen at each rank level, beginning with promotion from officer to sergeant and continuing up through the entire rank structure. While tactical experience in some members of the leadership team can benefit decision making, an overrepresentation of tactical experience in leadership may lead to an overreliance on tactical responses when more creative solutions are appropriate.

Leadership training

The SLCPD offers, through the CMPA, several courses encompassing supervision and leadership. The line supervision training course is a very basic eight-hour introduction to supervision. In addition, integrity-centered leadership is a 16-hour course.

The basic police supervision and leadership course is 40 hours of instruction in the following topic areas:

- Delegation of responsibilities and decision making
- Response to tactical incidents
- Identification of personal leadership styles and traits
- Management techniques for projects and people
- Subordinate counseling, evaluation, and mentoring
- Encouragement of personal growth and improvement for subordinates
- Discipline and conflict resolution
- Ethics and liability in supervision
- Discussion of current issues relating to supervision and administration

The SLCPD also requires all supervisors to attend the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) three-week Leadership in Police Organizations (LPO) program and encourages attendance of management personnel at courses such as Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Academy.

70. “Continuing Education Course Catalog” (see note 55).
72. SMIP is a program of the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) that provides senior police executives with intensive training in the latest management concepts and practices used in business and government, as well as discussions of the most challenging issues facing law enforcement executives today. A demanding three-week course, SMIP brings together faculty from top universities, successful law enforcement chief executives, and subject matter experts from the private sector. It is designed for mid- to upper-level police executives who ultimately will lead police agencies throughout the United States and other participating countries. For more information, see “Senior Management Institute for Police (SMIP),” Police Executive Research Forum, accessed May 29, 2015, http://www.policeforum.org/smip.
Findings and recommendations

Finding 6.1

**SLCPD personnel with TAC/SWAT experience are selected for promotion at significantly higher rates than those without.**

**Recommendation 6.1.1**

The SLCPD should conduct an in-depth review of its promotional procedures to determine the impacts of those procedures and their validity and to determine whether there are alternative promotional procedures that could meet the County’s needs but have less disparate impact on any group of applicants.

**Recommendation 6.1.2**

The SLCPD should review informal and formal reward systems to recognize and promote an increased emphasis on community engagement, problem-solving experience, and trust building with the community. Successes in these areas should be given prominent consideration for assignments and promotion.

**Recommendation 6.1.3**

The department should consider adding performance evaluation measures to the existing performance evaluation “neighborhood policing” category, focusing on community engagement, group problem solving, team building, and trust development.
Chapter 7. In-service Training

Missouri POST Requirements

“The Missouri Department of Public Safety’s Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Program is a regulatory agency that is responsible for the licensure of peace officers, reserve peace officers, basic training instructors, curriculum, and training centers.”74

The Missouri POST Commission requires every licensed peace officer to complete a minimum of 48 hours of continuing education (in-service training) over a three-year period. Missouri POST identifies four core curricular areas of instruction with a minimum requirement of four hours within each core area. Missouri POST also requires three hours of training to help deter racial profiling over the three-year period.

1. **Legal studies.** Training focuses on updates or familiarization with federal, state, and local criminal law or legal issues.

2. **Interpersonal perspectives.** Training focuses on communication skills such as cultural diversity training, ethics, conflict management, victim sensitivity, and stress management.

3. **Technical studies.** Training focuses on specialized studies or activities that directly relate to the job description, including first aid and CPR training.

4. **Skill development.** Training focuses on activities that develop physical skill proficiency such as defensive tactics, firearms driver training, first aid, and CPR training. A minimum of four hours of some type of firearms skill development training must be completed every three-year reporting period.75

Instructor requirements

In-service instructors primarily comprise CMPA staff and subject matter experts who conduct the training as necessary. All CMPA instructors must apply through the Missouri Department of Public Safety POST Program to be granted a one- or three-year license to serve as a licensed instructor. According to the Missouri Department of Public Safety POST Code of State Regulations (CSR 75-14.070 and CSR 75-14.080),76 those who wish to be certified can be licensed as generalist or specialist instructors.

For the generalist license, applicants must have the following qualifications:

- Sponsorship by a licensed basic training center
- Graduation from a POST-approved instructor development course

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76. The lists of requirements that follow can be found in Missouri Code of State Regulations, 11 CSR 75-14.
• One of the following:
  • Four-year baccalaureate degree and five or more years’ active commission as a full-time peace officer, federal law enforcement officer, or military law enforcement officer
  • Two-year associate degree and eight or more years’ active commission as a full-time peace officer, federal law enforcement officer, or military law enforcement officer
  • High school diploma or its equivalent and 10 or more years’ active commission as a full-time peace officer, federal law enforcement officer, or military law enforcement officer

For applicants seeking a specialist license, instructors must have the following qualifications:

• Sponsorship by a licensed basic training center
• Graduation from a POST-approved instructor development course
• Subject matter expertise as to one or more of the mandatory basic training objectives established pursuant to 11 CSR 75-14.030 (The director shall determine expertise after consideration of the instructor’s academic education, previous teaching experience, practical experience, membership in professional associations, publications, letters of reference, recognition as an expert by courts of law, independent certifications of expertise, and other evidence of the instructor’s qualifications.)
• A valid, current third-party or secondary license shall be required to qualify as a specialist instructor for any objective related to the following:
  • **Tactical communications.** If using verbal judo, instructor must be a graduate of a verbal judo trainer course.
  • **Hazardous materials.** Instructor must be a graduate of a POST-recognized eight-hour hazardous materials training course.
  • **Accident investigation.** Instructor must be a graduate of an accident investigation school or accident reconstruction school.
  • **First Responder.** Instructor must be a graduate of a certified first responder training course or a licensed emergency medical technician (EMT), emergency medical technician paramedic (EMTP), registered nurse (RN), medical doctor (MD), or doctor of osteopathy (DO).
  • **Core curricular areas under defensive tactics.** With the exception of the subject area of mechanics of arrest and control, instructor must be a graduate of a POST-recognized law enforcement defensive tactics instructor course.
  • **Core curricular areas under firearms.** Instructor must be a graduate of a POST-recognized firearms instructor school of at least 40 hours.
  • **Core curricular areas under driver training.** Instructor must be a graduate of a POST-recognized driver training instructor course.
  • **Memoranda, introduction to report writing, and report writing exercises.** If an instructor does not have at least a four-year college degree, he or she must be a graduate of a POST-recognized report writing instructor course.
Mandatory in-service training

According to the Missouri POST Commission, every three years, “all licensed peace officers and reserve officers must successfully complete a minimum of 48 hours of continuing education to maintain their peace officer license.”

According to the Missouri POST Commission, every three years, “all licensed peace officers and reserve officers must successfully complete a minimum of 48 hours of continuing education to maintain their peace officer license.” In addition, the POST Commission requires that of those 48 hours, 16 hours focus on specified curricular topic areas (four hours each in the legal, interpersonal, technical, and skill development topic areas).

To comply with the Missouri POST Commission continuing education requirements, the SLCPD requires two eight-hour in-service training blocks annually. In 2015, that training focused on (1) response to active shooters and (2) civil disturbances. However, SLCPD required training topics can vary from year to year. Command staff indicated that they were preparing in-service training on communication strategies for encounters between officers and citizens.

Findings and recommendations

Finding 7.1

The SLCPD does not require sufficient mandated in-service training that addresses community engagement or community policing.

The in-service training program currently provides the state-required racial profiling information, legal updates, and programs that address current issues such as use (and misuse) of social media. If an officer is interested in any community policing training, they must take a related course provided by the CMPA through continuing education or seek an outside provider.

Recommendation 7.1.1

The SLCPD should modify its in-service training to adequately address community policing, problem-oriented policing, and the historical impact on police-community relations.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing encourages law enforcement agencies to find ways to acknowledge the role of policing in past and present injustice and discrimination and how it is a hurdle to the promotion of community trust. Providing training that educates new officers on these issues is a starting point.

78. Ibid.
Chapter 8. Responses for Handling Protests and Mass Demonstrations

Snapshot of civil disturbance response teams and training

The manner in which to deploy and use civil disorder response teams (CDRT) has evolved since the 1999 World Trade Organization riots in Seattle. Largely in response to scenes that played out on the world stage during those incidents, law enforcement agencies across the country began training and equipping officers to prepare for large-scale violent demonstrations. Officers were given protective gear that when fully donned gave them a militaristic appearance. Along with new protective equipment, training was developed to enhance tactical response to violent protests.

During that era, CDRT training was focused on precision movements of team members forming lines to stop crowds from accessing an area. The training included strategies to split up or move a hostile crowd from an area. Proper use of tactics and equipment were skills that were drilled into team members, including directives not to engage the crowd in conversation. Officers were instructed to put on their equipment, carry their baton at port arms, and stare straight ahead. They were specifically instructed that they should not speak to or engage the crowd unless it was to give a lawful order. The teams were deployed in full protective equipment in an effort to intimidate those in the crowd seeking to engage in disruptive behavior. Law enforcement agencies across the nation soon discovered that when they trained their teams to prepare for a fight and to display that they were equipped and ready for a fight, they often wound up in the middle of a fight.

In recent years with large scale sporting event disturbances and civil movements such as the “Occupy” protests, best practices for crowd management have changed. Police agencies across the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have developed new strategies to address protesting crowds. The front line of defense to manage a disorderly crowd is starting with a softer approach. This strategy of crowd management, sometimes called the “Vancouver,” “Boston,” or “British” model, starts with officers in soft uniforms, interacting with protesters in a respectful and positive manner before and during a protest.

The strategy is designed for officers in standard patrol uniforms to walk among protesters engaging them in conversation. They work with the members of the crowd to conduct their protest peacefully. Experience has shown that highly visible officers interacting with members of the crowd before, during, and after a protest event can decrease violence and disorder as well as the number of arrests. It is difficult for someone to throw a rock or a bottle at officers when they were interacting with them in a respectful and positive way moments earlier.

Many of the most successful law enforcement crowd management incidents have CDRTs on standby out of the public’s view and ready to deploy if needed, but often never used. Front-line officers work with protesters to hold a productive peaceful protest, presenting themselves as the protesters’ guardians as opposed to their enemies and preventing the need to deploy more combat-ready teams.
When crowd members begin assaultive behavior against one another or the police, intervention must come swiftly. In these situations, pre-staged CDRTs quickly deploy and stop those engaged in violent behavior. In addition, because fire can cause psychological change in a crowd, officers must deploy immediately to any sign of fire, disperse those involved, and effectively extinguish the fire. This can be done with a tactical fire response or by members of the CDRT equipped with fire extinguishers.

As important as it is to quickly disperse or arrest those engaged in unlawful behavior, it is equally important to fall back to a less confrontational (out of sight if possible) staging area once the situation is under control. Often, the withdrawal of the police from a confrontation leads to those involved leaving on their own.

Civil disturbance in St. Louis County

Critical to reducing injury and property damage is preparation well in advance of any potential protests or mass demonstrations. Before August 2014, St. Louis County had never been challenged with the array of large-scale disturbance issues that it faced after the shooting death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. While formalized training programs prepared St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) officers for anticipated events and subsequent technical responses to civil disturbances, no formal programs focused on preventing and de-escalating disturbances. The National Incident Management System (NIMS) was not fully understood or institutionalized as an organizational response to major incidents. Regional response protocols for large-scale civil disturbance called for mutual aid from other departments, and many of these departments were not as well trained or experienced as the SLCPD.

Assessment of police response to demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri

Under the COPS Office Critical Response initiative, the Institute for Intergovernmental Research (IIR) recently conducted an assessment of the response to the August 2014 demonstrations in Ferguson, Missouri. The after-action report focused on the 17-day period that began with mass gatherings and protests through periods of both peaceful demonstrations and violence and ending as demonstrations and violence dissipated with an uneasy return to normalcy.

The after-action assessment conducted by IIR identified 48 findings and 113 lessons learned. These findings and lessons learned served as the benchmark for this review of the SLCPD’s preparation and response to the grand jury announcement on November 24, 2014. The IIR report identifies six key themes that dominated the response to incidents in Ferguson, Missouri, August 2014. They are as follows:

1. **Inconsistent leadership.** Inconsistency in direction, incident management, and tactical orders was apparent and particularly evident in the comments of frontline officers and supervisors.

2. **Failure to understand endemic problems in the community.** There was insufficient understanding of community concerns, and relationships between law enforcement and some community segments were lacking.

3. **A reactive rather than proactive strategy.** The police response to the mass demonstrations was generally reactive and did not appear to establish a strategic approach to effectively mitigate the complexity of issues and respond more effectively to the mass gatherings.

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4. **Inadequate communication and information sharing.** There was a lack of effective communication and information management. Communication gaps led to tactical and strategic uncertainty within law enforcement agencies, between law enforcement agencies, and with the community.

5. **Use of ineffective and inappropriate strategies and tactics.** There were instances where specific actions were taken that infringed upon constitutionally-protected activities and were not aligned with current national best practices. These strategies and tactics had the unintended consequence of escalating rather than diminishing tensions.

6. **Lack of law enforcement response continuity.** Complicating factors were presented by the response of smaller municipal law enforcement agencies in the region, each with disparate missions, policies, training, equipment, and policing cultures.\(^ {81}\)

**Overview of police response in Ferguson**

The Police Foundation (PF) assessment team worked with IIR to review the SLCPD response to events in Ferguson, Missouri, in August 2014. The collaborative collection of information, review of documents, collection of interviews, and sharing of findings allowed the assessment team to develop a framework for assessing SLCPD policies, preparation, and response to protests and demonstrations.

The purpose of the assessment in this chapter is to identify opportunities to strengthen policies, practices, training, and response to handling protests and mass demonstrations based on the findings in the IIR report, as well as changes implemented between the events in August 2014 and the response to the grand jury announcement on November 24, 2014.

While the IIR review and findings included the St. Louis County Police Department, Ferguson Police Department, St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and Missouri Highway Patrol, the PF assessment team reviewed all lessons learned, conducted interviews with community members and police employees, and reviewed documents and multimedia in determining findings and recommendations specifically designed for the SLCPD.

In addition, the PF assessment team attended planning briefings in preparation for the grand jury decision, which included both internal briefings for the SLCPD as well as a regional public safety briefing that included law enforcement, fire, EMS, emergency management, and the Missouri National Guard. Team members were also in St. Louis County and observed the SLCPD response to incidents following the grand jury announcement.

**Response to the grand jury announcement**

The SLCPD acknowledged that there was a significant likelihood of civil unrest in Ferguson and downtown Clayton when the grand jury reached a decision on whether or not to indict the police officer accused of shooting Michael Brown. In preparation, SLCPD leadership reached out to law enforcement leadership across the country\(^ {82}\) to seek advice and guidance on ways to prepare for the November 2014 decision.

\(^ {81}\) Ibid., xiv.

\(^ {82}\) Agencies such as the New York City Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department sent officers to St. Louis County to assist the SLCPD and to provide support and guidance in the preparation for the decision reading.
Based on lessons learned following the shooting death of Brown, the SLCPD undertook several steps to prepare for potential civil unrest. The action steps taken to prepare for the grand jury decision are summarized below.

**Public information**

According to community members interviewed by the assessment team, the SLCPD conducted outreach to the community following the incidents in August and up through the grand jury announcement on November 24, 2014. Outreach included local clergy and community leaders, many of whom were actively involved in the August protests. The effort went so far as to engage a group known as “Lost Voices.” This group consisted of some current and former gang members who are vocal critics of the police and authorities in the area.

In addition, school resource officers (SRO) regularly discussed the incidents in August and the pending grand jury decision with students. These discussions ranged from casual hallway conversations, classroom question and answer sessions, and school assemblies. The SROs in at least one high school helped facilitate an on-campus march that allowed students to express their feelings about events without disrupting school activities.

In the weeks leading up to the grand jury decision, the SLCPD focused on media outreach through its public information office. The SLCPD assigned new staff to the public information office, both civilian and sworn. The department hired a new civilian team member who previously worked for a local news affiliate as a social media strategist. Her extensive experience in social media helped her to begin the process of pushing out and gathering real-time information through social media. The SLCPD also assigned an additional sergeant to the unit who had prior private sector marketing experience and a degree in communications and public relations. This new social media and marketing team was effective at quickly constructing and managing the SLCPD’s messages to the media, community, and protesters.

**Officer deployment**

In contrast to the mass deployment of officers from over 50 agencies in August 2014, the SLCPD designed a strategic approach in response to protests following the grand jury decision. First, it restricted deployment to officers and supervisors identified as having the necessary training and knowledge of SLCPD deployment strategies. This included selecting agencies and personnel that the SLCPD determined would abide by any established command and control protocols, understood both individual and collective roles and responsibilities, had successfully completed necessary training, and would exemplify the best possible image at all times during any deployment to protests and mass demonstrations.

In addition, the SLCPD plan restricted exterior protective gear for officers until a credible threat was confirmed. Tactical members of the CDRTs were deployed ahead of time to a tactical command post near predicted disturbance locations. Team members and their equipment were out of the view of the public but available if needed.

A clear chain of command was established for all units assigned to any protests. The importance of professionalism and restraint was stressed to the officers and supervisors on the line. Officers who failed to conduct themselves professionally were removed, reassigned, or retrained.
The SLCPD developed extensive plans to respond to disorderly crowds, including thoughtful deployment of CDRT members. Plans outlined locations to which officers would deploy and the manner in which they would respond. They also included an agreed-upon use of force policy. Tear gas deployment required approval by the tactical commander. Video surveillance teams were assigned to each team to document the facts and circumstances of their deployment and to chronicle events that occurred while deployed.

Training

The SLCPD conducted extensive CDRT training of all of its officers as well as those regional officers responding to mutual aid requests. The department reviewed qualifications with regional departments to ensure that those on the front line were experienced and well trained. Training included instruction on responsible and professional response to incidents of civil unrest. Members of the prosecutor’s office assisted in training to detail applicable laws and statutes as well as officer responsibility to ensure the rights of protesters. Each officer was given a pocket-sized laminated card containing the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. It also contained the officers’ oath of office (sworn oath taken by all SLCPD officers upon becoming commissioned officers), as well as a list of applicable laws and ordinances. In addition to formal training sessions at the CMPA, roll call training was conducted to remind officers of their instructions, duties, and responsibilities during protests. Training sessions were often started with a selected officer reading the oath of office aloud to set the tone for the day.

Findings and recommendations

Lack of experience and ineffective execution of SLCPD plans hampered the response to civil unrest in Ferguson in August 2014 following the shooting death of Michael Brown. Throughout the many months of protests that followed, the SLCPD continued to develop and improve their preparation and response to continued mass demonstrations. Notwithstanding lessons learned from these events and changes made in anticipation of additional unrest following the reading of the grand jury decision, the assessment team identified several areas—including training, media relations, preparations, and responses—where the SLCPD could benefit from policy and practice changes for future response to protests and mass demonstrations.

Finding 8.1

While SLCPD officers understand NIMS terms and most concepts, they lack organization-wide understanding, experience, and proper application of NIMS.

The SLCPD has not fully implemented key concepts of NIMS command and management, including ICS, multiagency coordination systems, and public information. Department General Order (GO) 11-49 identifies the purpose, policy, and procedure for implementation of ICS and also includes training requirements as prescribed in NIMS, yet many employees do not understand NIMS.  

83. The oath of office is required by St. Louis County Revised Ordinances Title VII, § 701.050, Public Safety and Morals.
84. Departmental General Order 11-49 (see note 9).
Recommendation 8.1.1
While requirements mandate law enforcement training in NIMS\(^{85}\) and ICS,\(^{86}\) the SLCPD should require that supervisors and incident commanders with actual experience be available to respond to requests for assistance during incidents of civil disorder.

Recommendation 8.1.2
The SLCPD should require that ICS, including standardized ICS forms, be used during planned special events such as parades, presidential visits, large-scale gatherings, and sporting events.

This will provide opportunities to implement and practice protocols so that they are better deployed during response to events that develop rapidly. In addition, by policy, training, and practice, NIMS should be a day-to-day operational norm for the SLCPD. For example, search warrants should use command and management including an ICS structure and, when appropriate, multiagency coordination and public information.

Recommendation 8.1.3
The SLCPD incident commander should be required to ensure that a comprehensive incident action plan (IAP) is completed as described in NIMS and that any officer who responds to a mutual aid request is well informed of the IAP, including rules of engagement and disengagement and use of force policies.

Senior staff should verify dissemination and understanding of this information by those on the front lines.

Recommendation 8.1.4
The SLCPD should develop a policy that details the deployment of CDRTs.

The policy should address the other recommendations and concerns noted in this section.

Recommendation 8.1.5
The SLCPD should continue to regularly train and exercise with all potential mutual aid responders.

Recommendation 8.1.6
Department GO 11-49 should be revised to include appropriate recommendations identified in this report.

Finding 8.2
In August of 2014, the SLCPD had difficulty anticipating the extent of concern from communities it does not usually police and therefore did not properly plan for potential resulting protests.

By not identifying the potential for large-scale violent protests, officers reacted to problems instead of taking a proactive approach to preventing them. While this improved following the incidents in August, additional attention is required.

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\(^{85}\) National Incident Management System (see note 10).

\(^{86}\) Incident Command System Training (see note 11).
Recommendation 8.2.1
The SLCPD should include community leaders in the response planning process and inform and educate the public about potential police response plans.

Recommendation 8.2.2
As authorized by law, the SLCPD should use social media monitoring programs along with community source(s) development to encourage and enhance real-time actionable intelligence on issues emerging in the community.

Recommendation 8.2.3
The SLCPD should use social media to engage the community and protesters before, during, and after events to disseminate accurate information and correct erroneous information.

Finding 8.3
A civil disorder response that includes mutual aid resources (Code 1000) was difficult to manage because the experience, training, and professionalism of the officers varied so greatly among the many police departments in St. Louis County.

Recommendation 8.3.1
To establish a shared philosophy and set minimum standards, the SLCPD should take a leadership role in the review and revision of the Code 1000 response protocols that includes addressing unrequested self-deployment; competing department policies and procedures; equipment deployment; and conflicting tactics, supervisor experience, and officer training.

Agencies that do not participate in or that fail to comply with revised Code 1000 guidelines should be removed from participation in the Code 1000 system. If revisions do not meet the standards of the SLCPD, the department should discontinue participating with agencies that do not meet their standards.

Recommendation 8.3.2
To reduce reliance on mutual aid for civil disobedience, the SLCPD should consider using allied agency personnel to respond to dispatched calls for service and temporarily modify dispatch priorities to increase the number of SLCPD personnel available for mass demonstrations, thereby improving consistency, accountability, and command and control.

Finding 8.4
SLCPD CDRT training manuals do not emphasize alternative approaches to managing a public disorder event beyond line movements and formations.

Recommendation 8.4.1

SLCPD CDRT training should be modified to present a balanced response to civil disorder that includes proper responses when tactical teams are deployed. Training should also include ways to prevent, mitigate, and de-escalate disorder events.

The importance of de-escalating during a tactical response must be emphasized. The 2011 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Critical Issues in Policing Series issue entitled “Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field” provides best practices and examples from the field of events in which this type of approach has been successful.

Finding 8.5

The SLCPD does not have policies that ensure that they always exhaust other de-escalation options before using tactical responses to disorder and protests.

Recommendation 8.5.1

SLCPD policy should require that officers familiar with the area and the community deploy before tactical teams.

As they did in November 2014, the SLCPD should continue to assign officers who are skilled at community engagement to the front lines as situations develop. This recommendation in conjunction with the tiered approach in finding 8.4 reduces the overreliance on a tactical response by the SLCPD.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommends implementing policies that “address procedures for implementing a layered response to mass demonstrations that prioritize de-escalation and guardian mindset.”

Finding 8.6

The SLCPD, as well as mutual aid departments, deployed rifles and administered tear gas inappropriately. This practice resulted in officers with long guns on the front lines and the deployment of tear gas without proper documentation or sufficient warning, contrary to the CDRT training.

Recommendation 8.6.1

Written departmental policy should ensure that the deployment of long guns, less lethal shotguns, and chemical munitions is consistent with the incident action plan (IAP).

Recommendation 8.6.2

The SLCPD should prohibit, by policy, the use of “overwatch” for crowd management and mass demonstration incidents. “Overwatch” is a force protection tactic that is inappropriate for crowd management and mass demonstrations.

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89. President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report (see note 14).
90. Institute for Intergovernmental Research, After-Action Assessment, 51, 59 (see note 80).
Recommendation 8.6.3
Because deployment of tear gas is highly controversial, written department policy must clearly state that absent exigent circumstances, the deployment should occur only with approval of the incident commander.

Recommendation 8.6.4
Written department policy should require that the justification for the use of gas be recorded on video and documented in the appropriate police report.

Recommendation 8.6.5
Written department policy should require that public announcements and warnings regarding the use of gas be made allowing time for the crowd to orderly disperse.

Warnings should be video recorded, time stamped through credible systems such as recorded dispatch channels, and announced using real-time social media such as Twitter.

Finding 8.7
Department General Order 02-43 authorizes the use of a canine for crowd control at the discretion of the handler.

The SLCPD’s use of canines for crowd control is not consistent with accepted police practice.

Recommendation 8.7.1
The SLCPD should revise general order 02-43 to prohibit the use of a canine strictly for crowd control.

Finding 8.8
The SLCPD lacks documented comprehensive training in the psychology of crowds and de-escalation.

For example, front line officers wearing riot helmets and protective gear can inadvertently incite crowds resulting in increases in disorder and the level of protests. Tense situations can often be resolved by police withdrawal from the area while escalation can result in use of force by both sides. St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) instructors articulated that CDRT training included de-escalation strategies in addition to recognizing that the media and others in the crowd will record all actions. Academy staff confirmed that training also addressed the psychological aspects of crowd management strategies. However, when reviewing the lesson plans and PowerPoint presentations for the course, the assessment team noted that they lacked these areas of instruction.
Recommendation 8.8.1
The SLCPD should provide training based on best practices for crowd management issues, including the psychology of crowds, to improve frontline supervisors’ and officers’ decision making.
Trainers from outside the department should be considered to assist with delivery of a diverse curriculum.

Recommendation 8.8.2
The SLCPD should provide training that stresses the safe withdrawal of officers from the scene as soon as the situation allows it as a means to decrease tensions during protests.

Finding 8.9
SLCPD supervisors lacked clear direction in crowd management during civil disturbance events.
Supervisors were assigned a number of responsibilities during civil disorder events, mostly to ensure proper squad movement and tactics. They were also tasked with ensuring that use of force was documented and arrest paperwork was thorough. There is no mention in the CDRT training of supervisors’ obligation to engage and work with protesters during an event to mitigate the impact of law enforcement on the protest.

Recommendation 8.9.1
The SLCPD should supplement requirements and training to require supervisors to participate in crowd engagement during civil disturbance events.
Training should be provided that demonstrates de-escalation strategies and effective communication techniques for supervisors to engage crowd members and the media during protests. It is important that front line supervisors see their roles as responsible not only for the proper deployment of squads but also for facilitating protest response in an effective manner.

Finding 8.10
SLCPD supervisors lack personnel management training that includes monitoring the well-being of personnel during chaotic emotional events.
High stress events such as these sometimes require an officer to step off the skirmish line for a few moments to ensure that they remain professional in the midst of insults, threats to family members, or taunts by protesters. While the need for supervisors to monitor the well-being of personnel during incidents was covered in basic instruction immediately preceding deployment to the line, it is not included in training curriculum.

Recommendation 8.10.1
The SLCPD should train supervisors in warning signs including verbal cues and body language that their personnel are under severe stress and in need of relief from the line.
A periodic check of the officers’ well-being should be part of any deployment response.
Finding 8.11

During interactions with assessment team members, SLCPD personnel still exhibited signs of stress based on their experiences in 2014.\textsuperscript{92}

Recommendation 8.11.1

The SLCPD should evaluate the employee assistance program, peer support program, and chaplaincy to ensure that adequate resources, personnel, and access are available for employees.

Recommendation 8.11.2

The SLCPD should provide necessary resources for employees to reduce potential victimization from doxxing,\textsuperscript{93} identity fraud, and threats.

During the mass protests in 2014, officers’ personal information was obtained by protesters and published on the Internet. This can and did lead to doxxing, identity fraud, and threats to officers’ families, whose addresses can often easily be found through an Internet search. Media photos and interviews regarding the handling of the protests reported that officers deployed to the front lines of the protests removed nameplates and badges from their uniforms partly in fear of these potential dangers.


Introduction

Citizen allegations of racial profiling by law enforcement prompted the passage of the Missouri state law that all peace officers in the state report specific information, including the driver’s race, for each vehicle stop in the state. Law enforcement agencies in the state are required to submit stop data to the state attorney general, who is required to compile the data and report to the governor. The attorney general’s report compares the driving age population (16 years and older) to the number of drivers stopped to determine if minority drivers are stopped disproportionately. That report also reviews the search rate of drivers and contraband hit rates resulting from the searches. The state of Missouri defines racial profiling as “the inappropriate use of race by law enforcement when making a decision to stop, search, or arrest motorists.”

In 2014, the concerns of Missourians came to the forefront after the shooting death of an unarmed Black teenager by a Ferguson (Missouri) police officer and the claim that the majority-White police department harassed Black residents. This claim, coupled with an examination of courts and ticketing practices, prompted an investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice, which released a report in March 2015 confirming a broad pattern of biased policing that targeted the Black community for excessive arrests and harsh punishment following traffic stops made by officers of the Ferguson Police Department. In light of these concerns, this assessment by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) includes a review of traffic stop practices by the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD).

The purpose of this analysis is to identify possible trends or patterns of biased policing in vehicle stop information as it relates to SLCPD stop practices. It is critical to understand that this is not a comprehensive, in-depth study of stops or biased policing in the SLCPD. It is a review of existing SLCPD data providing a cursory look at stop practices in St. Louis County.

Overview

Conducting a comprehensive traffic stop profiling study to include direct observation benchmarks is beyond the scope of this project. However, a preliminary review of traffic stop data compared to census data of the population aged 16 years and older (the only benchmark data available to the Police Foundation [PF] assessment team) serves as a first step in determining if there is the potential for bias in traffic

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95. The law allows the governor to withhold state funds for agencies that do not comply with the law.
96. Contraband refers to items (e.g., drugs, weapons) illegally transported as defined by federal, state, or local laws.
97. Missouri Revised Statutes, chapter 590, § 590.650 (see note 94).
98. Investigation of the Ferguson Police Department (see note 6).
enforcement activities on the part of the SLCPD. The PF assessment team conducted a cursory assessment using vehicle stops data from 2010 through 2014. Those data were compared to estimations of the population aged 16 and older in St. Louis County using 2010 census data to approximate the number of individuals over the age of 16 who may be driving motor vehicles. It is important to caution that although the analysis presented here is an important preliminary step, it is not sufficient to provide actual evidence of bias in vehicle stops on the part of the SLCPD. Data and methodological limitations prohibit the identification of causal factors that may lead to racial or ethnic disparities in vehicle stops.

This chapter is organized first to assist readers in understanding SLCPD vehicle stop management, administration, and practices in the context of how they impact the community’s experience with stops by SLCPD officers. In addition, it lays the foundation for data collection and reporting of SLCPD data.

This chapter also provides a description of the data provided by the SLCPD and practices used by the PF assessment team to review the data. Based on review of SLCPD vehicle stop data, this chapter identifies key conclusions (and supporting data). Those conclusions are as follows:

- Limitations on data prohibit a comprehensive review of SLCPD stop data.
  - Lack of a benchmark to adequately measure all of the risk factors that may be associated with St. Louis County drivers’ likelihood of being stopped prohibits a comprehensive review of traffic stop data for the purpose of determining if a pattern of bias exists.
  - High numbers of outstanding warrants county-wide could skew the analyses of post-stop outcomes.
- Census data of the population aged 16 years and older in comparison with traffic stop data suggest an overrepresentation of Black drivers in the stop data. However, this finding does not necessarily indicate the presence of bias. A more comprehensive study that includes an assessment of the actual driving population is necessary to fully and accurately analyze stop data.
- Among drivers who are stopped, Black drivers were more likely than White drivers to be stopped for equipment violations, license checks, and investigative stops while White drivers were more likely to be stopped for moving violations.
- With regard to post-stop data, Black drivers were searched at a higher rate than White drivers, yet searches of Black drivers were less likely to result in a finding of contraband.
- Among stops that resulted in enforcement action, Black drivers
  - were arrested at twice the rate of White drivers;
  - were more likely to be issued citations than White drivers.

Finally, this chapter provides key findings and recommendations for the SLCPD to improve stop practices.

**Management and administration**

The SLCPD’s General Order (GO) 07-81 outlines the procedures for documenting all traffic and investigative stops as required by law. The written policy specifically addresses racial profiling as it relates to citizens encountered, stopped, or arrested:

All investigative detentions, traffic stops, arrests, searches, or seizures of property, including asset and forfeiture efforts, based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, disability, handicap, or health-related conditions or economic level conducted without probable cause

99. General Order 07-81 applies to contracted cities of the SLCPD as well.
or reasonable suspicion are strictly forbidden. Officers must be able to articulate specific facts, circumstances, and conclusions that support probable cause or reasonable suspicion for the arrest, traffic stop, or investigative detention.

Any time a SLCPD officer stops a driver of a motor vehicle for any reason, the officer is required to complete a traffic stop information form to record the vehicle’s driver information such as age, gender, and race. The form is completed online via the mobile data terminals (MDTs) in the officers’ patrol vehicles.

The SLCPD Planning and Analysis Unit compiles the traffic stop data on a quarterly basis in an effort to determine if any officers have a pattern of stopping members of minority groups disproportionally to the population of minority groups residing in SLCPD’s jurisdiction. If a pattern is detected, the Planning and Analysis Unit will compile a summary report of that individual officer. The officer’s report is then forwarded to his or her supervisor for review. The officer’s supervisor conducts an evaluation to ascertain whether the officer routinely stops members of minority groups as a pretext for investigating other violations of criminal law. Any officer found to have engaged in racially based policing is subject to counseling and training through continuing education classes within 90 days of the completion of the supervisor evaluation. At the date of publication, the Planning and Analysis Unit has never identified anyone as disproportionately stopping minorities.

SLCPD basic training includes four hours of bias-free policing and racial profiling training at the academy. The instruction provides information on “the dangers of bigotry and fanatical leadership.” It also “underscores the importance placed on police as the first line of defense to insure protection of constitutional rights as they work in an increasingly diverse society.” According to GO 07-81, annual sensitivity training is also provided to all officers who may conduct motor vehicle stops. The training course(s) emphasizes the prohibition against biased profiling and the understanding of racial and cultural differences. An additional hour of state Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) required in-service training on racial profiling is also provided.

**Limitations on SLCPD traffic stop data and analysis**

A comprehensive racial profiling study should estimate the number of individuals by racial group who drive motor vehicles and who could potentially be stopped by police in the absence of bias. This figure is then compared to the actual number of individuals who are stopped. Addressing these factors is beyond the scope of this study; however, it is important to understand them in order to provide context for the analysis that was conducted.

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100. Office of the Chief of Police, *Departmental General Order 07-81* (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2007).
101. The traffic stop information form does not need to be completed if the stop is made pursuant to a conducted sobriety checkpoint or roadblock.
102. The quarterly summary reports are produced in a manner that did not permit the assessment team to determine the aggregate number of officers that would have been included in each of the yearly reports.
103. Office of the Chief of Police, *Departmental General Order 07-81* (see note 100).
104. In the event an officer is found to have engaged in profiling and has repeated the behavior, the officer is subject to progressive discipline from the SLCPD.
105. Office of the Chief of Police, *Departmental General Order 07-81* (see note 100).
To help understand bias in targeting drivers for traffic stops, it helps to look at what happens when bias does not exist. Without bias, three key variables exist to determine who is more likely to be stopped by law enforcement.

1. The first variable is the driver or driving population. The more an individual drives, the greater the probability of committing a violation. Even the most cautious driver makes mistakes, and making an honest mistake increases the potential to be stopped by the police.

2. The second variable is the skill of the driver. We have all witnessed individuals who are not good drivers. In an unbiased policing culture, those who are not good drivers are more likely than those who are good drivers to be stopped by law enforcement.108

3. The third variable is location, or where people drive. Unbiased police agencies deploy officers based on call volume including criminal activity and traffic collisions. The goal is that the mere presence of an officer will have a positive effect on community safety. A driver who drives in areas where the concentration of officers is higher stands a greater chance of being stopped for vehicle or criminal violations. In addition, the deployment of officers in specific geographic areas can be taken into consideration in the analysis.

Benchmarking provides an accurate estimate of the impact of these variables on a driving population. When an analysis of stop data is conducted to determine potential effects of race on officers’ decision making, an appropriate benchmark of drivers is necessary. Ideally, one would need an accurate estimate of the actual driving population at particular locations during certain hours of particular days in combination with an assessment of the overall driving behavior for different population groups. These data would provide a benchmark of the driving population at particular locations on particular days and times of day as well as a sample of driving skills. All of this is necessary to determine the probability of being stopped by police.

Using census population data, even adjusted or refined to include only the driving population, is an imprecise way to determine who is most at risk of being stopped by a police officer.109 Factors such as the number of vehicles in the household; recreational activities; and work and school commuter patterns and shopping patterns (among others) all influence when, how, and where people drive. Social scientists are still examining promising approaches to provide a more robust understanding of racial and ethnic disparities in vehicle stop and vehicle stop outcomes.110

As part of those examinations, one promising strategy is the use of direct observation surveys of specific locations for benchmarking. Direct observation surveys of specific locations are a more reliable benchmark of the driving population from which a police officer identifies motorists to stop at each particular location.111 Such observational survey fieldwork requires the identification of locations based on traffic patterns

and police activity or randomly selected locations. Observational surveys of the driving population are conducted at the locations during randomly selected days of the week and times of day. These observations serve as the benchmark for the demographics of the driving population. Police traffic stop data for each location are then compared to the observational results. To the extent there is a difference in the racial composition between the observational survey and the police data, a case for racial disparity can be made.

**Methodology**

A direct observational study of drivers, vehicles, and driving patterns within St. Louis County was beyond the scope of this assessment of vehicle traffic stops. The present assessment relied on an analysis of legislatively mandated data collected by the SLCPD from 2010 through 2014 of traffic stop information. Through the use of this data, descriptive information is provided to convey potential biases by examining the relative differences between the percentages of drivers of different races stopped by SLCPD officers and the percentages of drivers of different races based on the benchmark of the census data of the population of the county aged 16 years and older. The assessment also included an analysis of the differences in the percentages of drivers who are stopped in relation to searches and post-stop outcomes (e.g., arrests, reasons for stops, citations issued).

The analysis compares the annual number of stops and the percentage of drivers stopped by race from 2010 through 2014 to the driving age (16 years and older) population estimate in the 2010 census. The use of age census data provides for a slightly better measure than the use of overall census figures by adjusting for residents who are unlikely or unable to drive because they are too young. In addition, the following five data fields were assessed related to vehicle stop information to determine if there is a potential for bias in the use of these police actions:

1. **Search rates.** The search\textsuperscript{112} rate indicator represents the percentage of drivers who are subjected to searches (number of searches divided by number of stops; result multiplied by 100).

2. **Contraband hit rate.** The contraband hit rate indicator reflects the percentage of searches in which contraband was found.

3. **Arrest rate.** The arrest rate indicator reflects the percentage of drivers who were subject to arrest during a traffic stop.

4. **Reasons for the vehicle stop** (e.g., moving violation, equipment violation, license checks).

5. **The outcome of the stop** (e.g. citation issued, warning, or no action taken by the officer).

**Analysis of vehicle stop data**

Lack of a benchmark to adequately measure all of the risk factors that may be associated with the likelihood of drivers’ being stopped prohibits a comprehensive review of traffic stop data for the purpose of determining if a pattern of bias exists.

As described earlier, an accurate benchmark of the driving population for St. Louis County was not available for this review. While the PF assessment team used census data to provide a starting point to review stop data, the census is not sufficient to make a thorough assessment. However, it is sufficient to look for broad trends of disparity that can be indicative of patterns of bias in stops.

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\textsuperscript{112} For the purpose of our assessment, we focused on the following types of searches: consent, inventory, drug/alcohol odor, incident to arrest, plain view contraband, reasonable suspicion-weapon; drug dog alert, and other.
Adding to the limits and associated complications of data analysis is the number of outstanding arrest warrants in the St. Louis area. According to a Missouri state judicial report, there were more than 750,000 outstanding arrest warrants in St. Louis City and St. Louis County in 2014, including the cities within the county,\textsuperscript{113} which is nearly three arrest warrants for every four adults. Unfortunately, the judicial report data did not capture the race or ethnicity of those with warrants. As such, data limitations prohibit determining whether the arrest rate for Black drivers is directly related to any disparity in outstanding warrants. Moreover, while state law and departmental policy require an officer to make an arrest on an outstanding warrant, an officer may exercise some discretion prior to an arrest and take into consideration the seriousness of the warrant violation (e.g., failure to appear on a municipal ordinance), the ability to verify the warrant with the issuing municipality, and the current workload (volume of calls for service) of the officer’s shift. The available stop data do not contain information regarding the violation of the warrant or the decision(s) why the officer did not arrest the driver.

Stop data trends and patterns 2010–2014

According to the 2010 U.S. Census for St. Louis County, 70.3 percent of the population was identified as White and 23.7 percent as Black (table 1 on page 16). For our comparison purposes, the census estimates that the population of individuals age 16 years and older self-identified as 71.4 percent White and 21.7 percent Black.

Table 11 presents the annual number of vehicle stops and the percentage of drivers stopped by race from 2010 through 2014.\textsuperscript{114} The overall number of stops shows a slight decrease in 2011 from 2010 and a significant decrease in 2014 from 2013. Overall, on average, nearly 30.2 percent of the drivers stopped were Black compared to 66.7 percent who were White drivers. Note that the census estimates 6.9 percent of individuals are of other racial categories. These individuals are included in the total number of stops, but a separate analysis is not conducted on these population groups.

\textbf{Table 11. Racial composition of drivers stopped, 2010–2014}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Stops (all races)</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>91,091</td>
<td>63,343 (69.5)</td>
<td>25,214 (27.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>89,151</td>
<td>59,565 (66.8)</td>
<td>26,793 (30.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>90,528</td>
<td>60,511 (66.8)</td>
<td>27,104 (29.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>85,895</td>
<td>55,165 (64.2)</td>
<td>28,014 (32.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>61,592</td>
<td>40,415 (65.6)</td>
<td>19,211 (31.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean*</td>
<td>83,651</td>
<td>55,800 (66.7)</td>
<td>25,267 (30.2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* In addition, given the low number of stops conducted in 2014 compared to the 2010–2013 yearly totals, the average percent of stops per racial group should be reviewed with caution. Based on conversations with SLCPD executive staff, the lower number of stops was attributed to the reallocation of personnel and priorities of events related to the Ferguson unrest. In August 2014, there were 4,400 fewer stops than in August 2013. The decline in stops continued throughout September and through the end of 2014.

Although a reliable and appropriate benchmark was not available for this review, the data would suggest a need for a comprehensive analysis of traffic stop data. The proportion of Black drivers was overrepresented based on the population of individuals who are 16 years and older throughout the five-year period. Black driv-

\textsuperscript{113} “FY 2014 Warrants Issued and Warrants Outstanding” (see note 34).
ers on average were 30.2 percent of the drivers stopped, yet Black individuals are 21.7 percent of the census estimates for citizens in the population age 16 years and older. The difference in the percentage of Black drivers stopped compared to their proportion in the population of those 16 years and older was significant (p ≤ .05).

Reason for stop

White and Black drivers significantly differed in the reasons for their respective traffic stops. Among drivers who had been stopped, on average, the majority of White drivers (55.7 percent) were stopped for moving violations, such as speeding or not stopping for a stop sign (compared to 34.3 percent of Black drivers). However, relative to White drivers, Black drivers were more likely to be stopped for equipment violations (25.6 percent versus 17.2 percent); license checks, including expired registration and suspended license (33.8 percent versus 23.7 percent); and investigatory stops (6.6 percent versus 3.6 percent), as shown in table 12.

Table 12. Percentage of drivers stopped by reason for stop, 2010–2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Moving violation (White, Black)</th>
<th>Equipment violation (White, Black)</th>
<th>License check (White, Black)</th>
<th>Investigative stop (White, Black)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>57.6†, 35.2</td>
<td>16.8, 27.3†</td>
<td>22.0, 32.7†</td>
<td>3.6, 4.9†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>55.0†, 34.5</td>
<td>18.7, 26.5†</td>
<td>23.0, 32.9†</td>
<td>3.5, 6.1†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>55.3†, 32.2</td>
<td>17.5, 25.5†</td>
<td>24.5, 36.3†</td>
<td>2.9, 6.3†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>55.1†, 34.0</td>
<td>17.3, 25.2†</td>
<td>24.5, 34.1†</td>
<td>3.8, 7.9†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>55.6†, 35.7</td>
<td>15.5, 23.3†</td>
<td>24.5, 33.1†</td>
<td>4.4, 7.9†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>55.7†, 34.3</td>
<td>17.2, 25.6†</td>
<td>23.7, 33.8†</td>
<td>3.6, 6.6†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data from “Annual Reports” 2010–2014 (see note 114).
† p ≤ .001
‡ Given the low number of stops conducted in 2014 compared to the 2010–2013 yearly totals, the average percent of stops per racial group should be reviewed with caution. Based on conversations with SLCPD executive staff, the lower number of stops was attributed to the reallocation of personnel and priorities of events related to the Ferguson unrest. In August 2014, there were 4,400 fewer stops than in August 2013. The decline in stops continued throughout September and through the end of 2014.

Percentage of drivers subject to search

The assessment team used the percentage of drivers who were subject to search as an indicator in the assessment of potential racial profiling. Officer-conducted searches included searches of drivers or of property in the vehicle. Searches were conducted (1) with the consent of the driver, (2) because the officer might have observed suspected contraband in plain view, (3) because the officer had reasonable suspicion that an individual might possess a weapon, or (4) incident to an arrest.

The search rate for all drivers stopped during the five-year period (see table 13) found that Black drivers were searched at higher rates than White drivers in each of the years examined. The observed difference between the search rates of Black and White drivers indicates that the probability such a result could have occurred by chance (p-value)115 is only .1 percent.

115. Significant differences refers to the probability of how likely it is that any observed difference between groups is due to chance. A p value close to 0 indicates that the observed difference is unlikely to be due to chance, whereas a p value close to 1 suggests no difference between the groups other than difference due to chance. The p value for the difference between Black and White drivers indicates that the probability that such a result could have occurred by chance is .1%.
In 2010, Black drivers were overall subject to searches 72 percent more often than White drivers. While the percentage of Black drivers searched relative to White drivers declined from 2010 to 2013, Black drivers were still subject to more searches than White drivers. In 2014, Black drivers were searched 59 percent more often than White drivers. These findings reveal a disparity between the race of drivers being searched. However, identifying a specific explanation for this disparity is beyond the scope of this analysis.

A more in-depth analysis is needed to determine underlying conditions that may contribute to disparity in searches. For example, the large number of outstanding arrest warrants in the St. Louis area may have a disproportionate impact related to drivers searched incident to arrest. Moreover, the disparity in search rates may be attributed to discretionary searches (e.g., consent searches where the officer asks the driver's permission to search or the driver suggests that the officer can search the vehicle) compared to nondiscretionary searches (e.g., search incident to arrest or contraband in plain view).

### Contraband hit rate

The outcomes of the search (e.g., finding contraband) were also compared between White and Black drivers. The indicator referred to as a contraband hit rate reflects the percentage of searches in which contraband was found. During the five-year period, there was variation in the contraband hit rate for each racial category in the proportion to drivers searched, as shown in table 14. The contraband hit rates during this time period show that, on average, searches conducted on Black drivers were less likely to result in finding of contraband than searches of White drivers. However, Black drivers were not more likely to experience a prolonged search for contraband. For Black and White drivers who were searched, 95 percent of searches took less than 15 minutes.116

Similar to the possible explanation for the difference in drivers subject to search (above), there may be factors that contribute to the different contraband hit rates during the time periods, such as higher arrest rates for Blacks who were stopped that require officers to conduct searches incident to arrest as well as the higher search rate of Black drivers as identified in table 13.

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### Table 14. Contraband hit rates, 2010–2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White drivers searched</th>
<th>White drivers with contraband N (%)</th>
<th>Black drivers searched</th>
<th>Black drivers with contraband N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>6,087</td>
<td>1,435 (23.6)†</td>
<td>4,175</td>
<td>863 (20.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5,838</td>
<td>1,432 (24.5)†</td>
<td>4,467</td>
<td>905 (20.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>5,903</td>
<td>1,472 (24.9)†</td>
<td>4,066</td>
<td>789 (19.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>5,171</td>
<td>1,264 (24.4)†</td>
<td>4,003</td>
<td>781 (19.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,415</td>
<td>826 (24.2)†</td>
<td>2,580</td>
<td>519 (20.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>5,283</td>
<td>1,286 (24.3)†</td>
<td>3,858</td>
<td>771 (20.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data from “Annual Reports” 2010–2014 (see note 114).
†p ≤ .001

### Arrest rate

The final indicator used for assessing potential racial profiling for this report was the rate at which drivers were arrested during traffic stops. Table 15 represents the percentage of Black and White drivers who were arrested as a result of traffic stops across the five-year period. Between 2010 and 2014, Black drivers were arrested at roughly twice the rate of White drivers. Each of these yearly differences is statistically significant,117 with Black drivers being subject to arrest more often than White drivers.

### Table 15. Drivers arrested as a percent of drivers stopped, 2010–2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>White drivers N (%)</th>
<th>Black drivers N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,675 (4.2)</td>
<td>2,196 (8.7)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2,607 (4.4)</td>
<td>2,615 (9.8)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>2,585 (4.3)</td>
<td>2,327 (8.6)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2,235 (4.0)</td>
<td>2,122 (7.6)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,498 (3.7)</td>
<td>1,498 (7.8)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>2,320 (4.1)</td>
<td>2,152 (8.5)†</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data from “Annual Reports” 2010–2014 (see note 114).
†p ≤ .001

The variation in the arrest rates between Black and White drivers is largely a function of the number of arrests for outstanding warrants. For example, in 2010, focusing on arrests for reasons other than “outstanding warrant,” the rate of arrest for Black drivers and White drivers is approximately equal (3 percent versus 2.5 percent).118 In an attempt to better understand the high arrest rate for Black drivers, we obtained data on the number of outstanding warrants issued for cities within St. Louis County, the city of St. Louis, and the county of St. Louis. While the number of outstanding warrants on June 30, 2014 was more than 750,000,119 data were not available on the race of the individuals identified in the warrants, so we were unable to complete this analysis. Anecdotally, we know...
that some officers will not make an arrest based on outstanding warrants.\textsuperscript{120} However, there is no measure of how often officers use their discretion. There are two possible mechanisms working in these cases. It could be that some officers are more likely to arrest a Black driver on an outstanding warrant than a White driver, which would indicate bias. Alternatively, it is possible that there are more Blacks who have outstanding warrants in Missouri, which would naturally increase the rate of Black drivers arrested. Although disparity could exist, we are unable to ascertain disparity based on the lack of data on drivers with outstanding warrants who were not arrested.

**Outcome of stop**

On average, 67.2 percent of Black drivers were issued a citation as a result of the stop compared to 64.7 percent of White drivers (see table 16). White drivers were more likely to be given a warning (29.2 percent) as a result of the stop than black drivers (25.1 percent). The difference in the proportion was also significant.\textsuperscript{121}

While the results seem to suggest that potential disparities exist for the outcomes of stops among the race of the drivers, it is not possible to conclusively determine whether the disparity is attributed to biased policing. More information is required regarding the officer’s motivation for the stop that may influence their decision to issue a citation.

**Table 16. Driver outcomes other than arrest, 2010–2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Citations: White N (%) ‡</th>
<th>Citations: Black N (%) ‡</th>
<th>Warnings: White N (%) ‡</th>
<th>Warnings: Black N (%) ‡</th>
<th>No action: White N (%) ‡</th>
<th>No action: Black N (%) ‡</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>41,455 (65.4)</td>
<td>17,076 (67.7)†</td>
<td>17,338 (27.4)†</td>
<td>5,963 (23.6)</td>
<td>3,196 (5.0)</td>
<td>1,372 (5.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>40,065 (67.3)</td>
<td>19,088 (71.2)†</td>
<td>16,210 (27.3)†</td>
<td>5,818 (21.7)</td>
<td>2,656 (4.4)</td>
<td>1,375 (5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>40,767 (67.4)</td>
<td>19,311 (71.2)†</td>
<td>16,985 (28.1)†</td>
<td>6,065 (22.4)</td>
<td>2,349 (3.9)</td>
<td>1,382 (5.1)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>33,491 (60.7)</td>
<td>17,412 (62.2)†</td>
<td>18,337 (33.2)†</td>
<td>8,176 (29.2)</td>
<td>2,894 (5.2)</td>
<td>1,978 (7.1)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>24,859 (61.5)</td>
<td>11,952 (62.2)†</td>
<td>12,653 (31.3)†</td>
<td>5,654 (29.4)</td>
<td>2,669 (6.6)</td>
<td>1,429 (7.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>36,127 (64.7)</td>
<td>16,968 (67.2)†</td>
<td>16,305 (29.2)†</td>
<td>6,335 (25.1)</td>
<td>2,753 (4.9)</td>
<td>1,507 (6.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data from “Annual Reports” 2010–2014 (see note 114).

† Percentages are based on the total number of stops for each racial group, including those who were arrested (see table 15). Some stops result in more than one outcome (for example, a driver may be cited for running a red light and arrested on an outstanding warrant in the same traffic stop). Therefore, the total number of outcomes per racial group in this table added to the total number of arrests per racial group will exceed the total number of stops for each year (see table 11), and the summed percentages of all of these outcomes per racial group will exceed 100%.

\textsuperscript{120} It is important to note that state law and departmental policy require the officer to make an arrest on an outstanding warrant. However, an officer can exercise some discretion prior to making an arrest and take into consideration the seriousness of the offense (e.g., failure to appear on a municipal ordinance violation), the municipal agency that issued the warrant, and the current workload of the shift (volume of calls for service) to which the officer is assigned. For example, officers are aware that some municipalities are regularly unable to verify the warrant or refuse to pick up the individual because the agency does not have an officer available to leave the city to take custody of the violator. If the municipality cannot verify the warrant or refuses to take custody of the individual and the warrant is not for a serious offense, the officer may release the individual on a warning to get the warrant resolved. As a consequence of this practice, we are unable to determine whether the disparity we found in arrests for outstanding warrants among Black and White drivers is a result of Black drivers with more serious offenses for their outstanding warrants.

\textsuperscript{121} The statistical test used to compare the differences (chi-square) is highly sensitive to the sample size in each of the categories. As such, the results should be reviewed with caution, as the differences are quite small.
Additional analysis: Comparison of precinct level stop data to county-wide stop data

Aggregate county-level results are made up of individual precinct differences where some precincts may have higher or lower racial compositions in the percentage of traffic stops and searches (for example) than the county as a whole, but where this difference does not necessarily indicate bias. For example, Blacks make up approximately 90 percent of the population of the city of Jennings, which can account for the apparently high level of traffic stops of Black drivers. If this is compared only to county-level census data, one would come to the erroneous conclusion that the city of Jennings was unfairly targeting Black drivers. However, when compared to the population of the city of Jennings, which is approximately 90 percent Black, the picture becomes clearer.

Therefore, the PF assessment team completed an analysis of SLCPD precinct-level traffic stop data. Based on that analysis, what follows is a summary of the comparison between SLCPD precinct-level and county-wide stop data. The conclusions and the supporting data table (table 17) summarize where differences between county-wide and precinct level findings exist or where they are dissimilar. Detailed data tables supporting this comparison can be found in appendix B.

Summary of key conclusions from comparison of SLCPD precinct level stop data to county-wide stop data

Precinct findings match the county-wide findings, with some exceptions:

- Black drivers were stopped at rates greater than their proportion of the population except in the 1st precinct, the 6th precinct, and the city of Jennings.
- In all eight precincts, White drivers were more likely to be stopped for moving violations than for any other type of violation.
- In all eight precincts, Black drivers were less likely than White drivers to be pulled over for moving violations.
- Black drivers were more likely to be pulled over for equipment violations in all precincts except the 4th and 5th precincts.
- Black drivers were more likely to be pulled over for license checks in all precincts.
- Black drivers were more likely to be pulled over for investigative stops in all precincts except the city of Jennings.
- In all but one precinct (the 5th precinct—City of Fenton), White drivers who were searched were more likely to have contraband than Black drivers who were searched.
- Black drivers were searched at higher rates than White drivers in all precincts except the 1st precinct.
Table 17. Precinct comparison to countywide stop data, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>County-wide findings</th>
<th>Precincts dissimilar to county-wide findings</th>
<th>Reason for dissimilarity to county-wide findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stops</strong></td>
<td>Black drivers were stopped disproportionately to Black representation in driving age population</td>
<td>1st precinct, 6th precinct, and Jennings</td>
<td>Black drivers were stopped at rates similar to Black representation in driving age population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jennings</td>
<td>White drivers were stopped at higher rate than White drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for investigative reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Reason for stop</strong></td>
<td>Black drivers were stopped at higher rates than White drivers for equipment violations, license checks, and investigative stops while White drivers were stopped at higher rates than Black drivers for moving violations</td>
<td>4th and 5th precincts</td>
<td>No significant difference in stop rates between Black and White drivers for equipment violations, license checks, or investigative stops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Jennings</td>
<td>White drivers stopped at higher rate than Black drivers for investigative reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Search</strong></td>
<td>Black drivers were searched at a higher rate than White drivers</td>
<td>1st precinct</td>
<td>No significant differences in search rates between Black and White drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Contraband</strong></td>
<td>Based on the number of searches, White drivers were more likely to have contraband</td>
<td>5th precinct</td>
<td>Black drivers were more likely to have contraband*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arrests</strong></td>
<td>Black drivers arrested at higher rates than White drivers</td>
<td>Jennings</td>
<td>Black and White drivers arrested at similar rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outcomes related to citations</strong></td>
<td>Black drivers were issued citations at higher rate than White drivers</td>
<td>2nd, 3rd, and 7th precincts†</td>
<td>White drivers issued citations at higher rate than Black drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th precincts†</td>
<td>No significant difference in citation rate between Black and White drivers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This is likely the result of searches conducted incident to an arrest. All five Black drivers arrested for contraband were arrested for outstanding warrants.

† The city of Jennings is the only precinct whose results match the general county-wide findings. Readers can explore this further in the 2014 traffic stop analysis in appendix B.
Summary of conclusions

The current lack of best practices benchmarking data in vehicle stops studies prohibits a comprehensive review of traffic stop data for the purpose of determining if a pattern of targeting minority motorists for traffic stops exists. While adjusted census data on population age 16 years and older suggest an overrepresentation of Black drivers among those stopped, a more comprehensive assessment using multiple benchmarks and research/analytical techniques is necessary.122

However, the data do allow for an analysis of reasons for the stop and post-stop activity. The data suggest that in the five-year period under analysis, Black drivers were stopped at higher rates for equipment violations, license checks, and investigative stops than White drivers. White drivers were stopped at higher rates for moving violations. Regarding post-stop activity, Black drivers were searched at higher rates than White drivers, yet searches of Black drivers were less likely to result in a finding of contraband than searches of White drivers. Among stops that resulted in enforcement action, Black drivers were more likely to be issued citations than White drivers and were arrested at a rate twice that of White drivers.

The analysis suggests that the stop practices of the SLCPD may have a disproportionate impact on Black drivers with respect to search rates, arrest rates, reasons for stops, and stop outcomes. The findings related to post-stop activity appear to be influenced to some degree by the high number of outstanding warrants within the region. The level of impact of those outstanding warrants on post-stop activity can only be determined by additional research and data collection.

Similar potential impacts among Black drivers were also found in our review of the 2014 stop data collected within the precincts; the few dissimilarities are outlined in table 17. As previously noted, the analysis is a preliminary step in examining the disproportionate impacts on drivers who are stopped; however, it is not sufficiently comprehensive to constitute evidence of bias in vehicle stops conducted by the SLCPD but does allow for improvements to process and changes to policies.

Findings and recommendations

Finding 9.1

While consistent with Missouri data collection law, the traffic stop analysis procedures employed by the SLCPD are inconsistent across the agency and lack the sophistication necessary for appropriate analysis of stop data. This results in a missed opportunity to fully understand if bias-based profiling is occurring.

Missouri Revised Statutes (RSMo) chapter 590, § 590.650, section 5 subsections 2 and 3 states, in part:

5. Each law enforcement agency shall adopt a policy on race-based traffic stops that

(1) prohibits the practice of routinely stopping members of minority groups for violations of vehicle laws as a pretext for investigating other violations of criminal law;

122. Ridgeway and MacDonald, “Methods for Assessing Racially Biased Policing” (see note 107).
(2) provides for periodic reviews by the law enforcement agency of the annual report of the attorney general required by subsection 4 of this section that:

(a) determine whether any peace officers of the law enforcement agency have a pattern of stopping members of minority groups for violations of vehicle laws in a number disproportionate to the population of minority groups residing or traveling within the jurisdiction of the law enforcement agency; and

(b) if the review reveals a pattern, require an investigation to determine whether any peace officers of the law enforcement agency routinely stop members of minority groups for violations of vehicle laws as a pretext for investigating other violations of criminal law; and

(3) provides for appropriate counseling and training of any peace officer found to have engaged in race-based traffic stops within ninety days of the review. The course or courses of instruction and the guidelines shall stress understanding and respect for racial and cultural differences, and development of effective, noncombative methods of carrying out law enforcement duties in a racially and culturally diverse environment.123

To comply with the review requirement of RSMo 590.650 § 5(2–3), SLCPD GO 07-81, section II, subsection D states:

The Planning and Analysis Unit shall compile data on a quarterly basis to determine if any officers have a pattern of stopping members of minority groups in a number disproportionate to the population of minority groups residing or travelling through the Department’s jurisdiction.

If the review shows an officer has stopped minorities in disproportion to the population, Planning and Analysis will run a summary report on that individual officer. Individual officers’ reports will be forwarded to the officer’s supervisor for review.

If the review reveals a pattern, the officer’s supervisor shall conduct an evaluation to determine whether the officer routinely stops members of minority groups as a pretext for investigating other violations of criminal law.

Any officer found to have engaged in bias-based profiling will receive appropriate counseling and training within ninety days of completion of the evaluation.124

GO 07-81 clearly describes a review process based on analysis of traffic stop data compared to the population of the jurisdiction served by St. Louis County. The SLCPD has established a threshold requiring the review of an officer’s stop activity if 20 percent or more of the officer’s stops during a three-month period are stops of minority drivers. The assessment team’s review of the SLCPD’s efforts described in GO 07-81 revealed a process that lacks appropriate documentation, is inconsistent among divisions, and lacks a review process that demonstrates an understanding of analysis methods necessary for a comprehensive review of traffic stop data.

123. Missouri Revised Statutes, chapter 590, § 590.650 (see note 94).

124. Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 07-81 (see note 100).

Based on preliminary (and imprecise) collection and analysis by the assessment team, the SLCPD’s traffic stop and post-stop activity show a potentially disproportionate impact on Black drivers. While the SLCPD is mandated by state law to collect stop data and the Planning and Analysis Unit does review the information for the identification of officers making stops in excess of the 20 percent threshold, the department needs to ensure that appropriate data are analyzed to identify potential issues of racially biased policing.

Vehicle stop data collection provides a law enforcement agency the opportunity to assess quantitatively the behavior of its officers in the decision-making process for vehicle stops. A COPS Office-funded project conducted by the CNA Corporation focused on key issues regarding the collection of racial profiling data. An objective of that project was to provide an assessment of existing and planned data collection and analysis of techniques that are employed by police agencies. Among the recommendations of the report were the following:

- “Data collection and evaluation is an appropriate way to address the concerns of racial profiling. Anecdotal evidence is an unreliable tool with which to make policy decisions;
- The data collection and evaluation plan should blend police operational expertise with external research methods. Combining the expertise of operational and research experts, working together, is the best way to accomplish an accurate evaluation of the data;
- Analytical methods should focus on accounting for the complexities of police procedures and operational methods as well as the characteristics of the city. Most cities have distinct neighborhoods, and it is likely that a thorough evaluation will need to reflect analysis at the neighborhood, area, region, or precinct level;”
- Data collection serves to identify potential problem areas or officer behaviors that may need to be addressed by the agency; it can also serve as a tool for developing training procedures and policies for conducting appropriate bias free vehicle stops.

Recommendation 9.1.1

The SLCPD should conduct a comprehensive and rigorous study of traffic stop practices.

One of the major issues in the analysis of stop data is determining the appropriate benchmark or standard to which the stop data are to be compared. While census-based benchmarks are imperfect benchmark measures, there is no consensus regarding benchmarking best practices. Our analysis of the SLCPD’s stop information showed the potential for disparities with respect to stops, searches, and arrests; however, the findings do not necessarily suggest that officers’ decision making is motivated by bias. The SLCPD should conduct a comprehensive study using a variety of benchmarks to address the perception of racially biased traffic stop practices.

127. Ibid., 2.
128. Fridell, By the Numbers (see note 110).
129. Tillyer, Engel, and Cherkauskas, “Best Practices” (see note 110).
Recommendation 9.1.2
The SLCPD should standardize and centralize the review of officer traffic stop data.

The current review process relies on an employee’s supervisor’s review and assessment of individual officers’ stop activity. The reports provided by the SLCPD clearly reveal a lack of consistency in review techniques and reporting.

Recommendation 9.1.3
The SLCPD should train all supervisors and executive-level staff who are responsible for the interpretation of stop data in research methods necessary to adequately review and identify potentially biased behavior.

Supervisors must have training including but not limited to fair and impartial policing and procedural justice that allows them to identify potential biased behavior.

Recommendation 9.1.4
The SLCPD should report quarterly the results of reviews conducted in accordance with GO 07-81 to the Board of Police Commissioners.

Recommendation 9.1.5
If the SLCPD chooses to conduct a comprehensive analysis of traffic stop data as described in recommendation 9.1.1, GO 07-81 should be revised to replace census data with the benchmark used in the study as the comparison to officer stop data.

Action taken by site. The SLCPD has invited the Center for Policing Equity from the University of California Los Angeles to assist them with their racial profiling data collection, policies, and practices to improve traffic stops.

Finding 9.2
The SLCPD does not collect and analyze information on pedestrian stops made by officers.

Recommendation 9.2.1
The SLCPD should collect pedestrian stop data for additional analysis of its stop practices.

The SLCPD should also collect data on pedestrian stops to more thoroughly address the potential issue of racially biased policing. Information from pedestrian stops should include, at a minimum, the race or ethnicity and gender of the individual(s) stopped, reason for the stop, whether a search was conducted and contraband found, whether an arrest occurred and reason for the arrest, and the location of the stop.

Finding 9.3
The SLCPD traffic stop data collection software does not capture the specific location of traffic stops (either longitude and latitude or address).

This precludes the ability to map stops to determine whether certain areas may have disproportionate stop practices. Having the specific locations of stops would provide the ability to perform geographic mapping or analysis of stops across the county and within each of the precincts.
Recommendation 9.3.1
The SLCPD should take immediate steps to accurately document the locations of traffic and pedestrian stops conducted by its officers.

Recommendation 9.3.2
The SLCPD should use traffic stop location information to assess potentially disproportionate stop, search, and enforcement activity.

Finding 9.4
The SLCPD’s GO 07-81, which establishes policies and procedures for citizen contacts and traffic stop information, is outdated.

The policy needs to be modified to reflect current law enforcement practices that provide guidance for avoiding biased policing. The GO has not been revised since 2007 and lacks sufficient guidance for officers on relevant issues of biased policing.

Based on a review of model policies and procedures on biased policing from various law enforcement agencies and the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the assessment team identified several areas that need to be addressed in the modification of this GO. While the SLCPD’s current policy includes an emphasis on the department’s commitment to unbiased policing, it only focuses on citizen encounters during arrest, traffic, and investigative stops; detentions; and search and seizure situations.

The existing GO also lacks specific procedures for officers to prevent or avoid racial profiling in traffic and pedestrian stops, searches or seizures of property, and investigative detentions.

Recommendation 9.4.1
SLCPD executive staff should review and modify the existing GO 07-81.

The revised policy should emphasize the specific purpose of the policy to include commitment to treating all citizens in a fair and equitable manner. Definitions of biased policing and racial profiling should be provided in the policy as well as procedures to be followed when initiating enforcement action (stopping, detaining, searching, etc.) to avoid the perception of bias.

The purpose of the policy should state unequivocally that during any encounter with citizens, the officer is responsible for treating the citizen in a fair, equitable, and objective manner, in accordance with the law and without consideration of the citizen’s race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, religion, national origin, or any other identifiable group.

130. Examples of reviewed policies included policies from the Anne Arundel County (Maryland) Police Department, Kansas City (Missouri) Police Department, and New Mexico Department of Public Safety, as well as the IACP’s unbiased policing model policy. “Model Policies,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, accessed June 26, 2015, http://www.theiACP.org/Model-Policies-Alphabetical-Order.
The modified policy should include a concise definition of what constitutes biased policing and how it relates to officers’ performance of enforcement duties as well as the delivery of police services. Separate definitions for probable cause and reasonable suspicion should also be more clearly defined in the policy.

Examples of procedures that should be adhered to when initiating each enforcement action (traffic or pedestrian stops, searches or seizures, and investigative detentions) need to be stipulated in a clear and concise manner in the modified policy.

**Recommendation 9.4.2**

As the SLCPD revises GO 07-81, the SLCPD should ensure that the revised GO is followed by training that mirrors the guidance for officer behavior during encounters, including but not limited to being courteous and professional, providing a reason for the stop, providing the citizen his or her badge number when requested, and offering an explanation if the officer determines that the reasonable suspicion for the stop was unfounded (e.g., investigatory stop).

Research on racially biased policing has consistently found that minority citizens are more likely to suspect that police stops are racially motivated if officers treated them discourteously or did not inform them of the reason for the stop.\(^\text{131}\) Focusing on direct and respectful communication between the officer and citizen during encounters will strengthen perceptions of county residents that SLCPD officers exhibit a high degree of professionalism and accountability in conducting duties.

**Finding 9.5**

**Before 2014, beyond the mandated training, the SLCPD did not provide officers with training on implicit bias and fair and impartial policing. Since that time, the SLCPD has made this training available.**

The SLCPD provides annual sensitivity training that focuses on the prohibition of racial profiling, the legal aspects of profiling, and respect for racial and cultural differences to all officers who may conduct traffic stops.

**Recommendation 9.5.1**

The SLCPD should continue to provide implicit bias and fair and impartial policing training for all SLCPD officers.

Currently, the SLCPD engages the St. Louis chapter of the Anti-Defamation League to provide bias-free training through in-service and continuing education efforts. This annual offering focuses on the prohibition against racial profiling, the legal aspects of profiling, and respect for racial and cultural differences to all officers who may conduct traffic stops. The SLCPD should continue to expand mandatory training on implicit bias and fair and impartial policing. The curriculum of the fair and impartial training program should instruct officers on the effect of implicit or unconscious bias that may influence decision making in enforcement actions.

Finding 9.6

The SLCPD currently does not include analyses of stop data in the annual reports provided for the public.

The SLCPD currently publishes annual reports that provide an overview of the administration and operations of the department. Annual reports detail crime statistics, complaints received and dispositions, and use of force statistics that occurred during the specific year and are made available to the public via the department’s website. Reports also serve to increase transparency of the SLCPD’s activities among county residents. Although the SLCPD is required by state law to report vehicle stop data to the Office of the Attorney General, it does not present the submitted data for inclusion in the annual report.

Recommendation 9.6.1

Once improvements have been made to policy and practice governing data collection, benchmarking, and analysis, the SLCPD should include vehicle and pedestrian stop data and analysis with appropriate benchmarking for interpretation in published annual reports.

Care should be taken to ensure that data cannot be misconstrued but are presented in their true and honest form. Providing this information in an easily accessible location (in the annual report, on the department’s website, etc.) will increase transparency, accountability, and dialogue with the public.

Introduction

From 2009 through 2013, officers in the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) were involved in 2,309 documented incidents of use of force according to departmental records. This chapter provides an analysis of those incidents.

The purpose of this analysis is to identify trends in use of force incidents and to identify gaps in SLCPD use of force policies, training, and investigation of use of force incidents.

This chapter is designed first to explain the SLCPD policies and procedures governing use of force. Second, the chapter will define the methodology used by the Police Foundation (PF) assessment team. Third, the chapter will provide an overview of key conclusions drawn by the analysis of use of force data. Those key conclusions include the following:

• From 2009 through 2013, the number of uses of force involving SLCPD officers was less than one-tenth of one percent (0.07 percent) of citizen contacts with officers. By comparison, national estimates of police use of force have found that 1.4 percent of police-citizen contacts resulted in police use or threatened use of force.¹³²

• For the SLCPD, the most prevalent dispatch call for service that resulted in use of force was among officers responding to misdemeanor crimes in progress.

• The race or ethnicity of officers involved in use of force closely mirrors the makeup of the department. In addition, the mean age of officers involved in use of force was 32 years, and the mean length of time such officers have been on the force was approximately 5.7 years. This compares to department mean age of officers 38 years and tenure of 10 years.

• The most frequent type of force used involved application of physical restraint and the use of Taser.

• Among the citizens involved in an officer(s) use of force, 53 percent were identified as Black, 45 percent were identified as White, 0.8 percent were identified as Hispanic, and 0.6 percent were identified as other race.

• There were 20 officer-involved shootings (OIS) during this five-year period. Of those incidents, seven resulted the death of the subject; four resulted in an injury to the subject; seven were missed targets; in one case, it is unknown whether the subject was hit; and in one case, the subject committed suicide.

Finally, this chapter will provide findings and recommendations to improve SLCPD use of force policies, procedures, and practices.

Management and administration

The SLCPD’s General Order (GO) 10-29 establishes the policy and procedures for both nondeadly and deadly force used by officers in the department. On the use of nondeadly force, the GO stipulates the following:

Where deadly force is not authorized, officers should assess the incident in order to determine which nondeadly technique or less lethal weapon will best de-escalate the incident and bring it under control in a safe manner. Only the appropriate amount of force necessary to bring an incident under control is authorized. In making an arrest, no more force shall be used than is reasonably necessary for the safe custody of the prisoner or for overcoming any resistance that may be offered and for ensuring the delivery of the prisoner into safekeeping. Officers are not authorized to use chokeholds, neck restraints, shoulder pins, or similar weaponless control techniques with a potential for serious injury.133

The GO authorizes officers to use nondeadly force under the following circumstances:

- To protect themselves or another from physical harm
- To restrain or subdue a resistant individual
- To bring an unlawful situation safely and effectively under control

The GO also provides guidelines for controlling resistive behavior (levels of resistance) with techniques that may be appropriate relative to the suspect’s behaviors.

SLCPD officers are required to report any uses or attempted uses of nondeadly force to their precinct watch commander or appropriate bureau commander. The GO’s definition of use of force that requires notification is “whenever an officer uses or attempts to use force under extraordinary circumstances that vary from the standard handcuffing process or detention techniques.”134 For example, if an officer uses an arm bar technique or pushes the suspect down in an effort to control the suspect, the officer would be required to report the incident to their supervisor. The department does not require reporting the threatened use of force (e.g., pointing a service weapon or Taser at a citizen). An officer involved in a use of force incident provides the police report and supplemental report that contains information regarding the number of officers involved, the subject’s reaction (i.e., verbal response, body language, physical actions) to the officer(s), the suspect’s mental condition (influence of drugs/alcohol, mental, agitated, etc.), and the officers’ responses (i.e., type of control methods used or attempted).

Upon notification of a use of force incident a supervisor must respond to the scene. In the event that an officer or suspect has sustained an injury or has any complaint of an injury,135 the supervisor ensures that the appropriate notifications are made (e.g., request for ambulance, inform bureau commander). Once the supervisor has arrived at the scene of the incidents, it is their responsibility to ensure that

- a thorough investigation is conducted, including an area canvass to locate, identify, and interview all witnesses to the incident;

133. Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 10-29 (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2010).
134. Ibid.
135. If a subject makes any complaint of injury, the officer will transport the individual to the hospital to obtain a “fit for confinement” from the medical staff. If the officer hits a subject with any impact weapon, the subject is automatically taken to the hospital for treatment.
anyone arrested as a result of the incident is escorted in an ambulance or transported in a police vehicle by an officer not directly involved in the incident.\textsuperscript{136}

The supervisor is required by SLCPD policy to complete a supervisor’s use of force review to make administrative comments regarding the incident, including recommendations about whether an investigation should be continued. The supervisor’s use of force review, the police report, and any supplemental reports of the incident are forwarded through the chain of command to the Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS). Before 2012, the supervisor’s use of force review was written in the form of a memorandum. Currently, the supervisor can enter findings or recommendations into IAPro, a web-based reporting system.

GO 10-29 also establishes guidelines to be followed in the event that an officer is involved in a use of force incident while off duty or outside St. Louis County. In those instances, the involved officer is required to immediately request assistance from the appropriate law enforcement agency to respond to the scene and to notify the Bureau of Communications of the incident. The Bureau of Communications notifies the officer’s watch commander, who responds to the scene and cooperates with the local authorities’ investigation of the incident. The commander prepares a supervisor’s use of force review and attaches a copy of the investigating agency’s report.

Officers are authorized to use deadly force under the following circumstances:

- To protect themselves or others from what is reasonably believed to be an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury
- To effect the capture or prevent the escape of a suspect when there is probable cause to believe that
  - the suspect committed or attempted to commit a felony;
  - the crime involved the use or threatened use of deadly force;
  - there is substantial risk that the fleeing suspect will cause death or serious physical injury if apprehension is delayed.\textsuperscript{137}

The GO stipulates procedures to be followed for both firearm discharges in which no gunshot wound is inflicted and firearm discharges causing a gunshot wound to any person. The procedures to be followed in each case are described in the following sections.

**Firearm discharges involving no gunshot wound**

Whenever a firearm is discharged by an officer involving no gunshot wound and the officer is not the victim of a first-degree assault, the officer notifies the on-duty watch commander and notifies the watch supervisor of the Bureau of Communications no later than one hour after the discharge of the firearm. The involved officer(s) prepares a police report that details the circumstances surrounding the firearm discharge. The officer’s watch commander responds to the scene to ensure that the officer has identified all known witnesses to the incident and prepares a supervisor’s use of force review form. The form details the supervisor’s observations of and conclusions regarding the incident as well as whether the incident was justified and in accordance with departmental policy. Both the form and the police report are forwarded to the BPS for review and a final determination of the disposition of the incident.

\textsuperscript{136} Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 10-29 (see note 133).

\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

Firearm discharges causing a gunshot wound

If an officer has inflicted a gunshot wound upon any person or the officer is the victim of a first-degree assault and discharges a firearm without causing an injury, the involved officer or the next officer on the scene immediately notifies the Bureau of Communication. The Bureau of Communication notifies the watch commander and the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons in addition to summoning required emergency medical aid. The watch commander responds to the scene to take command of the situation and await the arrival of the SLCPD’s Crimes Against Persons investigators.

Teams of Crimes Against Persons investigators are assembled and respond to the scene of the incident. Personnel from the SLCPD’s Bureau of Criminal Identification are also dispatched to the scene and are responsible for collecting physical evidence and photos and video taping the scene. Upon a review of the activities conducted by the Bureau of Criminal Identification, Crimes Against Persons investigators begin the investigation of the circumstances surrounding the incident (e.g., counting of the ammunition in the officer’s weapon, canvassing for witnesses, locating video cameras that may be in the vicinity of the incident), and the involved officer(s) is transported to the Division of Criminal Investigation where his or her statements of the circumstances are audio taped for the investigation.

Upon notification of the OIS, the BPS conducts a separate administrative review of the incident focusing on policy compliance and the identification of any possible training issues. The SLCPD has recently established a new procedure whereby the officer is advised of the sequence of events that will take place during the administrative review process.

A police investigation report (this report is different from the supervisor’s use of force review) is prepared by a detective(s) assigned to the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons and is reviewed by the officer’s supervisor or commander.

The police investigation report is submitted to the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office for review. If the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office finds evidence of a criminal nature, the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons will conduct the appropriate criminal investigation. In the event the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office finds that the shooting is not a violation of law, the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons completes a supplemental report and the police investigation report is closed.

The supervisor’s use of force review is completed by the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons supervisor indicating that the Prosecuting Attorney’s Office did not find a violation of law and submits the review to the commanding officers of the Division of Criminal Investigation for review and is forwarded to the BPS. The commanding officer of the BPS prepares an administrative shooting review report that is submitted to the chief of police and the Board of Police Commissioners for their review.

The administrative shooting review report contains the supervisor’s use of force review; the police investigation report; and any recommendations related to policy, equipment, or training issues as a result of the incident. The commanding officer of the BPS meets with the Board of Police Commissioners, the chief of police, and executive staff to discuss all of the facts and issues related to the administrative shooting review report and answer questions or concerns they may raise about the findings.
The investigation includes a conclusion as to whether the use of deadly force was or was not justified and in accordance with departmental policy. A copy of the completed investigative report is forwarded to the Division of Criminal Investigation and to the chief. The report is then forwarded to the BPS for final disposition.138

Psychological support program

The SLCPD has an established procedure to assist officers in understanding the psychological impact that may result both from a use of force incident that results in serious physical injury of a person and from the death of a person involved in a critical situation. When an officer’s actions result in a serious physical injury, the officer is removed from enforcement duties and placed under administrative status from their duty assignment pending a review by their supervisor or commander as to whether the officer should be placed on administrative detachment (i.e., administrative leave with pay). However, when the actions result in the death of a person, the officer is immediately placed on administrative detachment upon the officer’s completion of his or her preliminary report of the incident.

An officer on administrative detachment is referred to the St. Louis County Employee’s Assistance Program by their commanding officer for counseling with a specialist in post-critical incident counseling. The counseling sessions are used to determine whether the officer is psychologically fit to return to duty. Participation in the program is mandatory for officers whose actions resulted in fatal OIS. The chief can authorize participation in this program for officers involved in other critical incidents.

Use of force training

The Missouri Peace Officer Standards and Training (POST) Commission basic academy training requirements on use of force is conducted in a comprehensive and detailed manner at the St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) for both the SLCPD and regional law enforcement agencies. The training provides a review of the types of use of force, appropriate responses in accordance with departmental policy and procedures, and issues with regard to excessive force versus decisive force. Mandatory hours of instruction include 94 hours of firearm and 82 hours of defensive tactics. Training is also provided on verbal judo to instruct officers on how to tactically respond (not react) to high stress situations as a means for redirecting aggressive behaviors toward positive outcomes.

In-service training provided focuses on the use of auxiliary weapons available to officers including deployment of oleoresin capsicum (OC) spray (pepper spray), use of expandable batons, deployment of Taser, and the deployment of less lethal shotguns.

Command staff and supervisors have taken part in a training course to examine issues that may impact executive and midlevel supervisors concerning police use of force.

138. After the Board of Police Commissioners has reviewed the incident, the BPS will send a memorandum to the involved officer advising him or her of the disposition of the incident and that the case has been closed.
Methodology

The SLCPD Crime Analysis Unit provided use of force data from four data sources: (1) the department’s IAPro software system, (2) the records management system (RMS), (3) the computer-assisted report entry (CARE) system, and (4) supervisor use of force review memoranda. Before 2011, the department policy required supervisors to complete a standardized memorandum that provided the details of the use of force incident. Because the data came from various sources, department employees had to manually review each individual record in compiling the data. For example, the race of the citizen and officer was not included in the supervisor’s use of force memoranda. The SLCPD began using the IAPro web-based software in 2012 as a method to provide more comprehensive information (e.g., race of citizen and officer) for the internal departmental examination of use of force incidents. Using information from the RMS, the CARE system, and the IAPro system enabled the department to identify the race, gender, and age of citizens and officers involved in use of force incidents. Data collected from both the RMS and CARE systems also provided information related to the original nature of the calls to which officers were dispatched and their assignment at the time of the incident, while data collected from the supervisor reviews and IAPro system provided specific details of the reported type(s) of force used.

The SLCPD assigns a report number for each incident in which force was used, and the incident may involve multiple officers using multiple techniques and tactics in a given incident. These techniques and tactics were also provided in the data. For example, in an incident in which four officers used firearms in effecting the arrest of two suspects, eight counts of use of firearms would be entered into the reporting of the incident. Similarly, where an officer used force on two separate individuals, those would be captured as two separate incidents. Thus, the assessment team’s request for use of force data including demographic characteristics of both the subject and officer involved in the incident was a request for data collected differently than the manner in which the SLCPD captures use of force data. The department’s reporting method captures officer-level, rather than incident-level, data. As a result of the limitation in the current method of reporting use of force at the incident level, this analysis will be focused at the officer level.

During the data collection process, employees of the department coded and collapsed the type(s) of physical force officers used. The sergeant in charge of the data collection effort would review all the information obtained from the coders to ensure that the coded information was accurate based on the data sources used to capture the information. If errors were detected, the sergeant would instruct the coder to re-examine the case to provide the appropriate information. An officer might have used multiple techniques of force in an incident; in such cases, the coders would only capture the highest level of force or the highest end of the use of force continuum. For example, an officer might have used OC spray and then resorted to a firearm on a single individual. There would be a single use of force incident coded as use of a firearm. The order of the force continuum from low to high is as follows: physical restraint, physical striking, OC spray, Taser, canine, baton, less lethal munition, firearm. With the exception of the use of canines, the resulting hierarchy of the data follows the department’s GO on the use of force continuum. The collapsing of the type of force used, however, limits the assessment team’s ability to assess the progression of officers’ choices along the use of force continuum toward the decision to use the highest level of force.

139. The use of canines is not addressed use of force continuum in the GO. During the collection of the data, the SLCPD made the determination to code canine in the hierarchy between baton and Taser force because of the type of injury that may occur as a result of a canine incident.
For purposes of this review, department employees had to manually search pre-2012 records that contained use of force information. Unfortunately, data captured before the transition to the automated system are not as comprehensive as data entered into the current system. For example, before the installation of IAPro software the race of the citizen and officer were not included in the supervisor’s use of force memoranda.

For the assessment team’s review of OISs, the Planning and Analysis Unit provided data from the IAPro database maintained by the SLCPD’s Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS). The database contains all intentional on-duty discharges by any sworn officer from 2009 through 2013. The research team met with the commander, the supervisor, and five detectives assigned to investigate OISs involving the SLCPD as well as other OISs from municipalities in the county. For the purpose of our review, we defined an OIS as any intentional firearm discharge by a sworn officer.

It should be noted that as the county law enforcement agency, the SLCPD also investigates OIS incidents of area municipal police agencies at the request of the involved agency. Our review focuses only on OIS incidents involving the SLCPD.

**Key conclusions and supporting data on analysis of use of force data**

Data were provided by the SLCPD on the number of use of force incidents involving officers from 2009–2013. Based on the data, analyses were conducted for use of force incidents as it relates to the number of citizen-initiated contacts (i.e., calls for service) and officer-initiated contacts with citizens (i.e., traffic stops or suspicious persons stops).

**Use of force in relation to citizen contacts**

From 2009 through 2013, the number of uses of physical force by officers was less than one-tenth of one percent (0.07 percent) of police-citizen contacts. Police-citizen contacts were calculated by adding the number of directed calls for service in which an officer was dispatched by the SLCPD and the number of officer-initiated contacts. The average number of annual contacts with citizens within the county was 659,959 from 2009 through 2013, and the average annual number of use of force incidents for this time period was 462. Dividing the average number of all police-citizen contacts by the average number of instances of use of force shows that use of force was used in an average of 0.07 percent of all contacts. The annual instances of use of force in police-citizen contacts are significantly lower than estimates of police use of force in previous national research. Estimates from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) found that an estimated 1.4 percent of persons who had contact with the police in 2008 resulted in a use of force. Another research study on national estimates of police use force found that 1.7 percent of police-citizen contacts resulted in police use or threatened use of force.

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140. At the time of request for use of force data, 2014 data were not yet available.
141. “Contact” for the BJS survey was defined as citizen face-to-face contact with the police.
144. “Contact” in Hickman and colleagues’ study (see note 143) was defined as recent face-to-face contact the police or an arrest (survey respondents included inmates in local jails).
It should be noted that SLCPD officers are required to report any use or attempted use of force that varies from the standard handcuffing process or detention techniques, which may contribute to the total number of use of force incidents that are reported in this chapter.

Table 18 displays the number of police-citizen contacts compared to the number of use of force incidents involving officers.

**Table 18. Police-citizen contacts versus officer use of force incidents, 2009–2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Police-citizen contacts*</th>
<th>Use of force</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>602,612</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>482,667</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>724,256</td>
<td>504</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>734,609</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>755,650</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average</td>
<td>659,959</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Citizen calls for service (directed calls to officers by dispatch) and officer-initiated contacts

**Initial contact and call type**

To further analyze use of force, it is necessary to determine what caused the initial interaction between the citizen and police officer. Initial contact is defined as the original nature of the incident in response to which officers made contact with a member of the public. Two forms of initial contact were collected: (1) citizen contacts resulting from a dispatched call for service and (2) officer-initiated contacts resulting from traffic or suspicious person stops or pedestrian stops. For example, if an officer made a traffic stop and arrested the individual, and the officer use of force occurred during the transport to jail, the use of force would be coded as a traffic stop. Figure 1 presents the breakdown of use of force by initial contact and type of call.
Figure 1. Initial contact resulting in use of force, 2009–2013 (N=2,309)

From 2009 to 2013, citizen calls for service accounted for 76 percent of the use of force by officers. The most prevalent dispatch call for service that resulted in a use of force was among officers responding to misdemeanor crimes in progress (40 percent). Officers responding to a felony crime in progress accounted for 9 percent of uses of force, while calls for service involving crisis intervention teams (CIT)\footnote{CITs are composed of trained and certified officers who respond to situations involving persons in mental crisis.} were 8 percent of the use of force incidents. Officer-initiated contacts related to investigating suspicious persons or vehicles and traffic stops accounted for 24 percent of use of force incidents. Further separating out the officer-initiated contacts, those for traffic stops and or suspicious vehicles accounted for 17 percent of use of force incidents, while suspicious persons or pedestrian stops accounted for 7 percent of uses of force.

Table 19 shows the number of initial contacts or calls involving use of force by officer assignment (either location or specialized unit). Officers responding to misdemeanor crimes in progress accounted for most of the calls for service that resulted in a use of force among all of the precincts. Officer-initiated contacts for traffic stops or suspicious vehicles accounted for the second-most common call types resulting in officer use of force at the precinct level. Officers were less often involved in a use of force incident when attempting to make an arrest regardless of the assignment of the officers.
### Table 19: Number of Initial Contacts or Calls for Service Involving Use of Force by Location or Unit Assignment, 2009–2013 (N=2,309)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial Contact/Calls for Service</th>
<th>1st Precinct—North County N (%)</th>
<th>2nd Precinct—Central County N (%)</th>
<th>3rd Precinct—Affton SW N (%)</th>
<th>4th Precinct—South County N (%)</th>
<th>5th Precinct—Fenton N (%)</th>
<th>6th Precinct—Wildwood N (%)</th>
<th>7th Precinct—West County N (%)</th>
<th>City of Jennings N (%)</th>
<th>Drug Enforcement N (%)</th>
<th>Canine N (%)</th>
<th>Tactical N (%)</th>
<th>Highway N (%)</th>
<th>Metrolink N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arrest attempt</td>
<td>13 (0.56)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>8 (0.35)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>10 (0.43)</td>
<td>9 (0.39)</td>
<td>11 (0.48)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>66 (2.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIT</td>
<td>29 (1.26)</td>
<td>30 (1.29)</td>
<td>32 (1.39)</td>
<td>61 (2.64)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>17 (0.74)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>185 (8.01)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crime report</td>
<td>25 (1.08)</td>
<td>8 (0.35)</td>
<td>18 (0.78)</td>
<td>33 (1.43)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9 (0.39)</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>106 (4.59)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Felony in progress</td>
<td>69 (2.99)</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>15 (0.65)</td>
<td>38 (1.65)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>32 (1.39)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>28 (1.21)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>197 (8.53)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation</td>
<td>26 (1.13)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>6 (0.26)</td>
<td>7 (0.30)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>46 (1.99)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>98 (4.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor in progress</td>
<td>275 (11.91)</td>
<td>57 (2.47)</td>
<td>89 (3.85)</td>
<td>259 (11.21)</td>
<td>54 (2.34)</td>
<td>23 (1.00)</td>
<td>53 (2.30)</td>
<td>72 (3.12)</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>15 (0.65)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>9 (0.39)</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>917 (39.71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-criminal call</td>
<td>45 (1.95)</td>
<td>12 (0.52)</td>
<td>22 (0.95)</td>
<td>38 (1.65)</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>13 (0.56)</td>
<td>7 (0.30)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>151 (6.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>11 (0.47)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>33 (1.43)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer-initiated suspicious person</td>
<td>67 (2.90)</td>
<td>8 (0.35)</td>
<td>9 (0.39)</td>
<td>24 (1.04)</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>9 (0.39)</td>
<td>12 (0.52)</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>6 (0.26)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9 (0.39)</td>
<td>157 (6.80)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic stop / Suspicious vehicle</td>
<td>121 (5.24)</td>
<td>36 (1.56)</td>
<td>50 (2.16)</td>
<td>78 (3.38)</td>
<td>13 (0.56)</td>
<td>8 (0.35)</td>
<td>13 (0.56)</td>
<td>46 (1.99)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>12 (0.52)</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>5 (0.22)</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>3 (0.13)</td>
<td>391 (16.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>4 (0.17)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.04)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2 (0.09)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>8 (0.35)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total use of force</td>
<td>677 (29.32)</td>
<td>161 (6.97)</td>
<td>249 (10.78)</td>
<td>557 (24.12)</td>
<td>85 (3.68)</td>
<td>42 (1.82)</td>
<td>123 (5.33)</td>
<td>190 (8.23)</td>
<td>64 (2.77)</td>
<td>89 (3.85)</td>
<td>14 (0.61)</td>
<td>10 (0.43)</td>
<td>23 (1.00)</td>
<td>25 (1.08)</td>
<td>2,309 (100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The city of Jennings calls for service and officer-initiated contacts averages are from 2011–2013. Jennings was incorporated into the SLCPD in March of 2011.*
**Time of day**

Regardless of the day of the week, most incidents (nearly 35 percent) occurred between 6:00 p.m. and midnight, followed by noon to 6:00 p.m. (about 26.5 percent). As shown in table 20, the incidents are roughly evenly distributed throughout the week with slightly more occurring on the weekend days from Friday night through the early hours of Sunday morning, which generally reflect higher crime times. Comparatively few (about 14.6 percent) of incidents occur between 6:00 a.m. and noon, regardless of the day of the week.

**Table 20. Use of force incidents by time of day and day of week, 2009–2013 (N=2,304)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0000–0559 N (%)</th>
<th>0600–1159 N (%)</th>
<th>1200–1759 N (%)</th>
<th>1800–2359 N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sunday</td>
<td>100 (4.34)</td>
<td>34 (1.48)</td>
<td>65 (2.82)</td>
<td>82 (3.56)</td>
<td>281 (12.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monday</td>
<td>64 (2.78)</td>
<td>42 (1.82)</td>
<td>94 (4.08)</td>
<td>135 (5.86)</td>
<td>335 (14.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuesday</td>
<td>50 (2.17)</td>
<td>59 (2.56)</td>
<td>87 (3.78)</td>
<td>96 (4.17)</td>
<td>292 (12.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wednesday</td>
<td>57 (2.47)</td>
<td>42 (1.82)</td>
<td>92 (3.99)</td>
<td>117 (5.08)</td>
<td>308 (13.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thursday</td>
<td>81 (3.52)</td>
<td>54 (2.34)</td>
<td>116 (5.03)</td>
<td>102 (4.43)</td>
<td>353 (15.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friday</td>
<td>73 (3.17)</td>
<td>55 (2.39)</td>
<td>85 (3.69)</td>
<td>128 (5.55)</td>
<td>341 (14.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saturday</td>
<td>127 (5.51)</td>
<td>50 (2.17)</td>
<td>71 (3.08)</td>
<td>146 (6.34)</td>
<td>394 (17.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>552 (23.96)</td>
<td>336 (14.58)</td>
<td>610 (26.47)</td>
<td>806 (34.98)</td>
<td>2,304 (100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The number of incidents in this table does not add up to 2,309 because five cases did not have time-of-event data.

**Officer characteristics**

In this section, the type of force used, age, race, years of service, and assignment of the officers involved in use of force incidents is examined.

**Age and years of service**

Officers involved in use of force from 2009 through 2013 ranged from 21 to 64 years old, with a mean age of 32 years. With regard to years of service, officers involved in use of force had been on the force for an average of 5.7 years. By comparison, the department 2013 mean age of officers was 38 years and tenure was 10 years.

**Race/Ethnicity**

The majority of officers employed by the SLCPD are White (87.1 percent). Black officers make up 10 percent of the department, while 2.9 percent of officers represent other minority racial or ethnic groups. In our analysis of officers involved in use of force, 89 percent were identified as White, 9.3 percent as Black, 0.5 percent as Hispanic, and 1.5 percent as other race.

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146. Due to the limitation of the data to identify specific officers involved in use of force, we are not able to determine whether certain officers may account for a disproportionate number of force incidents.
Assignment

Most of the officers who used force (29.3 percent) were assigned to the 1st precinct, which has the most populated area of patrol responsibility and receives the most calls for service within the SLCPD. Officers assigned to the 4th precinct, with the second-most calls for service, accounted for 24.2 percent of the use of force.

Table 21 also presents use of force instances per police-citizen contact from 2009 through 2013 at the precinct level. The 1st precinct had a use of force rate of .09 percent, and the 4th precinct had a rate of .14 percent. Both precincts are responsible for providing police services in the most populated areas of the county, and relative to the amount of contact police have with citizens use of force is a rare event. The use of force rates per police-citizen contact among all precincts were lower than national estimates of police use of force per police citizen contacts resulting in police use of force.

Table 21. Use of force instances per total police-citizen contact by precinct, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct of officer assignment</th>
<th>Use of force incidents</th>
<th>Total police-citizen contacts</th>
<th>Use of force per police-citizen contact (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st Precinct—North County</td>
<td>677</td>
<td>739,584</td>
<td>.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd Precinct—Central County</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>358,665</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Precinct—Affton SW</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>398,978</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th Precinct—South County</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>406,643</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th Precinct—City of Fenton</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>79,320</td>
<td>.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th Precinct—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>103,327</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th Precinct—West County</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>325,463</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings*</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>130,856</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total†</td>
<td>2,084</td>
<td>2,542,836</td>
<td>.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Note: The city of Jennings calls for service and officer-initiated contacts figures are from 2011–2013. Jennings was incorporated into the SLCPD in March of 2011.

† Precinct data for calls for service comprise calls in which an officer was dispatched and an officer assists on the dispatched call. Precinct totals will be less than SLCPD totals as reported in table 18. Police-citizen contacts for drug enforcement, canine, tactical operations, highway safety unit, Metrolink, and others cannot be separated in this manner. When those units are dispatched, the call is included in the calls for service of the precinct in which the call was received. However, use of force data are not collected by geographic location, so use of force by an officer in a specialized unit cannot be attributed to a precinct.

Type of physical force used by officer

During the review, the PF assessment team examined the types of force used by officers, because more than one specific type of force may be used in a single incident. From 2009 through 2013, the most frequent type of force used involved officers’ application of physical restraint (40 percent) and Taser (35 percent) on subjects, as shown in figure 2. Only 1 percent of the instances of use of force involved the use of a
baton, and 1 percent involved the use of officers’ service weapons. Although GO 10-29 does not reference canine on the use of force continuum, during the data collection by SLCPD it was included as a higher type of force than Taser because of the greater likelihood of injury to an individual.

**Figure 2. Type of physical force used, 2009–2013 (N=2,309)**

The use of a Taser\(^\text{147}\) was the most frequent type of force used by officers assigned to the 1st and 4th precincts, as shown in table 22. Officers assigned to the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and 7th precincts were more likely to use physical restraint as the type of force compared to the other precincts. Officers in the 3rd and 6th precinct frequently used OC spray as a type of force compared to officers in the other precincts.

\(^{147}\) All SLCPD patrol officers are trained and authorized to carry Tasers. This may account for the frequent use of the Taser among officers in the SLCPD.
Table 22. Use of force by type of force used by precinct, 2009–2013 (N=2,084)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of force used</th>
<th>1st precinct—North County N (%)</th>
<th>2nd precinct—Central County N (%)</th>
<th>3rd precinct—Affton SW N (%)</th>
<th>4th precinct—South County N (%)</th>
<th>5th precinct—City of Fenton N (%)</th>
<th>6th precinct—City of Wildwood N (%)</th>
<th>7th precinct—West County N (%)</th>
<th>City of Jennings N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firearm</td>
<td>17 (0.82)</td>
<td>5 (0.24)</td>
<td>2 (0.10)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>26 (1.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less lethal</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>2 (0.10)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>2 (0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Batton</td>
<td>7 (0.34)</td>
<td>7 (0.35)</td>
<td>3 (0.14)</td>
<td>2 (0.10)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>9 (0.43)</td>
<td>30 (1.44)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canine</td>
<td>9 (0.43)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>5 (0.24)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>16 (0.77)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taser</td>
<td>281 (13.48)</td>
<td>65 (3.12)</td>
<td>228 (10.94)</td>
<td>22 (1.06)</td>
<td>16 (0.77)</td>
<td>31 (1.49)</td>
<td>73 (3.50)</td>
<td>776 (37.24)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC spray</td>
<td>75 (3.60)</td>
<td>42 (2.01)</td>
<td>88 (4.22)</td>
<td>12 (0.58)</td>
<td>1 (0.05)</td>
<td>9 (0.43)</td>
<td>19 (0.91)</td>
<td>258 (12.38)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical striking</td>
<td>47 (2.26)</td>
<td>19 (0.91)</td>
<td>25 (1.20)</td>
<td>4 (0.20)</td>
<td>2 (0.10)</td>
<td>10 (0.48)</td>
<td>17 (0.82)</td>
<td>131 (6.28)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical restraint</td>
<td>240 (11.52)</td>
<td>111 (5.33)</td>
<td>205 (9.84)</td>
<td>44 (2.11)</td>
<td>23 (1.10)</td>
<td>71 (3.41)</td>
<td>71 (3.41)</td>
<td>845 (40.55)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total*</td>
<td>677 (32.48)</td>
<td>161 (7.73)</td>
<td>249 (11.96)</td>
<td>557 (26.73)</td>
<td>85 (4.08)</td>
<td>42 (2.01)</td>
<td>123 (5.90)</td>
<td>190 (9.12)</td>
<td>2,084 (100.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rounding may cause totals not to add up to 100%.
† This table excludes use of force incidents for drug enforcement, canine, tactical operations, highway safety unit, and Metrolink. The use of force data are not collected by geographic location, so use of force by an officer in a specialized unit cannot be attributed to a precinct.

Subject characteristics

In this section, the race/ethnicity, gender, and age of subjects involved in use of force incidents from 2009 through 2013 is examined. SLCPD employees manually collected information on all use of force incident from 2009 through 2013 from the RMS, the CARE system, and the IAPro system to identify the race, gender, and age of citizens and officers involved in use of force incidents.

Race/Ethnicity

Table 23 presents use of force by race of subject and reason for contact. Officers responding to misdemeanor crimes in progress were more likely to use physical restraint on White subjects (51.1 percent) than Black subjects (46.5 percent), and officers more likely deployed a Taser against Black subjects (N = 179, 53.9 percent) than White subjects (45.8 percent). Officers more likely deployed a Taser against Black subjects (68.5 percent) than against White subjects (31.5 percent) during traffic stops. The difference in the percentages of type of use of force used between Black and White subjects for both traffic stops and misdemeanor crimes in progress was significant.148 An analysis to determine whether any potential disparities exist in the use of force by the race of subjects is beyond the scope of this assessment.

148. The statistical test used to compare the differences is highly sensitive to the sample size of the categories. As such, the results should be reviewed with caution.
It is important to note that the purpose of the analysis was not to examine whether there was any racial disparity among subjects and officers involved in use of force incidents, but to present only the demographic profiles of subjects and officers based on the data that were provided for analysis. An examination to determine whether any potential racial disparity exists in the application of force between officers and citizens is beyond the scope of this assessment process. In order to address this, data would have to be collected about the racial make-up of the population (the blend of residents, workers, and people utilizing public spaces) in order to give a more fine-tuned estimate of racial characteristics of an area. In addition, observations of police-citizen encounters are necessary to control for demeanor (of officers and citizens) and other factors, which could influence the escalation of use of force.

No significant differences were observed in the use of force by race of the subject across the other contacts or call types.

Table 23. Selected use of force by race of subject and reason for contact, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of force used</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
<th>Hispanic N (%)</th>
<th>Other N (%)</th>
<th>Total N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor crime in progress: Physical restraint</td>
<td>189 (51.1)†</td>
<td>172 (46.5)</td>
<td>4 (1.1)</td>
<td>5 (1.4)</td>
<td>370 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misdemeanor crime in progress: Taser</td>
<td>152 (45.8)</td>
<td>179 (53.9)†</td>
<td>1 (0.3)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>332 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic stop/ Suspicious vehicle: Taser</td>
<td>40 (31.5)</td>
<td>87 (68.5)†</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>127 (100.0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Rounding may cause totals not to add up to 100%.
† p ≤ .05

**Gender**

Of the incidents of use of force by officers between 2009 through 2013, 86 percent involved a male subject and 14 percent involved a female subject.

**Officer-involved shootings**

In this section, a descriptive analysis is provided to understand the prevalence and nature of OISs within SLCPD, including officer and subject characteristics as well as the dynamics of the incident. The analysis presented will have implications for policy and investigations of OIS incidents. We will examine the officers and subjects involved and the characteristics of the encounters.
Prevalence of officer-involved shootings

From 2009 through 2013, there were 20 OIS incidents involving 29 officers. The annual number of OIS incidents and the condition of the subject at the conclusion of the incident are shown in table 24. Of the 20 incidents during the five-year period, seven were fatal encounters; four incidents resulted in an injury to the subject; and seven subjects were not hit by officer(s) involved. One subject committed suicide, and in one incident the condition of the subject was unknown.

Table 24. Condition of subject at conclusion of OIS incidents, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition of suspect</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deceased (OIS fatal)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not hit</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceased (suicide)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Characteristics of officers involved in OIS incidents

Among the officers involved in OIS incidents, 27 were male and two female. The race or ethnicity of the officer was identified as 22 White, five Black, one Hispanic, and one Asian. The mean age of officers involved in OISs from 2009 through 2013 was 30.7 years. The age of the officers ranged from 24 to 41 years.

Subject characteristics

The 20 OIS incidents from 2009–2013 involved 23 subjects. The subjects were all male. The race or ethnicity of the subjects was identified as 16 Black, 6 White, and 1 Hispanic.

The age of the subjects ranged from 15 to 49 years, with a mean age of 26.6 years.

Subject weapons

Of the 20 OIS incidents from 2009 to 2013, 12 of the incidents involved the subject pointing a firearm or firing at the officer; six used a car as a weapon, of which one used both a car and a knife (the subject produced the knife after exiting the car); and two used sharp edged weapons (i.e., axe or knife). While departmental policy generally prohibits officers from discharging their firearms at a moving vehicle,149 five of those incidents involved subjects’ use of a vehicle as the only weapon used against officers.

Number of incidents involving one or more officers discharging firearm

Among the 20 incidents of OIS, 14 involved one officer discharging a firearm and six involved two or more officers discharging their weapons during the incident.

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149. “At or from a moving vehicle, unless the occupant(s) of the vehicle represents a direct and immediate threat to the life or safety of the officer or an innocent person, and then only as a last resort.” Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 10-29 (see note 133).
Findings and recommendations

Finding 10.1

The SLCPD does not thoroughly investigate the use of deadly force in all situations.

GO 10-29 establishes policies and procedures for use of force that are not consistent with contemporary policing policies. In particular, the general order does not require the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons to investigate the discharge of a firearm by an officer if both (a) it causes no injury to any person and (b) the officer is not the victim of a first-degree assault. The use of deadly force against another person is a serious event that requires a complete and thorough investigation not only to determine if the use of deadly force was within policy but also, and more important, to determine whether the officer’s actions are authorized by law.

Recommendation 10.1.1

The SLCPD should revise GO 10-29 to require the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons to investigate all uses of deadly force by an officer against another person irrespective of injury.

Finding 10.2

The SLCPD has not yet made full use of the IAPRO software that was first implemented in 2012.

Personnel assigned to the BPS need specific training on the IAPRO Blue Team system to more accurately and comprehensively report use of force incidents for identifying trends that may be of concern to the SLCPD. Additional training will enable the BPS to report and highlight problem areas that may need to be addressed more thoroughly among use of force incidents.

Recommendation 10.2.1

The SLCPD should provide officers assigned to the BPS with Blue Team system training on the proper way to document incidents in a more comprehensive and accurate report format.

While the implementation of the Blue Team software to document use of force incidents will provide more accurate reporting of use of force incidents, training on its use will assist the bureau in the annual collection and analysis of data on use of force incidents.
Chapter 11. Complaint Process

Overview

The ability of a citizen to make a complaint against a police officer is critical to building trust between the public and the police. That ability requires that the community is not discouraged, intimidated, or fearful of making a complaint.150

This chapter provides an overview of the SLCPD complaint process; to assess a citizen’s accessibility to make a complaint; to review the investigative process; identify any trends in complaints; and to provide findings and recommendations for SLCPD to improve their complaint process.

Background

From 2010 through 2013,151 310 citizen complaints were filed against officers in the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD). There were 552 internally generated complaints152 during the same period. This chapter is designed to describe the SLCPD complaint process as well as to review complaint data related to the SLCPD complaint process, policies, investigations, and dispositions. To understand the complete complaint process the assessment team reviewed all complaints, both citizen and internally generated.

The review allows for an assessment of accessibility to all citizens wanting to report alleged misconduct by officers. In addition, the review provides an opportunity to assess the complaint process for timeliness in adjudication of complaints as well as thoroughness of the investigations. Included is a descriptive analysis of complainants and the type of allegation(s) received by the Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS).

The SLCPD accepts and investigates all complaints, including those made anonymously. To manage both citizen and internal complaints, the BPS uses IAPro, a case tracking software system designed to track and manage internal affairs and professional standards investigations. The department’s goal is to complete an investigation and notify the citizen of the finding within 90 days. The SLCPD reports most investigations completed within the 90-day timeline. However, complex investigations may warrant a 90-day extension. The case management software used by BPS has a reminder feature that alerts an investigator when as the case approaches 90 days. In addition, the complainants are invited to contact the BPS periodically to check on the status of the complaint.

Management and administration

The SLCPD’s General Order (GO) 04-05153 establishes policy and procedures for complaint review process including supervisory and BPS responsibilities for investigation of complaints, disciplinary action, and officer rights during internal investigations. The purpose of the GO is to ensure that an “expeditious, thorough,
and equitable investigation of complaints filed against department personnel . . . [not only will make] a fair
determination of an employee’s conduct but will also determine the underlying causes of unsatisfactory
conduct so that action may be taken to remedy that conduct.”

The SLCPD accepts and investigates all complaints, even those made from anonymous sources. By accept-
ing anonymous complaints, the SLCPD does not require complainants to identify themselves. Individuals
can file a complaint against an officer(s) in person at the BPS or any precinct station, by phone, by letter,
e-mail, or online at the department website. Any department employee who may be contacted by a com-
munity member alleging misconduct by that employee or any other department employee is required to
“take steps to bring the citizen in contact with a supervisory employee in a timely fashion.”

Supervisory investigation

If the alleged complaint against the officer(s) constitutes a minor allegation and the officer is within the
supervisor’s command, the supervisor will initiate the investigation. The supervisor will contact the com-
plainant, including those who wish to remain anonymous, to determine if misconduct of the officer(s)
occurred. If no misconduct was apparent, the supervisor is not required to take further action. When
evidence exists of misconduct, the supervisor prepares a citizen complaint summary to document the
alleged misconduct. The complainant is requested, but not required, to sign the summary and provide a
written and signed statement regarding the allegation(s). The complainant is provided a copy of the citizen
complaint summary as an official receipt of the complaint, and the supervisor forwards the complaint
to the BPS. The supervisor will describe to the citizen the complaint review process and provide an
informational brochure describing the procedures.

In the event the complaint constitutes a serious allegation (e.g., the officer exercised unnecessary force,
was derelict or neglectful of his or her duty, or engaged in oppressive conduct) a complaint summary is
completed and forwarded to the BPS for investigation. The same process is used if the accused officer is
not in the supervisor’s command or if the officer(s) cannot be identified.

Bureau of Professional Standards investigation

The role of the BPS commander is to ensure that complaints have sufficient information to support an in-
vestigation. The commander or BPS investigators may contact the complainant for additional information
prior to determining the best path for the investigation. If an anonymous complaint does not contain suffi-
cient information to support an investigation, it is maintained within the BPS for one year and then de-
stroyed if no further information is forthcoming.

Complaints of a minor nature received by the BPS may be forwarded to the employee’s commanding offi-
cer for investigation. Minor allegations constitute approximately 25 percent of all complaints. The supervi-
sor conducts an investigation and forwards the recommended disposition back to the BPS.

154. Ibid.
155. A minor allegation is defined as “Misconduct not affecting the overall mission of the Department that, if proved true, will result in the imposition of summary
discipline. Examples of such conduct are uniform appearance violations, failure to remain in an assigned area, tardiness, and minor rules infractions.” Summary
discipline is defined as “Admonishment, such as a written or oral reprimand, which does not become part of the employee’s permanent personnel file.” Office of the
Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 04-05 (see note 153).
156. All supervisors have access to the IAPro system and can enter complaint information.
Chapter 11. Complaint Process

Allegations of a serious nature are investigated by the BPS. At the conclusion of the investigation, the BPS prepares a written report that details the facts of the investigation and what discipline, if any, is recommended. Based upon the conclusion of facts, the complaint disposition is classified as one of the following:

- **Exonerated.** The incident occurred, but the employee’s conduct was lawful and proper.
- **Unfounded.** The allegation was false or the incident did not occur.
- **Not sustained.** The evidence was insufficient to prove or disprove the allegation.
- **Sustained.** There is evidence sufficient to support the allegation.

When circumstances prevent the investigation from progressing to a successful conclusion—for example, when there is insufficient information to identify the accused employee—the complaint is considered closed with no action taken.

**Guidance Program—early warning system**

The SLCPD has an early warning system (EWS), known as the Guidance Program, to assist officers who display a pattern of behavior that is not consistent with departmental policies and procedures. The BPS is charged with identifying inappropriate behavior by an employee in a single incident or when an employee exhibits a pattern of behavior that generates an excessive number of complaints, use of force incidents, sick time, resisting arrest cases, assaults on police cases, arrested subject injuries, officer injury reports, pursuits, vehicle accidents, civil litigation, or any other similar incidents regardless of disposition.\(^\text{157}\)

The Bureau of Professional Standards procedure 13-23 identifies indicators and thresholds in which an employee will be subject to review for selection to the Guidance Program. (See table 25.) The IAPro software alerts BPS when one of the thresholds is met within the identified indicators.

**Table 25. Guidance Program incident threshold**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Threshold</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Directly involved in use of force, vehicle pursuit, citizen complaint, or internal complaint, or combination thereof, regardless of disposition</td>
<td>3 or more incidents in a 6-month period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directly involved in use of force, vehicle pursuit, citizen complaint, or internal complaint, or combination thereof, regardless of disposition</td>
<td>4 or more incidents in a 12-month period but does not meet above threshold</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BPS commander, upon determination of an incident or pattern, will notify the involved employee’s watch or bureau commander, and the two will meet with the employee to bring the problem to the attention of the employee and supervisor. The employee is advised of the incident(s) and given an opportunity to discuss the circumstances and explain their actions. The BPS commander and the watch or bureau commander will then determine what remedial action (if any) is to occur. The Guidance Program is not disciplinary in nature and is meant to assist SLCPD employees in mitigating issues affecting their work performance.

\(^\text{157}\). Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 11-71 (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2011).
If a decision is reached that requires remedial action to be taken against the officer, he or she may be referred to the employee assistance program (EAP), psychological counseling, supervisory counseling, a period of supervisory observation in the field, or specialized training (e.g., stress reduction, communication strategies, defensive tactics, driver training). The supervisor monitors the officer’s progress in the program for a period of one year and submits quarterly reports to the BPS.

**Board of Police Commissioners—civilian review board**

The SLCPD Board of Police Commissioners is a civilian oversight board composed of five members representing the citizens of the county. The Board of Police Commissioners is the final authority for the control and supervision of the department. Board members are appointed by the county executive and approved by the county council. At the direction of the chief, the BPS has implemented a use of force reporting summary that is presented to the Board of Police Commissioners for review and comment. The report lists the number of incidents and types of force used during the reporting period. The Board of Police Commissioners also reviews all external complaints before the complaints are presented to the chief for a final decision. The Board of Police Commissioners has the ability to make recommendations regarding officer discipline. The Board of Police Commissioners also conducts hearings for officers appealing discipline or termination and appeals from citizens over complaint dispositions.

**Actions of the chief of police**

The chief of police has the ultimate authority for disposition of complaints and the level of discipline. The chief has several options when presented with an investigation. The chief may accept the finding, change the finding, or return the case back to the BPS for additional investigation. The chief may do the same for proposed levels of discipline.

For complaints against an officer, the approved decision is documented in a letter that is sent to the officer stating the disposition, facts supporting it, and if sustained level of discipline. For citizen-initiated complaints, a letter is generated to the citizen informing them of the disposition handed down by the chief. Both the citizen and the officer(s) have the option to appeal decisions directly to the Board of Police Commissioners.

**Method**

The PF assessment team conducted a review the SLCPD policies, documents, and web site, interviewed the BPS staff, conducted a roundtable discussion with SLCPD employees, met with a member of the Board of Police Commissioners, and spoke with community members. In addition, the team completed a qualitative review of complaints to determine patterns in the outcomes of cases, discipline philosophy, and areas that may require improvement.

The team created a work flow chart to illustrate the complaint investigative process for both citizen-initiated complaints (figure 3) and internally generated complaints (figure 4).
Figure 3. St. Louis County Police Department process for citizen-initiated complaints

**Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS)**
- Informal* complaints referred to appropriate division for investigation
- Formal* complaints investigated by BPS and reported to deputy chief

**Deputy chief**
Formal complaints are referred to county counselor for review prior to review by chief of police

**Chief of police**
Formal and informal recommendations/review packet presented to Board of Police Commissioners

**Board of Police Commissioners**
Confirm/Reject chief’s recommendations

**Chief of police**
- Final dispositions are returned to BPS for implementation
- Final disposition presented to Board of Police Commissioners and to citizen(s) who registered complaint

**Division**
- Division of Criminal Investigation handles any complaints involving alleged criminal act(s) (e.g., stealing, sexual assault, assault)
- Appropriate division handles informal complaints

**County counselor**
Performs legal review of formal discipline(s) resulting in reduction of rank, loss of pay, suspension, or termination

**Citizen**
May appeal unsatisfactory decision directly to the Board of Police Commissioners

*Informal = low level of potential discipline
*Formal = increased level of discipline (e.g., leave, dismissal)
Figure 4. St. Louis County Police Department process for internally generated complaints

Complainant allegations

The SLCPD tracks and reports the number of complaints received from both citizens and internally initiated complaints.158 (See table 26.) Within each complaint, there will be one or more allegations. For example, a complaint involving an officer may allege that the officer used abusive language and unreasonable force and conducted an unlawful search. In this situation, there is one complaint with three separate allegations. During the years reviewed, the average number of allegations per complaint was 2.04.

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158. All of the data used are available in the SLCPD annual report for each of the years reviewed. “Annual and Anniversary Reports,” St. Louis County Government, accessed June 24, 2015, http://www.stlouisco.com/LawandPublicSafety/PoliceDepartment/ResourcesforCitizens/AnnualReports.
Table 26. Number of complaints received, 2010–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Internal</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>215.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SLCPD received 310 citizen complaints during the four years reviewed, resulting in 635 allegations. The types of allegations are reported by SLCPD and illustrated in table 27 as a percent of total allegations from citizen complaints in the year the complaint was received.

Table 27. Types of allegations in citizen-initiated complaints, 2010–2013 (N=310)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oppressive or rude</th>
<th>Racial profiling</th>
<th>Excessive force</th>
<th>Discreditable conduct</th>
<th>Neglect of duty</th>
<th>Disobedience of orders</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>2.4%</td>
<td>20.5%</td>
<td>6.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Citizen complaints of oppressive or rude behavior and excessive use of force are consistently the most frequent allegations against SLCPD employees.

Disposition of allegations

As discussed earlier, when a complaint is made and an investigation occurs the investigation will have one or more allegations. In the years reviewed, there were approximately two allegations per complaint, with each allegation receiving its own finding. Using the example above, a complaint alleges that the officer used abusive language and unreasonable force and conducted an unlawful search. In this situation, there is one complaint with three allegations, each allegation having a separate disposition. For illustration, in this example the investigation may have come to the following dispositions: not sustained with regard to the abusive language, sustained for unreasonable force, and exonerated for the unlawful search allegation. Each of the three dispositions would be reported in the appropriate category.

The disposition of allegations from both citizen and internal complaints is illustrated in table 28.
Table 28. Disposition of allegations resulting from all complaints, 2010–2013 (N=972)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sustained</th>
<th>Not sustained</th>
<th>Unfounded</th>
<th>Exonerated</th>
<th>Closed/Withdrawn</th>
<th>Employee resigned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>21.8%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>9.1%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>60.1%</td>
<td>9.6%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>8.4%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Dispositions are reported in the year the disposition is determined. For example, allegations made in the last quarter of a reporting period may not be completed and dispositions rendered before the reporting period ends. In such cases, allegations will be recorded in the year they are reported, but dispositions will be reported the following year. Therefore the number of dispositions for a given period will seldom equal the number of allegations for the same period.

Findings and recommendations

The assessment team reviewed the entire SLCPD complaint process. The review found the SLCPD process to be thorough and timely and the BPS staff skilled and professional. The findings and recommendations provided are designed to improve the compliant process.

Finding 11.1

The SLCPD may be unintentionally limiting complaints by not publicizing the acceptance of anonymous complaints and the locations where complaints may be made.

The SLCPD accepts and investigates all complaints, including those made anonymously. However, the presence of a signature line on the Citizen Complaint Statement (F-332) may intimidate some citizens and discourage them from making a complaint.

Recommendation 11.1.1

The SLCPD should review all printed material and its website to reinforce the openness of the complaint process including a listing of all locations where a complaint is accepted and the ability of a citizen to make an anonymous complaint.159

Recommendation 11.1.2

The SLCPD should remove the signature line on the Citizen Complaint Statement (F-332).

A signature, although not required, appears to be necessary to complete the form. The mere presence of the signature line appears to conflict with the openness of accepting anonymous complaints.

159. President’s Task force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report, 13 (see note 14).
Finding 11.2

**The SLCPD currently uses a traditional punitive form of punishment in response to a sustained complaint.**

For serious allegations, this comes in the form of reprimands, suspensions, demotions, and termination. This usually results in an adversarial relationship between the employee and department, which may leave employees bitter and not address the cause of the misconduct.

**Recommendation 11.2.1**

_The SLCPD should consider moving to an education-based discipline (EBD) process._

Many agencies including the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the Sacramento (California) Police Department, and the Lakewood (Colorado) Police Department have successfully implemented EBD and seen reductions in citizen-generated complaints.

**Recommendation 11.2.2**

_The SLCPD should establish a St. Louis County Police-Community Mediation Program._

The program uses a trained independent party to mediate citizen complaints against police employees. The mediation allows both the employee and the citizen to discuss their issues in a safe and impartial environment. The employee and community member are able to collaborate with each other rather than treat each other as adversaries and to have their complaints dealt with in an efficient manner. The goal is to build more understanding and better relations between the community and the SLCPD.

Finding 11.3

**The chief of police only receives the EWS report from the BPS annually, which limits the chief’s awareness and understanding of potential critical issues within the organization.**

This notification informs the chief on the nature of the conduct, the intervention, and the outcome. More timely awareness could be helpful in focusing limited training resources in appropriate areas that will positively impact staff.

**Recommendation 11.3.1**

_The SLCPD should provide quarterly reports of staff identified by the EWS to better inform the chief of issues that may affect performance and require additional training of departmental personnel._

There is also value in increasing the frequency of these reports to the chief in order to assist in day-to-day staffing decisions as well as having a strong sense of issues impacting staff performance.

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160. Depending on the severity and type of the offense, an employee is offered alternatives to punitive discipline that may range from a research paper, courses such as ethics, additional training, or any creative option the department believes will correct the underlying problem. The original proposed discipline remains on the officer’s record as per department policy.
Finding 11.4

During the review of BPS files, the assessment team discovered a pattern of light discipline in investigations involving ethical failings and untruthfulness.\(^{161}\)

The finding is based on comparing discipline administered in the SLCPD with discipline administered in similar cases identified by project team subject matter experts as well as current discussions regarding integrity in policing.

**Recommendation 11.4.1**

The SLCPD should establish a disciplinary matrix for officer misconduct to increase consistency.

Particular attention should be placed on allegations of ethical failings and dishonesty.

**Action taken by site.** The SLCPD has made some changes to policy regarding cases involving ethical failings and truthfulness to reinforce accountability as it relates to ethical failings and truthfulness.

Finding 11.5

The BPS does not use a consistent and comprehensive format for compiling pertinent information related to citizen complaints against officers.

While the implementation of the IAPro software provides more accurate reporting of complaints and allegations, officers assigned to the BPS do not have comprehensive training on collecting complete information.

**Recommendation 11.5.1**

Personnel assigned to the BPS should receive specific training on the IAPro system for more consistent and accurate reporting of citizen complaints and for identifying trends that may be of concern to the SLCPD.

The SLCPD should provide system training for officers assigned to the BPS on the proper way to document incidents in a more comprehensive and accurate report format. With the additional training, the BPS will be able to report and highlight problem areas that may need to be addressed more thoroughly among the types of complaints received from citizens.

**Recommendation 11.5.2**

Supervisors outside of the BPS have access to IAPro and should receive additional training on functionality and use of the system to ensure accurate and timely data collection.

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\(^{161}\) It should be noted that the cases in question resulted from discipline administered before Chief Jon Belmar became the chief of police.
Finding 11.6

The SLCPD uses an inappropriate benchmark in identifying an excessive number of complaints or incidents.

Departmental GO 11-71 section II B reads, “An ‘excessive number’ of complaints or incidents will be determined by comparing the employee’s pattern of behavior to that of employees in similar work environments, past performance evaluation reports, and input from their supervisors.” Using peer behavior as a benchmark is only appropriate if the employees used as a benchmark are model employees. If the employees in a similar work environment are not performing at an acceptable level, the comparison is inappropriate.

Recommendation 11.6.1

The SLCPD should review and revise the definition of excessive number of complaints or incidents as defined in GO 11-71 and any other documents, resources, and trainings using the same definition.

Finding 11.7

Oppressive or rude behavior and excessive force are the majority (a four-year mean of 58.3 percent) of citizen complaints against the SLCPD.

The fair and impartial interaction between the SLCPD and the community is critical to building trust. Opportunities exist for the SLCPD to reduce the number of complaints while building trust with the community.

Recommendation 11.7.1

The SLCPD should complete a comprehensive review of oppressive or rude behavior and excessive force allegations.

The review should include community stakeholders to determine causes of complaints and opportunities for reductions.
Chapter 12. Community Outreach

Overview

The current climate of police-community relations is leading to a nation that questions every decision made by law enforcement. The use of technology, particularly phones that can record every move made by an officer during an encounter, adds even further scrutiny. Police motivations, attitudes, and actions are under the microscope. The media has a vested interest in sensationalizing stories, often fueling an existing spark of public distrust and unrest. For these reasons, it is critical for law enforcement agencies to ensure accountability and embrace transparency, to showcase the positive work that officers do every day, and to engage all segments of their communities—minorities, LGBTQ, persons with disabilities or limited English proficiency, and others.

These are some of the key components to the community policing philosophy. The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) has funded community policing efforts in 12,000 of the 18,000 law enforcement agencies around the country. “Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.”\textsuperscript{162} The three primary components of community policing are (1) organizational transformation, (2) problem solving, and (3) community partnerships.\textsuperscript{163}

In support of community policing ideals to build public trust, the Final Report of the President's Task Force on 21st Policing recommends, “Law enforcement agencies should proactively promote public trust by initiating positive non-enforcement activities to engage communities that typically have high rates of investigative and enforcement involvement with government agencies.”\textsuperscript{164} It is essential to highlight the importance of establishing trust and maintaining relationships within the context of community policing. To realize trusting police-community relationships, community policing should be considered a long-term strategy that is sewn into the fabric of an organization rather than a short-term tactic or program. Trust develops over time. Cessation or lack of community policing activities can damage those critical relationships.

Community policing is intended to require an organizational transformation to accommodate this apparently new style of policing. However, a frequent manifestation is the employment of a community policing unit or division, which in some cases can limit the ability of agencies to fully integrate this philosophy into its entire organization. A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey found that nearly 60 percent of police departments had full-time community policing officers, demonstrating how common this practice is. Other community policing efforts include the use of foot patrols in order to better engage community members.


\textsuperscript{163} The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) has established a community policing self-assessment tool (CP-SAT) so departments receiving COPS Office funding can assess the extent to which their department is engaging in community policing. For more information, see “2009 COPS Hiring Recovery Program (CHRP),” Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, accessed June 1, 2015, \url{http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?item=2604}.

\textsuperscript{164} President's Task Force on 21st Century Policing, Final Report (see note 14).
and show presence, knock-and-talks, addressing quality of life and disorder to improve perceptions of public safety, and engaging community leaders and the general public. However, it should be noted that each of these tactics in and of itself is not a full manifestation of community policing; rather, it is the coordination of these tactics with the specific goal of interacting with the public to engage in community oriented place-based problem solving that defines true community policing.

**Department culture**

“Law enforcement culture should embrace guardian mindset to build public trust and legitimacy. Toward that end, police and sheriffs’ departments should adopt procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices to guide their interactions with the citizens they serve.”

– President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing

Organizational culture is a pattern of shared meaning within an organization. It affects productivity and performance and provides guidelines for service, quality, and safety. It is unique for every department and one of the hardest things to change. Identifying the culture of a department is difficult and can be misleading if taken as an absolute. It can also be very helpful in identifying organizational strengths and opportunities and to improve transparency, accountability, and community trust.

The assessment team observed that the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) is an agency that prides itself on efficient response to calls for service and tactical incidents. In doing so, the organization recognizes those who excel in tactical proficiency and experience as leaders. In describing his response to the request to investigate the shooting in Ferguson, Chief Jon Belmar stated that he called his tactical operations chief and told him there was an officer-involved shooting and he needed to get there.

The emphasis on the importance of tactical experience was mentioned in interviews with department personnel. On more than one occasion, the assessment team was told that the perception within the organization is that those with special weapons and tactics (SWAT) experience are given preference for assignments over those who did not have the same experience. While perceptions may not be based in fact, many employees believe this to be true.

Culture can be viewed by

- the ways the department conducts its business, treats its employees and the community;
- the extent to which freedom is allowed in decision making, developing new ideas, and personal expression;

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168. The assessment team did not review transfer and promotional records to validate the claim; however, the frequency of the comment is worthy of mention.
• how power and information flow through its hierarchy;
• how committed employees are towards collective objectives.

The St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) teaches all of the technical skills a recruit will need in the field. Recruits are taught all the elements of a crime and tested on arrest procedures. They are instructed on which crimes are felonies and which are misdemeanors and tested on the legality of the arrest. They learn how to stay safe by doing mock arrests, pat frisks, searches, interrogations, and uses of force to make sure that they are technically adept at these tasks and that they will perform their duties safely. As in many police departments, personnel are incentivized and valued based on statistics such as their number of arrests, vehicle citations, and field interrogation stops and tactical response proficiency. In addition, many in the department report that the more sought after assignments go to the most statistically productive officers.

While valuing tactical experience and officer safety is necessary and not inherently negative, it does influence the culture to be more responsive than proactive. It also influences decisions related to training, allocation of resources, and equipment. Well trained and appropriately equipped tactical and support units such as SWAT, K-9, explosive ordnance disposal, and air support are critical to an organization’s success. Equally if not more important for creating an officer better suited to address the complexities involved in modern policing are the resources dedicated to community engagement and problem solving.

Community engagement

As a part of the Police Foundation (PF) assessment team, staff conducted a scan of the community engagement activities and strategies employed by the SLCPD. The assessment team conducted a number of stakeholder meetings with a diverse array of SLCPD stakeholders including local community organization leaders, faith-based leaders, and high school students as well as chiefs of surrounding law enforcement organizations and beat officers from the SLCPD. These meetings brought to light common themes regarding perceptions of law enforcement in general and the SLCPD specifically. In addition, the PF assessment team reviewed departmental policies, manuals, and training lesson plans focused on community policing and problem solving.

Citizens Academy

The SLCPD engages the community in a number of ways. First, the Citizens Academy is a staple of their outreach program. The academy offers basic and advanced training classes, creating a cadre of participants who form the Citizens Police Academy Alumni Association. Members of this group serve as a volunteer base, much like boosters for community events, fundraising events, toy and food or clothing drives, and other civic engagement activities. The Citizens Academies operate in most SLCPD precincts, with an eight-week curriculum. Class size averages 15–20 participants per session. Much like other citizen police academies nationally, each precinct focuses on key issues facing their own geographic area in conjunction with the standard citizen academy curriculum.

Recruitment for the Citizens Academy is conducted through crime watch groups; neighborhood policing officers’ outreach to citizens in that precinct; and the SLCPD website, Twitter, and Facebook. Citizen Academies are touted as extremely successful and well received by those who attend them. Indeed, when

169. Office of the Chief of Police, Departmental General Order 05-88 (St. Louis, MO: St. Louis County Police Department, 2005).
speaking with stakeholders as part of the assessment process, many report that their experience with the
Citizens Academy allowed them to better understand the challenges facing line level police personnel,
and gain better insight as to how police departments, especially SLCPD, operate.

School resource officers

At the center of every community are the schools that educate its children. The SLCPD contracts more than
30 school resource officers (SRO) to 12 school districts throughout the county. To understand the influence
an SRO has on the community, one must first understand the role an SRO takes in the schools. It would be
inappropriate for an SRO to act primarily as an enforcer and disciplinarian, thereby contributing to the
school-to-prison pipeline. In fact, SROs should not have a role in school disciplinary matters, including
enforcing school codes of conduct. Rather, SROs should help to provide a secure environment in which
students feel safe. They should also serve as mentors and role models, thus influencing the development of
community relationships and trust. The assessment team spent time on school campuses observing the
interaction between SROs, students, and staff. The team interviewed school administrators, teachers, stu-
dents, and SROs to understand the influential role SROs play in St. Louis County Schools.

During site visits and in conversation, the assessment team observed that the SLCPD SRO program oper-
ates appropriately and that SROs have a positive relationship with the students, faculty, and staff. The SROs
have developed a relationship that can best be described as coaches and mentors. In one high school, an
SRO is one of the football coaches. Following the incidents in Ferguson, SROs worked with staff to conduct
student assemblies to listen to student concerns and inform students about events in Ferguson, including
the police response. In another high school, SROs helped facilitate an on-campus peaceful student march
that had no negative impact on classroom curriculum.

Problem solving

Along with community partnerships and organizational transformation, problem solving is a key compo-
nent to community policing. The community policing philosophy encourages the use of innovative, pro-
active solutions to address underlying problems causing crime in a community. In this sense, the use of
traditional policing strategies may be just one of many tools employed to address community problems.
This concept promotes the use of the SARA model (scanning, analysis, response, and assessment) to en-
gage in the “proactive and systematic examination of identified problems to develop and evaluate effect-
ive responses.”

During site visits and in conversation with SLCPD staff, the PF assessment team observed a lack of under-
standing, appreciation, and application of creative problem solving as it relates to community policing. The
lack of understanding key concepts such as the SARA model existed at all levels of the organization and
across all assignments. While the neighborhood police officers are working diligently to improve the com-
munities they are assigned, they lack the training, skills, and resources to effectively problem solve.

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171. Community Policing Defined (see note 162).
172. Ibid.
In 2015, the SLCPD has invested in a Crime Analysis Unit and will begin to look for patterns and trends in criminal activity so that unit can deploy resources intelligently. The chief is in the process of redesigning the department’s CompStat program, which will hold precinct commanders accountable for all aspects of activity within the precincts. CompStat meetings will require the commanders to identify problems and design solutions, which will encourage best practices to be shared throughout the county.

**Communication strategy**

The chief and his senior command team have reached out to local clergy and community leaders and engaged them in conversations and meetings to help develop their community policing program. Not only has the department reached out to their traditional community stakeholders but it has also reached out to some of its harshest critics—such as “Lost Voices,” a community group that is very critical of the SLCPD. The chief and his team have reached out and had extensive meetings to begin the dialogue on how to move forward together.

**Social media**

The SLCPD has begun development of a communication strategy that will increase transparency of SLCPD operations. The public information officer (PIO) is a formally trained communications expert with prior experience in the public relations department of a private sector organization. The office has received additional personnel, both sworn and civilian, to move from simply reporting incident information to enhancing and showcasing SLCPD’s reputation. In November of 2014, the SLCPD hired a social media strategist from the local news affiliate to develop a more proactive social media strategy and presence for the SLCPD. This person was onsite during the days leading up to the grand jury decision reading in late November and continues to engage the SLCPD and the community through Twitter, Facebook, and other social media outlets.

In addition, the SLCPD is now proactively publishing positive information about the work it is doing and highlighting constructive community engagements. It is utilizing both traditional media and social media to accomplish this.

**Stakeholder feedback: Community attitudes toward police**

Many of the stakeholders interviewed acknowledge that the issues faced by St. Louis County are not solely the responsibility of the SLCPD—or any law enforcement agency, for that matter. As one stakeholder put it, “It’s not just a policing problem, it’s a community-wide problem.” Among other things, the county needs
more economic and employment opportunities as well as opportunities for those who have been incarcerated. Members of one stakeholder group made up of municipal chiefs of police and other community leaders agreed that issues facing the area include

- a high rate of unemployment in North County;\(^{173}\)
- lack of interracial social relationships (neighborhoods are fractured; once people leave work, Blacks and Whites don’t associate);
- income gaps;
- education (poor education in poor areas).

Many changes have taken place in the months following the shooting death of Michael Brown. A number of high-level officials, some in law enforcement, have resigned and have been replaced. Some stakeholders suggested that these resignations were steps in the right direction to building stronger community perceptions of police and are hopeful that relationships with police can improve.

Stakeholders have acknowledged that various police departments in the area operate differently; however, many in the community still group all of law enforcement together. They say the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department focuses on crime within St. Louis city limits and attribute some questionable pedestrian stops of citizens to that department. Others say the SLCPD has a reputation as well for racial profiling in vehicle stops. The general feeling is that law enforcement in the area treat minority community members more harshly than nonminority community members. While some say the SLCPD is viewed as more professional than most of the other police departments in the area, most insist that they still need change in a number of areas.

Generally, the community does not view law enforcement in a positive light. While most people understand that not all police are bad, many stakeholders interviewed had firsthand experiences with police that left them feeling harassed by demeaning, disrespectful, intimidating, and aggressive behavior from police officers. From high school students to community leaders, many citizens could give detailed history of interactions that have created fear and disconnection from law enforcement personnel. For example, of the 20 high school students interviewed during an open forum with the assessment team, five to seven of them had negative experiences with police. The SLCPD will need to work to counter these negative perceptions about law enforcement if it is to improve its relationship with the community.

While the SLCPD has already taken steps to better communicate and engage the community, many stakeholders say local police agencies have a history of racial profiling, making the community fearful of even interacting with the police. They believe that the police unnecessarily stop and ticket individuals, particularly individuals of color. They say that parts of the county deemed predominantly White areas are particu-

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larly troublesome for communities of color. They feel that many police departments stop Black motorists simply for being in White areas at the wrong time of day. One stakeholder, speaking generally rather than about a specific incident known to involve the SLCPD, spoke of communities of color knowing that “if you wore a hat while on Jennings Station Road between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m., you would be getting ticketed and possibly arrested (especially Black youth). . . . It was called the ‘Hat Rule.’” High school students report avoiding interaction with police, moving in another direction when they see police in an effort to avoid a negative interaction.

The SLCPD’s response to the Michael Brown riots in Ferguson further damaged community opinions about the department. Many stakeholders interviewed were of the opinion that the response was too harsh, overly militarized, and too heavy-handed. One stakeholder said that although he believed the SLCPD tended to use their military surplus equipment sparingly and professionally, this incident seemed to confirm to many that the SLCPD relies too heavily on tactical response to incidents. Use of force, according to some, was used too extensively.

Community stakeholders listed a number of underlying challenges that may impact negative community perceptions. First, some believe that SLCPD leadership is not engaged enough in the community. While they do see some effort being made in that area, they would like to see all levels of SLCPD personnel from Chief Belmar to officers get out of their cars, talk to people, and get to know the community. Some also believe that training in understanding, relating to, and communicating with various segments of the community is needed. For example, training in understanding youth, trauma, and mental illness would help both in interacting with certain community members and in referring those in need to the appropriate services.

Still, while all of this information serves to form negative opinions of police on the part of the community, many are still interested in connecting with and understanding the SLCPD. Members of the high school stakeholder group, in particular, were very articulate and did not hold any apparent animosity toward the police. They couldn’t understand why the police were “so uptight, they need to loosen up and just talk to us some time.” They wanted to know why the police didn’t come and talk about the role of the police with them.

Stakeholders recognized that there are existing explorers programs run by the SLCPD, Big Brothers, and the Ferguson Youth Initiative, to name just a few of the programs aimed at engaging youth. However, perceived lack of coordination of these programs is perhaps the reason these programs are seen as relatively ineffectual despite the amount of work put into them. In addition, it has been difficult to replicate the positive SRO relationships that have been developed in the Hazelwood East school district and a few others. Many suggested that the current hiring practices for these important positions appear to be attracting the wrong candidates, who are not necessarily youth focused. Stakeholders consistently suggested that youth programs needed to be enhanced and strengthened to foster effective communication and relationships, between youth and police. Many echoed that true connection between police and the community would take time and effort to understand one another.
Local community study

A study published in March 2015[^174] assessed the initial impact of the Michael Brown shooting and responses to it on St. Louis County residents’ views of police. Researchers found that residents’ views about police legitimacy, procedural justice and trust, and effectiveness were significantly lower immediately following the shooting than in prior times, and their perception of the frequency of police misconduct were higher at this time.

Figure 5 shows the changes in public opinion on police, by race, before and after the incident.

**Figure 5.** Changes in public opinion by race

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public Opinion</th>
<th>African American Residents</th>
<th>Nonblack Residents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Percent Change</td>
<td>Average Percent Prior to Shooting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Legitimacy</td>
<td>-8.1[^a]</td>
<td>66.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust &amp; Procedural</td>
<td>-25.5[^a]</td>
<td>61.5[^b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>-8.2[^a]</td>
<td>70.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>+20.9[^a]</td>
<td>50.8[^b]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency of Misconduct</td>
<td>+2.6[^a]</td>
<td>88.2[^b]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NOTE:*[^a] Refers to a significant difference *within race* in the scores prior to versus after the shooting event.

[^a]: Refers to a significant difference in scores between African American and nonblack residents at that time point (prior or after the shooting).

Source: Kochel, “Assessing the Initial Impact of the Michael Brown Shooting” (see note 174).

The study also found that African-American residents had considerably lower views about procedural justice and trust in the police and reported seeing police misconduct more frequently than their White neighbors. This data are in line with Black and White residents’ confidence in police around the country. In a Gallup poll showing Americans’ confidence in police from 2011–2014, 37 percent of Black residents reported having a great deal of confidence in the police, 37 percent reported having some confidence, and 25 percent of Black residents reported having little or no confidence in police. White Americans reported confidence in police at 59 percent (great deal), 29 percent (some), and 12 percent (little to none).[^175]

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**Stakeholder feedback: Police**

The assessment team’s ride-alongs with SLCPD officers provided opportunities to observe SLCPD line officers while on patrol and to discuss their perceptions of the department. During the ride-along, the team found officers to be knowledgeable and friendly and to have a commanding presence. They sought out opportunities to engage children and young people when responding to calls for service (a wave from the car, a pleasant hello, or positive conversation when out of the car).

The officers had respect and confidence in first-line supervisors and lieutenants. They recognized command ranks as the authority over the area; however, Ferguson tested the leadership of the entire supervisory staff. It was a shared opinion of the men and women of the precinct that not all leaders wore white shirts or had rank.

It was learned that SLCPD members shared a heightened sense of officer safety and situational awareness since the situation in Ferguson. Officers were in favor of the SLCPD efforts to provide an employee assistance program to department members following Ferguson. Some officers are still impacted by what they experienced, and there is concern among department members as they enter into the warmer months.

The officers universally expressed a desire to engage more deeply with community members and key stakeholders but expressed a noticeable frustration with the department’s current staffing level and unfilled vacancies as well as their precinct’s staffing level as it relates to call volume. Members of the SLCPD told us they make conscious efforts to be visible while on patrol; however, these attempts become a challenge because of current staffing levels and the size of the geographical area they are expected to cover.

All of the officers understood and supported the need to create more diversity in the organization. They are also insistent that new officers be of high quality and not just warm bodies to fill a patrol car. As one officer noted, there are enough bad municipal cops in the county. We need to be better and hire the best of the best.

The assessment team also noted the community’s response to the officers on patrol. The North County community was generally engaging and happy to see the officers. As is typical in other communities, there were pockets of neighborhoods where individuals in the immediate area were less welcoming of the officers. This was by far an exception and not the rule.

**Website design and functionality**

In a time when public sentiment is mixed about law enforcement, police departments need to do all they can to create opportunities for interaction, not only to include officer accountability but also to showcase the good work officers do every day. In the wake of situations in Ferguson, Chicago, New York, South Carolina, and Baltimore, police departments need to develop and highlight programs and activities that improve good police-community interaction. One important way to do this is through departmental websites.

The PF assessment team reviewed the SLCPD’s website and developed recommendations to make this website a resource for community building and engagement. We view law enforcement as a protector of public safety and a provider of vital public services. To this end, the website presence must improve communication between the local police department and the community it serves.
Law enforcement websites can enhance police-community relations and address the needs of residents by providing content that is relevant and practical. It is not enough to simply create a website. The website has to be part of a community-building effort, inviting residents to learn more about the department, sharing ways to get involved, and including information on police services.

**Findings and recommendations**

**Finding 12.1**

The SLCPD often places more value on technical and tactical proficiency than on investments in community policing such as community engagement and problem solving.

**Recommendation 12.1.1**

The SLCPD should seek out and identify ways to embed the philosophies of community policing, procedural justice, and equity into the culture of the organization.

For example, include community policing measurements as a component of officer performance evaluations; ensure officers are trained and evaluated on procedural justice during field training; and promote community policing philosophies as problem solving during CompStat processes.

**Recommendation 12.1.2**

SLCPD command leadership and union representatives should identify ways to incentivize and reward officer performance in community engagement, problem solving, and trust building beyond the standard crime reduction metrics.

**Finding 12.2**

The SLCPD does not have an explicit policy or documented philosophy to serve as a set of guiding principles for community policing.

The department makes reference to neighborhood policing in public and departmental policies and procedures and has this as one of the key pillars for officer evaluation. A patrol directive exists, but it does not clearly define community policing. Absent a department-wide community policing strategy including regular input from the community, the SLCPD may suffer the perception often applied to police departments who fail to balance enforcement with problem solving. A strong enforcement theme tends to contribute to an action oriented policing culture—an "us against them" mentality. It is essential for local police to form meaningful relationships with the community so they are not viewed as an occupying force that is merely in the community to enforce rules and laws.

**Recommendation 12.2.1**

SLCPD leadership should conduct a scan of community policing and stakeholder engagement best practices in preparation for defining their community policing strategies.

SLCPD leadership can use the results from the citizen satisfaction survey (which are produced twice annually) to inform their community engagement strategy.

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Recommendation 12.2.2

SLCPD leadership should conduct outreach to other jurisdictions that have successfully integrated problem solving, prevention, and intervention strategies as part of their overall response to crime and disorder and reduction in fear of crime.

Recommendation 12.2.3

After the environmental scan, SLCPD leadership, line level officers, and community stakeholders should engage in a strategic planning process to develop a formal community policing strategy, policy, and blueprint for implementation across the SLCPD.

Recommendation 12.2.4

Using this blueprint, the SLCPD should develop a realistic timeline and strategic plan to implement the community policing strategy.

This timeline should incorporate community oriented policing throughout the department and enable every officer on patrol and in other units with public contact to provide community policing services.

Recommendation 12.2.5

The SLCPD should ensure that community policing includes respectful engagement and joint problem solving with members of the community through neighborhood- and block-level partnerships involving adults and youth in the community, through citizen advisory councils, or through expansion of the current neighborhood crime watch program.

Finding 12.3

Current departmental policies and procedures do not allow ample opportunity for officers to meaningfully engage with the community.

Officers are more often than not confined to their patrol cars for entire shifts, placing a physical barrier between them and the public.

Recommendation 12.3.1

The SLCPD should examine and revise patrol deployment, dispatch priorities, alternative methods of service delivery, and staffing levels to identify ways to allow officers more time for community engagement.

For example, the SLCPD could place bicycle racks on the patrol cars and encourage officers to ride the neighborhood on a bicycle as often as staffing and call volume allow. This will provide more opportunities for community engagement for the officer and community members especially near playgrounds and around outdoor community events or gatherings.
Recommendation 12.3.2

The SLCPD should use “park and walks” by all SLCPD officers assigned to field duties.

Allowing officers the opportunity to remove the barrier of a vehicle and communicate with community members is critical in developing relationships and establishing trust between residents and officers. These interactions are designed to be spontaneous, such as officers stopping to play with youth in a playground or talk with a family enjoying a front yard barbecue. However, they can also be deliberate, such as walking in an area that is struggling with crime or a shopping area to speak with customers, employees, and business owners.

Finding 12.4

The neighborhood policing officers (NPO) assigned to SLCPD precincts do not receive enough specialized training on partnership, problem solving, or prevention (crime prevention through environmental design [CPTED] or the SARA model).

Recommendation 12.4.1

The SLCPD should ensure that NPOs receive special community policing training beyond that which is provided to all officers with a focus on partnership development, problem solving, and organizational transformation.

Recommendation 12.4.2

After NPOs receive training focused on partnership development, problem solving, and organizational transformation, they should be required to participate in precinct-level problem-solving assignments focused on community engagement and improving neighborhood safety with measurable outcomes.

Finding 12.5

There is evidence that there are youth in the St. Louis community who fear and distrust the police.

The PF assessment team spoke with young people who said they often do not understand police actions and believe that the police do not understand them. The SLCPD has work to do to ensure that the youth of the St. Louis community are regularly and meaningfully engaged.

SLCPD officers should strive to understand and interact with the community’s youth in an effort to ameliorate fear in the youth community, build a foundation of mutual trust and respect, and begin to build a pool of potential police recruits from the community.

Recommendation 12.5.1

The SLCPD should create and maintain a series of police-youth dialogues.

This will allow youth and police officers to potentially curb conflict and increase trust and cooperation in neighborhoods most affected by violence and crime. Bringing together youth and police of racially and ethnically diverse groups to build dialogue guided by professional facilitators could help to break down stereotypes and communication barriers to build mutual respect and understanding.
Recommendation 12.5.2

The SLCPD should create a board of young adult police commissioners made up of juniors and seniors from several city high schools.

This commission would be a group of young people who work with the SLCPD chief to bridge the gap between young adults and SLCPD officers. With the assistance of the SLCPD, the young adult police commissioners can host events and forums so teens from various public schools can come together to discuss neighborhood and school issues and concerns.

Dialogue events would show that the SLCPD is making efforts to understand the community’s youth and vice versa. In addition, regular thoughtful and frank facilitated dialogue between the SLCPD and local youth could help to clarify the role of the police in the community and to create common understandings.

For example, teen police academies are offered by the various precincts as a means to inform and educate local teenagers about law enforcement and the justice system. Course outlines have been developed for each session and tailored to the age or interests of the group. Teen groups receive information about how police departments operate and the role of specialized units, focusing on issues by which youth are most often confronted, resistance strategies, problem resolution, etc.

Action taken by site. In Jennings, the SLCPD is operating a teen citizen police academy, which has been very well received by youth and families in 2014–2015. The Jennings precinct works in partnership with the Jennings School District, with the superintendent and parents all actively involved with the youth program.

Recommendation 12.5.3

The St. Louis CMPA should consider having youth participate in the community engagement training for academy recruits.

This would entail having a panel discussion with youth focused on youth culture and perceptions of police. It would serve to foster dialogue between new officers and youth in communities where officers will be potentially working.

Recommendation 12.5.4

The SLCPD should consider partnering with county schools, faith- and community-based organizations, and other community stakeholders to create youth programs (such as Junior Police Academies) free of charge for children ages seven to 14 years.

For example, youth camps could offer various athletic and educational activities for campers throughout a five- or six-week summer program. Members from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and fire departments should be given an opportunity to educate campers about their organizations. They can also

177. At the time of this report writing, the SLCPD reported that the Central County precinct attempted to have their first teen academy in the spring of 2015 but did not receive enough interest; the precinct commander is trying to generate more interest in the program and are planning to have one in the fall of 2015. The SLCPD North County precinct runs a teen academy in conjunction with their explorer program. The Affton Southwest and South County precincts combine resources to conduct a teen academy together. The West County precinct runs a teen academy in conjunction with their explorer program to include youth from the Fenton precinct, Wildwood precinct, and Valley Park detail. These programs operate annually depending on registrants.

178. Jennings was the only precinct to conduct a teen police academy in late 2014 or early 2015.

share important safety tips so campers can feel safer in their neighborhoods and be better prepared to make positive decisions. School resource officers from police departments within the SLCPD and others can serve as mentors to campers and provide a fun, educational summer experience. The SLCPD should also reach out to local colleges and universities with criminal justice programs to provide interns to assist with efforts.

**Recommendation 12.5.5**

The SLCPD should work with the courts, schools, and other social service entities to create a diversion program for youth offenders.

Instead of arresting youth offenders ages 12 through 17, they would be referred to a diversionary program. If they adhere to the guidelines of the diversionary program and successfully complete it, their record would be expunged. Similar (replicable) programs are currently underway in Ferguson\(^\text{180}\) and in Madison County, Illinois.

**Finding 12.6**

**Community trust in the SLCPD is negatively impacted by the enforcement practices of several municipal police departments within St. Louis County.**

The reduced level of trust by those subjected to heavy enforcement practices affects the SLCPD’s ability to develop relations with the community. Although the SLCPD has no legal supervisory authority over municipal police departments not under contract, they do have an obligation to ensure fair and impartial policing throughout the county. They also have an obligation to report agencies they have reason to believe are committing unconstitutional police practices.

**Recommendation 12.6.1**

The SLCPD should take a leadership role in the development of fair and impartial policing practices countywide.

This could be accomplished in many ways including education, training, advising, and taking a public stand against agencies that have a perceived or proven unethical culture of abusing the community. The effort could be led by the CMPA Board of Managers, which is composed of police executives from across the county tasked with coordination and addressing of training issues.\(^\text{181}\)

**Finding 12.7**

**The overall structure of the SLCPD website is difficult to navigate as a user and does not convey clear messages to users.**

**Recommendation 12.7.1**

The website should have a significant redesign to maximize its utility as a public resource.


\(^{181}\) The St. Louis CMPA is a unit of the SLCPD, in the Division of Operational Support. Since the CMPA serves the SLCPD, the municipal departments within St. Louis County, and many departments in the surrounding counties as well, its operations are managed by a Board of Managers made up of command personnel from several area departments. “CMPA Board of Managers,” St. Louis County Government (see note 53).
Recommendation 12.7.2

The website should have the most pertinent information in the top half of the screen.

This option can be achieved by using the current navigation panes in a more effective manner and by adding a top navigation pane. The top navigation should include the sections: About Us, Citizen Satisfaction Survey, Contact Information, Newsroom, and Community Resources.

Recommendation 12.7.3

The community resources section should include information about the Citizens’ Police Academy, neighborhood crime prevention, and Do the Right Thing.

This section should also include videos such as the active shooter video and other YouTube videos. A picture gallery that showcases images of law enforcement interacting with community residents gives citizens a reason to look at the gallery for potential photos of themselves and reinforces positive interactions with law enforcement.

Recommendation 12.7.4

The left navigation pane should be reorganized to include community programs, career information, welfare association, municipal services and contracting, commendations and complaints, and department procedures. The right navigation pane should be about connecting with law enforcement and should include precinct information, social media buttons, crime mapping, and alerts such as National Terror Advisory System and Amber Alerts.

Recommendation 12.7.5

The Resources for Citizens subsections in the left navigation pane should be part of the main text on that page.

The current subsections on the left navigation pane should be displayed in the main text of the Resources for Citizens page and then made into subnavigation pages to allow the user to access information about each specific resource.

Finding 12.8

The SLCPD website requires visitors to click too many times to find information.

A user wants to get to the information they need within one or two clicks of the mouse. In several places, a user has to click a number of times to access the necessary information. For example, when a user clicks on the media resources in the left column she gets two additional clickable options.

Recommendation 12.8.1

The initial click on any page should take the user directly to the information he or she needs.

The page should include subnavigation that provides suggestions for accessing related information. Staying with the media resources example, the page should take the user to a newsroom page with the press releases, e-mail registration, and specific contacts. If the site employs this structure there is no need for the main text on the page to redirect the user back to the left navigation to access any further information.
Finding 12.9

**Critical community content is not featured prominently on the SLCPD website.**

**Recommendation 12.9.1**

The SLCPD should move the community safety programs and initiatives higher up onto the web page and give the information more prominence.

**Recommendation 12.9.2**

The social media section should serve as a call to action with sections like “Connect with Us.”

The site should incorporate social media in a more efficient and graphic manner. The social media sites have a wealth of good community news and important safety information that does not appear on the website. The department can enhance the right navigation pane by including widgets showing the latest social media posts.

Finding 12.10

**The SLCPD website design is extremely flat and not dynamic.**

It does not feature the best design elements of a website such as pictures, graphics, and other elements such as hover features and responsive (clickable) graphics. The site should be optimized for viewing on tablets and other mobile devices.

**Recommendation 12.10.1**

The SLCPD should use photographs and navigation buttons, such as “Report a Crime,” to make the web page more visually appealing and more user-friendly.

**Recommendation 12.10.2**

The SLCPD should place all crime reporting features in one section on its website.

Currently, the St. Louis Regional CrimeStoppers, St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis County Drug Task Force, and St. Louis County Human Trafficking Task Force are on the bottom of the front page, but the drug activity reporting and human trafficking reporting forms are housed in the left navigation pane. Each of the reporting mechanisms should offer the opportunity to report anonymously if a community resident does not want to give personal information. Some reporting mechanisms note this ability while others do not mention the option to report anonymously.

**Recommendation 12.10.3**

The recruiting and career information section should include currently open positions that are now featured on the right navigation pane.

It is best to keep all like information together in one web section so all material is available to the user in one place.
Recommendation 12.10.4

The SLCPD should review websites from agencies and organizations around the country\(^\text{182}\) that can provide examples of design elements that could better engage the SLCPD’s audience.

The websites below are examples of sites that use design elements effectively to engage their audiences.

**California Highway Patrol.** The website has a nice, clean design with pictures and graphics buttons to draw the user to the site’s information. Notice how it has highlighted the information the user is looking to access and does not clutter its navigation panes. [http://www.chp.ca.gov/index.php](http://www.chp.ca.gov/index.php)

**The Los Angeles Police Department.** The website uses a graphic carousel to highlight the information most pertinent to the department. Unfortunately, the graphics do not allow the user to click to navigate to the section with that information as should be the case. However, the site uses a social media feed as suggested in the recommendations above and does a great job of showing positive law enforcement images through its photo gallery. [http://www.lapdonline.org/](http://www.lapdonline.org/)

**Milwaukee Police Department.** The website uses large photo background effectively. The images are not clickable but are enticing visually and draw a user into the site. It employs a static navigation pane on the right side of the web page and allows the user to scroll continuously down the page to access its other features. [http://www.milwaukeepolicenews.com/#menu=home-page](http://www.milwaukeepolicenews.com/#menu=home-page)

Recommendation 12.10.5

The SLCPD should use the data gathered from the citizen satisfaction survey results to determine the most sought after material on the website.

If that information is not available, restructure the website to place reporting and precinct information at the top of the page. The site could use the carousel technique to showcase the top five most sought-after categories at the top of the page. The carousel is composed of clickable images that take a user directly to the subpages for that material.

Finding 12.11

The SLCPD website’s usability is hampered by many broken links and outdated information.

At the time of this review, the assessment team identified broken links or pages such as that of the Citizen Academy that do not include the information for which a user is looking. For example, the Citizen Academy page does not inform a user about when the academies occur, what is involved, or how long the academy course takes.

Recommendation 12.11.1

The SLCPD should develop a consistent process to review and update website content.

Baseline information should always be readily available to serve the public while considering or adding enhancements.

Recommendation 12.11.2

The SLCPD should update the Citizen Academy page to include information—who, what, when, why, and how—that a user needs to know.

Updates should include highlights and success stories of those citizens who have completed the Citizen Academy on the corresponding pages. Currently, clicking on the Citizen Academy Alumni link does not produce any information. Clicking on the map of the various jurisdictions turns up no additional information either.

Finding 12.12

The citizen satisfaction survey indicates that it is used to identify general trends in citizen satisfaction, but it does not tell a user what happens to the information gathered.

Recommendation 12.12.1

The SLCPD website should include more detail in the description of the citizen satisfaction survey.

Questions to be addressed and posted on the site might be: Is it compiled and distributed in a yearly report? Does the department issue recommendations based on the survey that are available to citizens?

Recommendation 12.12.2

The SLCPD should regularly update the website with the latest statistics compiled from the citizen satisfaction survey and archive them on the survey page.

Recommendation 12.12.3

The SLCPD should develop a chief’s report or document for the website that informs residents of recommendations and activities based on the information gathered from the survey.
Chapter 13. Conclusion and Next Steps

In August 2014, the events that took place in Ferguson, Missouri, changed the landscape of community-police relations both in Missouri and across the nation. The officer-involved shooting of Michael Brown was tragic. It brought the ongoing conversation about race and the police (which had been underway between advocacy, civil rights, academics, youth, and law enforcement communities) into the national spotlight. The St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) has been at the center of this discussion, as its members were on the front lines responding to the civil unrest immediately after the shooting death of Brown. The SLCPD could have achieved better outcomes during its actions in the policing response to the public demonstrations in Ferguson—and its leadership has acknowledged as much.

Since the demonstrations that followed the shooting death of Michael Brown, SLCPD leadership has taken steps to change the department’s orientation toward large public protests. Another such protest took place after the county grand jury’s decision not to file criminal charges in the shooting; even though this second protest was at times violent and many businesses sustained substantial property damage, the police response was noticeably more organized and measured than the response to the first major demonstration in August 2014. Only after a few protesters began throwing rocks and bottles and shooting at police officers did the SLCPD deploy its tactical teams and vehicles.

The tragic shooting in Ferguson and the high profile police use-of-force incidents that have followed in places like New York; North Charleston, South Carolina; San Bernardino County, California; and Baltimore, Maryland, have made elected officials, policing professionals, police executives, and line-level officers pause to seriously reconsider how to best engage communities they served. These events have brought the current way of policing and the future of law enforcement practices in the 21st century into question. Those incidents, in conjunction with the tragic loss of two NYPD officers, have sparked a national conversation about police reform and the role of community policing in our cities and towns. The SLCPD, as part of the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) process, has been an active participant in contemplating the future of policing. Chief Jon Belmar, by virtue of inviting the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) CRI-TA to his department, has helped to signal to other police agencies that reform is necessary. Moreover, the department has started addressing deficiencies noted by Police Foundation (PF) experts when brought to the attention of its leadership.

The men and women of the SLCPD have been fully cooperative in the collaborative reform process. They have been tirelessly willing to respond to requests and have engaged consistently with thoughtfulness and professionalism. We would be remiss if we did not acknowledge that this process and this report would not have been possible without their willingness to open their department to the PF team.

While the SLCPD has been eager to make change throughout the CRI-TA process, there is still more work to be done. The leadership at the SLCPD has an opportunity to redefine the practice of community policing and engagement strategies and redirect training to issues such as community engagement, implicit bias, and using data to drive police practices.
Throughout the CRI-TA process, our goal has been to help position the SLCPD to develop new policy and practices that are fair and transparent to communities served. Our goal is that the SLCPD become a model for those departments striving to change culture and police practice to a focus on problem solving, engagement, and professional policing.

Over the next 12 months, the PF assessment team will work with the SLCPD and the COPS Office to monitor and assist in the implementation of the reforms outlined in this report. The SLCPD’s progress will be published in two monitoring reports. The reforms recommended in this report are intended to create a safer environment for the public and officers. By implementing these reforms, the department will be addressing the host of critical issues facing not only the SLCPD but also the entire police profession.
Appendices

Appendix A. Reference materials consulted by the Police Foundation

Chapter 4. Recruitment and hiring
Open Enrollment Recruit Program St. Louis County & Municipal Police Academy
SLCPD Commissioned Police Officer Requirements
SLCPD Police Officer Recruitment Brochure
SLCPD web page screenshot
General Order 06-69 Neighborhood Policing Committee

Chapter 5. Basic recruit training
St. Louis County & Municipal Police Academy Bylaws
St. Louis County & Municipal Police Academy Police Basic Training Program Curriculum 201
Field Training and Evaluation Program Manual Goals and Objectives: Rules and Procedures
Overtime Work Policy

Chapter 6. Promotions and postpromotional training
General Order 10-44: Promotional Policy
SLCPD Continuing Education Course Catalog 2014

Chapter 8. Responses for handling protests and mass demonstrations
General Order 07-31: Command Response Plan
General Order 11-49: Incident Command System
General Order 11-68: Public Information and News Media Policy
SLCPD Civil Disturbance Quick Reference Guide
The Code 1000 Plan for St. Louis County and Municipal Law Enforcement Agencies
St. Louis County Emergency Operations Plan
Public Information Officer Checklist

General Order 07-81: Citizen Contacts and Traffic Stops Information
Chapter 10. Five-year analysis of use of force incidents, 2009–2013

General Order 10-29: Use of Force


Conduct and Discipline Manual: Rules and Procedures
General Order 04-05: Complaint Review Procedures
General Order 11-71: Guidance Program

Chapter 12. Community Outreach

General Order 05-88: Citizens Police Academy Alumni Association
Law Enforcement Explorer Manual
Teen Leadership Academy
Citizen Survey Card

Appendix B. Detailed review and analysis of traffic stops by precinct data

In addition to the county-wide vehicle stop analysis reported in chapter 9, the assessment team conducted an analysis of the most recent (2014) vehicle stops in all seven precincts and in the city of Jennings, where the St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD) provides contracted law enforcement services. This section provides a descriptive analysis of the stop information to provide a more in-depth precinct level analysis of stops conducted by officers within the seven precincts: 1st—North County, 2nd—Central County, 3rd—Affton Southwest, 4th—South County, 5th—City of Fenton, 6th—City of Wildwood, 7th—West County, as well as the City of Jennings.183

The purpose of examining stops at the precinct level is to assist in identifying potentially dissimilar patterns of stop practices by officers within certain precincts compared to countywide data. The Police Foundation (PF) assessment team used the 2014 data to reflect the current precinct structure of the SLCPD.

As discussed in chapter 9 of this report, lack of observational data prohibits a comprehensive review of traffic stop data for the purpose of determining if a pattern of targeting minority motorists for traffic stops exists. While census data suggest an overrepresentation of Black drivers in the stop data, a more comprehensive assessment using observational benchmarking is necessary.

183. The City of Jennings Police Department was consolidated into the SLCPD in the latter part of March 2011. As such, it is considered a precinct that is responsible for providing police services to the city of Jennings, similar to the 5th (City of Fenton) and 6th (City of Wildwood) precincts.
Analysis of 2014 stops by precinct

Population demographics

Table B1 presents the population demographics for each of the precinct patrol boundaries. The City of Jennings, the 1st Precinct (North County) and the 2nd Precinct (Central County) have the highest concentration of Black residents.

Table B1. Population demographics by precinct, 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>% White</th>
<th>% Black</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td>116,452</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>75.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td>38,136</td>
<td>58.2</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td>75,095</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td>83,839</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td>4,020</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>35,632</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td>59,950</td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td>14,756</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>89.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The population figures used for these analyses are for the entire population of each precinct and not the aged 16+ population used for the county-level analysis.

† Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.

Stop data by precinct

Traffic stop information by precinct, when compared to the racial makeup within some precincts, reaffirms the need to conduct a comprehensive analysis of stop activity within the SLCPD. Table B2 presents the racial composition, by precinct, of drivers stopped in 2014. As stated earlier, there are no observational benchmark data to conduct an accurate assessment of traffic stops for the SLCPD.

Table B2. Racial composition of drivers stopped by precinct, 2014 (N=61,572)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Total stops (all races)</th>
<th>White N (%)</th>
<th>Black N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td>9,356</td>
<td>2,039 (21.8)</td>
<td>7,196 (76.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td>8,752</td>
<td>4,150 (47.4)</td>
<td>4,161 (47.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td>8,245</td>
<td>7,099 (86.1)</td>
<td>872 (10.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td>8,160</td>
<td>7,009 (85.9)</td>
<td>966 (11.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td>1,997</td>
<td>1,861 (93.2)</td>
<td>99 (5.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>6,103</td>
<td>5,788 (94.8)</td>
<td>156 (2.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td>13,663</td>
<td>11,925 (87.3)</td>
<td>1,051 (7.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td>5,296</td>
<td>531 (10.0)</td>
<td>4,703 (88.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The Planning and Analysis Unit provided data codes to represent the precinct. For the present analysis, 13 stops of White drivers and 7 stops of Black drivers had codes that did not represent the precinct definition that was provided and are excluded from the analysis.

† Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.

184. 2010 U.S. Census estimates of precinct-level populations were provided by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.
**Reason for stop**

The initial reasons for traffic stops in each precinct are shown in table B3. The difference between the percentage of Black and White drivers initially stopped for a moving violation was significant in all seven precincts and the city of Jennings. White drivers were more likely to be pulled over because of moving violations than for other violations. Black drivers, on the other hand, were less likely than White drivers to be pulled over for moving violations and, with the exception of the 4th and 5th precincts, were more likely than White drivers to be pulled over for equipment violations.

Moreover, the analysis suggested that Black drivers were stopped at higher rates across all precincts than White drivers for license checks (e.g., expired plates, registration check by officer that license is suspended). Finally, with the exception of the city of Jennings, Black drivers were more likely subject to investigative stops than White drivers. In the city of Jennings, White drivers were stopped at a higher rate (13.2 percent) for investigatory purposes than were Black drivers (10.0 percent). The difference in the percentage was significant.

**Table B3. Percentage of drivers stopped by reason for traffic stop by precinct, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Moving violation—White N (%)</th>
<th>Moving violation—Black N (%)</th>
<th>Equipment violation—White N (%)</th>
<th>Equipment violation—Black N (%)</th>
<th>License check—White N (%)</th>
<th>License check—Black N (%)</th>
<th>Investigative stop—White N (%)</th>
<th>Investigative stop—Black N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td>1,347 (66.1)</td>
<td>2,691 (37.4)</td>
<td>300 (14.7)</td>
<td>1,888 (26.2)</td>
<td>267 (13.1)</td>
<td>2,053 (28.5)</td>
<td>125 (6.1)</td>
<td>564 (7.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 2,039</td>
<td>Black total: 7,796</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td>2,651 (63.9)†</td>
<td>1,406 (33.8)</td>
<td>597 (14.4)</td>
<td>867 (20.8)†</td>
<td>797 (19.2)</td>
<td>1,632 (39.2)</td>
<td>105 (2.5)</td>
<td>256 (6.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 4,130</td>
<td>Black total: 4,161</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td>4,069 (57.3)†</td>
<td>311 (35.7)</td>
<td>1,007 (14.2)</td>
<td>165 (18.9)†</td>
<td>1,751 (24.7)</td>
<td>366 (38.5)†</td>
<td>272 (3.8)</td>
<td>60 (6.9)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 7,099</td>
<td>Black total: 872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td>3,107 (44.4)†</td>
<td>289 (29.9)</td>
<td>1,224 (17.5)</td>
<td>151 (15.6)</td>
<td>2,118 (30.2)</td>
<td>422 (43.7)</td>
<td>560 (8.0)</td>
<td>104 (10.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 7,009</td>
<td>Black total: 966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td>709 (38.1)†</td>
<td>30 (30.3)</td>
<td>476 (25.6)</td>
<td>18 (18.2)</td>
<td>568 (30.5)</td>
<td>40 (40.4)</td>
<td>108 (5.8)</td>
<td>11 (11.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 1,861</td>
<td>Black total: 99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>3,760 (65.0)†</td>
<td>75 (48.1)</td>
<td>580 (10.1)</td>
<td>24 (15.4)†</td>
<td>1,307 (22.6)</td>
<td>49 (31.4)</td>
<td>141 (2.4)</td>
<td>8 (5.1)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 5,788</td>
<td>Black total: 156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td>6,591 (55.3)†</td>
<td>501 (47.7)</td>
<td>1,960 (16.4)</td>
<td>197 (18.7)†</td>
<td>2,991 (25.1)</td>
<td>306 (29.1)</td>
<td>383 (3.2)</td>
<td>47 (4.5)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 11,925</td>
<td>Black total: 1,051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td>226 (42.6)†</td>
<td>1,548 (32.9)</td>
<td>122 (23.0)</td>
<td>1,159 (24.6)</td>
<td>113 (21.3)</td>
<td>1,527 (32.5)</td>
<td>70 (13.2)</td>
<td>469 (10.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 531</td>
<td>Black total: 4,703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.

† p ≤ .001
Searches

The countywide data reports show that Black drivers were searched at higher rates than White drivers. While the precinct findings are similar, in the 1st and 5th precincts there was no significant difference in search rates between Black and White drivers.185

The percentage of drivers subject to searches within each of the precincts and the city of Jennings were used to determine dissimilarities to countywide findings. As was presented in the overall department stop analysis in chapter 9, this includes all types of searches conducted as a result of the stop.

As indicated in table B4, the findings suggest that Black drivers were more likely to be searched as a result of the stop186 than White drivers in the following precincts:

- 6th (Wildwood) precinct, where Black drivers were searched at a 102 percent higher rate than White drivers
- 7th (West County) precinct, where Black drivers were searched at a 78 percent higher rate than White drivers
- 5th (Fenton) precinct, where Black drivers were searched at a 63 percent higher rate than White drivers
- 2nd (Central County) precinct, where Black drivers were searched at a 43 percent higher rate than White drivers
- 4th (South County) precinct, where Black drivers were searched at 46 percent higher rate than White drivers

While the finding that Black drivers are more likely to be searched in five precincts is consistent with the finding for the entire county, the influence of outstanding warrant arrests on searches can be seen at this level of detail. Take, for example, the 6th precinct (City of Wildwood), where the data identify Black drivers as twice as likely to be searched as than White drivers. Taken alone, that finding would be cause for concern; however, when search data are viewed in combination with total arrest (table B6) and contraband discovered (table B5) data, a more holistic view appears.

In addition, the city of Jennings has a predominately Black population, and depending on the location of the stop (e.g., high crime area), and the time of day, as well as the (suspicious) behavior of the driver during the stop, these may be factors that contributed to the higher search rates of White drivers.

185. For the purpose of our assessment, we focused on the following types of searches: consent, inventory, drug/alcohol odor, incident to arrest, plain view contraband, reasonable suspicion-weapon; drug dog alert, and other.
186. The search rate for different racial groups can be directly compared to one another. In the 6th precinct, for example, Black drivers were 1.97 times more likely to be searched than White drivers (8.1/4.1), or in other words, Black drivers were 97% more likely to be searched than White drivers.
Table B4. Percentage of drivers subject to search by precinct, 2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>White drivers stopped</th>
<th>White drivers searched N (%)</th>
<th>Black drivers stopped</th>
<th>Black drivers searched N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td>2,309</td>
<td>217 (10.6)</td>
<td>7,196</td>
<td>818 (11.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>330 (8.0)</td>
<td>4,161</td>
<td>478 (11.5)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td>7,099</td>
<td>845 (11.9)</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>133 (15.3)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td>7,009</td>
<td>635 (9.1)</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>128 (13.2)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>137 (7.4)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>12 (12.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>5,788</td>
<td>221 (3.8)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>12 (7.7)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td>11,925</td>
<td>882 (7.4)</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>139 (13.2)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>148 (27.9)†</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>859 (18.3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.
† p ≤ .001

Contraband

In all but one precinct (5th precinct), White drivers who were searched were more likely to have contraband than Black drivers who were searched. Among the searches conducted in the 5th precinct (City of Fenton), Black drivers were more likely to have a finding of contraband than White drivers (see table B5).

Table B5. Percentage of searches that resulted in finding of contraband by precinct, 2014*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>White drivers searched</th>
<th>White drivers with contraband N (%)</th>
<th>Black drivers searched</th>
<th>Black drivers with contraband N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>81 (37.3)†</td>
<td>818</td>
<td>180 (22.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>72 (21.8)†</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>76 (15.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td>845</td>
<td>191 (22.6)†</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>22 (16.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>128 (20.2)†</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>12 (9.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>36 (26.3)†</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5 (41.7)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>59 (26.7)†</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2 (16.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>189 (21.4)†</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>23 (16.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>43 (29.1)†</td>
<td>859</td>
<td>170 (19.8)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.
† p ≤ .001

Arrests

Black drivers were more likely to be arrested as a result of a traffic stop in each precinct than White drivers. However, the differences in the arrest rate of Black drivers who have been stopped by the police is consistent with the results found in national estimates and with research on vehicle stops conducted in the state of Missouri.187 Overall, in each precinct, the majority of drivers were arrested on outstanding warrants.

The analysis of arrests made by precinct suggests that there were significant differences in the percentage of drivers arrested, as shown in table B6. The exceptions are the 5th precinct (City of Fenton) and the city of Jennings, where there were no significant differences in the percentage of drivers arrested. It should also be noted that the higher search rate of Black drivers might be a contributing factor in the differential arrest rate for Black drivers.

**Table B6. Arrests as a percentage of traffic stops by race per precinct, 2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>White drivers stopped</th>
<th>White drivers arrested N (%)</th>
<th>Black drivers stopped</th>
<th>Black drivers arrested N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td>2,309</td>
<td>80 (3.9)</td>
<td>7,196</td>
<td>417 (5.8)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td>4,150</td>
<td>117 (2.8)</td>
<td>4,161</td>
<td>214 (5.1)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td>7,099</td>
<td>316 (4.5)</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>56 (6.4)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td>7,009</td>
<td>333 (4.8)</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>84 (8.7)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td>1,861</td>
<td>76 (4.1)</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>8 (8.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td>5,788</td>
<td>111 (1.9)</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>12 (7.7)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td>11,925</td>
<td>398 (3.3)</td>
<td>1,051</td>
<td>79 (7.5)†</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>67 (12.6)</td>
<td>4,703</td>
<td>628 (13.4)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.
† p ≤ .001

Based on information contained within the Motor Vehicle Stops annual reports, the most common reason for an arrest was an outstanding warrant, and this pattern was reproduced within each precinct. For example, in the city of Jennings, 71.4 percent of drivers arrested were arrested on outstanding warrants. It is unclear whether the differences found in the city of Jennings reflect corresponding differences in the racial composition of the city residents, the distribution in outstanding warrants, or a combination of the two.

**Outcome of stop**

Citations were issued to drivers for moving violations, equipment violations, or suspended or expired licenses. The percentages of drivers who were issued citations as a result of traffic stops are presented in table B7. In the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 7th precincts, White drivers who were stopped were more likely to be issued citations than Black drivers who were stopped, but the difference was significant only in the 6th and 7th precincts. In the 1st and 4th precincts and the city of Jennings, Black drivers who were stopped were more likely to be issued citations than White drivers who were stopped, but the difference was significant only in the 1st and 4th precincts.
### Table B7. Driver outcomes other than arrest by precinct, 2014*†

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Precinct</th>
<th>Citations—White N (%)</th>
<th>Citations—Black N (%)</th>
<th>Warnings—White N (%)</th>
<th>Warnings—Black N (%)</th>
<th>No action—White N (%)</th>
<th>No action—Black N (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st—North County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 2,039</td>
<td>1,429 (70.1)</td>
<td>5,286 (73.5)i</td>
<td>443 (21.7)</td>
<td>2,161 (30.0)i</td>
<td>320 (15.7)i</td>
<td>521 (7.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 7,196</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd—Central County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 4,150</td>
<td>2,923 (70.4)</td>
<td>2,866 (68.9)</td>
<td>1,293 (31.2)</td>
<td>1,310 (31.5)</td>
<td>102 (2.5)</td>
<td>171 (4.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 4,161</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd—Affton SW</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 7,099</td>
<td>4,670 (65.8)</td>
<td>539 (61.8)</td>
<td>2,178 (30.7)</td>
<td>255 (29.2)</td>
<td>536 (7.6)</td>
<td>130 (14.9)i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 872</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th—South County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 7,009</td>
<td>3,950 (65.4)</td>
<td>607 (62.8)i</td>
<td>2,695 (38.5)</td>
<td>329 (34.1)</td>
<td>646 (9.2)</td>
<td>78 (8.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 966</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th—City of Fenton</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 1,861</td>
<td>1,280 (68.8)</td>
<td>77 (77.8)</td>
<td>511 (27.5)</td>
<td>19 (19.2)</td>
<td>108 (5.8)</td>
<td>5 (5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 99</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th—City of Wildwood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 5,788</td>
<td>4,516 (78.0)i</td>
<td>105 (67.3)</td>
<td>1,100 (19.0)</td>
<td>47 (30.1)</td>
<td>192 (3.3)</td>
<td>8 (5.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th—West County</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 11,925</td>
<td>7,150 (60.0)i</td>
<td>564 (53.7)</td>
<td>4,628 (38.8)</td>
<td>432 (41.1)</td>
<td>683 (5.7)</td>
<td>99 (9.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 1,051</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Jennings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White total: 531</td>
<td>339 (63.8)</td>
<td>3,138 (66.7)</td>
<td>135 (25.4)</td>
<td>1,317 (28.0)</td>
<td>96 (18.1)i</td>
<td>439 (9.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black total: 4,703</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data supplied by John Wall (sergeant, SLCPD), pers. comm. with Edwin Hamilton (research manager, Police Foundation), March 18, 2015.

† Some stops result in more than one outcome (for example, a driver may be cited for running a red light and arrested on an outstanding warrant in the same traffic stop; see figure B1). Therefore, the total number of outcomes per racial group in this table added to the total number of arrests per racial group (table B6) will exceed the total number of stops for each precinct.

‡ p ≤ .001
Figure B1. Sample traffic stop form

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>MM DD YY</th>
<th>TIME</th>
<th>AM/PM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. **VIOLATION RESULTING IN STOP** (✔ all that apply)
   - MOVING
   - EQUIPMENT
   - LICENSE
   - INVESTIGATIVE

   If a “moving” violation, (✔ category of violation)
   - SPEED
   - LANE VIOLATION
   - FOLLOW TOO CLOSE
   - CVE
   - FAIL TO SIGNAL
   - OTHER MOVING VIOLATION

2. **RESULT OF STOP** (✔ all that apply)
   - CITATION
   - WARNING
   - NO ACTION
   - OTHER

3. **DRIVER’S RACE/MINORITY STATUS** (based only on visual observation)
   - WHITE
   - BLACK/AFRICAN-AMERICAN
   - HISPANIC/LATINO
   - AMERICAN INDIAN/ALASKA NATIVE
   - ASIAN
   - OTHER/UNKNOWN

4. **DRIVER’S AGE**
   - UNDER 18
   - 18-29
   - 30-39
   - 40+

5. **DRIVER’S GENDER**
   - MALE
   - FEMALE

6. **LOCATION OF STOP**
   - INTERSTATE HIGHWAY
   - U.S. HIGHWAY
   - STATE HIGHWAY
   - COUNTY ROAD
   - CITY STREET
   - OTHER

7. **WAS A SEARCH INITIATED?**
   - YES
   - NO

   If YES, probable cause/authority for search (✔ all that apply)
   - CONSENT
   - INVENTORY
   - DRUG/ALCOHOL ODOR
   - INCIDENT TO ARREST
   - PLAIN VIEW CONTRABAND
   - OTHER
   - DRUG DOG ALERT
   - REASONABLE SUSPICION-WEAPON (TERRY STOP)

8. **WHAT WAS SEARCHED?**
   - DRIVER ONLY
   - PROPERTY ONLY
   - DRIVER AND PROPERTY

9. **DURATION OF SEARCH**
   - 0-15 MINUTES
   - 16-30 MIN.
   - 31+ MIN.

10. **WAS CONTRABAND DISCOVERED?**
    - YES
    - NO

    If YES, type of contraband (✔ all that apply)
    - DRUGS/ALCOHOL/PARAPHERNALIA
    - CURRENCY
    - WEAPON
    - STOLEN PROPERTY
    - OTHER

11. **WAS DRIVER ARRESTED?**
    - YES
    - NO

12. **IF ARREST MADE, CRIME/VIOLATION ALLEGED** (✔ all that apply)
    - OUTSTANDING WARRANT
    - OFFENSE AGAINST PERSON
    - RESISTING ARREST
    - DRUG VIOLATION
    - DWIBAC
    - PROPERTY CRIME
    - TRAFFIC VIOLATION
    - OTHER

Source: St. Louis County Police Department
Appendix C. Traffic stops chart

Motor vehicle stop
Stop initiated for traffic violation OR crime (robbery, etc.)

Warning, ticket, arrest, field interview report (FIR)

Traffic stop report (TSR) completed
- Electronic or paper
- Officer records TSR number on daily activity sheet

Planning and analysis
- Monthly report compiled of stops by race and precinct
- Quarterly reports by precinct including all officers
- Yearly traffic report distributed to Missouri attorney general

Division commander review
- Distributes quarterly reports to precinct, bureau, and unit commanders

Precinct, bureau, and unit commander review
- Commanders produce a findings report/review to the division commander

Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS)
- Officers identified in reports are recommended for counseling and/or training
- If complaint initiated internally, BPS begins formal review
Appendix D. Deadly use of force chart

Deadly use of force (UOF)
(death or wound inflicted)

On-duty supervisor responds to scene
- Ensures medical aid to suspect(s) and officer(s)
- Secures crime scene
- Identifies witnesses
- Notifies Crimes Against Persons
- Original crime report is completed by officer

Crimes Against Persons unit
- Crime Scene Unit conducts investigation
- Crimes Against Persons supervisor completes use of force (UOF) (Blue Team) report

Crimes Against Persons commander review
Case report and UOF (Blue Team) report

DCI division commander review
Case report and UOF (Blue Team) report

Prosecutor review
- Reviews case file
- Provides disposition or charge (justified or crime)

DCI division commander review
Case report, UOF (Blue Team) report, and prosecutor report

Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS) review
- Justified force is forwarded to deputy chief
- Policy violation initiates formal BPS investigation process

Deputy chief review

Chief of police review

Board of Police Commissioners review

Chief of police final review

BPS review
BPS notifies officer(s) of final disposition
Appendix E. Nondeadly use of force chart

Non-deadly use of force (UOF) (includes use of deadly force where suspect was not wounded)

On-duty supervisor responds to scene
- Interviews suspect
- Canvasses area for witnesses
- Interviews officer(s) that used force
  *if policy violation determined, supervisor initiates Bureau of Professional Standards (BPS) complaint
  *if UOF was criminal, Bureau of Crimes Against Persons notified

Supervisor completes use of force (UOF) (Blue Team) report
- Original report is completed and attached

Precinct unit commander review

Division commander review

BPS review

Deputy chief review

Chief of police review

BPS review
BPS notifies officer(s) of final disposition

Monthly departmental UOF summary is presented to the chief, command staff, and Board of Police Commissioners.
Yearly UOF report is published in the department annual report available online and in print.
Appendix F. Findings and recommendations

Finding 4.1

The SLCPD does not represent the diversity of the population it serves.

Compared to the population of St. Louis County, Blacks are significantly underrepresented in the commissioned ranks of police officer and police sergeant, and while the SLCPD has made efforts to increase minority representation in the command ranks the department remains moderately under representative of the community in the ranks of lieutenant and captain.

Women are also underrepresented in all ranks of the department. Currently, of the 13 SLCPD captains, only one is female. In addition, the department has only three female, in comparison to 26 male, lieutenants. The assessment team also noted the lack of inclusion of female leadership in all executive-level meetings between the assessment team and the SLCPD.

Recommendation 4.1.1

The SLCPD should develop a strategic plan for officer recruitment, focused on race and gender diversity, to include attention to recruiting, promotion, and retention of minorities and women.

Addressing underrepresentation begins with recruiting. The SLCPD should conduct a scan of organizations that have successfully overcome recruiting barriers and develop a plan with goals, objectives, and outcome measures. This plan should be articulated to the rank-and-file officers and reviewed annually to respond to any changing demographics in the metropolitan area.

The SLCPD should create education and training events that assist applicants or those considering becoming applicants in understanding hiring and application requirements, areas of concern during the background process, and common mistakes made by applicants.

In addition, the training program should provide potential applicants with sample written exams and exposure to the fitness test to better prepare them for the application process.

Recommendation 4.1.2

The SLCPD should create a community recruiter program that identifies and trains community leaders to serve as SLCPD recruiters.

Community recruiter training should include education on the hiring process, common candidate exclusions such as felony convictions, resources available to candidates that could improve success, and mentoring skills training so that the community recruiter can support the candidate throughout the hiring process.

Recommendation 4.1.3

The SLCPD should track and publicly report, at least annually, demographic information of current employees, employees who have left the organization, and applicants who have applied to the department.

Reporting for current employees should include rank and areas of assignment. For individuals who left the department, the reason for leaving should be noted. For applicants, the status as identified in table 6 should be included.
Recommendation 4.1.4
The SLCPD should consider creating a diversity council representing gender, ethnic, racial, LGBT, and linguistic minorities to serve as advisors and champions for the chief and SLCPD command staff to support recruitment efforts focused on youth, newcomer populations, and gender diversity.

Recommendation 4.1.5
The SLCPD should create a youth advisory council representing youth from schools throughout the county who will serve as advisors to the chief and command staff on ways to engage the community’s youth and on potential barriers to recruiting St. Louis youth into policing.

The council should involve youth in the police department, fostering relationships with officers and executive staff and exposing them to the work of the department. It will also provide department staff with the opportunity to create relationships with future leaders of the community.

Recommendation 4.1.6
The SLCPD should conduct an in-depth review of its hiring process, including the examinations it uses, to determine whether any step in the process has an adverse impact against any group of applicants and, if so, whether the process is valid and whether there are alternative selection procedures that could meet the county’s needs but have less disparate impact.

Finding 4.2
The SLCPD recruiting process has not been able to consistently translate existing relationships with high school students and youth programs into employment opportunities.

Relationships developed between department personnel and St. Louis youth offer opportunities for recruitment of diverse populations with strong ties to the community. Often, these meaningful relationships begin with St. Louis County students and their school resource officers (SRO). Unfortunately, many of those employment opportunities are lost when youth graduate from high school and either go to college or enter the job market without the ability to remain connected to law enforcement career opportunities.

Recommendation 4.2.1
The county of St. Louis should identify and create job classifications that allow for entry level employment in the police department designed for individuals who desire a career as a police officer but who do not meet age or college requirements.

For more than 40 years, law enforcement agencies across the country have used police cadet or community service officer job classifications to successfully diversify organizations without sacrificing employment or education standards. Employing youth from within the community strengthens community police relationships and keeps local jobs local.

Many community services officer (CSO)/cadet programs require employees to go to college while working part time at the police department during the school year and full time while on school breaks. The employee would also attend the academy and earn college credits that would apply toward minimum requirements. All of this can be accomplished before the potential applicant meets the minimum age requirement.
Recommendation 4.2.2

Job duties of cadets or community service officers should prepare them for the job of police officer while also reducing the workload of existing officers to allow for more time for engagement in community activities and problem solving.

Duties performed may include nonenforcement functions such as completing crime and accident reports, interviewing witnesses, augmenting neighborhood policing functions, assisting at major crime scenes, or any other non-enforcement function the employee can be or has been trained to perform.

Recommendation 4.2.3

SROs, neighborhood police officers, and other employees whose jobs require high levels of youth contact and community engagement should be trained and evaluated on recruitment techniques so that they are proficient in recruiting efforts.

The recruitment officer should not be the only department staff member to shoulder the entire recruiting responsibility. The job should be divided between all who have the ability to be role models and mentors and to coach youth.

Finding 4.3

The SLCPD website employment link does not inspire viewers to engage, volunteer, or join the department.

The academy site link lacks similar attributes. The Academy Challenge video describes the hiring process and academic challenges appropriately. However, the video is heavily influenced by the use of force and officer safety curriculum. While the latter are important to the safety of officers, the uninformed viewer may perceive the video as representing the primary work officers do in the community.

Recommendation 4.3.1

The SLCPD should redesign its website to interactively engage viewers.

The site not only should serve as a method of informing the audience but also should showcase the department to the community. The department should devote at least one page on the website to recruitment. The page should illustrate the tenets of community policing such as service, volunteerism, and community problem solving to engage potential applicants to the SLCPD. Videos that allow the viewer to experience the daily work of a patrol officer, dispatcher, forensics staff member, SRO, or detective should also be posted. The SLCPD should use the video to highlight the actual work done on a daily basis to make the community a safe place to live, work, and play. The video should not focus on tactical operations of the department; this is a mistake made by many departments across the country.

Finding 4.4

The SLCPD recruitment unit is insufficiently staffed.

It is composed of one officer assigned to the personnel division. This staffing level is insufficient to accomplish the recruitment tasks necessary to identify and select the best officer candidates and to reach desired diversity levels. While the SLCPD is making sincere efforts to diversify the ranks of officers, traditional diversity recruitment efforts with existing staffing levels are not meeting community or department expectations.
Recommendation 4.4.1

The SLCPD should increase staffing levels to support the important job of new officer recruitment.

Finding 4.5

The SLCPD automated system does not allow for in-depth analysis of the hiring process.

Recommendation 4.5.1

The SLCPD should maintain an automated system that tracks applicants through the entire recruitment and hiring process, allowing for real-time access to individual applicant information and for a review of the selection process.

Such a system would allow background investigators and supervisors to identify potential issues with individual applicants and would also allow managers to identify successes or potential flaws in the process.

Finding 5.1

The St. Louis CMPA provides insufficient training hours devoted to community engagement, diversity, and community policing elements during SLCPD basic recruit training. Of the 916 hours of basic recruit training, only 14 hours are devoted to these topics.

Recommendation 5.1.1

The SLCPD should include fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development in the basic academy curriculum.

The foundation of recruit training should be modified to include courses on policing history and professionalism, community policing, and community engagement strategies. They should include case studies on effective alternative policing programs that lead to increased trust by the community. Community oriented policing and community engagement training should be expanded and enhanced. Training should also expand focus on social service agency referrals for citizens who have a need.

Finding 5.2

The CMPA does not sufficiently use experts in the area of cultural diversity.

Most CMPA trainers do not have the expertise necessary to teach officers about cultural diversity, youth issues, and newcomer populations; nor does the SLCPD regularly engage youth or diverse populations as part of the standard recruit training program (or in-service or postpromotional training).

Recommendation 5.2.1

The SLCPD should invite university instructors and members of community-based organizations and other subject matter experts in cultural diversity, youth issues, and newcomer populations to serve as guest lecturers. Instructors who are identified as subject matter experts on cultural diversity should have a curriculum vitae (CV) that reflects the necessary expertise.

The St. Louis CMPA has invited speakers from community service organizations such as the Alzheimer’s Association, Deaf Interlink, and the Anti-Defamation League. But they should also invite guest lecturers who actually represent local community populations to complement the CMPA instructors to enhance the recruit experience and understanding of community diversity. This will also involve the community in the police department.
Finding 5.3

The CMPA trains recruits for a large number of law enforcement agencies with disparate policies and procedures, which creates complexity and added challenges with regard to teaching best practices.

The variety of agency recruits attending the academy requires CMPA instructors to be knowledgeable in the policies for each agency and in certain courses, such as pursuit and use of force reporting, to create separate blocks of instruction unique to the agency recruit(s). The additional workload combined with disparities in department policies and requirements affects continuity of instruction.

**Recommendation 5.3.1**

The SLCPD should collaborate with the municipal departments trained by the St. Louis CMPA to streamline pursuit, use of force, and other policies to promote uniformity and to prevent instructors from having to teach to the differences in policies and procedures in each individual department.

**Recommendation 5.3.2**

The SLCPD should take a leadership role in collaborating with municipal agencies in St. Louis County to attempt to gain consensus on semiannual, countywide, standardized training on police legitimacy, fair and impartial policing, procedural justice, and building community trust.

These classes should be facilitated by the SLCPD acting in its capacity as a regional police training provider and using subject matter experts in the identified curriculum.

Finding 5.4

Based on interviews with instructional staff, instructors at the CMPA are not subject matter experts in areas such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

The majority of academy instructors are assigned full time and are experts in their assigned areas. However, impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development are key principles that should be woven into nearly every course of instruction. All instructors should be knowledgeable in these principles and their application.

**Recommendation 5.4.1**

All instructors authorized to teach at the St. Louis CMPA should complete train-the-trainer or similar courses in the areas of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

**Recommendation 5.4.2**

St. Louis CMPA curricula should be modified to create themes relating to police legitimacy, procedural justice, fair and impartial policing, community policing, and building community trust that can be woven into all academy classes.

All instructors should, where appropriate, attempt to weave these themes through all instructional material. Appropriate evaluation instruments beyond written exams should be used to measure application of the instruction.
Finding 5.5

Many FTIs are unfamiliar with and unqualified to train on the latest trends in contemporary police practices such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

Based on the assessment team’s ride-alongs, interviews, focus groups, and review of general department training, the team determined that not all FTIs were familiar with and qualified to train on the latest trends in policing practices.

**Recommendation 5.5.1**

The SLCPD should provide periodic in-service instructor training to FTIs that will prepare them to train probationary officers on current patrol practices to keep up with new or changing policing trends and state and local laws. Instruction should weave themes of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development throughout all courses.

**Recommendation 5.5.2**

The SLCPD should require FTIs to be qualified trainers in critical courses of instruction such as fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

**Recommendation 5.5.3**

As part of a regular review process, FTIs should be evaluated on their instruction in and daily application of fair and impartial policing, community engagement, and partnership development.

Finding 6.1

SLCPD personnel with TAC/SWAT experience are selected for promotion at significantly higher rates than those without.

**Recommendation 6.1.1**

The SLCPD should conduct an in-depth review of its promotional procedures to determine the impacts of those procedures and their validity and to determine whether there are alternative promotional procedures that could meet the County’s needs but have less disparate impact on any group of applicants.

**Recommendation 6.1.2**

The SLCPD should review informal and formal reward systems to recognize and promote an increased emphasis on community engagement, problem-solving experience, and trust building with the community. Successes in these areas should be given prominent consideration for assignments and promotion.

**Recommendation 6.1.3**

The department should consider adding performance evaluation measures to the existing performance evaluation “neighborhood policing” category, focusing on community engagement, group problem solving, team building, and trust development.
Finding 7.1

The SLCPD does not require sufficient mandated in-service training that addresses community engagement or community policing.

The in-service training program currently provides the state-required racial profiling information, legal updates, and programs that address current issues such as use (and misuse) of social media. If an officer is interested in any community policing training, they must take a related course provided by the CMPA through continuing education or seek an outside provider.

Recommendation 7.1.1

The SLCPD should modify its in-service training to adequately address community policing, problem-oriented policing, and the historical impact on police-community relations.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing encourages law enforcement agencies to find ways to acknowledge the role of policing in past and present injustice and discrimination and how it is a hurdle to the promotion of community trust. Providing training that educates new officers on these issues is a starting point.

Finding 8.1

While SLCPD officers understand NIMS terms and most concepts, they lack organization-wide understanding, experience, and proper application of NIMS.

The SLCPD has not fully implemented key concepts of NIMS command and management, including ICS, multiagency coordination systems, and public information. Department General Order (GO) 11-49 identifies the purpose, policy, and procedure for implementation of ICS and also includes training requirements as prescribed in NIMS, yet many employees do not understand NIMS.

Recommendation 8.1.1

While requirements mandate law enforcement training in NIMS and ICS, the SLCPD should require that supervisors and incident commanders with actual experience be available to respond to requests for assistance during incidents of civil disorder.

Recommendation 8.1.2

The SLCPD should require that ICS, including standardized ICS forms, be used during planned special events such as parades, presidential visits, large-scale gatherings, and sporting events.

This will provide opportunities to implement and practice protocols so that they are better deployed during response to events that develop rapidly. In addition, by policy, training, and practice, NIMS should be a day-to-day operational norm for the SLCPD. For example, search warrants should use command and management including an ICS structure and, when appropriate, multiagency coordination and public information.
**Recommendation 8.1.3**

The SLCPD incident commander should be required to ensure that a comprehensive incident action plan (IAP) is completed as described in NIMS and that any officer who responds to a mutual aid request is well informed of the IAP, including rules of engagement and disengagement and use of force policies.

Senior staff should verify dissemination and understanding of this information by those on the front lines.

**Recommendation 8.1.4**

The SLCPD should develop a policy that details the deployment of CDRTs.

The policy should address the other recommendations and concerns noted in this section.

**Recommendation 8.1.5**

The SLCPD should continue to regularly train and exercise with all potential mutual aid responders.

**Recommendation 8.1.6**

Department GO 11-49 should be revised to include appropriate recommendations identified in this report.

**Finding 8.2**

In August of 2014, the SLCPD had difficulty anticipating the extent of concern from communities it does not usually police and therefore did not properly plan for potential resulting protests.

By not identifying the potential for large-scale violent protests, officers reacted to problems instead of taking a proactive approach to preventing them. While this improved following the incidents in August, additional attention is required.

**Recommendation 8.2.1**

The SLCPD should include community leaders in the response planning process and inform and educate the public about potential police response plans.

**Recommendation 8.2.2**

As authorized by law, the SLCPD should use social media monitoring programs along with community source(s) development to encourage and enhance real-time actionable intelligence on issues emerging in the community.

**Recommendation 8.2.3**

The SLCPD should use social media to engage the community and protesters before, during, and after events to disseminate accurate information and correct erroneous information.
Finding 8.3

A civil disorder response that includes mutual aid resources (Code 1000) was difficult to manage because the experience, training, and professionalism of the officers varied so greatly among the many police departments in St. Louis County.

**Recommendation 8.3.1**

To establish a shared philosophy and set minimum standards, the SLCPD should take a leadership role in the review and revision of the Code 1000 response protocols that includes addressing unrequested self-deployment; competing department policies and procedures; equipment deployment and conflicting tactics, supervisor experience, and officer training.

Agencies that do not participate in or that fail to comply with revised Code 1000 guidelines should be removed from participation in the Code 1000 system. If revisions do not meet the standards of the SLCPD, the department should discontinue participating with agencies that do not meet their standards.

**Recommendation 8.3.2**

To reduce reliance on mutual aid for civil disobedience, the SLCPD should consider using allied agency personnel to respond to dispatched calls for service and temporarily modify dispatch priorities to increase the number of SLCPD personnel available for mass demonstrations, thereby improving consistency, accountability, and command and control.

Finding 8.4

SLCPD CDRT training manuals do not emphasize alternative approaches to managing a public disorder event beyond line movements and formations.

**Recommendation 8.4.1**

SLCPD CDRT training should be modified to present a balanced response to civil disorder that includes proper responses when tactical teams are deployed. Training should also include ways to prevent, mitigate, and de-escalate disorder events.

The importance of de-escalating during a tactical response must be emphasized. The 2011 Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) Critical Issues in Policing Series issue entitled “Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field” provides best practices and examples from the field of events in which this type of approach has been successful.
Finding 8.5

The SLCPD does not have policies that ensure that they always exhaust other de-escalation options before using tactical responses to disorder and protests.

Recommendation 8.5.1

SLCPD policy should require that officers familiar with the area and the community deploy before tactical teams.

As they did in November 2014, the SLCPD should continue to assign officers who are skilled at community engagement to the front lines as situations develop. This recommendation in conjunction with the tiered approach in finding 8.4 reduces the overreliance on a tactical response by the SLCPD.

The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommends implementing policies that “address procedures for implementing a layered response to mass demonstrations that prioritize de-escalation and guardian mindset.”

Finding 8.6

The SLCPD, as well as mutual aid departments, deployed rifles and administered tear gas inappropriately.

This practice resulted in officers with long guns on the front lines and the deployment of tear gas without proper documentation or sufficient warning, contrary to the CDRT training.

Recommendation 8.6.1

Written departmental policy should ensure that the deployment of long guns, less lethal shotguns, and chemical munitions is consistent with the incident action plan (IAP).

Recommendation 8.6.2

The SLCPD should prohibit, by policy, the use of “overwatch” for crowd management and mass demonstration incidents.

“Overwatch” is a force protection tactic that is inappropriate for crowd management and mass demonstrations.

Recommendation 8.6.3

Because deployment of tear gas is highly controversial, written department policy must clearly state that absent exigent circumstances, the deployment should occur only with approval of the incident commander.

Recommendation 8.6.4

Written department policy should require that the justification for the use of gas be recorded on video and documented in the appropriate police report.

Recommendation 8.6.5

Written department policy should require that public announcements and warnings regarding the use of gas be made allowing time for the crowd to orderly disperse.
Finding 8.7
**Department GO 02-43 authorizes the use of a canine for crowd control at the discretion of the handler.**

The use of canines for crowd control is not consistent with accepted police practice.

*Recommendation 8.7.1*

The SLCPD should revise GO 02-43 to prohibit the use of a canine strictly for crowd control.

Finding 8.8
**The SLCPD lacks documented comprehensive training in the psychology of crowds and de-escalation.**

For example, front line officers wearing riot helmets and protective gear can inadvertently incite crowds resulting in increases in disorder and the level of protests. Tense situations can often be resolved by police withdrawal from the area while escalation can result in use of force by both sides. St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy (CMPA) instructors articulated that CDRT training included de-escalation strategies in addition to recognizing that the media and others in the crowd will record all actions. Academy staff confirmed that training also addressed the psychological aspects of crowd management strategies. However, when reviewing the lesson plans and PowerPoint presentations for the course, the assessment team noted that they lacked these areas of instruction.

*Recommendation 8.8.1*

The SLCPD should provide training based on best practices for crowd management issues, including the psychology of crowds, to improve frontline supervisors’ and officers’ decision making.

Trainers from outside the department should be considered to assist with delivery of a diverse curriculum.

*Recommendation 8.8.2*

The SLCPD should provide training that stresses the safe withdrawal of officers from the scene as soon as the situation allows it as a means to decrease tensions during protests.

Finding 8.9
**SLCPD supervisors lacked clear direction in crowd management during civil disturbance events.**

Supervisors were assigned a number of responsibilities during civil disorder events, mostly to ensure proper squad movement and tactics. They were also tasked with ensuring that use of force was documented and arrest paperwork was thorough. There is no mention in the CDRT training of supervisors’ obligation to engage and work with protesters during an event to mitigate the impact of law enforcement on the protest.

*Recommendation 8.9.1*

The SLCPD should supplement requirements and training to require supervisors to participate in crowd engagement during civil disturbance events.

Training should be provided that demonstrates de-escalation strategies and effective communication techniques for supervisors to engage crowd members and the media during protests. It is important that front line supervisors see their roles as responsible not only for the proper deployment of squads but also for facilitating protest response in an effective manner.
Finding 8.10

SLCPD supervisors lack personnel management training that includes monitoring the well-being of personnel during chaotic emotional events.

High stress events such as these sometimes require an officer to step off the skirmish line for a few moments to ensure that they remain professional in the midst of insults, threats to family members, or taunts by protesters. While the need for supervisors to monitor the well-being of personnel during incidents was covered in basic instruction immediately preceding deployment to the line, it is not included in training curriculum.

Recommendation 8.10.1

The SLCPD should train supervisors in warning signs including verbal cues and body language that their personnel are under severe stress and in need of relief from the line.

A periodic check of the officers’ well-being should be part of any deployment response.

Finding 8.11

During interactions with assessment team members, SLCPD personnel still exhibited signs of stress based on their experiences in 2014.

Recommendation 8.11.1

The SLCPD should evaluate the employee assistance program, peer support program, and chaplaincy to ensure that adequate resources, personnel, and access are available for employees.

Recommendation 8.11.2

The SLCPD should provide necessary resources for employees to reduce potential victimization from doxxing, identity fraud, and threats.

During the mass protests in 2014, officers’ personal information was obtained by protesters and published on the Internet. This can and did lead to doxxing, identity fraud, and threats to officers’ families, whose addresses can often easily be found through an Internet search. Media photos and interviews regarding the handling of the protests reported that officers deployed to the front lines of the protests removed nameplates and badges from their uniforms partly in fear of these potential dangers.

Finding 9.1

While consistent with Missouri data collection law, the traffic stop analysis procedures employed by the SLCPD are inconsistent across the agency and lack the sophistication necessary for appropriate analysis of stop data. This results in a missed opportunity to fully understand if bias-based profiling is occurring.

GO 07-81 clearly describes a review process based on analysis of traffic stop data compared to the population of the jurisdiction served by St. Louis County. The SLCPD has established a threshold requiring the review of an officer’s stop activity if 20 percent or more of the officer’s stops during a three-month period are stops of minority drivers. The assessment team’s review of the SLCPD’s efforts described in GO 07-81 revealed a process that lacks appropriate documentation, is inconsistent between divisions, and lacks a review process that demonstrates an understanding of analysis methods necessary for a comprehensive review of traffic stop data.
Based on preliminary (and imprecise) collection and analysis by the analysis team, the SLCPD’s traffic stop and post-stop activity show a potentially disproportionate impact on Black drivers. While the SLCPD is mandated by state law to collect stop data and the Planning and Analysis Unit does review the information for the identification of officers making stops in excess of the 20 percent threshold, the department needs to ensure that appropriate data are analyzed to identify potential issues of racially biased policing.

**Recommendation 9.1.1**

The SLCPD should conduct a comprehensive and rigorous study of traffic stop practices.

One of the major issues in the analysis of stop data is determining the appropriate benchmark or standard to which the stop data are to be compared. While census-based benchmarks are imperfect benchmark measures, there is no consensus regarding benchmarking best practices. Our analysis of the SLCPD’s stop information showed the potential for disparities with respect to stops, searches, and arrests; however, the findings do not necessarily suggest that officers’ decision making is motivated by bias. The SLCPD should conduct a comprehensive study using a variety of benchmarks to address the perception of racially biased traffic stop practices.

**Recommendation 9.1.2**

The SLCPD should standardize and centralize the review of officer traffic stop data.

The current review process relies on an employee’s supervisor’s review and assessment of individual officers’ stop activity. The reports provided by the SLCPD clearly reveal a lack of consistency in review techniques and reporting.

**Recommendation 9.1.3**

The SLCPD should train all supervisors and executive-level staff who are responsible for the interpretation of stop data in research methods necessary to adequately review and identify potentially biased behavior.

Supervisors must have training including but not limited to fair and impartial policing and procedural justice that allows them to identify potentially biased behavior.

**Recommendation 9.1.4**

The SLCPD should report quarterly the results of reviews conducted in accordance with GO 08-81 to the Board of Police Commissioners.

**Recommendation 9.1.5**

If the SLCPD chooses to conduct a comprehensive analysis of traffic stop data as described in recommendation 9.1.1, GO 07-81 should be revised to replace census data with the benchmark used in the study as the comparison to officer stop data.

**Finding 9.2**

The SLCPD does not collect and analyze information on pedestrian stops made by officers.

**Recommendation 9.2.1**

The SLCPD should collect pedestrian stop data for additional analysis of its stop practices.

The SLCPD should also collect data on pedestrian stops to more thoroughly address the potential issue of racially biased policing. Information from pedestrian stops should include, at a minimum, the race or
ethnicity and gender of the individual(s) stopped, reason for the stop, whether a search was conducted and contraband found, whether an arrest occurred and reason for the arrest, and the location of the stop.

Finding 9.3
The SLCPD traffic stop data collection software does not capture the specific location of traffic stops (either longitude and latitude or address).

This precludes the ability to map stops to determine whether certain areas may have disproportionate stop practices. Having the specific locations of stops would provide the ability to perform geographic mapping or analysis of stops across the county and within each of the precincts.

Recommendation 9.3.1
The SLCPD should take immediate steps to accurately document the locations of traffic and pedestrian stops conducted by its officers.

Recommendation 9.3.2
The SLCPD should use traffic stop location information to assess potential disproportionate stop, search, and enforcement activity.

Finding 9.4
The SLCPD’s GO 07-81, which establishes policies and procedures for citizen contacts and traffic stop information, is outdated.

The policy needs to be modified to reflect current law enforcement practices that provide guidance for avoiding biased policing. The GO has not been revised since 2007 and lacks sufficient guidance for officers on relevant issues of biased policing.

Recommendation 9.4.1
SLCPD executive staff should review and modify the existing GO 07-81.

The revised policy should emphasize the specific purpose of the policy to include commitment to treating all citizens in a fair and equitable manner. Definitions of biased policing and racial profiling should be provided in the policy as well as procedures to be followed when initiating enforcement action (stopping, detaining, searching, etc.) to avoid the perception of bias.

Recommendation 9.4.2
As the SLCPD revises GO 07-81, the SLCPD should ensure that the revised GO is followed by training that mirrors the guidance for officer behavior during encounters, including but not limited to being courteous and professional, providing a reason for the stop, providing the citizen his or her badge number when requested, and offering an explanation if the officer determines that the reasonable suspicion for the stop was unfounded (e.g., investigatory stop).

Research on racially biased policing has consistently found that minority citizens are more likely to suspect that police stops are racially motivated if officers treated them discourteously or did not inform them of the reason for the stop. Focusing on direct and respectful communication between the officer and citizen during encounters will strengthen perceptions of county residents that SLCPD officers exhibit a high degree of professionalism and accountability in conducting duties.
Finding 9.5
Before 2014, beyond the mandated training, the SLCPD did not provide officers with training on implicit bias and fair and impartial policing. Since that time, the SLCPD has made this training available.

The SLCPD provides annual sensitivity training that focuses on the prohibition of racial profiling, the legal aspects of profiling, and respect for racial and cultural differences to all officers who may conduct traffic stops.

Recommendation 9.5.1
The SLCPD should continue to provide implicit bias and fair and impartial policing training for all SLCPD officers.

Currently, the SLCPD engages the St. Louis chapter of the Anti-Defamation League to provide bias-free training through in-service and continuing education efforts. This annual offering focuses on the prohibition against racial profiling, the legal aspects of profiling, and respect for racial and cultural differences to all officers who may conduct traffic stops. The SLCPD should continue to expand mandatory training on implicit bias and fair and impartial policing. The curriculum of the fair and impartial training program should instruct officers on the effect of implicit or unconscious bias that may influence decision making in enforcement actions.

Finding 9.6
The SLCPD currently does not include analyses of stop data in the annual reports provided for the public.

The SLCPD currently publishes annual reports that provide an overview of the administration and operations of the department. Annual reports detail crime statistics, complaints received and dispositions, and use of force statistics that occurred during the specific year and are made available to the public via the department’s website. Reports also serve to increase transparency of the SLCPD’s activities among county residents. Although the SLCPD is required by state law to report vehicle stop data to the Office of the Attorney General, it does not present the submitted data for inclusion in the annual report.

Recommendation 9.6.1
Once improvements have been made to policy and practice governing data collection, benchmarking, and analysis, the SLCPD should include vehicle and pedestrian stop data and analysis with appropriate benchmarking for interpretation in published annual reports.

Care should be taken to ensure that data cannot be misconstrued but are presented in their true and honest form. Providing this information in an easily accessible location (in the annual report, on the department’s website, etc.) will increase transparency, accountability, and dialogue with the public.

Finding 10.1
The SLCPD does not thoroughly investigate the use of deadly force in all situations.

GO 10-29 establishes policies and procedures for use of force that are not consistent with contemporary policing policies. In particular, the general order does not require the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons to investigate the discharge of a firearm by an officer if both (a) it causes no injury to any person and (b) the officer is not the victim of a first-degree assault. The use of deadly force against another person is a serious
event that requires a complete and thorough investigation not only to determine if the use of deadly force was within policy but also, and more important, to determine whether the officer’s actions are authorized by law.

**Recommendation 10.1.1**

The SLCPD should revise GO 10-29 to require the Bureau of Crimes Against Persons to investigate all uses of deadly force by an officer against another person irrespective of injury.

**Finding 10.2**

**The SLCPD has not yet made full use of the IAPro software that was first implemented in 2012.**

Personnel assigned to the BPS need specific training on the IAPro Blue Team system to more accurately and comprehensively report use of force incidents for identifying trends that may be of concern to the SLCPD. Additional training will enable the BPS to report and highlight problem areas that may need to be addressed more thoroughly among use of force incidents.

**Recommendation 10.2.1**

The SLCPD should provide officers assigned to the BPS with Blue Team system training on the proper way to document incidents in a more comprehensive and accurate report format.

While the implementation of the Blue Team software to document use of force incidents will provide more accurate reporting of use of force incidents, training on its use will assist the bureau in the annual collection and analysis of data on use of force incidents.

**Finding 11.1**

**The SLCPD may be unintentionally limiting complaints by not publicizing the acceptance of anonymous complaints and the locations where complaints may be made.**

The SLCPD accepts and investigates all complaints, including those made anonymously. However, the presence of a signature line on the Citizen Complaint Statement (F-332) may intimidate some citizens and discourage them from making a complaint.

**Recommendation 11.1.1**

The SLCPD should review all printed material and its website to reinforce the openness of the complaint process including a listing of all locations where a complaint is accepted and the ability of a citizen to make an anonymous complaint.

**Recommendation 11.1.2**

The SLCPD should remove the signature line on the Citizen Complaint Statement (F-332).

A signature, although not required, appears to be necessary to complete the form. The mere presence of the signature line appears to conflict with the openness of accepting anonymous complaints.
Finding 11.2

The SLCPD currently uses a traditional punitive form of punishment in response to a sustained complaint.

For serious allegations, this comes in the form of reprimands, suspensions, demotions, and termination. This usually results in an adversarial relationship between the employee and department, which may leave employees bitter and not address the cause of the misconduct.

Recommendation 11.2.1

The SLCPD should consider moving to an education-based discipline (EBD) process.

Recommendation 11.2.2

The SLCPD should establish a St. Louis County Police-Community Mediation Program.

The program uses a trained independent party to mediate citizen complaints against police employees. The mediation allows both the employee and the citizen to discuss their issues in a safe and impartial environment. The employee and community member are able to collaborate with each other rather than treat each other as adversaries and to have their complaints dealt with in an efficient manner. The goal is to build more understanding and better relations between the community and the SLCPD.

Finding 11.3

The chief of police only receives the EWS report from the BPS annually, which limits the chief’s awareness and understanding of potential critical issues within the organization.

This notification informs the chief on the nature of the conduct, the intervention, and the outcome. More timely awareness could be helpful in focusing limited training resources in appropriate areas that will positively impact staff.

Recommendation 11.3.1

The SLCPD should provide quarterly reports of staff identified by the EWS to better inform the chief of issues that may affect performance and require additional training of departmental personnel.

There is also value in increasing the frequency of these reports to the chief in order to assist in day-to-day staffing decisions as well as having a strong sense of issues impacting staff performance.

Finding 11.4

During the review of BPS files, the assessment team discovered a pattern of light discipline in investigations involving ethical failings and untruthfulness.

The finding is based on comparing discipline administered in the SLCPD with discipline administered in similar cases identified by project team subject matter experts as well as current discussions regarding integrity in policing.

Recommendation 11.4.1

The SLCPD should establish a disciplinary matrix for officer misconduct to increase consistency.

Particular attention should be placed on allegations of ethical failings and dishonesty.
Finding 11.5
The BPS does not use a consistent and comprehensive format for compiling pertinent information related to citizen complaints against officers.

While the implementation of the IAPro software provides more accurate reporting of complaints and allegations, officers assigned to the BPS do not have comprehensive training on collecting complete information.

Recommendation 11.5.1

Personnel assigned to the BPS should receive specific training on the IAPro system for more consistent and accurate reporting of citizen complaints and for identifying trends that may be of concern to the SLCPD.

The SLCPD should provide system training for officers assigned to the BPS on the proper way to document incidents in a more comprehensive and accurate report format. With the additional training, the BPS will be able to report and highlight problem areas that may need to be addressed more thoroughly among the types of complaints received from citizens.

Recommendation 11.5.2

Supervisors outside of the BPS have access to IAPro and should receive additional training on functionality and use of the system to ensure accurate and timely data collection.

Finding 11.6
The SLCPD uses an inappropriate benchmark in identifying an excessive number of complaints or incidents.

Departmental GO 11-71 section II B reads, “An ‘excessive number’ of complaints or incidents will be determined by comparing the employee’s pattern of behavior to that of employees in similar work environments, past performance evaluation reports, and input from their supervisors.” Using peer behavior as a benchmark is only appropriate if the employees used as a benchmark are model employees. If the employees in a similar work environment are not performing at an acceptable level, the comparison is inappropriate.

Recommendation 11.6.1

The SLCPD should review and revise the definition of excessive number of complaints or incidents as defined in GO 11-71 and any other documents, resources, and trainings using the same definition.

Finding 11.7
Oppressive or rude behavior and excessive force are the majority (a four-year mean of 58.3 percent) of citizen complaints against the SLCPD.

The fair and impartial interaction between the SLCPD and the community is critical to building trust. Opportunities exist for the SLCPD to reduce the number of complaints while building trust with the community.

Recommendation 11.7.1

The SLCPD should complete a comprehensive review of oppressive or rude behavior and excessive force allegations. The review should include community stakeholders to determine causes of complaints and opportunities for reductions.
Finding 12.1
The SLCPD often places more value on technical and tactical proficiency than on investments in community policing such as community engagement and problem solving.

Recommendation 12.1.1
The SLCPD should seek out and identify ways to embed the philosophies of community policing, procedural justice, and equity into the culture of the organization.

For example, include community policing measurements as a component of officer performance evaluations; ensure officers are trained and evaluated on procedural justice during field training; and promote community policing philosophies as problem solving during CompStat processes.

Recommendation 12.1.2
SLCPD command leadership and union representatives should identify ways to incentivize and reward officer performance in community engagement, problem solving, and trust building beyond the standard crime reduction metrics.

Finding 12.2
The SLCPD does not have an explicit policy or documented philosophy to serve as a set of guiding principles for community policing.

The department makes reference to neighborhood policing in public and departmental policies and procedures and has this as one of the key pillars for officer evaluation. A patrol directive exists, but it does not clearly define community policing. Absent a department-wide community policing strategy including regular input from the community, the SLCPD may suffer the perception often applied to police departments who fail to balance enforcement with problem solving. A strong enforcement theme tends to contribute to an action oriented policing culture—an “us against them” mentality. It is essential for local police to form meaningful relationships with the community so they are not viewed as an occupying force that is merely in the community to enforce rules and laws.

Recommendation 12.2.1
SLCPD leadership should conduct a scan of community policing and stakeholder engagement best practices in preparation for defining their community policing strategies.

SLCPD leadership can use the results from the citizen satisfaction survey (which are produced twice annually) to inform their community engagement strategy.

Recommendation 12.2.2
SLCPD leadership should conduct outreach to other jurisdictions that have successfully integrated problem solving, prevention, and intervention strategies as part of their overall response to crime and disorder and reduction in fear of crime.

Recommendation 12.2.3
After the environmental scan, SLCPD leadership, line level officers, and community stakeholders should engage in a strategic planning process to develop a formal community policing strategy, policy, and blueprint for implementation across the SLCPD.
Recommendation 12.2.4

Using this blueprint, the SLCPD should develop a realistic timeline and strategic plan to implement the community policing strategy.

This timeline should incorporate community oriented policing throughout the department and enable every officer on patrol and in other units with public contact to provide community policing services.

Recommendation 12.2.5

The SLCPD should ensure that community policing includes respectful engagement and joint problem solving with members of the community through neighborhood- and block-level partnerships involving adults and youth in the community, through citizen advisory councils, or through expansion of the current neighborhood crime watch program.

Finding 12.3

Current departmental policies and procedures do not allow ample opportunity for officers to meaningfully engage with the community.

Officers are more often than not confined to their patrol cars for entire shifts, placing a physical barrier between them and the public.

Recommendation 12.3.1

The SLCPD should examine and revise patrol deployment, dispatch priorities, alternative methods of service delivery, and staffing levels to identify ways to allow officers more time for community engagement.

For example, the SLCPD could place bicycle racks on the patrol cars and encourage officers to ride the neighborhood on a bicycle as often as staffing and call volume allow. This will provide more opportunities for community engagement for the officer and community members especially near playgrounds and around outdoor community events or gatherings.

Recommendation 12.3.2

The SLCPD should use “park and walks” by all SLCPD officers assigned to field duties.

Allowing officers the opportunity to remove the barrier of a vehicle and communicate with community members is critical in developing relationships and establishing trust between residents and officers. These interactions are designed to be spontaneous, such as officers stopping to play with youth in a playground or talk with a family enjoying a front yard barbecue. However, they can also be deliberate, such as walking in an area that is struggling with crime or a shopping area to speak with customers, employees, and business owners.

Finding 12.4

The neighborhood policing officers (NPO) assigned to SLCPD precincts do not receive enough specialized training on partnership, problem solving, or prevention (crime prevention through environmental design [CPTED] or the SARA model).

Recommendation 12.4.1

The SLCPD should ensure that NPOs receive special community policing training beyond that which is provided to all officers with a focus on partnership development, problem solving, and organizational transformation.
Recommendation 12.4.2

After NPOs receive training focused on partnership development, problem solving, and organizational transformation, they should be required to participate in precinct-level problem-solving assignments focused on community engagement and improving neighborhood safety with measurable outcomes.

Finding 12.5

There is evidence that there are youth in the St. Louis community who fear and distrust the police.

The PF assessment team spoke with young people who said they often do not understand police actions and believe that the police do not understand them. The SLCPD has work to do to ensure that the youth of the St. Louis community are regularly and meaningfully engaged.

SLCPD officers should strive to understand and interact with the community’s youth in an effort to ameliorate fear in the youth community, build a foundation of mutual trust and respect, and begin to build a pool of potential police recruits from the community.

Recommendation 12.5.1

The SLCPD should create and maintain a series of police-youth dialogues.

This will allow youth and police officers to potentially curb conflict and increase trust and cooperation in neighborhoods most affected by violence and crime. Bringing together youth and police of racially and ethnically diverse groups to build dialogue guided by professional facilitators could help to break down stereotypes and communication barriers to build mutual respect and understanding.

Recommendation 12.5.2

The SLCPD should create a board of young adult police commissioners made up of juniors and seniors from several city high schools.

This commission would be a group of young people who work with the SLCPD chief to bridge the gap between young adults and SLCPD officers. With the assistance of the SLCPD, the young adult police commissioners can host events and forums so teens from various public schools can come together to discuss neighborhood and school issues and concerns.

Recommendation 12.5.3

The St. Louis CMPA should consider having youth participate in the community engagement training for academy recruits.

This would entail having a panel discussion with youth focused on youth culture and perceptions of police. It would serve to foster dialogue between new officers and youth in communities where officers will be potentially working.
Recommendation 12.5.4

The SLCPD should consider partnering with county schools, faith- and community-based organizations, and other community stakeholders to create youth programs (such as Junior Police Academies) free of charge for children ages seven to 14 years.

For example, youth camps could offer various athletic and educational activities for campers throughout a five- or six-week summer program. Members from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies and fire departments should be given an opportunity to educate campers about their organizations. They can also share important safety tips so campers can feel safer in their neighborhoods and be better prepared to make positive decisions. School resource officers from police departments within the SLCPD and others can serve as mentors to campers and provide a fun, educational summer experience. The SLCPD should also reach out to local colleges and universities with criminal justice programs to provide interns to assist with efforts.

Recommendation 12.5.5

The SLCPD should work with the courts, schools, and other social service entities to create a diversion program for youth offenders.

Instead of arresting youth offenders ages 12 through 17, they would be referred to a diversionary program. If they adhere to the guidelines of the diversionary program and successfully complete it, their record would be expunged. Similar (replicable) programs are currently underway in Ferguson and in Madison County, Illinois.

Finding 12.6

Community trust in the SLCPD is negatively impacted by the enforcement practices of several municipal police departments within St. Louis County.

The reduced level of trust by those subjected to heavy enforcement practices affects the SLCPD’s ability to develop relations with the community. Although the SLCPD has no legal supervisory authority over municipal police departments not under contract, they do have an obligation to ensure fair and impartial policing throughout the county. They also have an obligation to report agencies they have reason to believe are committing unconstitutional police practices.

Recommendation 12.6.1

The SLCPD should take a leadership role in the development of fair and impartial policing practices countywide. This could be accomplished in many ways including education, training, advising, and taking a public stand against agencies that have a perceived or proven unethical culture of abusing the community. The effort could be led by the CMPA Board of Managers, which is composed of police executives from across the county tasked with coordination and addressing of training issues.
Finding 12.7

The overall structure of the SLCPD website is difficult to navigate as a user and does not convey clear messages to users.

Recommendation 12.7.1
The website should have a significant redesign to maximize its utility as a public resource.

Recommendation 12.7.2
The website should have the most pertinent information in the top half of the screen.

This option can be achieved by using the current navigation panes in a more effective manner and by adding a top navigation pane. The top navigation should include the sections: About Us, Citizen Satisfaction Survey, Contact Information, Newsroom, and Community Resources.

Recommendation 12.7.3
The community resources section should include information about the Citizens’ Police Academy, neighborhood crime prevention, and Do the Right Thing.

Recommendation 12.7.4
The left navigation pane should be reorganized to include community programs, career information, welfare association, municipal services and contracting, commendations and complaints, and department procedures. The right navigation pane should be about connecting with law enforcement and should include precinct information, social media buttons, crime mapping, and alerts such as National Terror Advisory System and Amber Alerts.

Recommendation 12.7.5
The Resources for Citizens subsections in the left navigation pane should be part of the main text on that page.

The current subsections on the left navigation pane should be displayed in the main text of the Resources for Citizens page and then made into subnavigation pages to allow the user to access information about each specific resource.

Finding 12.8

The SLCPD website requires visitors to click too many times to find information.

A user wants to get to the information they need within one or two clicks of the mouse. In several places, a user has to click a number of times to access the necessary information. For example, when a user clicks on the media resources in the left column she gets two additional clickable options.
**Recommendation 12.8.1**

The initial click on any page should take the user directly to the information he or she needs. The page should include subnavigation that provides suggestions for accessing related information. Staying with the media resources example, the page should take the user to a newsroom page with the press releases, e-mail registration, and specific contacts. If the site employs this structure there is no need for the main text on the page to redirect the user back to the left navigation to access any further information.

**Finding 12.9**

Critical community content is not featured prominently on the SLCPD website.

**Recommendation 12.9.1**

The SLCPD should move the community safety programs and initiatives higher up onto the web page and give the information more prominence.

**Recommendation 12.9.2**

The social media section should serve as a call to action with sections like “Connect with Us.” The site should incorporate social media in a more efficient and graphic manner. The social media sites have a wealth of good community news and important safety information that does not appear on the website. The department can enhance the right navigation pane by including widgets showing the latest social media posts.

**Finding 12.10**

The SLCPD website design is extremely flat and not dynamic.

It does not feature the best design elements of a website such as pictures, graphics, and other elements such as hover features and responsive (clickable) graphics. The site should be optimized for viewing on tablets and other mobile devices.

**Recommendation 12.10.1**

The SLCPD should use photographs and navigation buttons, such as “Report a Crime,” to make the web page more visually appealing and more user-friendly.

**Recommendation 12.10.2**

The SLCPD should place all crime reporting features in one section on its website.

Currently, the St. Louis Regional CrimeStoppers, St. Louis Terrorism Early Warning Group, St. Louis County Drug Task Force, and St. Louis County Human Trafficking Task Force are on the bottom of the front page, but the drug activity reporting and human trafficking reporting forms are housed in the left navigation pane. Each of the reporting mechanisms should offer the opportunity to report anonymously if a community resident does not want to give personal information. Some reporting mechanisms note this ability while others do not mention the option to report anonymously.
**Recommendation 12.10.3**

The recruiting and career information section should include currently open positions that are now featured on the right navigation pane.

It is best to keep all like information together in one web section so all material is available to the user in one place.

**Recommendation 12.10.4**

The SLCPD should review websites from agencies and organizations around the country that can provide examples of design elements that could better engage the SLCPD’s audience.

**Recommendation 12.10.5**

The SLCPD should use the data gathered from the citizen satisfaction survey results to determine the most sought-after material on the website.

If that information is not available, restructure the website to place reporting and precinct information at the top of the page. The site could use the carousel technique to showcase the top five most sought-after categories at the top of the page. The carousel is composed of clickable images that take a user directly to the subpages for that material.

**Finding 12.11**

**The SLCPD website’s usability is hampered by many broken links and outdated information.**

At the time of this review, the assessment team identified broken links or pages such as that of the Citizen Academy that do not include the information for which a user is looking. For example, the Citizen Academy page does not inform a user about when the academies occur, what is involved, or how long the academy course takes.

**Recommendation 12.11.1**

The SLCPD should develop a consistent process to review and update website content.

Baseline information should always be readily available to serve the public while considering or adding enhancements.

**Recommendation 12.11.2**

Update the Citizen Academy page to include information—who, what, when, why, and how—that a user needs to know.

Include highlights and success stories of those citizens who have completed the Citizen Academy on the corresponding pages. Currently, clicking on the Citizen Academy Alumni link does not produce any information. Clicking on the map of the various jurisdictions turns up no additional information either.
Finding 12.12

The citizen satisfaction survey indicates that it is used to identify general trends in citizen satisfaction, but it does not tell a user what happens to the information gathered.

Recommendation 12.12.1

The SLCPD website should include more detail in the description of the citizen satisfaction survey.

Questions to be addressed and posted on the site might be: Is it compiled and distributed in a yearly report? Does the department issue recommendations based on the survey that are available to citizens?

Recommendation 12.12.2

The SLCPD should regularly update the website with the latest statistics compiled from the citizen satisfaction survey and archive them on the survey page.

Recommendation 12.12.3

The SLCPD should develop a chief’s report or document for the website that informs residents of recommendations and activities based on the information gathered from the survey.
# Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJS</td>
<td>Bureau of Justice Statistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BPS</td>
<td>Bureau of Professional Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CALEA</td>
<td>Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARE</td>
<td>computer assisted report entry system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDRT</td>
<td>civil disorder response training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CED</td>
<td>conducted energy device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIT</td>
<td>crisis intervention team/training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMPA</td>
<td>St. Louis County and Municipal Police Academy</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPS Office</td>
<td>Office of Community Oriented Policing Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPTED</td>
<td>crime prevention through environmental design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP-SAT</td>
<td>Community Policing Self-Assessment Tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRI-TA</td>
<td>Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>community service officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DO</td>
<td>doctor of osteopathy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCI</td>
<td>Division of Criminal Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>U.S. Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAP</td>
<td>employee assistance program</td>
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<tr>
<td>EBD</td>
<td>education-based discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMT</td>
<td>emergency medical technician</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMTP</td>
<td>emergency medical technician paramedic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EWS</td>
<td>early warning system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FIR</td>
<td>field interview report</td>
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<tr>
<td>FPD</td>
<td>Ferguson Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTI</td>
<td>field training instructor</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTO</td>
<td>field training officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>GO</td>
<td>general order</td>
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<tr>
<td>IACP</td>
<td>International Association of Chiefs of Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>IAP</td>
<td>incident action plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICS</td>
<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIR</td>
<td>Institute for Intergovernmental Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPO</td>
<td>Leadership in Police Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACTAC</td>
<td>multi-assault counterterrorism action capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD</td>
<td>medical doctor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDT</td>
<td>mobile data terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPCCF</td>
<td>Missouri Police Chiefs' Charitable Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPOLE</td>
<td>Missouri Peace Officers Licensing Exam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBQ</td>
<td>not best qualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOBLE</td>
<td>National Organization of Black Law Enforcement Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPO</td>
<td>neighborhood policing officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>oleoresin capsicum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIS</td>
<td>officer-involved shooting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBL</td>
<td>problem-based learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERF</td>
<td>Police Executive Research Forum</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Police Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIO</td>
<td>public information officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POST</td>
<td>Peace Officer Standards and Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTO</td>
<td>police training officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS</td>
<td>records management system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RN</td>
<td>registered nurse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSMo</td>
<td>Missouri Revised Statutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SARA</td>
<td>scanning, analysis, response, assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLCPD</td>
<td>St. Louis County Police Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMIP</td>
<td>Senior Management Institute for Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>school resource officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWAT</td>
<td>special weapons and tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>traffic stop report</td>
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<tr>
<td>UOF</td>
<td>use of force</td>
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</table>
Glossary

**Blue Team.** Proprietary, police-specific personnel management software.

**citizen-initiated.** A call for police service initiated by a citizen.

**Guidance Program.** A SLCPD-specific employee intervention and mentoring program.

**IAPro.** Proprietary personnel complaint and use of force management software.

**officer-initiated.** A call for police service self-assigned by an SLCPD officer (who handles the call him- or herself).

**pepper spray.** A common policing term for oleoresin capsicum sprays.

**precinct.** An organizationally determined geographic area under SLCPD jurisdiction created for resource allocation purposes (commanded by a police captain).

**probationary officer.** A newly appointed commission police officer OR one who is placed on probation as a result of disciplinary action.

**Taser.** Proprietary name for Taser, Inc’s electronic control weapon; also the colloquial police term for any electronic control weapon or for deployment of such a weapon (“to taser” or “to tase”).

**use of force.** The police use a range of force to secure compliance or apprehend an arrestee.
About the Police Foundation

The Police Foundation is a national, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization dedicated to advancing innovation and science in policing. As the country’s oldest police research organization, the Police Foundation has learned that police practices should be based on scientific evidence about what works best, the paradigm of evidence-based policing. Established in 1970, the foundation has conducted seminal research in police behavior, policy, and procedure, and works to transfer to local agencies the best new information about practices for dealing effectively with a range of important police operational and administrative concerns. Motivating all of the foundation’s efforts is the goal of efficient, humane policing that operates within the framework of democratic principles and the highest ideals of the nation.
About the COPS Office

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime.

Rather than simply responding to crimes once they have been committed, community policing concentrates on preventing crime and eliminating the atmosphere of fear it creates. Earning the trust of the community and making those individuals stakeholders in their own safety enables law enforcement to better understand and address both the needs of the community and the factors that contribute to crime.

The COPS Office awards grants to state, local, territory, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire and train community policing professionals, acquire and deploy cutting-edge crime fighting technologies, and develop and test innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders and all levels of law enforcement. The COPS Office has produced and compiled a broad range of information resources that can help law enforcement better address specific crime and operational issues, and help community leaders better understand how to work cooperatively with their law enforcement agency to reduce crime.

- Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing.
- To date, the COPS Office has funded approximately 125,000 additional officers to more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies across the country in small and large jurisdictions alike.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than 8.57 million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.

COPS Office resources, covering a wide breadth of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—are available, at no cost, through its online Resource Center at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This easy-to-navigate website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.
Recent events in Ferguson, Missouri; Staten Island, New York; Cleveland, Ohio; and Baltimore, Maryland, have exposed deep divides between communities and their police departments. Law enforcement agencies nationwide have begun the process of self-evaluation, reflecting on policies and practices and implementing innovative strategies to better engender community policing principles, build trust, and allay fear. The St. Louis County Police Department (SLCPD), with 855 authorized sworn commissioned officer positions, is one such agency. This report reflects findings and recommendations identified by the Police Foundation assessment team—an interdisciplinary team comprising subject matter experts, researchers, and analysts—through the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance process, which is designed to assess and reform policies and practices, taking into account national standards, best practices, current and emerging research, and community expectations in an effort to improve community-police relationships. Recommendations in this report focus on recruitment, training, mass demonstrations, vehicle stops, use of force, and communication.
Example 3


July 2018
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<tbody>
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<td>BWC</td>
<td>Body-worn Camera</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIT</td>
<td>Crisis Intervention Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>COPA</td>
<td>Civilian Office of Police Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPD</td>
<td>Chicago Police Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOJ</td>
<td>United States Department of Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>FOP</td>
<td>Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7</td>
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<td>FTO</td>
<td>Field Training Officer</td>
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<td>Investigatory Stop Report</td>
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<td>Mobile Data Terminal</td>
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<td>NGT</td>
<td>Nominal Group Technique</td>
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<tr>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Police Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPO</td>
<td>Probationary Police Officer</td>
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Executive Summary

Purpose of Project

In August 2017, Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan filed a lawsuit against the City of Chicago, based on a year-long civil rights investigation conducted by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ), into the practices of the Chicago Police Department (CPD). The DOJ investigation and public report detailed the following key areas of reform necessary for CPD:

- Improve CPD’s **accountability** system to identify police misconduct and hold officers accountable for their actions.
- Make **community policing** a core philosophy that is infused throughout the department’s policing strategies and tactics by ensuring that supervision, training, promotions and accountability systems incentivize and support officers who engage in community policing.
- Improve officer **supervision** in the field by creating policies that hold supervisors accountable for guiding officer behavior and reporting misconduct.
- Improve the quality and quantity of **officer training**, particularly pre-service Academy training, the Field Training Officer (FTO) program, and in-service training.
- Improve **officer assistance and support** by creating an overarching operational plan that includes robust counseling programs, comprehensive training, functioning equipment, and other tools to ensure officers are successful and healthy—physically, mentally and emotionally—and overcome officers’ concerns that using officer wellness services will negatively impact their career.
- Improve **data management** systems and quality of data used by the Independent Police Review Authority (IPRA) or Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA) so misconduct investigations can be tracked and analyzed.
- Increase **transparency** by publicly reporting use of force and misconduct complaints and settlements of officer misconduct lawsuits.
- Update **use of force** policies and improve officer training, reporting, and accountability systems when force is used.¹

The Mayor of Chicago and the Superintendent of CPD committed to working with Attorney General Madigan to negotiate a consent decree.² As part of the development and negotiation

of the consent decree, the Illinois Attorney General’s Office gathered input from the community and CPD officers into key topics and areas of focus and potential solutions that could be mandated by the consent decree to reach sustainable reform for constitutional policing in Chicago.

**Methodology**

The Illinois Attorney General’s Office solicited the Police Foundation (PF) to facilitate a series of focus groups of sworn CPD officers. PF facilitated a total of 13 focus groups that included 11 focus groups of randomly selected CPD officers and two with members of affinity groups. All told, PF held focus groups with a total of 170 CPD officers. The purpose of the focus groups was to collect qualitative information from CPD officers on their perceptions of the department’s challenges and areas of change needed under the consent decree.

CPD focus group participants were selected through a randomization process, and they were asked by their supervisors to report to the location of the focus groups. However, once they arrived, officers were given the option of participating in the discussion or not by the group facilitator and through an Informed Consent form provided to each officer upon arrival. No sign-ins were conducted, and PF team members did not know the names of the officers in the groups. All input was given with the assurance that while input was documented verbatim and would be included in this report, no names or other attribution would be shared. Affinity group officers self-selected and did not participate in the other CPD focus groups.

CPD focus groups were facilitated by PF Executive Fellows, Police Chief (ret.) Darrel Stephens, and Police Chief (ret.) Daniel Isom II, Ph.D. Chief Stephens is an accomplished police executive with 48 years of experience, serving in various ranks and ultimately as Chief of Police for the Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department. Recently, he also served as a Technical Advisor to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing and as Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association. Chief Daniel Isom II is a Professor of Policing and the Community at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. He is also the retired Chief of Police for the Metropolitan Police Department-City of St. Louis.

During the focus groups, Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used to gain input from the officers. “NGT gathers information by asking individuals to respond to questions posed by a moderator, and then asking participants to prioritize the ideas or suggestions of all group members.”

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3 A full detailed description of the methodology can be found in Appendix A of this report.
4 A full copy of the Informed Consent form can be found in Appendix B of this report.
5 Detailed biographies of Chiefs Isom and Stephens can be found in Appendix C of this report.
members.”\(^6\) Two specific questions were asked, and all of the officers’ answers were documented by PF staff on flipcharts and electronically.

The two questions posed during the focus groups and the affinity group meetings were:

- **Question One.** “*What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?”*
- **Question Two.** “*What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?”*

Finally, in an attempt to gain input from CPD officers who either did not feel comfortable talking in front of the group or who were not randomly selected to participate in the focus groups but wanted to provide input, PF also set up a password-protected open comment box on their website via SurveyMonkey. The website address and password to access the comment box was posted on the CPD intranet, provided to CPD officers via email and during roll calls, and focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box. The comment box was open for 17 days and received 24 responses.

### Findings

**Question One** asked, “*What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?*” A total of 295 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.\(^7\) Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific issues were coded into 15 broader topics, with the following key topics receiving the most overall votes.

- Lack of Support
- Accountability
- Training
- Policies
- Staffing Shortages
- Equipment & Technology
- Lack of Proactive Policing
- Department Culture
- Hiring
- Expanded Role of Police

**Question Two** asked “*What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?*” A total of 134 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff.\(^8\) Like question one, many of the items that were identified during the discussions were similar across the focus groups. To better organize the specific items and account for the overlaps, they were coded into 13 broader topics, with the following key topics receiving the most overall votes.

- Increased Support
- Increased, Enhanced & Mandated Training


\(^7\) A full list of responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.

\(^8\) A full list of responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.
Additionally, PF solicited feedback from CPD officers regarding the items they felt should be addressed in the consent decree using an open comment box on PF’s website. Twenty-four CPD officers provided comments, which mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups. To better organize the multiple items mentioned in many of the responses, the 24 responses were analyzed and coded into 17 broader topics with the following three topics being mentioned in more than two comments:

- Merit-Based Promotional Process
- Political Involvement/Lack of Political Support
- DOJ Investigation Report

\[9\] A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.
Analysis of Findings

Question 1: What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?—Issues Organized by Topic

Figure 1 identifies the most frequently discussed topics across all 13 of the focus groups and affinity group meetings. Topics pertaining to equipment, lack of support and training were discussed in every focus group. Other frequently discussed topics included accountability, policy, expanded role of police, and staffing shortages.

When participants were asked to vote on the biggest challenges they face in doing their job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively, lack of support received the highest number of votes (n=216, 33% of all votes cast). Lack of support included support from the criminal justice system, the community, the Chicago Police Department, support from elected officials, and the media. These results are displayed in Figure 2 and Figure 3.
Figure 2: Total Votes on Topics Raised in Response to Question 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Total votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Support</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policies</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing Shortages</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment &amp; Technology</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department Culture</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lack of Proactive Policing</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expanded Role of Police</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotions</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Measures</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Safety and Wellness</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3: Vote Percentages on Topics Raised in Response to Question 1 (n=648)

PERCENT OF TOTAL VOTES (N=648)

- Lack of Support: 33%
- Accountability: 18%
- Training: 16%
- Policies: 6%
- Staffing Shortages: 6%
- Equipment & Technology: 5%
- Department Culture: 4%
- Lack of Proactive Policing: 3%
- Hiring: 2%
- Expanded Role of Police: 2%
- Communications: 1%
- Promotions: 1%
- Performance Measures: 1%
- Officer Safety and Wellness: 1%
Question 2: What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?—Issues Organized by Topic

Figure 4 identifies the topics discussed during the 13 focus groups. Ways that the consent decree could *increase support* were discussed in 11 of the 13 focus groups, while *increased, enhanced and mandated training* was discussed in nine focus groups. Topics including those pertaining to how the consent decree could address *accountability; new and maintained equipment, technology and facilities;* and *staffing* were raised in eight focus groups.

*Figure 4: Topics Raised in Response to Question 2*

The participants in one of the focus groups only raised one topic that they would like to see addressed in the consent decree and, therefore, did not vote. When the participants in the remaining 12 focus groups were asked to identify topics that the consent decree could deal with in order to address challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community, *lack of support* received the highest number of votes (n=101, 21% of all votes cast). *Training, accountability, staffing,* and *promotions* all ranked in the top five in terms of the number of votes they received. These results are displayed in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
Figure 5: Total Votes on Topics Raised in Response to Question 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th># votes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased Support</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased, Enhanced &amp; Mandated Training</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotional Process Transparency &amp; Improvements</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Policies</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New &amp; Maintained Equipment, Technology &amp; Facilities</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance Measures</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hiring</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Work</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Safety and Wellness</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Vote Percentages on Topics Raised in Response to Question 2 (n=485)
Overarching Observations

While this report captures, in most cases verbatim, comments and input provided by Chicago police officers during focus groups, the PF team also believes it is important to note observations perhaps not captured in the description of participants’ comments, but clearly and decisively observed by the team.

1. During focus group discussions, Chicago police officers displayed genuine care for the City of Chicago and for the safety of its people.

Of immediate note by the PF team was that the CPD officers expressed views that displayed genuine interest in both the well-being of Chicago and CPD. They spoke of wanting to protect the city and keep it safe from crime, but that they lack the resources to do so. Some officers spoke of their technology and equipment not functioning, sometimes putting them at risk while trying to do their jobs. Supervisors and officers consistently discussed the lack of support they face and the frustration that causes, but also acknowledged their commitment to their jobs, the city, and keeping communities safe. Officers of the Chicago Police Department seemed to want the best for the City of Chicago and for its people despite the difficulties they perceive in doing their job.

2. Participants were engaged in the focus groups, showing a good faith effort to improve the department and increase safety in the city.

The team also noted that officers’ willingness to actively participate in the focus group discussion and process signaled a desire to contribute to the overall health and safety of the department, the city, and the community. Participants contributed to discussions, asked thoughtful questions, and engaged in meaningful dialogue with facilitators and each other, notwithstanding efforts by the local Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) to deter participation in focus groups. Participants were engaged in the discussion despite the fact that they were free to decline to participate; their obvious deep frustration with the current state of crime and policing in Chicago; and, their disagreement with the need for a consent decree in the first place. Even within CPD’s ranks, disagreement exists about how to improve policing in the city, but they clearly desired to be part of the process and to have their voice heard in hopes that it will produce change for a better future in policing in Chicago.

3. Many participants showed physical signs of stresses caused by the job, including exceptionally low morale.

Another team observation was that, without exception, participants in each focus group showed a sense of frustration, hopelessness, and neglect regarding their experiences as police officers in Chicago. The PF team, including retired Chiefs Isom and Stephens—who have worked with police departments around the country—was surprised by the level of frustration and
anger with the current policing situation in Chicago exhibited by CPD supervisors and officers who participated in the focus groups. The PF team also observed that participants showed little hope that real, sustainable change for the better is possible. They seemed to believe that changes were necessary at so many levels within the City that the complexity of the task was overwhelming. Worse, participants’ body language and posture as they described these conditions was that of stress, fatigue, and sometimes resignation. Participants’ perceived a lack of support for officer safety and wellness, in large part by CPD, further compounded the stresses of the job, and PF team members observed physical signs of the toll the job has taken on some CPD participants.

4. Participants seemed to lack fact-based knowledge and understanding of important topics discussed, including the DOJ investigation of their department, the consent decree, and levels of accountability.

During focus groups, the PF team noted that many participants lacked a thorough understanding of key topics related to the consent decree and the department’s position. For example, some participants had questions about the data and findings of the DOJ investigation and the lawsuit filed by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office. Many participants also inquired about the consent decree content and process, and the impact of consent decrees on policing in other law enforcement agencies. They also seemed to lack an understanding as to why the City and CPD agreed to negotiate a consent decree. Additionally, when referring to CPD policy and practice, focus group participants often referenced stories conveyed by others, what they were told by the FOP, or what they read in the newspaper. This type of reliance could show a void in a well-communicated message from the department’s administration, the City of Chicago, and/or the Illinois Attorney General’s Office related to the consent decree process.
Discussion of Key Topics and Areas of Focus—Question #1

During the focus groups, two specific questions were asked, and participants’ answers and perceptions were documented by PF staff on flipcharts and electronically. The first question asked was: **What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job as a Chicago police officer safely and effectively?** A total of 295 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff. Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 15 broader topics, with the following ten topics receiving the most overall votes. The below list is in the order of priority as defined by the overall number of votes it received during focus groups.

1. **Lack of Support (from the Department, Media, Community, Elected Officials, Criminal Justice System)**

Universally, focus groups identified the lack of support from supervisors and command staff, elected officials, and the public as negatively impacting their ability to do their job safely and effectively.

_Lack of Support Internally from Department Command and Supervisors._ Some focus group participants indicated that the lack of internal support—from the CPD command staff all the way down to their direct supervisors—has complicated day-to-day work for police officers, contributed to a lack of proactive policing, and depleted officer morale. Focus group participants perceived that the CPD command staff is more concerned with satisfying City elected officials, the media, and the community than with defending department members. Particularly in difficult or complex situations, such as use of force, focus group participants recounted times where CPD administration officials were more apt to remain silent or make a statement suggesting that officers may have been at fault, than to support the officer(s) involved. This lack of support extended to the perception that the command staff was more likely to believe complainants than officers and that officers are “guilty until proven innocent.” Multiple participants stated that the department would rather settle lawsuits alleging impropriety than interview officers and witnesses that could prove the suit is frivolous. In addition to settling lawsuits quickly and favoring the community over CPD officers, focus group participants expressed the feeling that the command staff too frequently disciplines officers for not following the exact letter of policies and general orders, even when the outcome is correct. The perception is that the department leadership too frequently agrees with the findings and discipline recommended by the Civilian Office of Police Accountability (COPA).

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10 A full list of responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.
11 Under the current disciplinary process, if the Superintendent and COPA agree on the discipline recommended, the Superintendent imposes the recommended discipline. If the Superintendent disagrees with COPA, the Superintendent has the burden of overcoming COPA’s recommendation. The dispute is heard by a single member
Focus group participants also described the lack of internal support coming from direct supervisors. They explained that some supervisors are uninterested in providing additional on-the-job instruction, mentoring, or providing solutions to difficult situations when they are called to a scene. Some participants suggested that this is directly related to the fear of repercussions from COPA, the department, and lawsuits resulting from potentially making wrong tactical decisions, coupled with supervisors not wanting to be responsible for making what could be perceived as the wrong supervisory decision. Other focus group participants suggested that their supervisors are more concerned with protecting their continued advancement opportunities by not getting involved in direct supervision. Participants suggested that the lack of support from CPD leadership has contributed to a lack of proactive policing by officers in Chicago.

Focus group participants also explained that supervisors feel pressured by the CompStat process and the department’s overall focus on numbers-based performance metrics. Participants shared that supervisors are more concerned with CompStat metrics than they are with personnel management and community policing. They shared that pressure to produce CompStat metrics—or what the focus group participants called “quotas”—is then passed down from supervisors, who expect their officers to prioritize arrests and stops versus focusing on community policing and effectively dealing with more challenging calls. Some participants noted that supervisors lack the personnel management skills and compassion necessary to provide the professional support that officers require. One participant noted that their supervisor criticized or talked about officers behind their backs instead of providing direction and instruction.

Additionally, some participants described the lack of internal communication as indicative of the lack of support coming from their supervisors and the command staff. These participants stated that they are made aware of significant announcements or policy changes from the media, not their supervisors or command staff. Participants also indicated that dissemination of important information by the administration is generally rushed and uncoordinated. They noted that the lack of a consistent internal communication strategy makes it difficult to know what the goals and objectives of CPD are and how they are expected to help achieve those goals through their daily actions on the streets.

Lack of Support from the Media. Biased and negative portrayals by the media and on social media were mentioned frequently by the focus group participants regardless of rank. They indicated that the media will frequently not fully report elements of a CPD incident, focusing on information to sell the story rather than providing all of the factual information about the incident. Focus group participants’ perception was that the media has been slanted against the police for some time and that it is influencing public perception, which makes their daily interactions with the community more volatile. Some officers expanded upon this, suggesting that after each critical incident the media is quick to condemn the officer and use the case as additional evidence that the department is corrupt. In addition, participants suggested that the media has significantly contributed to sensationalizing and demonizing the police, and they believe that the community suspects every officer of being crooked or of racially profiling. Negative portrayals of the police by the media were also identified as having an impact on the department’s ability to recruit. Participants explained that having every action they take examined under a microscope by the media dissuades many from wanting to be a police officer.

Lack of Support from the Community. Many of the focus group participants indicated that the ability to conduct their job safely and effectively was impeded by a decline in police-community relations in recent years, and a general lack of community support. This was attributed in large part to negative portrayals of policing in general—and of CPD specifically—in the media and on social media, as well as through reporting misperceptions and misrepresentations of specific incidents. Officers also noted a societal lack of respect for authority as influencing negative police-community relations. Many officers expressed concerns that citizens disrespect police officers and are less likely to comply with officer orders today compared to in the past. Additionally, focus group participants described a lack of public understanding of the difficulties of policing.

Lack of Support from Elected Officials. Lack of support from elected officials was also discussed in almost all of the focus groups and was identified as an item that participants felt prevented them from doing their jobs safely and effectively. Participants noted that elected officials say what is necessary to be reelected, and that while CPD and elected officials should be united in reducing crime and improving community safety, the current political environment favors a “war on police.” Focus group participants specifically mentioned increased influence by civilians and community organizations in the development of policies, civilian oversight into police accountability and police investigations, and the politicization of police priorities and practices as impediments. A handful expressed their frustration regarding the lack of political support by noting the hypocrisy surrounding the fact that multiple elected officials in Chicago have been imprisoned or indicted for crimes, but the police department is facing a consent decree. Overall, participants noted that until elected officials are no longer allowed to have significant influence in departmental decisions, nothing will be able to change.

Lack of Support from the Criminal Justice System. Focus group participants also expressed frustration with a perceived lack of support from the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Office and the judicial system. Participants explained that they could only affect a felony arrest on an
individual with a known criminal history, because, in their view, the State’s Attorney’s Office reduces felony charges to misdemeanors or is unwilling to prosecute. During the focus groups, participants suggested that this results in individuals returning to the street causing similar problems only days later, in some cases; responding to a call involving the same individual frustrates officers. They also suggested that mandating harsher penalties and truth-in-sentencing requirements would prevent judges from being lenient on repeat offenders, which also further complicates their jobs.

2. Accountability

Many focus group participants considered the fear of negative repercussions and an over-abundance of accountability measures put in place for police as one of the largest challenges to doing their job safely and effectively. A handful of participants mentioned that they had too much to potentially lose—their job, pension, house, and family—to risk what they perceive to be a potentially unfair or incorrect COPA ruling and the repercussions associated with such a ruling. One participant suggested that historically the understanding has been that, “if your heart was in the right place when you took action, even if you made a mistake, you would be okay.” However, this line of thinking has been replaced by the fear that even if officers do everything appropriately, a complainant can make an unfounded accusation and the officer will be subjected to investigations and penalties. Other participants agreed and added that they feel inhibited from taking action in some cases because they fear they will be subjected to removal of vacation days, suspensions without pay, termination, or lawsuits. They also noted that the fear of repercussions weighs so heavily that some of their colleagues second guess every decision they make while on the street. Participants noted this as an enormous officer safety issue, particularly in critical situations where split-second decisions have significant impacts and some officers have become hesitant to take any action, including using necessary force.

In addition to the general fear of repercussions, many participants specifically identified COPA as the office responsible for substantially contributing to the officers’ fear of repercussions. Almost all of the focus groups participants that mentioned COPA stated they believed that because all of its employees are civilians, they are not properly trained in policing or on CPD policies, procedures, or general orders, and they are thus not well-informed about the challenges that the police face on a daily basis. Participants believed that COPA employees undergo two weeks of training, and they believe that this is an inadequate length of time given the authority they possess. Participants also expressed that they believe COPA is extremely biased against the police department and consistently renders findings (or rulings) against police officers. Some participants perceived that COPA has leveraged its authority to find officers at fault in scenarios where CPD’s Bureau of Internal Affairs found that their actions were justified; to consistently and frequently recommend at least a suspension without pay or loss of vacation days; and to unfairly reopen cases that were previously adjudicated (years ago in some cases) to appease the community and elected officials.
Focus group participants also mentioned the number of devices that record them—and that they are required to use—as duplicative and unnecessary accountability measures. Participants noted that in addition to the dashboard camera in their car, they are required to wear a body-worn camera (BWC) that captures audio and video, a separate microphone to capture audio, and anything they say over the radio is also recorded. In addition to having all of these devices, participants added that if they forget to turn on the radio, the cameras, or the microphone in accordance with department policies, they are likely to be questioned for the validity of the stop they conducted.

Participants also perceived the need to swipe in at the beginning of their shifts and out at the end of their shifts as an unnecessary additional accountability measure enacted by the City. As discussed during the focus group, despite the fact that all other City departments use swiping—and that the concept was initiated by the Mayor—participants questioned the efficiency of swiping in and out and believed that this would cause unnecessary delays. Participants also questioned the effectiveness of the system and its need. While it was not mentioned as frequently as COPA and the fear of lawsuits, it was specifically mentioned as another accountability measure created by the City to appease the community and elected officials.

3. Training

The focus groups almost universally identified various aspects of department training as an important topic and one in need of improvement. Overall, training was summarized as too infrequent, reactionary, outdated, inapplicable, and merely intended to protect the CPD administration and the City from lawsuits.

Police Academy. Academy training was described as overcrowded, unorganized, and ineffective in preparing recruits to become probationary police officers (PPOs). Some recent academy graduates specified that some instructors were consistently late or did not show up at all and were unprepared and/or inexperienced as instructors. Other participants described some instructors as disconnected from what was actually occurring on the street because they had not worked the street in many years, and that they were unable to translate the curricula into practical instruction. Some officers suggested that academy training could be improved by reducing the amount of lecture and video training and increasing the use of scenario-based training. One officer expressed genuine concerns that academy trainers were “out of touch” with the circumstances that occur when working the street. This officer also suggested that this influences the culture of the department and reinforces systemic issues within CPD.

Field Training Officer (FTO) Program. Once PPOs graduate from the academy, they are assigned an FTO to receive additional experiential training in Chicago neighborhoods. However, many of the focus group participants—including FTOS—noted that the program has shortcomings, including too many PPOs per FTO, lack of incentives to encourage quality officers to become FTOS, and lack of training for FTOS. Some participants—who were FTOS—recounted having more than one PPO at a given time, which led to an inability to provide specialized training to
PPOs who were at different levels of comprehension of department policy and procedure. Other FTOs indicated that because they had to use cars without cages to accommodate the PPOs, they could not provide training or experience on affecting an arrest. Lack of meaningful incentives and having to change partners were also mentioned repeatedly as impediments to attracting more experienced officers to become FTOs. The incentives that were mentioned included a slight pay increase, the opportunity to bid out of their district, and the ability to choose their shift. More tenured participants—who were not FTOs—suggested that the comfort of a steady partner, instead of the uncertainty of PPOs, generally deterred them and their colleagues from becoming FTOs. More-tenured focus group participants also expressed that being an FTO was not worth the potential ramifications and repercussions if one of their PPOs makes a mistake. Almost universally, the focus groups believed that the qualifications for being an FTO needed to be adjusted, as the minimum tenure for an FTO (three years) does not allow officers enough time on the job to obtain the necessary experience to properly train and prepare PPOs to be full-time officers.

*In-service Training.* Focus group participants also highlighted deficiencies in the in-service training. Of large issue to some of the officers was that no minimum standards exist for annual in-service training. Focus group participants explained that some important in-service training opportunities are optional, when they should be required, such as crisis intervention team (CIT) training. Because CIT training is optional—often offered only during certain shifts (days) and not regularly scheduled—some focus group participants expressed that they would like to be trained in CIT but have not had the opportunity to attend training. Without this training, focus group participants suggested that they often wait for a CIT-trained officer to arrive on scene, rather than handle the situation in a way that may run counter to CIT protocols learned during trainings. Participants reported that most in-service training is only provided during the day shift, and that this means that supervisors not working days have to adjust schedules for their officers to be able to attend trainings. Participants shared that while convenient, much of the CPD in-service training is conducted through videos and online instruction, to the exclusion of situational, scenario-based and hands-on training where the principles being taught must be applied. Focus group participants consistently recommended a combination of the two types of training to provide more skills to more officers.

Focus groups participants described having to watch a general video or click through a couple of high-level documents and then electronically sign a document indicating that they had completed the training. They suggested that for general orders and new legislation—where participants explained that understanding legal implications and practical implementation is imperative—this type of in-service training for complex guidance on policy and practice was perceived as inadequate and ineffective. In fact, focus group participants perceived the in-service training, and the process for administering the training provided, as a quick and easy way to protect the department from lawsuits—leaving officers vulnerable if a response is called into question—instead of prioritizing training based on the needs of the officers or the situations they are experiencing on patrol. Focus groups frequently referred to this type of training as “check the box” training. Additionally, some participants stated that because CPD
lacks enough equipment (such as Tasers, breathalyzers, and radar guns), some officers are not trained on use of that equipment.

**Firearms Qualification.** Participants also specifically identified the lack of firearms training and qualification as a safety risk for both officers and the community. Focus group participants noted that the department used to provide 100 rounds of ammunition annually to each officer so that they could practice and train with their firearms whenever the officer was able. These participants explained that this is no longer the case and that officers are currently only required to qualify annually.

### 4. Policies

A number of focus group participants described unclear, inconsistent, and rushed policies as impairing their ability to do their job safely and effectively. Additionally, some noted that the involvement of community members and organizations in creating department policies has had a perceived impact on what officers can reasonably do and has turned the department from being proactive to reactive.

Focus group participants explained that the development and dissemination of policies is sometimes rushed, but that officers are expected to know all new policies and become fluent in each immediately upon release to the rank and file. One participant explained that there is no opportunity to ask questions about possible interpretations and application of policies and that their personal interest in law and policy was the only thing that helped them understand. Another explained that policies are not always black and white, but officers are expected to follow them verbatim or face consequences. One participant explained that depending on how you read and interpret the use of force policy, for example, you may be forced to use your gun instead of a Taser in certain situations and then you are left to be second guessed by the media; participants saw this as a no-win situation. Other participants mentioned that not everyone has access to Tasers—because they are assigned to cars, not individuals—and therefore not all officers have been trained on them, yet, everyone is still expected to understand and abide by the policies related to them.

Some focus group participants also commented that the involvement of the community and community organizations has significantly impacted their policing efforts, especially after critical incidents. Participants perceived that CPD leadership has changed policies to appease elected officials and the community, but these changes handicap officers because the policies contradict training, lack clear instruction and training on their application, sacrifice officer safety, and are inconsistent with other department goals. Many of the focus groups honed-in on the Investigatory Stop Report (ISR) process and policy as one that has had the largest impact on their ability to be proactive in enforcement. While officers have been required to fill out contact cards as part of community contacts based on reasonable suspicion for some time, newer ISRs—according to participants—are lengthier. Participants explained that the new process requires CPD officers to complete an ISR when they conduct any stop or contact based.
on reasonable suspicion, collect much more in-depth information, and explain the rationale for the stop or contact. Officers’ perception is that the intent of the ISRs is for CPD to collect data on potential racial bias in stops and contacts. However, some officers believe that the ACLU has access to all of the ISRs and, in some cases, follow up with community members to encourage them to file complaints against officers.

The vehicular pursuit policy was also specifically identified by focus group participants as impacting their ability to do their job effectively and enforce Illinois laws. Multiple participants noted that they believe the policy is so restrictive that criminals can flee, and officers would not be able to pursue them, putting the community at further risk.

5. Staffing Shortages

Focus group participants discussed the challenges associated with safely and effectively performing their duties while being significantly understaffed. Some suggested that the recent cycle seems to be that the department hires approximately 1,000 officers, then loses a couple hundred to attrition, and has not come close to the budgeted 13,500 sworn officers. Some also expressed feeling as if the department is “treading water” with sworn officers, by not having the full number of sworn staff to properly provide police services in the City of Chicago. Others suggested that the department intentionally double counts officers who are patrol officers, and who also have special duty assignments to inflate the number of sworn officers.

Others discussed staffing shortages that result in ineffective allocation of officers at district stations. Some participants indicated that there are districts with an unnecessarily high number of officers, while other districts are forced to frequently have one-officer cars instead of the traditional two-person patrols because they do not have enough officers to partner. One participant explained that districts that have decreasing crime are often penalized because those district officers are then shifted to other districts that have crime problems—at the expense of having the police presence that they believe led to the crime drop in the first place. Participants in focus groups also explained that the lack of officers has ancillary impacts. Some explained that because supervisors barely have enough officers to put on the streets, officers cannot be freed up to receive the department training they need. Others described not being able to take vacation or having their vacation days canceled because the department was short-staffed. Still others mentioned that supervisors are not able to allow partners to patrol together consistently, which participants identified as a safety issue because of the inability to develop rapport and comfort in knowing where your partner is and what they are thinking under different circumstances. Participants conveyed that they believe that this also fuels officers’ experience of lack of support and overall stress.

6. Equipment and Technology

Multiple focus groups mentioned that the equipment and technology provided by the department was unreliable and impeded their ability to effectively carry out their
responsibilities. Participants mentioned that this lack of reliable equipment and technology negatively impacts their ability to train with certain pieces of equipment (primarily Tasers and firearms), decreases officer safety and wellness, and contributes to general inefficiencies in day-to-day processes. It also contributes to officers’ perception of a lack of support from CPD.

Some participants believed that equipment was duplicative in some cases and deficient in others. They described having a BWC with a microphone, a separate portable microphone that they are required to wear, and an in-car dashboard camera. Others mentioned having too much equipment on their utility belt and vest. This was contrasted with participants who believed that the department does not have enough basic supplies; vehicles; and working computers, printers, and other technology. In addition to lacking simple office supplies, like paper to print reports and other documents in the district sub-stations, they expanded that CPD lacked more contemporary equipment—like automated license plate readers and driver’s license scanners in patrol vehicles—to do things like conduct speed limit enforcement.

Multiple participants indicated that their mobile data terminal (MDT) and radios frequently do not work or easily lose signal because their internet service is not consistent throughout the police districts and patrol areas. One participant indicated that because there is not a function on MDTs to save reports before they are complete, if the signal cuts out, the officer has to restart from the beginning, which is frustrating because it causes unnecessary work for those on patrol. Additionally, these dead zones create an officer safety risk because when the MDT is not connected, the GPS does not function and important information about calls is not readily available.

In addition to the MDTs, focus group participants noted that the computers in the district stations are equally unreliable. Multiple participants recounted difficulties in identifying enough functioning computers to complete quality reports efficiently. They recounted situations where only one computer in a district station was working so they were required to wait to type up reports from their shift. Other participants noted that because finding computers next to each other was difficult, partners could not sit next to each other and work on reports about the same incident, which impacted the quality of their reports. As for radios, participants conveyed that in certain locations that they patrol, their radios are ineffective.

Another participant mentioned that the department’s Tasers frequently do not work, fail during use, or do not produce the intended impact. The participant suggested that when people wear multiple layers of clothing or heavier clothing during cold weather, the darts cannot make contact with the individual, which limits their effectiveness and reliability in a city like Chicago where the weather is frequently cold. They noted that needing to potentially rely on an unreliable piece of equipment posed officer and community safety implications.

Focus group participants also described ancillary problems related to the equipment, including cars not being designed to fit all equipment necessary for protection; poor positioning of the MDT docking stations; and the magnetic holders for the BWCS not being strong enough to stay
in place, particularly when wearing heavy winter coats or during foot pursuits. One participant explained that the implications for losing a BWC are so severe that they purchased their own click-in holder to avoid losing the equipment. Another participant noted that because the breathalyzers at the academy were broken during their Academy training, their entire recruit class is not certified in its use and cannot conduct driving-while-intoxicated stops.

The software systems and applications that run on the MDTs and station computers were also described as problematic. Participants mentioned that the patchwork system that requires them to access multiple applications to document various parts of an arrest is extremely inefficient and can lengthen the time required to document an arrest that can already take hours to process. Multiple midnight shift participants also indicated that if required updates to the system are necessary, it normally occurs during their shift, which can cause additional delays in their ability to complete administrative work. Others described having to manually enter driver’s licenses because the department does not have the technology to be able to scan them. Finally, officers explained that if equipment necessary for accountability—such as one of the cameras or microphones—is broken or lost, it is fixed or replaced quickly. By contrast, they thought equipment necessary for officer safety or to effectively conduct their job takes considerably longer to replace and is not maintained as well.

7. Lack of Proactive Policing

Focus group participants mentioned that a reduction in proactive policing has been occurring amongst some CPD officers, which prevents others from doing their job safely and effectively. They noted that some colleagues were refraining from getting involved in some situations for fear of it escalating to needing to use force. These participants suggested that the reluctance to do anything beyond clearing calls stemmed from a lack of motivation to conduct proactive police work and the vulnerability associated with it if their supervisors did not support their decision-making as it relates to police tactics on scene. One participant suggested that the documentation for a traffic or pedestrian stop has become so in-depth, tedious, and time-consuming that they just do not affect stops anymore. Similarly, as mentioned above, some officers simply are not trained to conduct some proactive policing tactics, such as administering a breathalyzer test. Another explained his perception that taking any proactive action will likely be skewed by the media, community members, and community organizations, so it was just easier to not take the chance to engage in proactive policing. They noted that with all of the processes that an officer has to go through and the pieces of equipment that they are required to turn on, there is the potential to accidentally forget to do something small and then have the contact scrutinized, so it is safer to simply no longer take proactive policing action.

8. Department Culture

In addition to lack of support from CPD administration and supervisors, some focus group participants identified the overall department culture as one of the biggest challenges to doing their jobs safely and effectively. Some noted cultural challenges based on race, generational
divide, and gender. More-tenured focus group participants voiced their belief that younger officers do not understand or respect the chain-of-command, are too hesitant to use force when necessary, and do not fully understand the importance of face-to-face interaction (in an age of texting); this has started to create a new department culture within their age cohort. Additionally, these participants perceived that certain recruits and younger officers do not take the time to understand policies and practices, think they already know the best way to handle situations based on what they learned in the academy or from family members who were police officers, and do not want to admit that they may need help. Participants suggested that this mentality creates potential officer safety issues.

Meanwhile, less-tenured participants suggested that their more mature colleagues are resistant to change, do not understand technology and that their mentality that any community member that they attempt to talk to or who is the subject of a stop and question should automatically follow directions is outdated and ineffective. This has created a generational divide in the department that some suggested has had an impact on how the department polices.

Additionally, some participants perceived that minority and women officers do not receive the same level of respect—particularly from their subordinates—as their white, male colleagues. These participants explained that they experience a “double whammy,” and “get it from every angle,” which they defined as not receiving support from their supervisors as it is related to training and promotions while also not receiving the same level of respect and support from colleagues. The participants also conveyed being belittled in the community as problematic to doing their job.

9. Hiring

Focus group participants perceive that CPD has lowered its recruitment and hiring standards to dangerous levels to alleviate staffing shortages and has done so at the expense of officer safety and effectiveness. Participants explained that lowering the hiring standards begins with making the entrance exam significantly easier and inflating scores to be able to fill academy classes. By doing this, according to the groups, the department is able to push people through the academy. However, participants suggested that this does not bode well for the quality of PPOs that graduate. As a result, they suggested that recent recruit classes have included recruits who are unable to write reports when they graduate and who have expressed no desire to learn the job or conduct traditional police work. This sentiment was echoed by a handful of PPOs who participated in the focus groups and noted that they were generally unprepared to do more than write reports upon graduation from the Academy, and instead had to learn most of what they know from experiencing things themselves during field training. Some focus group participants went so far as to describe recent recruit classes as including people who were only interested in collecting a paycheck from the City. They noted that this has impacted officer safety and decreased the overall professionalism of the department.
Focus group participants indicated that CPD has become the agency that must solve the challenges that other city, county, and state agencies cannot or do not address. Many participants described having to serve as a mental health counselor, social worker, medic, parent or teacher, domestic violence victim advocate, and substance abuse counselor, as well as deliver police services all during their shift, making the job of a police officer infinitely more challenging. Focus group participants also explained that they do not receive the necessary level of training to address these situations as effectively as the appropriate counselor or social worker. Focus group participants explained that while the 40-hour CIT training—which they believe CPD has condensed into shorter Force Mitigation training—is beneficial, it does not fully prepare officers to be mental health counselors. Officers shared they feel pressured by the CompStat process and the department’s overall focus on numbers-based performance metrics to clear calls as quickly as they can, but are also trained in and expected to use de-escalation techniques to resolve potentially volatile situations involving persons with mental illnesses, which can take hours. This struggle leaves officers unsure of how to balance their expanded roles with their responsibility to clear calls-for-service. They suggested that the combination of increased tasks and expectations along with the lack of training or inadequate training further impacts their ability to provide professional police services. Focus group participants also indicated that because the training was offered, they are now expected to adhere to all the principles perfectly. They suggested that each time law enforcement expands its scope of work to include a new function—receiving a brief training and policy—it comes with increased pressure from the department and increased scrutiny from the public and the media if something goes wrong. They perceived that this positions the police department to take the blame for the inability of the government to adequately fund and respond with appropriate entities that are best prepared to offer social services.
Discussion of Key Topics and Areas of Focus—Question #2

The second question asked, “What can the consent decree do to address these challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?” A total of 134 specific items and perceptions were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff. Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 13 broader topics, with the following ten key topics receiving the most overall votes.

1. Increased Support (Community and Elected Officials)

Focus group participants overwhelmingly requested that the consent decree include measures that will help to increase support from elected officials and community members and will indicate to officers that support does exist.

Focus group participants recommended that the consent decree require the City to develop and execute a public education strategy for community members, which would provide opportunities for community members to learn more about policing and crime in Chicago from the perspective of CPD versus only getting information from the media and social media. In addition to community members not understanding the challenges facing the police, some officers expressed concerns that the police sometimes do not understand the citizens they are serving or the challenges facing the community. To address this, some officers recommended CPD develop training to promote cultural awareness and sensitivity to improve the relationship between the police and the community. One officer suggested that the training be geared toward the cultural nuances of the neighborhood in which the officer works.

Others suggested that requiring the City to allocate funds and resources to CPD to foster and improve relationships and build bridges with the community would result in enhanced police-community relations and increased support from elected officials for the department. Specific ideas mentioned to achieve this goal, and to promote awareness around challenges that officers face, included running the ten-week citizens police academy more frequently and publishing educational advertisements or public service announcements.

Participants suggested that the consent decree require the City to fully fund officer pensions as a demonstration of exemplifying increased support for the department. Participants indicated that the City keeping up with its financial obligation to support officers would send a message to the officers that they are important to the city. Participants also requested that the consent decree somehow require elected officials to refrain from inserting politics into the department’s policies and procedures, particularly during campaigns.

13 A full list of responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.
2. Increased, Enhanced, and Mandated Training

Many of the focus group participants indicated that increased opportunities for and availability of quality training is a necessary part of reform at CPD. They suggested improving academy training, field training, and in-service training. Additionally, focus group participants would like to see the consent decree mandate certain training for all officers and require a set amount of annual in-service training. Overall, the participants thought that CPD needs a strategic training plan to guide a more-comprehensive management, planning, and oversight structure for training.

Academy & Field Training. During focus group discussions, participants expressed the need to entirely overhaul the police academy training program, to include bringing in instructors with more subject matter expertise and recent field experience. They said the academy needs to better prepare graduates for their experiences as PPOs, and that the overall training at the academy should be more robust, including adding more scenario-based training. Likewise, participants pointed out the need to provide incentives to entice more tenured and more experienced officers to serve as FTOs.

In-service. According to participants, officers currently receive most of their in-service training in static formats such as watching videos or presentations or “clicking through a PowerPoint or policy.” Focus groups indicated that having more hands-on and situational training would help them better apply the techniques and principles learned to real-world scenarios. They also recommended that the consent decree include an increased requirement for regular in-service training, particularly one that provides updates on significant legal and department policy changes and provides insight into practical application of those changes to policing.

Focus group participants also recommended that certain trainings—particularly CIT training—be mandated, rather than voluntary, so that the officers on every shift are provided access to much-needed instruction during their regular shifts.

Firearms Qualification. Many participants also recommended that firearms qualifications occur more frequently than just once a year. Some suggested that qualifications should be at least twice per year, while others indicated that it should be quarterly.

3. Accountability

Focus group participants discussed their desire to see accountability measures implemented as part of a more fair and integrated process. They noted, in particular, civilian oversight and investigations to check CPD. They perceived that each critical incident is followed by a knee-jerk reaction to include more oversight, which has created a labyrinth of systems of accountability for officers that has become too difficult to keep up with. Some suggested that language be included in the consent decree to check the ability of civil rights organizations, and civilians in particular, to determine department policies and general orders. This stemmed from the
perception that civilian community members and civil rights organizations do not understand the nuances of police work, and—while their policy requirements may seem reasonable—often the practical implications of those policies are not considered by those without experience. Rather, the participants suggested that the consent decree require a more thoughtful, fair, and integrated process that balances the input of these individuals and organizations with the safety and practicality needs of law enforcement.

Participants also discussed the idea of requiring specific experience for COPA staff handling investigations. Focus group participants suggested that the consent decree mandate that COPA investigations include at least one person with police expertise. They believed this would help to significantly reduce the bias against CPD officers perceived by focus group participants. Inclusion of individuals with police expertise would also reduce the second guessing that participants described occurs when officers face potential investigations and sanctions despite following laws and department policies. Along similar lines, participants requested that the consent decree provide indemnification and limit punitive damages that officers could be subjected to as a result of lawsuits.

Some focus group participants also recommended that the consent decree should remove the additional accountability measure of swiping in and out of their shifts. Officers believed this to be an unnecessary addition imposed by the City and conveys an unfair lack of trust and support.

4. Staffing

Focus group participants recommended that the consent decree require the department to develop a realistic hiring plan that will result in the full staffing of qualified officers for the department. Some participants indicated that CPD is a male-dominated department and believed that a hiring or staffing plan should include sections clearly outlining processes for creating a more diverse department. Many also suggested specifically defining supervisor-to-officer ratios to ensure more appropriate oversight in the field. In addition, some of the focus group participants recommended that the consent decree include a staffing allocation study or workload analysis to address inequality in how districts are staffed.

5. Promotional Process Transparency and Improvements

Almost universally, focus group participants recommended addressing and reforming the existing merit-based promotional process and increasing transparency in the overall promotional process. There was a clear consensus that the promotional exams be administered more frequently than once every ten years. Focus group participants suggested that the consent decree clearly define and make consistent the steps and standards for promotions, require the department to schedule exams consistently and more regularly, and require third-party organizations or law enforcement agencies to administer the promotional exams to avoid favoritism.
6. Enhanced Policies

Focus group participants suggested that the consent decree address the lack of clarity and strength of some CPD policies. They suggested that some of the department’s policies, particularly regarding the process and requirements surrounding ISRs, should be revised to consider the perspective of officer safety. Others explained that policies cannot always be implemented in their exact steps in real situations and recommended that the consent decree require department policies and general orders to include language to reduce repercussions if the intent of the policy is followed. Other participants suggested that the consent decree mandate that CPD policies, particularly the use of force policy, provide more clarity and better mirror state statutes. The focus group participants also requested that the consent decree mandate processes to allow for officer input into policy, procedure, and general order changes that affect practical implementation on the street. They suggested that the department’s comprehensive strategic communications plan include a process to better keep officers up to date on policy changes and include a process that allows officer input into the development of policy.

7. New and Maintained Equipment, Technology, and Facilities

Focus group participants also requested that the consent decree mandate that CPD improve equipment, technology, and facilities. They suggested that equipment standards be implemented to require CPD to purchase and maintain equipment, including working computers in patrol vehicles and district stations, Tasers, and other basic supplies. They also suggested that the consent decree require the City to support CPD with new technology to increase effectiveness and bring the department into the 21st Century fight against crime. Focus groups requested that the academy and training facilities, as well as the deteriorating district stations, be repaired and improved to support the officers and improve morale.

8. Communication

Participants in the focus groups suggested that the consent decree mandate efforts to address internal and external communications. Some noted that the consent decree should require CPD to develop an internal strategic communication plan to disseminate important information, particularly about new policies and procedures. Additionally, participants suggested that the consent decree require the department to enhance its external communications strategy as well to better tell its own story and explain its actions to the public. They suggested that the external communications strategy include the department policy on how and in what form it releases information, particularly body-worn camera footage, and explain that it is designed to avoid influence of potential criminal prosecutions and cases, not to hide nefarious police acts.
9. Performance Measures

Focus group participants recommended that the consent decree require CPD to establish performance measures that eliminate the focus on numbers-based policing. These participants indicated that CompStat has become such a predominant influence throughout the department, that performance measures are almost entirely numbers-based, and are merely an attempt by CPD command staff to rename “quotas.” They suggested that performance measures ensure qualitative and quantitative measures and that they account for making positive community contacts; acknowledge the length of time and difficulty that clearing certain calls can take; acknowledge optional training programs and continuing education; include peer and supervisor assessments; and allow for the quality of reports to be considered as a metric for officer success and promotion.

10. Hiring

Focus group participants noted that the consent decree should require CPD to clearly establish minimum recruiting standards that reflect the skills and capabilities required to be an effective police officer. Participants suggested that these standards include a preference for individuals with military experience and noted that increasing the minimum recruiting and hiring standards would result in a more effective and professional department. Participants also perceived that the residency requirement prohibits CPD from attracting lateral transfers from nearby departments because it forces them to move within City limits. They suggested that the consent decree either remove this requirement or establish a process where officers with a certain number of years of service be eligible to live outside of the City of Chicago. Some also requested that the consent decree increase the recruiting standards so that people entering the academy are better-prepared for what they will experience. Participants lamented that recent recruit classes have included some less-than-desirable recruits who are only looking for a paycheck, which has impacted officer safety and decreased the overall professionalism of the department. By mandating recruitment standards through the consent decree, participants suggested that the department would improve officer safety and morale.
Discussion of Key Topics and Areas of Focus—Online Feedback

Additionally, PF solicited feedback from CPD officers regarding the items they felt should be included in the consent decree through an open comment box on a password-protected page on the PF website. The website address and password to access the comment box were posted on the CPD intranet, information regarding it was provided to CPD officers via email and during roll calls, and focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box. The open comment box, which was accessible for 17 days, allowed CPD officers to submit their responses anonymously.

The FOP issued a notice the day after the comment box was published that, “strongly suggest[ed] that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey.”\(^\text{14}\) A total of 24 comments were submitted.\(^\text{15}\) The input mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups. To better organize the multiple items mentioned in many of the responses, the 24 responses were analyzed and coded into 17 broader topics with the following three topics being mentioned in more than two comments.

1. Merit-Based Promotional Process

More than half of the comments suggested the need to reform the existing merit-based promotional process and increase transparency throughout the process. Some of the comments suggested clearly defining and making the steps and standards for promotions consistent; prohibiting active CPD officers from serving as subject matter experts; and opening the process to all eligible CPD officers. Multiple comments also mentioned that the promotional exams should be administered more frequently, in accordance with national best practices.

Additionally, a number of the comments indicated that as a result of the merit-based promotional process, the department lacks true leadership. These comments indicated that the process lacks legitimacy and has led to the promotion of individuals who otherwise would not be leading components of the department. The commenters also insinuated that meritorious promotions have placed more of an emphasis on “who you know” than “what you know,” which has caused a “brain drain” amongst the leadership of the department. The comments suggest that CPD leadership is better at politics than policing. One comment stated, “[t]he only way to bring CPD leadership practices into the 21\(^{\text{st}}\) century is to holistically review and revamp the promotional process from the ground up.”


\(^{15}\) A full list of responses can be found in Appendix F of this report.
2. Political Involvement/Lack of Political Support

More than one-quarter of the comments mentioned a lack of support from elected officials. Multiple comments suggested that elected officials should support the police department by giving CPD officers the tools necessary to do their jobs and avoid indicting the department’s policies and procedures in order to cater to potential voters. Another commenter advised that local elected officials should focus on allowing the department to reduce crime instead of criticizing the department. One comment specifically mentioned, “removing the mayor’s influence over department leadership” because it creates a sense of needing to appease elected officials instead of effectively and safely running a law enforcement agency.

3. DOJ Investigation Report

Some comments criticized the year-long civil rights investigation conducted by DOJ into the practices of the CPD. The comments complained about both the investigation and the results. For example, one comment suggested that the investigation, “lacked specificity and contained nothing but anecdotal observations.”
Conclusion

The Police Foundation commends the Illinois Attorney General’s Office for recognizing the importance of gaining input on provisions of the consent decree from Chicago Police Department personnel. Officers’ comments were thoughtful and well-intentioned. They expressed frustration and confusion about the consent decree process and many of the changes suggested and/or being made by the department. Participants in this process seemed truly concerned for the safety of the City and for their fellow Chicago police officers.

The reform process can serve as a bridge to help rebuild relationships between the community and the police in a common goal of public safety. As suggested in the Task Force Report on 21st Century Policing, “[A]dopting procedural justice as the guiding principle for internal and external policies and practices can be the underpinning of a change in culture and should contribute to building trust and confidence in the community.”\(^\text{16}\)

Acknowledgements

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Additionally, PF would like to thank CPD Superintendent Eddie T. Johnson for his commitment to this process and his staff from the Policy and Procedure, Research and Development Division, who provided endless support to the team throughout the process.

PF would also like to thank each CPD officer who took time out of their schedules to provide thoughtful input and engage in the NGT process, as well as those individuals who submitted their feedback online. Their commitment to CPD and the City of Chicago is evident.

The PF staff members—Blake Norton, Vice President/Chief Operating Officer; Jennifer Zeunik, Director of Programs; Amber Perenzin Askey, PhD, Senior Research Associate; and, Ben Gorban, Policy Analyst—would also like to acknowledge Chief (ret.) Darrel Stephens, Chief (ret.) Daniel Isom, and Chief (ret.) Rick Braziel for their subject matter expertise on this effort. Their guidance throughout the process, facilitation of the focus groups, and report review was instrumental to the team.

Finally, PF would like to acknowledge the following organizations whose funding supported this work: the Albert Pick, Jr. Fund; the Chicago Community Trust; Chicago CRED; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; the Joyce Foundation; the Polk Bros. Foundation; and the Steans Family Foundation.
Appendix A. Detailed Methodology

The Illinois Attorney General’s Office solicited the Police Foundation (PF) to facilitate a series of 14 focus groups of sworn Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers, in addition to focus groups with law enforcement affinity groups in Chicago. PF facilitated a total of 13 focus groups that included 11 focus groups of randomly selected CPD officers and two with members of affinity groups. The reduction in the number of focus groups was due to (1) a scheduling error that affected one midnight focus group, (2) a cancellation of one focus group when all participants walked out after a member of the Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7 made a statement at the beginning of the focus group that deterred officer participation, and (3) the combination of two concurrent focus groups. The CPD focus groups were held during April 10-13, 2018 at CPD headquarters. Focus groups with members of two affinity groups were held on April 11 and April 25, 2018. All told, PF held focus groups with a total of 170 CPD officers. The focus groups contained CPD commanders, captains, lieutenants, sergeants, patrol officers, FTOs, and PPOs.

Sampling

PF received an Excel file containing the area, watch, and rank of 7,102 sworn CPD officers in the Bureau of Patrol. CPD’s jurisdiction is divided into three areas: North, Central, and South. CPD has four watches: first watch (midnight shift), second watch (day shift), third watch (evening shift), and fourth watch (special assignments that do not line up with the traditional watch schedules, such as school resource officers). Frequency distributions for these variables shows that 87.68% of the selected CPD sworn officers are patrol officers, 9.25% are sergeants, 2.6% are lieutenants, etc. The sampling strategy used by PF was programmed in a way that required the characteristics of our sample to match the characteristics of the CPD officers provided with respect to area, watch, and rank.

Sampling was conducted without replacement using Stata—a statistical software program that includes the function of random sampling. In the first round of sampling, 450 officers were selected to participate in the focus groups. The composition of the sample of 450 officers closely mirrors the composition of the sample of 7,102 officers provided by CPD.

CPD expressed some concerns that because of requirements to testify in court cases and other obligations, it would be more difficult to recruit available officers working during the second watch (day shift). Therefore, a decision was made to oversample this population within the department and an additional 100 officers working the second watch were added to the sample.

17 The number of CPD focus groups was selected by the Illinois Attorney General’s Office to mirror the 14 community meetings that they facilitated during the process.
This sampling process identified a total of 550 sworn officers who were randomly selected to participate in the focus groups.\textsuperscript{18} CPD received the random sample of 550 sworn officers and removed from that sample officers who were unavailable to attend focus groups during their watch because of other commitments or because they were scheduled to be out. Ultimately, 170 officers attended the CPD and affinity group focus groups. Participants in the affinity group focus groups self-selected, and were not randomly selected to participate.

**Focus Group Structure**

All CPD focus groups were held at CPD Headquarters. The focus groups were scheduled throughout the day—at 11:00 am, 5:30 pm, 8:00 pm, and 12:30 am—and participants were assigned to a particular focus group. The two affinity group focus groups were held at a time and location selected by the groups and followed the same structure and process as the CPD focus groups.

While participants were required by their supervisors to report to CPD Headquarters for their assigned focus groups, once the focus groups began attendees were given the option of participating in the discussion or not by the group facilitator and through an Informed Consent form provided to each participant.\textsuperscript{19} No sign-ins were conducted and PF team members did not know the names, badge numbers, or randomly assigned numbers of the officers in the groups. Nominal Group Technique (NGT) was used during the focus groups to gain input from participants. “NGT gathers information by asking individuals to respond to questions posed by a moderator, and then asking participants to prioritize the ideas or suggestions of all group members.”\textsuperscript{20} Focus group attendees were provided five dots to place next to the items they felt were the most important; however, some chose not to participate or put multiple dots next to the same item. All comments were given with the assurance that while input was documented verbatim and would be included in this report, no names or other attribution would be given to participants.

Of the 170 people that attended:

- 165 remained after reading the informed consent form, which informed individuals of their rights, including that they were able to leave the focus group at any time.
- 155 remained for the entirety of the focus group or meeting. Some individuals left early to attend to other obligations.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{18} A copy of the CPD Bureau of Patrol message can be found in Appendix G of the report.
\textsuperscript{19} A full copy of the Informed Consent form can be found in Appendix B of this report.
\textsuperscript{20} “Gaining Consensus Among Stakeholders Through the Nominal Group Technique.” Evaluation Briefs.
\textsuperscript{21} These numbers do not include the 12 officers who walked out after the FOP member made a statement and after reading the informed consent form.
When participants arrived for their focus group, the training room table was set up in a U-Shape where officers sat during the focus group discussion. Each group was staffed by three PF staff members—a group facilitator, a co-facilitator (tasked with documenting input on flip-charts) and a note-taker who took notes on a computer. Focus group facilitators included Chief (Ret.) Dan Isom, II, PhD and Chief (Ret.) Darrel Stephens. Each focus group ran essentially the same way as outlined below:

**Introduction.** The facilitator and co-facilitator introduced themselves, and the facilitator gave a short background of who they are and why they were there. The facilitator explained the purpose of and process to be used for the focus group, and ensured the group understood. The facilitator then read each group the Informed Consent for Officers Form, and ensured copies of the statement were at each place on the table. The facilitator then reviewed group logistics, methodology, breaks, and how information gathered will be used and shared. The facilitator then answered any other questions posed by the group.

**Brainstorming Question 1.** The facilitator then asked Question 1 and posted it on a white board. The question was, “What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job safely and effectively as a Chicago Police Officer?” The facilitator explained as necessary and allowed up to 5 minutes of silence for everyone to think about the question and jot down ideas as they come to them. The facilitator then invited each person to provide one item, going in a sequential order, until all items were recorded. The co-facilitator recorded all items, in words as close as possible to those used by the contributor. The facilitator checked back with participants to ensure the item was captured accurately. No discussion or evaluation of ideas was conducted during this time. The group continued to generate and record ideas until all participants confirmed they had no additional ideas.

**Discussion Question 1.** Once all input was collected, the group discussed, combined, and reorganized each item. Wording changed only when the item’s originator agreed. The discussion clarified meaning, explained logic or analysis, raised and answered questions, or stated agreement or disagreement.

**Prioritization of Question 1 Ideas.** Once a comprehensive list was complete, all participants were provided with five dot stickers. They were then asked to place their stickers on the items that they believe to be the most important items on the flipchart. The group note-taker then tallied items with stickers and how many each item had, resulting in the priority of each item.

**Repeat for Question 2.** The group was then given a five-minute break, after which they repeated the entire process above with Question 2, which was “What can the consent decree do to address those challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?”

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22 Detailed biographies of Chiefs Isom and Stephens can be found in Appendix C of this report.
Once all input was recorded and prioritized and all discussions concluded, the facilitator took final questions, thanked officers for their participation and excused them.

**Thematic Coding of Topics**

After each focus group, researchers entered the number of votes each item received in an Excel spreadsheet. Items in this spreadsheet were grouped into broader underlying topics. The first round of coding was completed by two members of the PF team and were then reviewed by the rest of the team.

For Question 1, a total of 295 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff. Many of the same items were identified across focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 15 broader topics—listed alphabetically below—with some containing multiple subcategories that were used to differentiate the larger topics.

- Accountability
- Communications
- Department Culture
- Equipment & Technology
- Hiring
- Lack of Proactive Policing
- Lack of Support
- Miscellaneous
- Officer Safety and Wellness
- Performance Measures
- Expanded Role of Police
- Policies
- Promotions
- Staffing Shortages
- Training

For Question 2, a total of 134 specific items were noted by the participants and documented by PF staff. Like question one, many of the responses to this question were similar across the focus groups. To better organize the items and account for the overlaps, the specific items were coded into 13 broader topics—listed alphabetically below—with some containing multiple subcategories that were used to differentiate the larger topics:

- Accountability
- Communications
- New & Maintained Equipment, Technology and Facilities
- Hiring
- Increased Support
- Miscellaneous
- Officer Safety and Wellness
- Performance Measures
- Enhanced Policies
- Promotional Process
  - Transparency & Improvements
- Scope of Work
- Staffing
- Increased, Enhanced & Mandated Training

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23 A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix D of this report.
24 A full list of the responses can be found in Appendix E of this report.
The codes and subcategories, as well as each of and the individual items that were coded under each category, can be found in Appendices D and E of this report.

**Online Comment Box**

PF created an online comment box on their website to allow all sworn CPD officers to provide input. The website address and password to access the comment box was posted on the CPD intranet and information regarding it was provided to CPD staff via emails from CPD’s Policy and Procedure, Research and Development Division. Focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box by the CPD Lieutenant at the beginning of the focus groups. Officers were also reminded of the comment box during roll calls. The comment box was open for 17 days. The FOP issued a notice the day after the comment box was published that “strongly suggest[ed] that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey.”25 A total of 24 comments were submitted, which mirrored the input gathered during the focus groups.

Appendix B. Informed Consent Form (Provided to all Focus Groups Participants)

Informed Consent for Police Officers
Organizational Survey and Focus Groups: Chicago Police Department
April 2018

Overview of the Project
The National Police Foundation has reached an understanding with the Office of the Illinois
Attorney General (AG) to hold focus groups to solicit feedback from Chicago Police Department
(CPD) employees—leadership, rank and file. The project goal is to gather input from CPD staff
regarding department strengths and challenges to provide employees a voice in the consent
decree negotiation process.

About Your Participation
Your participation in this 60 - 90 minute focus group is entirely voluntary. If you agree to
participate, you will be asked questions about your experiences with your job, your supervisor,
and the department. The project team from the National Police Foundation will not receive
your name from CPD and will not be collecting any identifying information during the meeting.
Please note that we will do everything we can possibly do to protect your identity during and
after this focus group. Additionally, the National Police Foundation will encourage all
participants to keep everything said in the room confidential. However, as you are likely to
know at least some of the other officers in the room (or they may know you), we cannot
guarantee that what you say will not be shared publicly by other participants. If for any reason,
you feel uncomfortable sharing information with any or all the other participants in the focus
group, please only share that which you feel safe providing.

By participating in this interview/focus group, I agree to the following:
I have been informed that as with any focus group, I may perceive advantages and
disadvantages of participation. The focus group does require a commitment of my time and a
willingness to provide honest information whenever possible.

In any written reports or oral presentations of the results, my name will not be associated with
statements and opinions I provide, unless I give my explicit permission and provide my name
for this purpose. I understand that the Police Foundation will use the information I provide for
general assessment purposes only and I acknowledge that the focus group team plan to present
aggregate or summary results only. This means that any reported results will include analysis and interpretation of responses based only on groups large enough to where no person can be individually identified (for example, male officers). I have been advised by the Police Foundation that they will not disclose information that would identify me to anyone in CPD, the City or the Illinois Attorney General’s Office or anyone else outside of the project without my permission. At the same time, I have been informed that the Police Foundation team cannot control what other participants disclose after the focus group session, so I will be careful not to say anything that I would not want repeated outside the room.

Also, I have been informed herein that if I agree to participate in the focus group, I may withdraw at any time, or choose to not answer some questions.

I have been assured that if I choose to withdraw, I will not be asked to provide any more answers to additional questions, except for the reason for my withdrawal (and even then, I do not have to answer that question).

There will be no penalties or negative consequences if I decide to skip any questions or stop participating altogether. If I choose to stop participating during the session I am free to leave.

If I have any questions, concerns, or complaints, I may feel free to contact any of the people listed below by email or phone during regular business hours.

CONTACTS

If your concern is about the focus group, or your participation, please contact:
Blake Norton
Chief Operating Officer
Principal Investigator (PI)/ Project Director
National Police Foundation
1201 Connecticut Ave, N.W. Suite 200
Washington D.C. 20036-2636
bnorton@policefoundation.org
Tel: 202-833-1460

26 If I choose to withdraw, I may elect to call or email or leave a voice message for Blake Norton.
Appendix C. Focus Group Facilitator Biographies

Chief (Ret.) Daniel Isom II, Ph.D.

Daniel Isom was Chief of Police for the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department from 2008 and 2013. He is currently the E. Desmond Lee Professor of Policing and the Community at the University of Missouri-St. Louis. He also serves as a Police Foundation Executive Fellow.

After leaving the police department, Isom served as the Public Safety Director for the state of Missouri and as a member of the Ferguson Commission, which produced recommendations on how to transform the St. Louis region in the wake of the 2014 shooting death of Michael Brown, Jr. in Ferguson, Mo. Isom was co-chair of the working group on Citizen-Law Enforcement Relations for the Commission. Isom’s research interests include police management, police misconduct and use of force. As a 2013 Eisenhower Fellow, Isom studied community policing and police training in Ireland and Germany.

A member of the Metropolitan Police Department for 24 years until his retirement in 2013, Isom held a variety of positions within the department. Prior to his promotion as Chief of Police, he worked as the special projects assistant to the Chief, responsible for the planning and implementation of all department community-based initiatives. Previously, he served as commander of several districts as well as the St. Louis Police Academy, head of internal affairs, and he also worked in the internal audit unit and the juvenile division. Isom is a progressive advocate for elevating the standards of professionalism for law enforcement and strengthening the relationship between the police and citizens. His policing philosophy is based on the founder of modern police departments, Sir Robert Peel, who stated almost 200 years ago, “The people are the police and the police are the people.”

Isom holds bachelor’s, master’s and Ph.D. degrees from the University of Missouri-St. Louis in criminology and criminal justice and a master’s degree in public administration from St. Louis University. He is also a graduate of the FBI National Academy, the Police Executive Forum Senior Management Institute (PERF) and the FBI National Executives Institute.
Chief (Ret.) Darrel Stephens

Darrel Stephens currently serves as a consultant and an Executive Fellow with the Police Foundation. He is an accomplished police executive with 48 years of experience. His career began as a police officer in Kansas City, Missouri in 1968. In addition to his police experience, he served for 2 years as the City Administrator in St. Petersburg, Florida—a community of 250,000 people—where he was responsible for a work force of approximately 3,000 employees and a budget of $380 million. He has 22 years of experience in a police executive capacity including almost nine years from September 1999 to June 2008 as the Chief of Police of the 2,100-member Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (CMPD). He served as the Executive Director of the Major Cities Chiefs Association from October 2010 through October 2017.

Perhaps best known for advancing innovative approaches to policing, Stephens has earned a national reputation as a leader in policing. He served as the President, Vice President and Legislative Committee Chair of the Major Cities Police Chiefs Association while Chief in Charlotte. Throughout his career, he has taken on difficult and challenging opportunities, and championed strategic technology investments to enhance employee productivity. He is frequently called on to provide guidance on policing issues. He served as a technical advisor to the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. He has served as a member of the Innocence Project Board of Directors from 2011 through 2016. He has authored a number of publications on various topics related to policing and has served as a consultant and speaker promoting progressive policing approaches. He received the Police Executive Research Forum's Leadership Award and was elected as a Fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration in 2005. In 2006, he was awarded an Honorary Doctorate of Law Degree from Central Missouri State University. In 2010 he was inducted into the Evidence-Based Policing Hall of Fame and received the Distinguished Achievement Award in Evidence-Based Crime Policy, both presented by George Mason University’s Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy. In 2017 he received the Sir Robert Peel Medal for Evidence Based Policing from the Police Executive Program at Cambridge University. He also received the Major Cities Chiefs Association 2017 Leadership Award.
Appendix D. Full List of Responses to Question 1—Items Organized by Topic

The following represents a full list of the responses to Question 1, “What are the biggest challenges you face in doing your job safely and effectively as a Chicago Police Officer?” Items are organized by topic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No accountability from administration (outside agencies DOJ)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swiping in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swiping In (like punching a timeclock)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPA needs to be disempowered from investigating officer shootings because they're completely biased against police and technically illegal under state law (except Chicago, which is Home Rule)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPA's influence on the media and the effect it has on the public and their ability to trust the community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nothing positive about COPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers are apprehensive with their decision-making even when they are following department policy because of COPA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outside opinions (COPA), scrutiny on police actions causing officers to second guess themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perception of COPA as a knee-jerk reaction</td>
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<tr>
<td>War on police - COPA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We have to worry about being sued for making tough split-second decisions, and we're being judged by civilians (COPA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>When COPA completes an investigation years ago, they reopened the case for the third time. As officers, we need to have some assurance that once a case is investigated and ruled on it should be closed. There should be a statute of limitations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability for Police Officers focused on the wrong thing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a male white officer during the tensions between public and the police</td>
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<tr>
<td>Completion of ISR/Fear of negative repercussions/discipline for ISRs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of doing the wrong thing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of lawsuits</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of lawsuits and getting fired</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of negative repercussions/discipline for incorrect BWC use</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officer second guessing themselves and fear of repercussions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers are afraid to do their jobs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers are afraid to do their jobs because of lawsuits / consent decrees, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers are second guessing themselves</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers fear of unjustified prosecution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repercussions of doing your job</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Younger guys are more afraid of what's going to happen afterwards</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fear of getting second guessed and not wanting to mess up and getting in trouble</td>
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<tr>
<td>Getting used to the cameras and not allowing them to cause second guessing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support brings fear of doing the job and young officers second guessing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second guessing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second-guessing situations by a lot of officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Everything seems to be under a microscope/Too much oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police are handcuffed (racial profiling is overblown)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The demographics of the people we're dealing with have nothing to lose because they're criminals and we have everything to lose</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We're constantly being looked at under a microscope/People are afraid of doing the job/ We're being crucified by media and CPD is portrayed as the bad guys/Poor morale</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>External</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Communication with citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News Cycle vs. Due Process - News doesn't need to be truthful and police are stuck with perception (which becomes reality)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We need a spokesperson within the department that actually speaks to the media to inform the general public about the officer side of things</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Internal</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication with one another on the street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Communication - officers should get info before media.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Policies and laws change and our department doesn't actually tell us how to do things the right way. Development and dissemination is not done well and there is no practical application provided to us.</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department Culture</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coworkers that lack cultural competency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department does not have an us/us mentality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Do what you need to do and be the officer that they expect and put individual effort/Teaching officers how to interact so that the community doesn't always perceive us as being negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peer culture - I have a dangerous job so I do the job as I see fit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Growth and understanding of the community in which you serve</td>
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<tr>
<td>Have to drag police officers to change</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers aren't articulating what they're doing properly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Women work 10x as hard to prove themselves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females being in a male dominated profession - makes the work difficult</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Do as I say&quot; mentality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Divergence between old officers and new officers/Culture conflict regarding policing. Creates tension/People feel bullied by the new way of thinking</td>
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<tr>
<td>---</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of longevity/experience officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers struggling to adapt to new form of policing/Struggling with the new methods of policing. Conflict with &quot;old way vs. new way&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The current environment is making the police softer and the training is now based more on talking/de-escalation than on talking</td>
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<tr>
<td>Times have changed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Younger hires (millennials) have created a culture with age cohort</td>
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<tr>
<td>Younger officers don’t understand chain of command</td>
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<tr>
<td>Millennials</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black officers hear the criticism first and &quot;get it first from every angle&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Double whammy for blacks (lack of public support and lack of internal support)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female black supervisor does not get respect from all male officers, all race subordinates</td>
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**Equipment and Technology**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Body cameras</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District buildings are in poor shape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment - not maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment (radios aren't encrypted and offenders can listen to what we're doing)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment (working cars, phones, computers, the necessity things that we need don't work or aren't readily available)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment that doesn’t work</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment/Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equipment/Technology always broken</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of cars and poor facilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not enough equipment for existing FTOs (cage-less cars)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not enough in car computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poor equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Proper equipment (software systems, MDT placement, computers inside the stations, vehicles)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SST phones - not enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Too much equipment to keep track of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working equipment (vehicles, computers, radios don't work on a daily basis)</td>
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</table>

**Hiring**

<p>| Entrance exam is a joke |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lowering standards to hire people</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manpower / Staffing levels are low. Recruiting is difficult. Pushing low standard people through the Academy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of the recruits and the PPOs</td>
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<tr>
<td>The administration never fires anyone or washes out any of the bad recruits</td>
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**Lack of Proactive Policing**

- ACLU involvement in policing has negatively impacted our job because we're not as likely to stop people
- Breakdown between the community and the police, which in large part is impacted by the drop of the contact card in favor of the ISR
- Fear, by younger officers, of putting their hands on people
- ISRs - makes people reluctant to do their job. Makes officers feel like ACLU may be fishing
- ISRs - the document when we do street stops. They're in-depth, time-consuming, and are immediately transferred to the ACLU, which will call the suspect and try to challenge anything
- Motivating police officers to do their job when they're worried about being sued when they have everything (pension, family, life, etc.) on the line
- Not being able to be proactive because of all of the processes that we have to do and the potential for us to forget something small/accountability requirements that will end up with us getting jammed up
- Officers afraid to do their job
- Police are restricted by what we can do

**Lack of Support**

**Criminal Justice System**

- ASA support and accountability
- Criminal Justice system (including prosecution/courts) not operating the way it should
- Felony arrest vetting process
- Lack of public trust in justice system
- Lack of support from judicial system
- Police officers do not have credibility from judge
- Punishment not strict enough or enforced
- SA won't prosecute and knocks down charges
- Stronger sentencing especially for violent offenders

**Community Support**

- Citizens/Jurors are much more receptive of defendants than they are of police
- community distrust - us against them
- Community does not value officers who go above and beyond
- Community has lack of respect for police
- Community is uneducated about PO's job, what they are required to do, law, etc.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community needs to buy into process - this is a 'together' process</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community won't provide information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disrespect from our own community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Failure to comply with police officers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Increased scrutiny with cameras</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of community education of what police officers do</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of community support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of respect for authority.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of social support (We second guess every action. CPD is constantly under the microscope)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support for POs from community</td>
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<td>Lack of support from community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support from public</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative perception of the police / no positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Negative public perception</td>
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<tr>
<td>Perception of the police by the community</td>
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<tr>
<td>Police community trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public attitude - nowadays everybody knows the law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public doesn't understand the challenges we face and our ability to resolve them</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Perception</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public perception/CPD is a punching bag</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public perception/misperception</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public trust</td>
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<tr>
<td>Relationship between people in the community and the police.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Society's lack of respect for the police</td>
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<tr>
<td>The disconnect between public perception of what CPD does</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Department (CPD) Support</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Brothers/Sisters in blue not embraced by all</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Command staff needs to back us up and support us</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department does not have the officers' back</td>
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<tr>
<td>Department support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disparity in discipline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support from supervisors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support from the administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support from the command structure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of support internally, particularly from CPD leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of transparency in discipline process (not in notes, in picture)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lift morale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Micromanagement that the department puts on the sergeants to further micromanage their officers. Sergeants are required to do so much paperwork that they can't get on the streets to do the work that they need to do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Officers don’t feel like they can make an honest mistake</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peer pressure does not allow officers to speak up</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervision challenges</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisors do not provide adequate support</td>
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<tr>
<td>Supervisors' lack of interest for those they serve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors that lack knowledge, people skills, and compassion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support and respect from command staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support from supervisors</td>
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<tr>
<td>Trust and support from administration</td>
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### Media

- How we are portrayed in the media
- Media - quick to demonize police; giving unfair
- Media not giving the full story or doing what they have to sell the story

### Elected Officials

- City needs to start fighting lawsuits against police department
- City pays out lawsuits too fast
- Cops should be judging cops not politicians/Political support
- Impartiality (administration, political powers/structure)
- Lack of political support
- Lack of political support
- Lack of support from the City
- Lack of support from the city to investigate complaints against officers. The city settles too quickly
- Pension should be funded
- Political agendas driving decisions (BWCs for example).
- Political influence "Machine"
| Politicians/elected officials take side of criminals over police / Too much involvement by City Hall |
| Positive public relations from the city - if the mayor and council backed us more |
| Support from administration and politicians |

**Miscellaneous**
- Consent decree based on anecdotal data
- No follow through to fix issues
- Retaining composure and professionalism when we're always on camera
- Too much paperwork

**Officer Safety and Wellness**
- Internal Partnerships
  - Lack of adequate mental health resources for CPD officers
  - No steady partners, no familiarity with the person I'm working with and what they're thinking

**Officer foot pursuit technology/Safety tracking**
- Officer safety and wellness. Caring for officers who are impacted by all events on the job. EAP - officers are not comfortable accessing those services
- Weapons easily available to those on the street

**Morale**
- Demoralized
- DOJ poor influence on CPD morale - ACLU
- No cohesion in uniforms
- PD feels like a battered spouse

**Performance Measures**
- Activity-based performance measures (quotas)
- Numbers issue is poorly defined. Where do the numbers come from?
- Supervision - too numbers based. Too strict. Undue pressure
- We're a numbers-based department instead of effort-based. People are forced to do things that they may not need to do just to be "seen" and have a number. The department has been demanding quotas even though they won't call it that

**Expanded Role of Police**
- CFD is requesting our presence at calls, but it impacts our ability to do calls
- City wants the police department to be proactive
- Constantly being put in a no-win situation/Better call screening
- Dealing with family issues that they turn into police issues / Dealing with all social ills that are not police/crime-related
- Dealing with people with mental health issues, particularly those who are violent
- Officers have misconception of their role and get tunnel vision. They think it’s not my job. Traditional policing vs service
- Police being asked to handle all issues without proper training in those areas
Police held accountable for every social ill
Should narrow police focus, not broaden it
We're no longer proactive, only reactive/Can't do our jobs

**Policies**

- Car chases - policy is so restrictive because liability has outweighed law.
- Catch 22s (for example, uncertainty with use of Taser)
- Discipline is inconsistent across the department
- General orders should be easier to digest and more user-friendly
- Interpretations of the policies are not clear at all
- Intimidated by the policies the department writes for us
- Limiting our options for secondary employment
- Narrow interpretation of 4th amendment
- Policies (especially use of force) are confusing
- Policies in general too restrictive
- Public involvement in creating policy
- Residency requirement
- Rolling out policies is a rushed process and we're expected to know it as soon as it's issued
- Too many policies
- Use of force
- Use of force policies
- Vehicle chase policy is too restrictive
- We should just be CALEA accredited so that we don't have to go through separate processes with the city, the county, the state, etc.

**Promotions**

**Internal Procedural Justice**

- No advancement for police officers (the promotional exam is administered too infrequently)
- Promotional process needs to be revamped
- Scheduling of promotional exams
- We need a command staff that has actually been merit-promoted and go back to promoting people that have actually done real police work because they're the ones making the decisions that got us to where we are now

**Staffing Shortages**

- Command staff incompetence to allocate appropriately
- Lack of manpower
- Lack of manpower - training
- Lack of officers - staffing levels
- Manpower
- Manpower issues
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Manpower shortage</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not enough manpower</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrol assignments are disparate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staffing levels and allocation of manpower</td>
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<tr>
<td>There's not enough time to do your job</td>
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**Training**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lack of proper training</th>
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<tr>
<td>Lack of training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Midnights don't get training - they have to change their hours/shift in to be able to train</td>
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<tr>
<td>More training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need practical, scenario-based and situational training, not just book training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not enough real-world training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario-based trying has gone away in lieu of computer-based training</td>
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<tr>
<td>Should train on work shift</td>
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**Police Academy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Academy is a joke</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academy is overcrowded. Facilities are no good. Feels rushed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy is overrated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy not challenging enough</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academy training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased qualification for the range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instructors do not have enough experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory force mitigation training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No power test effective 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People make it through the academy that should not</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources/training - academy is theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe lack of organization in the academy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Firearms Qualification**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Don’t shoot enough - training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Firearms training and qualification should be more than once a year</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FTO Program**

<p>| FTO program |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FTO Program is a joke / needs an overhaul. No accountability for police officers from FTO. No incentives or training for FTOs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FTO program not consistent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTOs are motivated for wrong reason</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTOs should want to help us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No oversight over field training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPOs not prepared after FTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The FTO program is overcrowded and there's no incentive to be an FTO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**In-service Training**

- Continued training (both physical and tactical, and updated policies/book)
- Everyone should be trained in CIT
- More structured In-Service training giving officers the knowledge to understand effective policing strategies
- Need more CIT training. CFS [Calls for service] for MH [mental health] issues have skyrocketed
- Needs CIT training
- Now everyone is requesting a CIT-trained officer for dealing with persons with mental disabilities, but we've been dealing with them my entire 20+ year career, but we have to be trained by it
- Training - not enough time to take the training
- Training. (No In-Service; Not enough qualify; tactical training; active shooter training (in academy only)
Appendix E. Full List of Responses to Question 2—Items Organized by Topic

The following represents a full list of the responses to Question 2, “What can the consent decree do to address those challenges, support officer safety, and enhance service to the community?” Items are organized by topic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accountability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability of civil rights organizations and other civilians to have complete right to determine policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discipline - restorative justice practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Federal agency reviews in 72 hours</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knee jerk reaction to a few bad incidents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No swiping in and out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review and reform complaint process, reception &amp; investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set guidelines for civilian oversight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Streamline discipline process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supervisors need to be held accountable on the streets - not enough supervisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COPA ability to investigate Chicago officer involved shootings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandate that police expertise be required in COPA investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for COPA-what are the requirements?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't penalize officers for following laws</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indemnification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limit punitive damages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second guessing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communication</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limit the release of information/video before trial to not influence case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department does a terrible job of explaining actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase internal communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Span of control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency and internal communication that allows for understanding in the public on the actual issues during a critical incident</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>New and Maintained Equipment, Technology, and Facilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Are the proper equipment/training provided to officers to reduce use of force? -taser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better equip officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment standards (in your car, the Toughbook, and in the stations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved Equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invest in newer equipment to help us fight crime with technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Need working computers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not enough vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proper resource allocation for the fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require better equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require better/improved facilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Require properly funded equipment, training and facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Update technology</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Hiring**

- Preference for military experience
- Recruiting standards

**Increased Support**

- Citizen police academies
- City and CPD should work together to put out ads/educational campaign about listening to police officers and importance of compliance from the public
- Educate citizens
- More funds/resources to help build bridges with the community
- Provide public education for the community
- Public does not understand the decision-making process
- Internal procedural justice
- Requests up the chain of command are not honored
- Balance paying out very quickly sends wrong message
- Fully funded pension/City needs to be required to keep up with its obligations
- Keep politics out of policing
- More support from politicians
- Pensions should be fully funded by city
- Political support for the police department
- Politics/election year pressure
- Require fully funded pension
- Resources for everyone at CPD across the board
- Set some sort of parameter where we can catch up to our pension. The city has to reach a certain amount by a certain time or they can be penalized for us
- Time frame, metrics for consent decree

**Miscellaneous**

- Contract allows for officers to leave assignments that might be more reflective of one’s race
- Nothing

---

27 One focus group participant indicated that the consent decree could do nothing to address their challenges, support officer safety, or enhance service to the community.
### Officer Safety and Wellness

- Increase MH [mental health] resources for officers
- Mandating EAP [Employee Assistance Program] - officer safety wellness
- Officer safety needs to be prioritized in all areas of consent decree requirements

### Performance Measures

- Elimination of numbers-based policing/No more quotas
- Ensure that state legislation and departmental policies are aligned/Reconsider and review numbers-based performance metrics
- Get rid of CompStat
- Limit the impact of ISRs on the numbers-base. Take into account calls-for-service, report writing, going to community meetings, etc.

### Enhanced Policies

- Clarity of general orders/policies (e.g. Taser use)
- Eliminate residency requirement
- Legal process that defines what happens if an officer is involved in a complaint/Complaint reception/investigation process should be clearly defined
- Lift residency requirement
- Limit the requirements of the ISRs/Process of ISRs/Reconsider ISR issue with officer safety perspective
- New positions to oversee diversity
- Our department guidelines, particularly use of force, should better mirror state statutes
- Pedestrian Stop Report created by the Illinois Department of Transportation should be used by CPD/Have the State AG's office mandate a form that should be used and stop reporting to the ACLU
- Policies aren't always black-and-white and we need to have the assurance that if we don't follow policy exactly we won't be punished. We need to have verbiage in our policies that allow us to do our job. Ensure officers are provided the opportunity to use discretion to protect themselves
- Prioritize what helps officers (maybe implement process that allows officer input into policies/procedures/changes)
- Time limit on contract negotiations

### Promotional Process Transparency and Improvements

- Define promotional process (planning)
- Define promotional process (role of FTO)
- Improve promotional process; more frequent tests
- Incentivize good police officers who want to stay officers
- Increase opportunities for advancement
- Language that mandates the changes of merit-based promotions and more transparency with your score on the exam
- No clear guidelines for promotion
Outside agency implementing promotional exams
Promote sergeants to enhance beat integrity and supervision
Promotional process consistent
Reform promotional testing process
Transparent promotional testing process

**Scope of Work**
Create resources for diversion of mental health calls

**Staffing**
Address investigative units
Better staffing better policing
Clearly define process for staffing allocation
Create incentives for working in certain districts
Education mandate
Examine staffing schedules
Fully staff the department
Increase staffing to assist with community policing duties
Male dominated department - women are not decision makers - especially black women
Manpower workload analysis
Manpower-officer job is being watered down
Manpower-sliding scale for tasks
Require clearly defined supervisor to officer ratio.
Require staffing study/review to address allocation of resources
Require the city to hire more police officers
Staffing plan
Understand the cost benefit analysis
Unrealistic hiring plan

**Increased, Enhanced, and Mandated Training**
Create legitimate training - not check the box
Develop comprehensive strategy for all training
Improved Training Program
Lack of training
Need a comprehensive approach to training for officers/community
Prioritize training for all officers
Require better training that keeps up with the changing times and better communication of the changing policies and laws
Require better training
Taser 2015 incident not fully trained
Training to change behavior - bias
Value effective trainings that enhance officer safety and reduce use of force

We lack a lot of the training that other departments have

### Academy & Field Training

- Require higher Academy standards (physical especially); need more instructors
- Review the screening process, the training they receive in the academy, and all the way through
- Training should be done when you're in the academy, not after you're already on the street
- Incentivized FTO program

### Firearms Qualification

- Rifle qualifications - need to know someone

### In-service

- Better training for new supervisors (include more SMEs [subject matter experts])
- Better training for new supervisors (lessons from private sector)
- Better training for new supervisors (train new supervisors check-in)
- Consistent application of training
- Mandate training
- Mandatory training requirements and consistent in-service training
- Mandatory CIT, force mitigation, range qualifications
- Motivate officers to take training - rename classes "how not to get sued"
- Officers trained two weeks a year- keep current with training
- Review and increase the amount of in-service training at the academy in an organized fashion
- Roll call training
- There should be more mandatory situational training
Appendix F. Online Open Comment Box Responses

PF created an online comment box on its website to allow all sworn CPD officers to provide input. The website address and password to access the comment box was posted on the CPD intranet and information regarding it was provided to CPD staff via emails from CPD’s Policy and Procedure, Research and Development Division. Focus group attendees were also encouraged to inform their colleagues about the comment box at the beginning of each focus group. Officers were also reminded of the comment box during roll calls. The comment box was open for 17 days. The FOP issued a notice the day after the comment box was published that “strongly suggest[ed] that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey.”

A total of 24 comments were submitted and are listed verbatim below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Online Open Comment Box Responses</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There will be no value in a consent decree that doesn’t address the chronic problems of political favoritism and nepotism in the Department. These issues are most clearly visible in the promotional process. The entire process lacks legitimacy and is highly suspect. If members lack confidence in the promotional system, how can they have confidence in their leadership? And if there’s no confidence in the leadership, how are the members supposed to follow and ‘buy-in’ to any reform or direction CPD brings about. The consent decree should address the promotions exams (content, frequency, transparent grading), address the cheating (which has been rampant for decades and has been identified through litigation), and address the merit system (which is just code for promoting your friends/family/secretaries/drivers). This is an opportunity to really do some good for the department as an organization, and restore legitimacy to our operations. Ignoring this topic (or leaving its enforcement to vague and weak) would be a disservice.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

You guys really need to let the City and the Department know about the problems in the promotion process. The consent decree should state 1) how often exams will be administered (national average is every 2-3 years), 2) that no active CPD members will serve as SME's (to reduce the flagrant cheating), and 3) should revamp the 'merit' process to make it fairer, more transparent, and open to everyone. This would go a long way towards improving morale, increasing member buy-in, and providing positive career progression for our members.

---

Since I wasn't chosen for one of the focus groups and was never interviewed by either the DOJ or the Mayor's Commission I guess this is the only way for me to provide feedback to those revamping the CPD. In my four decades with the Department this biggest change that has had the most negative impact on the Department has been the merit promotion process. It is time for this failed social experiment to end. The merit process has resulted in two negative impacts that has led to many of the other problems the Department is facing. The first negative impact has been the loss in respect for all supervisors. The average officer thinks all supervisors were promoted through the merit process so they not only do not respect them personally, but they also don't respect their professional decisions. The second negative impact is a brain drain. The department is now run overwhelmingly by individuals who could not even pass a sergeant's exam. Many were meritorious detectives, meritorious sergeants, meritorious lieutenants and then Lt. commanders. They only had to pass the written portion of the exam which had a passing rate on only 60%, then never had to show their ability to think critically by taking and/or passing the second part of the exam. This has led to illegitimate leadership who's only way to legitimize their positions is by wearing all their award ribbons. Apparently, by wearing their ribbons the rest of us are expected to recognize them as legitimate leaders. It doesn't work, most officers see it for what it is. The arrogance and sense of entitlement displayed by these merit promotees is not good for either the Department or the City as a whole. The merit process must end.

I believe that it is absolutely critical that the consent decree between the IL-AG and CPD include drastic changes to the Department's promotional process. The processes for both rank-order and merit selection needs a complete overhaul as neither are in line with national best-practices. The sworn members of the Department have no faith in the current promotional process and do not believe that it is honest, fair, or transparent in any way. The process is ripe with cheating, abuse, nepotism, favoritism, and cronyism. Each and every aspect of the process (from the exam to the "merit" nomination/selection process) is cloaked in secrecy and is highly suspect. This results in not only low morale and low confidence in career progression/mobility, but also results in a less than optimal caliber of leadership in the Department. Instead of identifying and promoting the best and brightest amongst its member, CPD has, historically, preferred the clouted and the politically-connected. This needs to stop. The only way to bring CPD leadership practices into the 21st century is to holistically review and revamp the promotional process from the ground up. However, in the absence of concrete and accountable language in a court-enforced order – I fear that any efforts to reform this politically charged topic will be largely a "dog and pony show."

There should be promotional exams year round. Why is there always a minimum gap of 10 years in between promotional exams? ---- When people are promoted, why is that they are only sent to a district for a short period of time and then quickly whisked away to some special unit, with less than a year in the new position?? ----- Why do they open NOJO's, when they already have the specific people in mind who they want for the job and are usually less qualified?! It's like they open these NOJO's with the false hope that the selection process is actually legit and unbiased. It's a joke.
The promotional process in the Chicago Police Department is extremely demoralizing. The tests come around every 8-10 years and the merit process can only be described as a "slap in the face." People are getting promoted simply because of their relationship with bosses and city council members. Many of the promoted have never worked the street and barely have any time on the job. This has created a culture within the department where it has become difficult to acknowledge any supervisor (of all ranks) as such and that is not fair to those who have earned that position deserving.

With over 90% of the command staff having been promoted through the ranks "meritoriously" their is no hope for an average supervisor that has made it through the ranks by taking the promotional exams scoring high enough to be promoted to ever be considered for a promotion.

I would like to see a clear definition of "Merit," as it pertains to the promotional process. I would like members of each collective bargaining unit to be solicited for information and/or feedback prior to the implementation of any changes.

It is my firm belief that the DOJ 'investigation' was a monumental waste of money. If that 'study' was an academic paper it would have received a failing grade. It lacked specificity and contained nothing but anecdotal observations. Nothing was backed up by facts or specific examples. No study can be accepted as serious if it is void of hard facts. How any free thinking person can accept the DOJ study as a serious investigation is beyond me. The current DOJ administration is right in staying out of this mess. The misrepresentations and outright lies have been the death knell of proactive policing and has led to the unnecessary deaths of hundreds of Chicagoans. The persons involved in this 'study' and its flawed findings should be ashamed of themselves, they have blood on their hands.

I think a Consent Decree is a horrible idea. I am satisfied with the status quo. I believe monitoring and maintaining a consent decree would not serve the public as it would create a tax burden on every citizen of Chicago.

Maybe if promotions on the police department were actually legitimate, and the type of people being promoted weren't then maybe, but other it's a complete joke. She is seeking a consent decree to help Rahm force changes that we have in our contract. The mayor doesn't give a shit about the police department, he only cares about his re-election as Mayor. The police does need reform but so do the citizens that we protect.

Address the overworking of officers (ie. days off cancelled for certain teams or units) resulting in working 7-10 days in a row without a break. Should be limits on how and when they can cancel days
Training and the lack of enough QUALIFIED supervisors needs to be addressed. Interestingly enough, just yesterday a Department of Aviation Security Officer announced a lawsuit for his lack of training. There is no listed criteria for merit promotions and most poor supervisors are products of merit promotions. Additionally, there should be a limit of one merit promotion to anyone that receives one.

There is no support from the politicians in Chicago. COPA is does not have the training in state law or department policy to objectively make a determination in use of force incidents. Let’s put them through some scenarios where they have to make split second decisions. Every time an incident happens, the media lets the small group of protestors get their message out. Where is the department to explain the actual law? In a recent incident from Elgin, where a woman with a knife was shot by an Elgin officer, the Elgin police chief was explaining to the demonstrators that the officer doesn’t have to wait to be stabbed before the officers can protect themselves. Where is that support in Chicago?

We are also seeing the effects of years of merit promotions. Officers in leadership roles that aren’t equipped to handle the day to day rigors of police work because they have never actually performed any functions of real police work. The same leaders that are calling for activity, have no idea about reasonable articulable suspicion or probable cause. The call for activity during the comstat era caused officers to seek quantity over quality. Now all ISRs go to the ACLU to be scrutinized. And still the department wonders why there is not more proactive policing.

Because the Chicago Police Department let the ranks of its members dwindle to the lowest amount of officers during my career, there were insufficient in service training conduct to keep officers informed of new policies. There is no commitment to training and even if there was any attempt to properly train, there would not be enough officers on the street to cover for officers in training. Now that the department is seemingly making an effort to hire additional officers, this type of the mass hiring will not result in the best trained officers.

The efforts of the Illinois Attorney General are misguided and political. There are many flaws in the DOJ investigation and the results are Chicago having high crime rates and many neighborhoods are unsafe to live in. Police officers should be given the tools they need and support from their department, their politicians and the community as the try to serve and protect. The indictment into the practices of the department should be an indictment against the exempt members of the department, who let failed strategies become common practice.
This is all BS and a political ploy to aid and enable mayor Emanuel's re-election startegy. It is plain to see that he is attempting to put lipstick on a pig and call it police reform. Start by protecting your employees and provide them with a living wage.

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) is continually adopting new strategies in the fight against crime. For example, it has built intelligence centers in various districts in an attempt to respond faster to shots fired calls. CPD has also began a frenzied hiring spree in order to put more police officers on the street. Thus, in the spirit of fighting of fighting and solving crime, I am perplexed as to why the CPD has dwindled the Crime Lab down to (3) forensic investigators working on the street? Why has the CPD not replenished the ranks of the forensic investigators along with their specialized skillset (e.g., usage of the Leica laser system, etc.)? How is it that a major American city which is plagued with violent crime in vulnerable communities can have such a meager staff of highly trained forensic investigators? Will it take a forensic fumble in a high-profile homicide, disaster, or God forbid police shooting for the City of Chicago to realize that it needs a well staffed team of forensic investigators? If the CPD truly wants to have genuine "CHANGE" in its way of serving and protecting its citizens, I suggest it should have a well trained staff of forensic investigators in order to effectively catch, arrest, and successfully convict the evil element which plagues our city. Thank you for any and all consideration with regard to this matter.

A consent decree is very damaging to the department. When allowing politicians and civilians to dictate what and how a police officer is to conduct himself while he is in performance of his duties is extremely dangerous to the public and to the officer. As a detective who reviews a lot of officers body cameras I have noticed officers are becoming more and more reluctant to put handcuffs on the individuals they are stopping. This failure has caused more officers to be battered. As a veteran of over 22 years on this job, every time I stopped more than one person the handcuffs went on. I told who I was stopping that this was done for their safety and for mine and guess what the results were? I NEVER fought with anybody, EVER and I NEVER got a CR number, go figure!! Today, officers have to document why they are stopping someone, why they are searching someone and why handcuffs may have been put on an individual and that is an absolute shame. Because of this officers are not stopping as many people which means the bad guys can now pretty much walk and drive freely without worry that an officer ma stop them. The result, more murders, shootings, robberies, carjackings. Sad. Having civilians and politicians dictate the use of force protocol for officers is an embarrassment. Until one walks in an officers shoes, I really don't think you have the right to tell an officer when he can or can't use deadly force. I don't think you have the authority to tell an officer what piece of equipment he should use in a particular situation. But, the mayor is desperate for votes so he allows this backwards strategy to move forward, tragic. Officer training, I'm ll for it. Accountability? Really? Why do you think that the last promotional exam is for lieutenant? Let's fix that problem. Why can two officers get in trouble for the exact same thing and one officer takes 20 days and the other takes 2? The same reason there is no promotional exam after lieutenant that's why. This system is beyond broke, a consent decree will do nothing except lower, if that's possible,
officer moral and will be the final nail in making sure officers do nothing proactive, which is exactly what the politicians and the criminals want.....Sad. The bottom line is criminals don't want to be stopped, harassed, talked to and I never thought that the day would come when laws would be in place to make sure that does happen, no more stops, no more harassing. I never thought I would see the day when we allow the criminals to win, wrong becomes right. A criminals word is more believable then an officers word. Really Tragic times in Chicago and my fear is it's only going to get worse.

One of the most important things that needs to be done is to establish some type of leadership in this department. To do this we must bring integrity to the testing process and eliminate "meritorious" promotions. Meritorious promotions often give us unqualified leaders that are promoted based only on who they know. Removing the mayor's influence over department leadership would lead to better leaders. The department members have no confidence to this pandering mayor.

Appeasing people for political agendas is not grounds for a consent decree. The DOJ report was rushed and put together by an outgoing administration that is not supported by the current administration. Chicago and its politicians need to focus more on why there is so much crime in Chicago. Not handicapping their police officers and making the police feel like the bad guy. This is unsafe for all police and citizens and detrimental in making Chicago a world class city. I advise all involved in this to reconsider.

Equipment upkeep and facility upkeep should be mandated in the form of service contracts or mandated checks. As a organization we allow everything to break and it takes eons for things to get fixed. Vehicles, Buildings, Clean locker rooms, Etc. This may seem "non-essential" however moral would improve. Imagine if at your workplace you showed up everyday to a location that had dirty, bathrooms, Asbestos, cars that were old, comuters that were not updated with current licenses to use Microsoft Word or Excel. Imagine driving thier everyday, would your work performance improve?
Appendix G. CPD Bureau of Patrol Message Regarding Focus Groups

BUREAU OF PATROL

TO:         Deputy Chief  All
           District Commander  All

FROM:       Fred L. Waller
           Chief
           Bureau of Patrol

SUBJECT:    Police Foundation Focus Group

8 April 2018
B.O.P. #18-0083

The Illinois Attorney General has contracted the Police Foundation (https://www.policefoundation.org), the oldest nationally-known, non-profit, non-partisan, non-membership driven organization, to conduct focus groups with Chicago Police Department members. The purpose of these focus groups is to find out from officers what challenges they face in doing their jobs safely and effectively and what can a consent decree do to help solve these issues.

Participants were randomly selected anonymously by the Police Foundation from patrol districts on all watches. The Police Foundation was never given any identifying information. The selected members will be notified to report to the Second Floor Training Room at the Public Safety Headquarters at 3510 S. Michigan. Each session will last no longer than 90 minutes.

Members are required to attend, but participation is voluntary. No identifying information will be collected by the Police Foundation for any reason. The Foundation will only document the groups’ responses. This is an opportunity for members to share their opinions regarding the issue they face every day and discuss possible solutions that work for them.

The members on the attached lists have been selected to participate in the Police Foundation Focus Groups. District Commanders will ensure the members are notified to appear as instructed on the date and time listed.

Fred L. Waller
Chief
Bureau of Patrol

FLW/GJD/j
Attachment

Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago Lodge #7
April 11, 2018

Focus Groups / Consent Decree

As you are probably aware, the Illinois Attorney General filed a lawsuit against the City seeking to impose a consent decree upon the Chicago Police Department. The Fraternal of Police opposed the need for this consent decree.

Today, the Lodge became aware of a Bureau of Patrol order entitled Police Foundation Focus Groups. These focus groups are being conducted at Chicago Police Headquarters by a company named the Police Foundation. The order does not specifically state the subject(s) that the focus group will address, but it is believed the group will focus on a proposed consent decree. Attendance is mandatory, but participation is voluntary. Lodge attorneys have recommended that FOP members attend, but refrain from participation in any dialog at this meeting.

More importantly, the Lodge has also become aware of a message from CPD Research and Development that directs FOP members to a website for feedback and suggestions regarding a consent decree proposed by the Illinois Attorney General's Office. The information garnered from Officer responses will be compiled by the National Police Foundation.

Lodge attorneys have advised the Lodge that these are illegal attempts to gain information from our members. Our attorneys strongly suggest that FOP members do not participate in this web-based survey.
Example 4

ENGAGING COMMUNITIES
ONE STEP AT A TIME

Policing's Tradition of Foot Patrol as an Innovative Community Engagement Strategy

Brett M. Cowell | Anne L. Kringen
ENGAGING COMMUNITIES
ONE STEP AT A TIME

Policing’s Tradition of Foot Patrol as an Innovative Community Engagement Strategy

Brett M. Cowell | Anne L. Kringen
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The Police Foundation would like to offer a very special thanks to the Charles Koch Foundation for their generous support of this study and for their steadfast belief in the virtues of policing, particularly in all of those who so bravely serve their communities.

We also want to offer our immense gratitude to the officers and staff of the Cambridge Police Department, the New Haven Police Department, the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety, the Evanston Police Department, and the Portland Police Bureau for their enthusiastic support throughout the course of this study, and we want to thank each officer and community member for volunteering their time to participate in the interviews. Their stories, opinions, beliefs, and insights added tremendous value to our research.

We are also indebted to the officers and staff that helped coordinate our visit at each of the five sites. Specifically, we want to thank retired Commissioner Robert Haas (Cambridge Police Department), Superintendent Joseph Wilson (Cambridge Police Department), Kia Benjamin (Cambridge Police Department), former Chief Dean Esserman (New Haven Police Department), Sergeant Roy Davis (New Haven Police Department), Commander Brian Henry (Evanston Police Department), Sergeant Dennis Leaks (Evanston Police Department), Chief Jeffrey Hadley (Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety), Captain Jim Mallery (Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety), Sergeant Jim Quackenbush (Portland Police Bureau), Lieutenant Michael Frome (Portland Police Bureau), and Acting Sergeant Stephen Yakots (Portland Police Bureau).

Finally, we offer a special thanks to our project team – Anne Kringen, Ph.D., Chief Frank Straub, Ph.D. (Ret.), and Sergeant Renee Mitchell – for their hard work and dedication, as well as to Cynthia Lum, Ph.D., and Christopher Koper, Ph.D., for providing valuable assistance during the planning stage of the project. We would like to also thank all Police Foundation staff that supported the development of this report. This project was designed, proposed and overseen by Jim Burch, the Police Foundation’s Vice President for Strategic Initiatives. Mr. Burch provided guidance and support throughout the project and served as editor of this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Although support for foot patrol as a policing strategy has shifted over time, in modern policing foot patrol has received substantial attention (Fields & Emshwiller, 2015; Bekiempis, 2015). Primarily lauded as a potential remedy to strained relations between community members and police, the effectiveness of foot patrol at reducing crime, diminishing fear of crime, or relieving strained relations with the community is unclear. While foot patrol may hold promise as a crime reduction approach, no definitive conclusions can yet be drawn as to its effectiveness in this regard.

The conflicting evidence on the effectiveness of foot patrol may relate to variation in how foot patrol is implemented in various departments. Considering that foot patrol ultimately manifests as one-on-one interactions between officers and community members, differences in attitudes toward foot patrol assignments, as well as variation in the specific activities undertaken as part of foot patrol, may help explain contradictory research findings. However, few detailed descriptions outlining variation in foot patrol exist. This limitation is noteworthy as detailed descriptions of different implementations of foot patrol may also provide direction to agencies considering adopting foot patrol as part of their operational strategies.

Present Study

Using semi-structured interviews with officers, focus-groups of community members, and observational techniques, this report examines how five different agencies—(1) Cambridge (MA) Police Department, (2) New Haven (CT) Police Department, (3) Kalamazoo (MI) Department of Public Safety, (4) Evanston (IL) Police Department, and (5) Portland (OR) Police Bureau—utilize different foot patrol strategies to interact, engage, and build relationships with their communities. Descriptions of these agencies and their approaches are detailed, and attitudes of officers and citizens are analyzed. Organizational issues are discussed, and recommendations for agencies considering adopting foot patrol are presented. The remainder of this executive summary presents the primary findings and summarizes the key recommendations of the overall report.

Key Findings

Key findings of the study generally related to two distinct areas. The first area focuses on the perceived benefits of foot patrol. Given the nature of the analysis, these benefits reflect those positive characteristics noted by officers that were supported by community-member statements or through observational data, as shown in Table 1 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Benefits of Foot Patrol</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between officers and the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foot patrol enhances the enforcement and problem-solving capability of law enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relationships built through foot patrol can change how the community views police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Relationships built through foot patrol can increase the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the community.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Foot patrol is rewarding and psychologically beneficial for the officers involved.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The second area relates to key challenges of implementing and maintaining foot patrol. Based on the type of analysis conducted, these themes relate to challenges noted at multiple sites. These challenges are listed in Table 2 below:

### Table 2: Challenges for Implementation of Foot Patrol

- Foot patrol is manpower intensive.
- Traditional productivity measures may be inappropriate for assessing the performance of foot patrol officers.
- Foot patrol focused on community engagement may be seen as antithetical to the traditional crime control model of policing, which may create challenges for internal acceptance in some cases.

### Recommendations to Departments

Based on the analysis and emergent themes, departments considering implementing foot patrol as an operational strategy should consider four key areas: (1) purpose, (2) resources, (3) continuity, and (4) commitment. These areas reflect both the challenges of foot patrol as discussed by various agencies as well as components of implementation that were noted as beneficial by foot patrol officers and community members. Table 3 presents the rationale for each area and suggested questions for self-assessment.

### Table 3: Key Areas for Foot Patrol Implementation Planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AREA</th>
<th>RATIONALE</th>
<th>ASSESSMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Purpose</td>
<td>Agencies should understand why they are adopting foot patrol.</td>
<td>Can the organization clearly articulate the reasons they are choosing to implement foot patrol and the goals they hope to accomplish?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Agencies should understand the resource implications of foot patrol.</td>
<td>Has the department identified the necessary resources to adequately implement foot patrol?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuity</td>
<td>Agencies should maintain ongoing foot patrol in areas utilizing the same officers.</td>
<td>Is there an established plan to assure continuity in foot patrol, including continuity of officers as well as continuity of patrol?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Agencies should maintain foot patrol over an extended period.</td>
<td>Does the organization demonstrate a long-term commitment to implementing foot patrol, or is the decision reactionary or temporary in nature?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the span of American policing, views on foot patrol as an enforcement strategy have changed. Originally considered a fundamental component of policing, foot patrol was later viewed as unnecessary. At times considered outdated, foot patrol was later recast as an innovative approach. Perhaps most importantly, belief in foot patrol’s ability to achieve law enforcement goals has oscillated back and forth with foot patrol being lauded as effective at times and criticized as ineffective at others.

In modern policing, foot patrol has been suggested as a remedy to strained relations between community members and the police, and the practice has made a resurgence in a number of law enforcement agencies across the country (Fields & Emshwiller, 2015; Bekiempis, 2015). The reemergence of foot patrol as a policing strategy has spurred substantial discussion of potential benefits. Additionally, a number of evaluations of the effectiveness of foot patrol on several law enforcement goals, including crime reduction, community sense of safety, and increased community/police interaction, have been completed.

To date, evaluations of foot patrol have yielded mixed results. While some have demonstrated reductions in crime when foot patrol has been implemented, others have not. Similarly, several evaluations offering evidence that foot patrol reduces fear of crime have been contradicted by other evaluations demonstrating no such reductions. As well, improvements in approachability, familiarity, and sense of trust resulting from foot patrol have received only partial empirical support.

Underlying the conflicting evidence is a definitional problem wherein foot patrol is often discussed and/or evaluated as a singular patrol strategy. Statements such as, “foot patrol improves community relations,” imply that foot patrol is a homogeneous activity. Yet, variation between foot patrol deployments exists. At a core level, foot patrol is about one-on-one interactions between officers and citizens, and different officers engage in diverse activities while conducting foot patrol. Likewise, officers vary in their approaches to the practice. Officers’ approaches may be partially guided by agency protocols, and variation between agencies likely reflects differential implementation strategies, goals, and buy-in. These differences can result in substantially different police-citizen interactions which likely explain why foot patrol is sometimes effective and other times ineffective at achieving various outcomes.

To date, limited empirical work has focused on documenting variation in foot patrol activity. Thus, empirical understanding of foot patrol’s effect on departments’ desired outcomes is limited by this implementation concern. Agencies considering adopting foot patrol as a policing strategy also have few resources that provide models demonstrating how the practice can be utilized. To address these two key limitations and to better understand differences in foot patrol implementation between and within departments, the following study was undertaken.

Using field observations, semi-structured interviews, and focus group interviews, this report examines how five geographically diverse agencies utilize different foot patrol strategies in order to interact, engage, and build relationships with their communities. This study adds to the existing research on foot patrol by offering greater insight into different uses of foot patrol across five sites, including the perceived benefits of various foot patrol strategies, the challenges associated with implementation, and the organizational dynamics within each of the five examined agencies. Additionally, the study offers an assessment of officer and citizen perceptions of, and attitudes towards, foot patrol. Notably, the five agencies included in this study are engaged in long-term and manpower intensive efforts to build relationships with their communities amidst a national conversation regarding community-police relations.
After a discussion of the current literature on foot patrol and a brief description of the methodology used in the present study, this report presents a series of case studies on the five participating agencies describing what the agencies are doing with foot patrol and how they are doing it. Following these site descriptions, the report discusses several salient themes related to foot patrol that emerged across sites and participant groups, broadly classified into benefits and challenges of the foot patrol deployments. Finally, the report concludes with final thoughts and general takeaway points gleaned from the study.
Early models of policing embraced foot patrol as a means to establish a constant vigil based on the assumption that officers engaged in foot patrol would provide a deterrent function thereby reducing crime (Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, Groff, & Wood, 2011). However, as policing evolved into the professional era, foot patrol was shunned as a strategy. Compared to motorized patrol, which increased the range of patrol, decreased the time necessary to respond to incidents, and provided a means of pursuit of criminals who increasingly utilized cars to commit crimes, foot patrol was viewed as inefficient and as a waste of departmental resources (Wilson, 1963). Supported by technological improvements including telephone and radio communications, preventive motorized patrol and rapid response became the primary policing functions while foot patrol waned (Kelling & Coles, 1996).

Research into the effectiveness of motorized patrol and rapid response indicated that these strategies were ineffective at reducing crime (Kelling et al., 1974; Spelman & Brown, 1981). Amidst the lack of demonstrated effectiveness, critics argued that motorized patrol damaged police-community relations. Motorized patrol led to increased beat sizes and minimized interactions between police officers and citizens (Esbensen, 1987). The lack of interaction created social distance between officers and community members and, in some instances, added to community sentiments that patrol officers represented an occupying force. In light of these sentiments, proponents of community-policing advocated for foot patrol as a potential remedy (Kelling & Coles, 1996).

While early evaluations of foot patrol indicated that it was similarly ineffective at reducing crime (Bowers & Hirsch, 1987; Esbensen, 1987; Kelling, 1981; Pate, 1986), community-policing advocates asserted that foot patrol resulted in other benefits, namely producing approachability, familiarity, and trust between officers and residents (Cordner, 2010, Kelling & Coles, 1996). Belief in these benefits was echoed by the public’s increased demands for foot patrol which was viewed as a “proactive, non-threatening, community-oriented approach to local policing” (Wakefield, 2007, p. 343).

Although the validity of these claims has yet to be definitively established, a growing body of research on foot patrol has established a core understanding of its effects in three key domains. The first domain centers on effectiveness as a crime reduction strategy. The second domain focuses on impact on citizens’ perceptions, including fear of crime within their communities, satisfaction with police, and trust in police. The third domain considers the impact on officers’ perceptions, including job satisfaction, sense of safety, and challenges faced by officers when assigned to foot patrol. The key findings to date for each of the three domains are outlined in the following sections.

**Crime Reduction through Foot Patrol**

Early research suggested that foot patrol was ineffective at reducing levels of crime. While an evaluation of foot patrol in Flint (MI) found crime reductions of 8.7% for foot patrol areas (Trojanowitcz, 1982), other studies found foot patrol’s effect to be negligible. Both the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment, conducted by the Police Foundation, and an evaluation of Boston Police Department’s 1983 Patrol Re-allocation Plan failed to uncover any reductions in crime associated with foot patrol (Bowers & Hirsch, 1987; Kelling et al., 1981). Similarly, other studies failed to demonstrate support for an effect of foot patrol on levels of crime in other regions (Esbensen, 1987; Esbensen & Taylor, 1984).

Despite these early findings, researchers continued to consider the effectiveness of foot patrol on levels of crime. As place-based policing – which focuses policing efforts in areas of high crime concentrations...
— gained traction, researchers concluded that a focus on smaller places might allow patrol functions to alter the deterrence equation emphasizing the certainty of detection to reduce crime (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011). Still, others asserted that place-based foot patrol might aid enforcement efforts in other ways. Officers on foot patrol working small areas are more likely to become familiar with people, and increased familiarly might improve communication resulting in greater exchange of information needed to prevent crime (Groff, 2013; Trojanowicz, 1984).

Guided by place-based insights, directed foot patrol efforts in crime hotspots were undertaken, and the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment established through a randomized control trial that targeted foot patrols in violent crime hotspots can significantly reduce violent crime through a deterrent effect at the micro-spatial level (i.e. street segments and intersections) (Ratcliffe et al., 2011). Additional work provided support for the effectiveness of foot patrol at reducing violent crime in Newark (Piza & O’Hara, 2013). However, subsequent analysis of the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment indicated that, while foot patrol reduced violent crime by 23% compared to areas without foot patrol (control areas), none of the foot patrol beats exhibited residual deterrence after the experiment ended (Sorg et al., 2013). Further, attempts at replicating the findings in Philadelphia through a second foot patrol intervention implemented as part of the Philadelphia Police Tactics Experiment failed to produce evidence of a similar effect on crime (Groff et al., 2015). However, as Groff et al. (2015) notes, these differing findings may have been the result of differences in implementation between the two studies. In the former study, foot patrol officers spent twice the amount of time in hotspots and engaged in significantly more enforcement activity, compared to control areas, than foot patrol officers in the replication study, leading Groff et al. (2015) to conclude, “the effectiveness of [foot patrol] is contingent on the timing and duration of [foot patrol] and on the activities undertaken by foot patrol officers” (p.45).

More recently, an experiment conducted in Peterborough, United Kingdom, found that increased foot patrol in hot spots of crime and disorder decreased reported crime by 39% and emergency calls-for-service by 20% when compared to areas that did not receive increased foot patrol (Ariel et al., 2016), supporting the notion that foot patrol, with adequate dosage, can be used effectively for crime reduction. Moreover, the study found that the foot patrol resulted in a cost savings of at least £5 in potential imprisonment costs for every £1 spent on foot patrol based upon the number of crimes prevented by the foot patrol officers.

Impact on Citizens

Even though limited evidence suggests that foot patrol can reduce crime, the practice became the most widely implemented strategy to enact community policing (Rosenbaum & Lurigo, 1994). However, the strategy may have been adopted primarily to address community relations and fear of crime rather than to reduce the incidence of actual crime (Cordner, 1986; Jim, Mitchell, & Kent, 2006). While some evidence suggests that foot patrol can reduce fear of crime, the National Research Council classifies foot patrol’s effect on fear as supported by only weak-to-moderate evidence (Skogan & Frydl, 2004).

Many of the studies that attempted to discern the effectiveness of foot patrol as a crime reduction strategy did find that foot patrol impacted community fear of crime. The Police Foundation’s Newark Foot Patrol Experiment uncovered evidence that areas with higher levels of foot patrol reflect lower levels of fear of crime (Kelling, 1981). Similar reductions in fear of crime were noted in the evaluations of the Flint Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program (Trojanowicz & Baldwin, 1982) and in the Baltimore Citizen...
Oriented Police Enforcement program (Cordner, 1986). However, surveys of residents in the Philadelphia Policing Tactics Experiment suggested that foot patrol had no impact on community perceptions of crime and disorder or perceptions of safety (Ratcliffe, Groff, Sorg, & Haberman, 2015).

Beyond fear of crime, foot patrol is also believed to create a sense of approachability, familiarity, and trust of officers among residents as well as higher levels of satisfaction with police (Cordner, 2010, Kelling & Coles, 1996). Empirical work has demonstrated partial support for these effects. Both the Newark Foot Patrol Experiment and the Flint Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program demonstrated evidence that community members expressed increased satisfaction with police in areas where foot patrol was established (Kelling et al., 1981; Trojanowicz & Baldwin, 1982). However, foot patrol did not impact the sense of police professionalism, support for police, or relations between police and business owners (Esbensen, 1987). As with fear of crime, evidence from Philadelphia suggests that foot patrol did not impact satisfaction with the police (Ratcliffe et al., 2015).

Despite some studies indicating no effect for foot patrol on community perceptions of police, authors have noted that the lack of change may be associated with employing foot patrol in communities with initially-positive views of police. Evidence that foot patrol efforts seemingly closed the gap between black and white residents’ perceptions of police suggests that foot patrol may be effective at altering perceptions of police in communities that hold less initially-positive views of police (Trojanowicz & Banas, 1985a).

Impact of Foot Patrol on Officers

The impact of foot patrol on officers has also been studied. Evaluations have shown that officers engaged in community policing through foot patrol report increased job satisfaction compared to officers engaged in other forms of patrol (Hayeslip & Cordner, 1987; Pelfrey, 2004). Evidence suggests that this is not an artifact of the novelty of foot patrol as an experimental condition. Five years after the experimental Neighborhood Foot Patrol Program resulted in higher levels of job satisfaction for foot patrol officers compared to motorized officers, follow-up research with officers indicted that foot patrol officers maintained higher levels of job satisfaction and enthusiasm for their job than officers working motorized patrol (Trojanowicz & Banas, 1985b). Moreover, evidence has shown that officers who displayed higher levels of positive motivation, a type of job satisfaction, were more supportive of police-community relations (Greene, 1989). Similar findings have been associated with officers involved in community engagement activities through foot patrol (Yates & Pillai, 1996).

In addition to job satisfaction, foot patrol has been demonstrated to impact officers’ perceptions of safety. Some studies indicate that foot patrol officers feel safer on patrol than officers on motorized patrol (Trojanowicz & Banas, 1985c; Trojanowicz & Pollard, 1986). Officers indicated that their increased sense of safety relates to knowing their beats geographically, knowing the residents of the communities they patrol, and having confidence that residents would help them if they needed assistance (Trojanowicz & Banas, 1985c).

Finally, evidence suggests that foot patrol impacts the way officers conduct their work. Field observations of foot patrol officers indicate that foot patrol facilitates officers getting to know their communities and engaging in proactive policing efforts; however, officers working foot patrol struggle to balance their community interaction activities with crime-control tactics that more often receive recognition.
from their departments (Wood et al., 2014). This issue may relate to cynicism among foot patrol officers who express a desire to do what they deem “real police work”. Despite these views, foot patrol officers seemingly utilize an effective combination of legal and non-legal remedies to influence their environments. Their presence on foot patrol introduces an element of guardianship which may prevent crimes from occurring (Wood et al., 2015).

Research Summary

To date, the research across all three domains has exhibited mixed support. While limited evidence supports crime reduction benefits of foot patrol, support for perceptual benefits for both citizens and officers has been more common. Despite several studies demonstrating perceptual benefits for citizens, contradictory evidence for decreases in fear of crime or increases in community satisfaction with the police suggests limitations in this strategy’s potential impact. The evidence that foot patrol has benefits for officers is likewise murky. Unfortunately, any increased job satisfaction and sense of safety associated with working foot patrol may be contradicted by institutional cultures that view foot patrol and community policing efforts as antithetical to the crime control model of policing.

Given the limitations in the evidence, substantial thought has been given to understanding why foot patrol seemingly intermittently impacts crime, citizens, and officers. While effectiveness studies focusing on crime reduction have ranged from analysis of simple interventions applied throughout jurisdictions to randomized controlled trials applied only in crime hotspots, these studies have typically adopted similar measurements analyzing official records of crimes known to police or calls for service as measures of crime. While these differences may explain variability in findings and the lack of a consistent conclusion, key issues including dosage and implementation remain largely unexplored. Particularly important in the context of fidelity is that the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment, which demonstrated a crime reduction effect for foot patrol, utilized rookie officers. The replication attempt, which failed to demonstrate an effect, relied on veteran officers who were less aggressive in their enforcement strategy (Groff et al., 2014). Thus, differences between officers’ levels of activities and perceptions of foot patrol are important fidelity considerations.

Studies of changes in citizens’ and officers’ perceptions have primarily been assessed through survey methods. While differences in citizens’ perceptions may relate to limitations with the underlying implementation of foot patrol protocols (i.e., the Philadelphia Police Tactics Experiment) or other design issues, survey methods have yielded greater support for officer benefits. However, a key limitation to the research on officers’ perceptions relates to insufficient qualitative information available from officers about their experiences of working and their perceptions of foot patrol. This limitation is noteworthy as qualitative approaches, including interviews and focus groups, are ideal for discovering details from nuanced discussion that surveys may be unable to capture. While focus groups and observational techniques were utilized as components of the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment (see Woods et al., 2014; Woods et al., 2015), the experimental nature of the protocol raises questions about perceptual differences between officers in a treatment versus natural condition.
The Present Study

The present study incorporates a qualitative approach to isolate key issues surrounding foot patrol in multiple study sites. While the sites include both urban and suburban departments, all departments studied have previously integrated foot patrol into existing operations. As foot patrol represents an existing function within these agencies, officers were not temporarily assigned to foot patrol as an experimental condition. Thus, the qualitative assessment of officer attitudes and perceptions provides an assessment that is likely more important to agencies considering implementing foot patrol as an ongoing operational strategy.

To provide greater insight into both the individual and organizational dynamics that impact foot patrol, the present study involves qualitative interviews with officers of varying rank, including officers engaged in foot patrol operations as well as supervisors overseeing these efforts. Although limited, the study incorporates community perceptions of foot patrol collected through community focus groups. This allows for a triangulation approach where the research considers perspectives within and across rank but also looks to community perceptions to validate officers’ sentiments. Finally, much of the detail focuses on organizational challenges of real-world implementation which can only be examined outside of an experiment.
Five agencies engaged in long-term foot patrol operations were selected for participation in this study: (1) Cambridge (MA) Police Department, (2) New Haven (CT) Police Department, (3) Kalamazoo (MI) Department of Public Safety, (4) Evanston (IL) Police Department, and (5) Portland (OR) Police Bureau. To examine how each agency uses foot patrol to build relationships with their community as well as address crime concerns, site visits were conducted for two days at each agency. Individuals within each agency, ranging from patrol officers to chiefs, were interviewed using a semi-structured format. These interviews focused on a number of key issues, including:

1. the goals of the agency’s foot patrol strategy,
2. specific details about the foot patrol deployment, such as the number of officers assigned to foot patrol or the size of the walking beats,
3. the regular activities performed by the foot patrol officers during a shift, and
4. the interviewees’ general assessments of the advantages, disadvantages, challenges, and effectiveness of foot patrol.

Researchers also conducted focus group interviews of citizens served by each agency, including clergy, members of local business alliances or community management teams, community leaders, business owners, and current and former members of local government. These focus groups assessed general perceptions about foot patrol as well as perceptions of effectiveness. In total, researchers conducted 31 interviews (including focus groups) involving 64 interviewees across the five sites. Interviewees included:

- Four (4) Chiefs
- Five (5) Assistant/Deputy Chiefs of Operations
- Five (5) Shift/Unit Commanders
- Five (5) Sergeants
- Five (5) focus groups consisting of a total of twenty-six (26) foot patrol officers
- Seven (7) focus groups consisting of a total of nineteen (19) community members

In addition to interviews and focus groups, researchers conducted field observations with foot patrol officers at each site to identify the activities regularly performed by foot patrol officers and to observe the nature of the interactions between officers and community members. A team of two researchers participated in “walk-alongs” with foot patrol officers, and while accompanying the officers, the researchers documented all of the activities of the officers and noted the subject-matter of all conversations between officers and community members. Walk-alongs generally ranged from 2 – 5 hours at each site and took place during the afternoon/evening hours to correspond with the officers’ regular deployment schedule.
Thematic analysis of the interviews was conducted utilizing the citizen focus groups and the field observations to gain a more detailed understanding of the officers’ responses. Codes were derived to identify key themes within the aggregated data, and multiple researchers were consulted to ensure the validity of the coding process. Based on the frequency of codes, salient themes emerged across all five sites as well as across specific participant groups (e.g., chiefs, foot patrol officers, etc.). These themes, discussed in Section IV of the report, represent the key findings of this study and serve as the basis for our recommendations. (For a more detailed description of our methodology and site selection process, please see Appendix A).
Cambridge, Massachusetts, is a 6.39 square mile city located northwest of the city of Boston, directly across the Charles River. The city has a population of approximately 105,000 residents, with a racial composition of approximately 62.1% White, 11.7% African-American, 7.6% Hispanic or Latino, and 15.1% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010a). Serving the city of Cambridge is the Cambridge Police Department with a sworn force of 272 officers.

With a tradition of foot patrol dating back to the 1970s, the Cambridge Police Department is using foot patrol as a way to foster a greater connection and relationship between the police and the community. The department deploys officers on foot, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, in two of the city’s business districts—Harvard Square and Central Square (shaded in red on the map)—due in large part to the amount of people that either work in or transit the areas. Each square is approximately ten city blocks and has a minimum of two foot patrol officers capable of covering their assigned area in 10 to 15 minutes.

The department also deploys foot patrol officers in some of the city’s 13 neighborhoods, including The Port, Riverside, Cambridgeport, and North Cambridge. While the city is currently experiencing a 50-year low in crime, these neighborhoods have tended to be the city’s more violent areas with a number of shootings and murders, prompting many of the neighborhoods to specifically request that the department conduct foot patrols.

To meet the community’s requests, the department conducts foot patrol in the neighborhoods, when staffing permits, from 6:00pm to 2:00am in the summer months and from 4:00pm to 12:00am in the winter months. On nights when the neighborhood foot patrol beats are staffed, the department could have up to eight foot patrol officers deployed across the city, with two in each square and the remainder in the neighborhoods.

On foot patrol, officers are expected to not only enforce law, but also to engage and interact with people, taking the time to get to know them and address any problems or concerns they may have. While foot patrol officers are still responsible for calls-for-service within their assigned areas, the department generally tries to limit the number of calls these officers receive to afford them the necessary time to invest in relationships and solve problems in the community.

To develop these relationships, foot patrol officers engage in activities such as attending community events and meetings, assisting stranded motorists (pictured below), playing basketball with kids, and striking up conversations with people on the street, including homeless individuals. In Harvard and Central Squares, foot patrol officers routinely go into businesses, introduce themselves, and talk with managers, owners, and employees about any problems they are facing.
Many of the problems identified by the foot patrol officers through conversations with business owners and community members tend to be quality-of-life issues, such as loitering, urinating in public, panhandling, and drinking in public, generally related to the large homeless population present in Central Square and the young, transient population in Harvard Square. Since foot patrol officers are generally free from responding to calls-for-service, they have the time to interact with the community and address the root causes of some of these identified problems. For example, the department was receiving numerous complaints about homeless individuals sitting on milk cartons and loitering in front of businesses. One of the foot patrol officers figured out that these individuals were taking the milk cartons from the very businesses that were making the complaints because those businesses were not locking up their storage rooms. That officer went around to all of the businesses and arranged for the businesses to lock up their storage rooms, and the problem subsequently ceased.

It is important to note that the foot patrol officers are not only engaged in community engagement and problem-solving activities; they are also regularly engaged in enforcement activity. They do a significant amount of self-initiated or directed patrol (code 86’s) within their walking beats to hotspots identified by the daily crime analysis bulletin or to other known problematic areas. When the city was dealing with an open drinking problem in Harvard and Central Squares, the foot patrol officers were heavily involved in engaging the homeless and transient populations and conducting stringent enforcement until the issue was resolved.

New Haven Police Department — New Haven, CT

Located along the Eastern Seaboard, New Haven, Connecticut, is 18.68 square miles with a population of approximately 129,000 residents. The population is approximately 31.8% White, 35.4% African-American, 27.4% Hispanic or Latino, and 4.6% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010b). New Haven has a sworn police force of 442 officers.

The New Haven Police Department has been using foot patrol as a way to reconnect and build trust with its community since 1990, but in 2011, the department rededicated its policing strategy to foot patrol. What is particularly innovative about New Haven is that the department has committed to putting all rookie officers on foot patrol for one year after they graduate the academy in order to immerse them in the community they serve.
Out of the department’s patrol officers, sixty-one are presently assigned to conduct foot patrol. These officers are deployed citywide, with walking beats in each of the city’s ten districts. District walking beats are designed by the district commanders, who have full discretion to adjust the boundaries of the walking beats to best meet the needs of their district. As such, walking beats vary in size, but generally, officers report being able to walk their beats within 15 to 20 minutes.

Since one of the primary goals is to interact and build relationships with people, the bulk of foot patrol officers are deployed in the evenings from 3:00pm to 11:00pm or 4:00pm to 12:00am when the majority of people are home from work and school. In any given shift, the number of officers on foot within each walking beat ranges from two to nine officers, with an average of about six. Motorized patrol tends to handle the majority of the calls-for-service within each district, while foot patrol officers are only expected to respond to calls within their walking beats. Not having to respond to calls-for-service city-wide reportedly affords foot patrol officers time to not only develop relationships with community members, but also to engage in more in-depth problem solving in the community.

The foot patrol officers perform a wide range of engagement-related actions while on patrol. In residential areas of the city, foot patrol officers routinely greet and initiate conversations with residents in front of their homes or out on the sidewalk, and in downtown, officers go into businesses and develop relationships with owners and employees. Downtown foot patrol officers also routinely interact with the large homeless population in the area and work to not only develop a rapport with them, but also to provide them with information on services and shelters available to them. Officers have tried to take interactions with community members to the next level by playing basketball with neighborhood kids, purchasing food for persons in need, passing out candy to kids, providing Thanksgiving baskets to families, giving Christmas presents, and handing out their own cell phone numbers to people on their beat, all in an effort to bridge the gap between the community and the police.

When necessary, foot patrol officers tailor their actions to address identified crime problems in the community. If, for instance, there is a home burglary in a neighborhood walking beat, foot patrol officers will follow up with the family a few days later to see how the family is doing and offer any assistance they can. When confronted with a string of thefts from vehicles, two foot patrol officers created pamphlets to inform residents about the most commonly stolen items and to offer tips on theft prevention, and they organized a community meeting to discuss the issue. In downtown, officers have focused on public drinking enforcement to address the large number of intoxicated individuals routinely in the area.
Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety — Kalamazoo, MI

The city of Kalamazoo is 24.68 square miles, located in the southwestern region of Michigan. Of the city’s approximately 74,000 residents, approximately 65.6% are White, 22.2% African-American, 6.4% Hispanic or Latino, and 1.7% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010c). The city is served by the Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety, in which all 257 sworn officers are cross-trained to respond to all of the fire, EMS, and law enforcement needs of the city.

The Kalamazoo Department of Public Safety has undertaken a particularly innovative approach to build trust and enhance its relationship with the community. In March 2014, the department recognized a need to connect its officers with the residents of Kalamazoo on a more personal level. In response, the department set out on a mission to knock on every residential door in the city as a way to introduce its officers to the community, learn about community problems, and gather feedback on the department’s performance. Referred to as “canvassing”, this involves officers walking the city on a daily basis, two blocks at a time, to interact and engage with residents. In addition to this, the department has also committed to conducting daily foot patrols in the downtown Kalamazoo mall to increase its interaction and visibility with the downtown shoppers and business community.

Public safety officers are deployed across seven zones in Kalamazoo. Each zone conducts canvassing according to a rotating schedule so that, in any given day, only one zone is scheduled for canvassing. When a zone is scheduled to canvass, one officer and one sergeant deploy on foot and knock on each residential door in a pre-designated two-block area of that zone. Depending on how many people answer their doors, canvassing could take anywhere from five minutes to an hour to complete.

In the conversations officers have with residents, the officers introduce themselves and ask “Are there any problems in the neighborhood that you would like us to know about?” and “Is there anything that we, from public safety, can do better?” If a problem is identified with a resident, officers are given latitude to devise a solution. Officers do not simply “pass the buck” and let the problem persist. If someone needs a ride to the bus stop and it is four blocks away in 10-degree weather, they ask if the resident wants a ride. If the officers have to call another city agency to address a problem, they do it. The officers will even go out of their way to assist residents. For example, officers encountered a dispute between two neighbors, one of which was upset about leaves blowing into her yard from her neighbor’s. One of the officers went and got a rake from the station down the road, and the officers raked up the leaves. In other situations, officers have purchased Thanksgiving meals for families or replaced kids’ bicycles after they were stolen, all out of their own pocket.
Should officers miss connecting with a resident while canvassing an area, they leave a card at the door that says “Sorry we missed you” and provides them with a contact number to call if they want to speak with someone in the department. Once a canvass is completed, that two block area is marked as completed using GIS mapping, and officers provide a narrative of their interactions to their sergeant, who then incorporates the narrative into a daily activity report that is reviewed by the Operations Captain.

Occasionally, the department deviates from the regularly scheduled canvassing to conduct canvassing in an area recently affected by a violent incident or high-profile police activity. If, for instance, an area of the city experiences a shooting incident, the department will move its canvassing operations to that area of the city for a few days to address residents’ concerns and provide any information they can about the incident. Similarly, if the police conduct a highly visible search or arrest warrant on a house, the department will focus canvassing on the surrounding 3-block area to explain the event to residents and answer as many of their questions as possible.

In addition to canvassing, the department also conducts foot patrol in the downtown Kalamazoo mall for six hours every day to increase its interaction and visibility with the community. At the beginning of each shift, a sergeant creates a list of six officers from the seven patrol zones and assigns each of them to a one-hour time slot at the mall. During their one-hour “mall walk”, officers will take enforcement action when necessary, particularly against panhandlers, but the overarching emphasis is community engagement—giving the officers an opportunity to introduce themselves and talk with shoppers and workers that they might otherwise never encounter in their normal patrol operations.

Officers engaged in canvassing and mall walks are generally not responsible for answering calls-for-service, with the exception of in-progress calls, because of the priority placed on community engagement. Should a fire or a similarly high priority incident occur, canvassing and mall walks will be temporarily suspended to reallocate manpower for the response; otherwise, the department relies on its power shift (the 3pm – 3am shift that overlaps with the 7am – 7pm and the 7pm – 7am shifts) to help cover an area while officers are canvassing a neighborhood or conducting foot patrol at the mall. If calls-for-service are overwhelming a zone’s resources, the zone sergeant may reassign officers from adjacent zones to assist with canvassing.

In the 29 months that the department has been canvassing, there have only been five shifts in which neighborhood canvassing was not conducted, due to priority calls-for-service, such as fires. In May 2015, after 16 months of canvassing, the department met its goal of knocking on every residential door in the city. The department is currently conducting their second city-wide canvass due to the success of the canvassing efforts.
Evanston Police Department — Evanston, IL

Situated approximately 14 miles north of downtown Chicago, Evanston, Illinois, is a city of 7.78 square miles with a population of approximately 74,000 residents across nine political wards. The racial composition of the population is approximately 61.2% White, 18.1% African-American, 9% Hispanic or Latino, and 8.6% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010d). Evanston is served by the Evanston Police Department, which has a sworn force of 167 officers.

Originally utilized in the mid-80s and early 90s, the Evanston Police Department began redeploying foot patrol officers in its 5th ward in 2008 after repeated requests by the community to reinstitute foot patrol. The primary focus of these officers is to communicate, engage, and build relationships with residents in the 5th ward to help people feel more comfortable with the police; however, the officers have also been instrumental in the department’s efforts to improve safety in the area.

The Evanston Police Department deploys two officers on foot in the city’s 5th ward, a predominately African-American community troubled by gangs and violence, averaging about 3–5 shootings per year. Together, the officers patrol a one square-mile area on foot from Tuesday—Saturday in the afternoon/evening hours to maximize the number of interactions they have with the community. Officers that volunteer for the foot patrol assignment serve on a three-year rotation, at the end of which the officers are allowed to choose their next assignment in the department.

As a part of the Community Strategies unit, the foot patrol officers are generally not responsible for taking calls-for-service, such as a noise complaint, but they will respond to in-progress calls in their area, such as a shooting in progress, utilizing their patrol vehicle if necessary. This freedom from answering calls-for-service affords the foot patrol officers the requisite time to talk and build relationships with the residents. While on patrol, the officers routinely meet with residents at their homes to engage in casual conversations and to listen to their concerns. In one instance recounted by a community member, the officers even showed up to her house and saw her son off to his prom.

The officers also regularly participate in community events. Every month, the officers attend the 5th ward community meeting, and on the first Wednesday of the month, they read to kids, ages 3–5, for 30 minutes at the local community center. The officers routinely accept requests from the community to attend other events at the community center or the local churches, and they occasionally host “coffee with a cop”, an event designed to give the community an opportunity to talk with their police officers.

Through their interactions with the community, the foot patrol officers have developed a working relationship with pastors in the 5th ward. One evening, the officers organized a meeting with local pastors
to answer their questions and discuss why the police do the things they do and why encounters with the police do and do not go well. Since that initial meeting, the department has offered the class to other churches and now conducts regular classes for kids at the junior-high level. Thus far, about 250 people have attended the classes.

Another area in which the foot patrol officers are seeking to make an impact is in outreach to youth at risk for gang involvement. The 5th ward has a heavy gang presence, so the foot patrol officers have been working to develop relationships with vulnerable youth. If, for example, three or four individuals are hanging out at a local barber shop, the officers will stop by and initiate casual conversations with them. Through relationships built with these individuals, the officers can talk to them about gang involvement, and they can connect them to the city’s outreach services.

The officers also work to identify problems or concerns in the community and develop long-term solutions. Last summer, a shooting occurred in the 5th ward between two rival gangs. The residents began voicing concerns about gang members congregating on a dead-end street near one of the local parks. That particular area was very dark, overgrown, and secluded, and it was being used by gang members to hide guns and drugs. Focusing on situational crime prevention through environmental design, the foot patrol officers partnered with Streets and Sanitation, Parks and Recreation, Forestry, police supervisors, and the 5th ward alderman. Together, these agencies worked to trim bushes, remove fences, and improve the area’s lighting, which successfully addressed the problem. If the officers identify a complex problem requiring longer term resources to address, they will bring the problem to officers in the department’s Problem Solving Team, whom they work closely with in the 5th ward.

Portland Police Bureau — Portland, OR

Portland is a city of 133.43 square miles located in the northwestern portion of Oregon on the Columbia River. The city has a population of approximately 583,000 residents, of which approximately 72.2% are White, 6.3% African-American, 9.4% Hispanic or Latino, and 7.1% Asian (U.S. Census Bureau, 2010e). Responsible for the safety of Portland's residents is the Portland Police Bureau, an agency of 858 sworn officers.

Every year, the city of Portland experiences a large influx of young homeless individuals, also known as “travelers”, “street kids”, or “transients”, traveling from all across the country. The offenses committed by this group of individuals are generally minor in nature, such as littering, panhandling, loitering, and drinking in public, but the community began expressing heightened concern after a storeowner was assaulted by a “traveler”. In response, the Portland Police Bureau began deploying foot patrol officers in March of 2014. However, instead of focusing on heavy enforcement, the foot patrol officers were instructed to focus on engaging and connecting with the community.

The bureau currently deploys six officers on foot patrol in its Central Precinct. These officers are concentrated in two deployment areas—downtown on 3rd Avenue and east of downtown on Southeast
Hawthorne Boulevard—due to the high number of complaints and the volume of pedestrians in these locations. The officers deploy as a part of the bureau’s B shift, patrolling from noon until 10:00pm to cover the busiest time of day for pedestrian activity.

When foot patrol first began in March 2014, the foot patrol officers functioned as a dedicated unit. However, due to recent staffing limitations, the officers are now being used to fill in as a part of regular patrol to respond to calls-for-service from noon until 4:00pm when the bureau’s C shift comes on duty and frees up the foot patrol officers. At that time, the foot patrol officers are no longer expected to answer calls-for-service, but they will still respond to calls within their walking beats.

The primary goal of the foot patrol officers is to get to know the people in their beats and to learn about their problems and concerns. Much of their time on patrol is spent interacting with the homeless and/or transient populations in their walking beats, many of whom do not have positive views of the police. In an attempt to build better relationships with these individuals and improve cooperation, the officers make an effort to not only talk to them and get to know them, but also to provide for some of their basic needs. For example, in fall of 2015, the foot patrol officers participated in Operation Overcoat, partnering with Union Gospel Mission to hand out socks, shoes, and overcoats to people on the streets. Additionally, the officers created Operation Puppy Coat, which involved foot patrol officers handing out dog coats and pet food donated from the Oregon Humane Society to individuals who may have difficulty providing for their pets—all in an effort to develop positive relationships with these individuals.

When the foot patrol officers have to contact individuals in response to minor offenses or citizen complaints, they utilize enforcement actions—such as arrests and citations—as a last resort. Officers generally start with a conversation—simply asking individuals to cease the behavior at issue. If the individuals they contact are in need of services, the officers will work to connect those individuals to available services, such as shelters or addiction treatment facilities. One officer recounted an incident where an individual, new to Portland, observed an interaction between the foot patrol officers and a group of transient individuals on the street. The individual saw how the foot patrol officers were interacting with the group in a very positive manner, so when the group dissipated, this individual was willing to approach the officers to ask for help—he was out on the streets for the first time and did not know what to do. Within five minutes, the officers had him in the back of their car, and they were able to secure a housing situation for him at a local youth shelter.

Outside of their interactions with the homeless and transient populations, the foot patrol officers also regularly engage in other activities with the community. They frequently start conversations with people on the street or go into businesses to introduce themselves, and from time to time, they engage in the occasional photo opportunity with Portland tourists. They also engage in activities with the community for special occasions, such as decorating Christmas cards for the children’s hospital with the local Boys and Girls Club.
Our analysis of the five foot patrol deployments revealed a number of salient themes, some of which offer support for prior research on foot patrol. Generally, the identified themes, listed in Table 4 below, can be organized as potential benefits of foot patrol deployments or as challenges that agencies may encounter when implementing and utilizing such a strategy:

Some themes were particularly prevalent across all sites and participant groups, while others only emerged in a smaller subset of sites or specific groups. These themes are discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this section.

**Benefits of Foot Patrol**

**Foot Patrol Facilitates Relationship-Building**
Across all five sites and all participant groups, including community member focus groups, there was very strong support for the notion that foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between police officers and community members. Support for the relationship-building benefit of foot patrol was seen in 84% of interviewed supervisory officers, 100% of foot patrol officer focus groups, and 100% of community focus groups. As one assistant chief commented, “You can’t build a respectful relationship with a community when you are driving by them. Foot patrol allows

“The key to policing, no matter where you are in the country, is building relationships. It’s not rocket science.”

– Community member

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Some themes were particularly prevalent across all sites and participant groups, while others only emerged in a smaller subset of sites or specific groups. These themes are discussed in greater detail in the remainder of this section.
you to connect with the community you work for.” This point was echoed by a community member who stated, “[Foot patrol] is a really good way for the police officers to know the community and for the community to know the police officers.” Community groups at all study sites strongly agreed that their communities are getting to know their foot patrol officers, a finding in support of prior research conducted by Wood et al. (2014), which indicated that foot patrol facilitates officers getting to know their communities.

Based on the interview responses of supervisory officers, foot patrol officers, and community members, four subthemes emerged that may offer an explanation as to why foot patrol may be particularly conducive to facilitating relationships between communities and the police.

First, 86% of community focus groups, 80% of officer focus groups, and 89% of interviewed supervisory officers indicated that **foot patrol increases the opportunities for interaction between the police and the community**. This may be due to the fact that the nature of the foot patrol deployments places officers in and among shoppers, pedestrians, residents, and business owners as opposed to sitting in a patrol vehicle. As one community member explained it, “When the officers got into the squad cars, it really provided a physical barrier and it eliminated a lot of that interaction—just the day to day interactions with officers.” Echoing this assessment, a foot patrol officer noted, “A car is a barrier. It’s whizzing by to an emergency call—that’s all people see of their police force.” As such, foot patrol officers are in an advantageous position to see, greet, talk, and simply interact with members of the community, all necessary elements of any relationship. One business member described how, “with foot patrol, you get to know and see the same group of guys on a regular basis…whenever they are in the area, they come in and stop by.” Similarly, another community member pointed out, “When you walk by someone, it’s hard not to make eye contact and say hello.”

In Portland, Cambridge, and New Haven, foot patrol places officers in a position of constant interaction with the cities’ homeless populations, which enables the officers to not only be conduits to city services, but also to build relationships with and get to know these individuals. Similarly, foot patrol allows officers in Evanston to interact with gang members present in the area, outside of normal enforcement-related activity, thus creating opportunities for intervention. In Kalamazoo, the department’s neighborhood canvassing and mall walks have given officers opportunities to interact with residents that they would likely not meet otherwise. One officer observed, “There’s a ton of people that have lived in neighborhoods, and [officers] have never once been to their house or contacted them.” The impetus behind neighborhood canvassing is to get officers to meet and interact with these residents. After all, the chief commented, “How many times does an officer knock on your door without wanting anything other than [to say], ‘Hey, I’m here. How can I help? What can we do better?’”

“If we are going to make this fundamental shift back to where we need to be as law enforcement, we have to get back into the communities and get out of these [expletive] cars.”

— Shift commander
A second explanation for why foot patrol facilitates relationship-building is because foot patrol officers are easier for the community to approach than motorized patrol officers, a belief voiced by 71% of community focus groups and 60% of foot patrol officer groups. This finding supports previous research conducted by Cordner (2010) and Kelling & Coles (1996) that found foot patrol created a sense of approachability for residents.

One community member noted that it is a lot easier to approach officers on foot than “trying to get their attention as the patrol car goes by.” Emphasizing this point, one foot patrol officer commented, “A lot of people know our schedules…and they’ll see us and run up and talk to us. Before [foot patrol], we would have never gotten that.” As one of the sergeants explains, “People are more comfortable going up to an officer walking by them, shoulder to shoulder on the street, than they are to approach a cruiser.” From the perspective of a foot patrol officer, the community loves this approachability:

“When we’re out there and we’re accessible and people can come out and talk to us or maybe ask us a question or ask for help, they love it. They love talking with the police. It seems like the community, and I would go as far as to say nationwide, just wants a relationship with their police.”

Moreover, foot patrol officers at three of the five study sites are finding ways to be even more approachable for the communities they serve by providing their own personal cell phone numbers to the residents and businesses on their walking beats.

A third reason why foot patrol may be conducive to relationship-building is because foot patrol humanizes the officers involved. While not widely mentioned by foot patrol officer focus groups or supervisory officers, more than half of the community focus groups (57%) expressed this view, and it was a theme that emerged in all five sites. One foot patrol officer commented that, “[On foot patrol], you can get to know the people that you’re working for in that area and they can get to know us as humans and not just as police officers.” Similarly, a community member explained how the foot patrol officers “go into the businesses, up and down, everywhere, so that they are not an alien presence in blue with a gun—they are human beings.” It is possible that this humanizing effect bridges a gap and lays the foundation for a positive, much more intimate relationship between police officers and community members than the kind of relationship typically seen between patrol officers and the communities they serve.

While mentioned explicitly by only a minority of interviewees and focus groups, a common characteristic of all five foot patrol deployments is that foot patrol officers are afforded the time by their agencies to develop relationships with their communities and to engage in problem-solving. Typically, foot patrol officers at each of the five sites are not expected to answer calls-for-service while on foot patrol unless the officers are in the immediate vicinity of the call or the call is for an in-progress event. This relative freedom from calls-for-service is likely yet another reason why foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between communities and the police. According to one shift commander:
“[Foot patrol officers] are afforded the time to engage by the mere fact that they are walking. They have the opportunity to engage the homeless population downtown; they have the opportunity to engage the people at [the] park…whereas the car is going from call to call to call.”

Similarly, another shift commander explained, “If you’re spending most of your time in your car just responding, call to call, you’re going to have less time to just talk and establish relationships.” Indeed, as one chief explained, an advantage of foot patrol is that it “[allows] relationships to build fully rather than [being] driven by incidental 911 calls.” A foot patrol officer echoed this comment, saying that, while on foot patrol, “you have that extra time to really show that person that you give a [expletive] about what they’re talking about, not just, ‘oh yea, okay, see you later,’” as is the case while going from call to call while on motorized patrol. Thus, the interaction between the community and the officers is much more relational, not transactional. This underscores the importance of a recommendation offered by the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015): “Law enforcement agencies should evaluate their patrol deployment practices to allow sufficient time for patrol officers to participate in problem solving and community engagement activities” (p. 44). Otherwise, officers may not have the requisite time to talk with their communities and develop personal relationships.

The notion that foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between community members and police officers is the single most important theme this study identified across all five sites and participant groups. It is the foundation upon which most other benefits of foot patrol are derived, as discussed below.

### Table 5: Foot Patrol Facilitates Relationship-Building between Police Officers and Community Members: Summary of Subthemes

| 1. | Foot patrol increases the opportunities for interaction between the police and the community. |
| 2. | Foot patrol officers are easier for the community to approach than motorized patrol officers. |
| 3. | Foot patrol humanizes the officers involved. |
| 4. | Foot patrol officers are afforded the time by their agencies to develop relationships with their communities and engage in problem-solving. |

The notion that foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between community members and police officers is the single most important theme this study identified across all five sites and participant groups. It is the foundation upon which most other benefits of foot patrol are derived, as discussed below.

**Foot Patrol Enhances the Enforcement and Problem-Solving Capability of Law Enforcement**

Another theme that was particularly prevalent across all sites is that foot patrol enhances the enforcement and problem-solving capability of law enforcement. It does this through the familiarity and relationships that foot patrol officers develop with members of the community. This theme is supported by four main subthemes, described below.

Across sites and participant groups, researchers found that *relationships with the community increase the flow of information to the officers regarding crimes and community concerns*. This subtheme was voiced by 68% of supervisory officers, 71% of community focus groups, and 100% of foot patrol officer focus groups, and it confirms a previous finding by Trojanowicz (1984) that increased familiarity might improve communication, resulting in greater exchange of information needed to prevent crime. One shift commander provides a good explanation of this process:
“You are in an advantageous position as a foot patrol to create relationships with the public, and with relationships, you start to build trust. And when they start to trust you, all of a sudden they start telling you things. When something bad happens in the neighborhood, you’ll have someone walk by and say, ‘Hey officer, that guy that shoplifted at Wal-Mart up there, he’s up the street in the laundromat.’ They start to tell you things. Now, on the flipside, if you’re not engaging the public, they’re not going to learn to trust you, and if they’re not going to trust you, they’re not going to tell you, even if that guy that committed that crime is in that laundromat.”

As the commander explains, people begin to talk to officers when they know and trust them. The benefit of this is particularly evident in a story shared by another shift commander. The commander recounted a neighborhood foot patrol he conducted in the aftermath of a shooting. The residents on the street where the shooting occurred were historically not particularly cooperative with police, but the commander, along with another officer, went to the neighborhood to engage and talk with whomever they could. Toward the end of their patrol, a resident shook the commander’s hand and said, “Hey, this is probably something you want to know.” In shaking the commander’s hand, the resident passed the commander a note that had the shooter’s name written on it. That note subsequently allowed the police to investigate further, arrest the shooter, and recover weapons. The commander concludes, “If we hadn’t spent that time and formed relationships [with the community], that would have never happened.”

Relationships can also help officers when seeking information from suspects. According to one foot patrol officer:

“A lot of times, we are able to get more out of individuals than our patrol officers or detectives or gang guys because we took that extra step and built a relationship prior to the incident that we are there for. We may have seen this individual for 3-4 weeks, stopped by and talked to him, said, ‘Hey, how you doing? How’s the family?’ And then when they do something wrong or they are accused of doing something wrong and they see us, they are more willing to talk to us and deal with us, a lot of the times, because of the relationship that we built.”

This cooperation received as a result of relationships enhances the officers’ ability to resolve incidents in an effective and efficient manner.

It is important to note that while relationships can result in increased information regarding criminal activity, they also open up an avenue for community members to voice their concerns to the police—concerns that may otherwise not come to light. Indeed, the importance of developing relationships with the community in order to fully comprehend the community’s concerns cannot be overstated. One foot patrol officer keenly observed,

“There is a disconnect between officers in their cars and a real understanding of the problems that are out there on the street”

- Foot patrol officer

Courtesy of Police Foundation
“There is a disconnect between officers in their cars and a real understanding of the problems that are out there on the street.” As such, foot patrol officers, through their interactions and relationships with the community, are well positioned to identify and understand the full range of problems plaguing a community. For example, during a neighborhood foot patrol, one resident pointed out that she was concerned about an abandoned house across the street where people were living and leaving trash everywhere. Over the next few months, the officers worked with city services to clean up the trash and secure the property. Reflecting on this story, the officer involved noted the importance of the neighborhood foot patrol in identifying and addressing this problem:

“She didn’t call us on that, but once we made contact with her, she had a face and a person that she could talk to about her problems. She felt more comfortable, so she would fire off that email. Where she wasn’t calling the police department to have it fixed, she was emailing one of us because she had that personal connection with us.”

Capturing the essence of this story, a community member explained, “The more familiar you are with the police, the more you will reach out to them in times of need.” Thus, relationships with the community are of critical importance for officers seeking to accurately identify and solve problems within the community.

A second way in which foot patrol can enhance the enforcement and problem-solving capability of law enforcement is by assisting in the identification of suspects through the familiarity that officers develop with the people on their walking beats. This notion was expressed in four of the five study sites, but it was only strongly supported in one site, where all supervisory officers and the officer focus group discussed a previous murder investigation that the foot patrol officers were instrumental in closing. The detectives on the case had video and picture evidence showing the murder suspects, but due to the fact that the suspects were transient individuals, no one knew who the individuals were. The detectives asked the foot patrol officers for help in identifying the suspects, and because of their constant interaction with the transient population, the foot patrol officers were able to easily identify the suspects. Moreover, the foot patrol officers were able to determine the location of the suspects through a relationship with another transient individual, and the foot patrol officers were able to arrest the suspects without incident.

Similarly, a commander from another study site recalled an investigation he helped close back when he was in foot patrol. At that time, he had a friend that worked for the State Troopers as an undercover narcotics detective. His friend was doing undercover buys in his walking beat, but the troopers did not know who they were buying from in the area. His friend approached him to ask for help in identifying the suspects, and the commander was able to identify each individual because of the familiarity he had developed with the people on his walking beat. Had he not been there to identify these guys, the commander commented, “the investigation never would have been completed.”

Analyzing by participant group, researchers found that 60% of shift commanders and 40% of sergeants across sites indicated that foot patrol assists in the identification of suspects. The fact that this theme is confined to these specific participant groups may be due to the fact that shift commanders and
sergeants are traditionally the individuals responsible for running roll call at the beginning of each patrol shift, a time in which officers are normally briefed on persons of interest and wanted individuals. One commander explained, “You’ll have detectives who are inundated with cases upstairs. They’ll come down with a nickname. Who’s going to know that nickname? The walking beat...knows the nickname because they are out there and they know who’s who. That has happened numerous times.” Thus, one can conclude that foot patrol offers a demonstrated benefit to the crime fighting efforts of law enforcement.

Thirdly, the relationship that foot patrol officers develop with their communities can be instrumental in the success and acceptance of enforcement efforts. This subtheme was almost exclusively seen at one study site, where it was a salient theme across 75% of supervisory interviews and both community and officer focus groups. The reason why this point is particularly salient at this site and not other sites may be due to the success of the department’s recent efforts to take guns off the street in order to curb the violence in its community.

In response to a series of shootings and homicides, the department decided to implement stop-and-frisk, a controversial police tactic associated with disproportionate minority contact in many cities across the country. However, this department proceeded differently. At the outset, the department relied on its foot patrol officers to meet with the community and to explain what the department would be doing and why they were doing it. The officers explained that they would not be stopping people indiscriminately, but rather, would be focusing their enforcement effort on the people that had been identified as associated with criminal activity. The point of emphasis here is that the relationships and the familiarity the foot patrol officers had with the community allowed the officers to not only obtain the cooperation of the community, but to also target the enforcement in such a way as to substantially reduce the collateral damage on the community. Indeed, as a community member noted, “The fact that they had [stop-and-frisk] without any complaint and got a little less than 20 guns in that effort, that tells you they know who [to focus on], and they are doing their job properly.” She goes on to say, “As a mother of a 20-year-old black man, I would be getting the feedback from his friends that we’re getting frisked all the time, and I haven’t heard anything.” Importantly, the community members attribute the success of the intervention to the fact that the foot patrol officers “know the kids” and “know the people” in the community.

The relationships that foot patrol officers have with the community can have even more direct results on enforcement efforts. For example, foot patrol officers at one site developed a relationship with a particular gang member. That individual subsequently contacted them wanting to give them a gun (a Mac-10), no strings attached, because it needed to be off of the streets and the individual wanted to help the officers, to which the officers responded, “Huh? We used to have to go out there and find guns.” According to one of the officers, “That doesn’t happen every day; that comes from relationship-building.”

“You can de-escalate situations by just having a relationship with somebody.”

- Foot patrol officer
Lastly, the relationships and familiarity that foot patrol officers have with community members can enhance the enforcement and problem-solving capability of law enforcement by helping officers de-escalate and address certain situations more effectively. As an example, foot patrol officers at one site came into contact with a mentally ill individual known to the officers. This individual had a reputation of being a very nice man, but he had been going without his medications for a week. In contacting the man, it helped that the man knew the officers and the officers knew him. As one of the foot patrol officers explained, “You can de-escalate situations by just having a relationship with somebody.” Adding another element to this, one assistant chief commented:

“When you have walking beats, you know your neighborhood; you know the people that live in your neighborhood, and if a situation arises where you are going to a call, the person you are dealing with on the other side is no longer a stranger, and a lot less mistakes happen. And a lot of the mistakes currently happening around the country, in my opinion, have to do with fear. So if you know the other person, the fear goes down quite a bit.”

This familiarity with the people in their community can help foot patrol officers deal with situations more effectively than officers that do not have prior experience with the involved individuals, and it could prevent or reduce the need to use force in order to obtain compliance in some situations. Interestingly, this theme was only discussed in two study sites, and within those sites, support was concentrated in 75% of community focus groups and 100% of foot patrol officer focus groups (versus 25% of supervisory officers).

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<tr>
<th>Table 6: Foot Patrol Enhances the Enforcement and Problem-Solving Capability of Law Enforcement: Summary of Subthemes</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Relationships with the community, developed through foot patrol, increase the flow of information to officers regarding crimes and community concerns.</td>
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<td>2. Foot patrol assists in the identification of suspects through the familiarity that officers develop with the people on their walking beats.</td>
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<td>3. The relationships that foot patrol officers develop with their communities can be instrumental in the success and acceptance of enforcement efforts.</td>
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<td>4. The relationships and familiarity that foot patrol officers have with the community can help officers de-escalate and address certain situations more effectively.</td>
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**Relationships Built Through Foot Patrol Can Change How the Community Views Police Officers**

Relationships built through foot patrol change how the community sees police officers, a finding supported by 71% of community focus groups. As people interact with and get to know the foot patrol officers, a community member explained, “what happens is, instead of looking at them as police, you see them as humans who are trained to help, assist, and protect you, so that it’s not just the police, it’s our police officer who knows my block, who knows that that’s a dark street, and they’ll be there.”

Courtesy of the Portland Police Bureau
Another community member stressed the importance of developing a relationship and rapport with officers in order to overcome negative stereotypes or views associated with the police. She discussed how her relationship with the foot patrol officers “help[s] her 8-year-old son to see the police in a different way because if he’s hearing on the news about police being violent towards young black boys, for him to see his mother waving and saying hello [to officers], …I think that sends him a broader view of what police officers can be.” One foot patrol officer acknowledged this potential to overcome negative perceptions of law enforcement through greater engagement with the public:

“We see the impact that we’ve had, and it’s just going out and talking to people. I think this is the way that police work should be done in this country, and I think people are looking at ‘what do they want from their police in this country?’ It’s not going and constantly hitting the same drug houses with no effect. I think it’s cool that we have all of this armor and stuff, but there are a lot of people in this country that think we’re some occupying force in their community and that we’re out specifically to get them. If people can come out—whether it’s foot patrol or whatever other unit—if they can go out and contact people on several different levels and get to know them and forge these relationships with them, people will see us a lot differently. They will.”

This potential for changing perceptions of police is particularly evident in Portland, where the relationships the foot patrol officers are building through their outreach efforts are changing the way they are seen by the community. One community member explained that “a lot of the homeless folks tend to have an adversarial view of the police…so to have the officers from foot patrol participate in [an operation helping to provide coats to the homeless] was really a huge positive [because] they’re developing a friendly relationship with these folks.” This supports a finding of Trojanowicz & Banas (1985a) that foot patrol may be effective at altering perceptions of police in communities that hold less positive views of police.

**Relationships Can Increase the Legitimacy of the Police in the Eyes of the Community**

Across all study sites, 60% of foot patrol officer focus groups and 57% of community focus groups voiced that relationships between the police and the community can increase the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the community. In other words, when communities have relationships with their officers, community members are more likely to view the enforcement actions of police as appropriate and within their legal authority as police. One community member offered an illustration of this point:

“If a foot patrol officer has a relationship with kids in the neighborhood, when that officer goes to arrest someone, “[the kids] will have a broader view of that officer because they’ll know him as being a good guy versus ‘he’s just a bad cop.’ They’ll at least say, ‘no, that’s officer so-and-so; that [person he’s arresting] had to do something because he’s not a mean person.”

Relatedly, officers at another site explained that the relationships they have with residents through neighborhood foot patrol can be instrumental in explaining enforcement action:

“**America better police this way because the crisis in legitimacy is not going to be changed in this day and age without the slow painstaking work of building relationships.**”

– Chief
“[If] you see a house surrounded and we pull someone out in handcuffs who is yelling and cussing… and that’s all you see, of course it doesn’t look great. [During the foot patrol, we can explain], ‘well the reason that [the person] was dragged out of the house was because they were holding someone at knife-point’ or whatever the situation is. That automatically will change people’s opinion.”

Without these relationships, negative impressions of the police and their actions may go unchecked. Relationships with the community are seemingly critical for maintaining and increasing the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the community. Affirming this assessment, a chief commented, “America better police this way because the crisis in legitimacy is not going to be changed in this day and age without the slow, painstaking work of building relationships.”

Foot Patrol Is Rewarding and Psychologically Beneficial for the Officers Involved

During the course of the study, researchers found that the majority of foot patrol officer focus groups discussed how rewarding and beneficial foot patrol has been for them as officers. Specifically, 80% of officer focus groups and 60% of shift commanders discussed the personal benefits of foot patrol, and the theme was particularly prevalent in one site, where all interviews with the police (supervisory interviews and officer focus group) were in support of this theme.

Much of the psychological benefit derived from foot patrol is a result of the increase in positive interactions foot patrol officers have with members of the community. As one foot patrol officer explained:

“When you’re working a car, you’re getting a call somewhere specific; it’s something that needs the police there, so it’s only going to be something negative. Whereas just walking around, sometimes you see parents with their kids—you know, ‘Hey, officer. How are you doing?’ You’re out there shaking hands, being friendly with people. You have more positive interactions on foot.”

This assessment was echoed by officers across study sites, and it is understandable given the types of interactions and outreach opportunities that foot patrol officers have engaged in with their communities. For instance, in Portland, foot patrol officers are able to take part in handing out clothes to homeless individuals, and in Cambridge, officers are able to play basketball with kids in the neighborhoods. In Kalamazoo, officers can interact with kids at the mall or go door to door meeting people they have never met before. In Evanston, the officers get to take part in classes designed to improve understanding between the police and the community, while officers in New Haven are able to place individuals in need into contact with city services.

These positive interactions that officers are able to have with their communities can give officers a better view of the community they serve. One assistant chief asserted:

“The more we can get a patrol officer in front of the 94-97% of good people, that’s going to balance the cynicism that this industry creates where the night shift officer thinks, ‘Man, everyone is an [expletive] that I deal with—everyone’s like that.’ Well, no, not really.”

The assistant chief went on to tell a story about how an experienced officer approached him to discuss his thoughts on the agency’s foot patrol deployment. The officer said he initially thought it was [expletive], but then he was able to meet an elderly lady in one of the neighborhoods. The officer ended up
talking to her for 45 minutes, in which the resident told the officer how much she supported the police. The officer concluded that had the department not implemented the foot patrol strategy, the officer would never have experienced that positive interaction.

Not only can the positive interactions give officers a more positive view of their community, they can also give officers a mental break and an opportunity to reduce stress. One officer commented, "You can only get [cursed] so much in one day, so when you talk to normal people, it's kind of nice and refreshing." At one site, the department actually sees foot patrol as an opportunity for officers to de-stress. If an officer experiences a particularly stressful call, sergeants are empowered to place that officer on an immediate foot patrol assignment to provide them with an opportunity to de-escalate and de-stress through positive interactions with the community.

It is important to note that many of the foot patrol officers across the sites indicated that they did not initially want to do foot patrol. One shift commander noted, "I would’ve never thought I would’ve bought into this program, but not only do I see the benefits, but I also see the benefits within myself." Only after doing it and seeing the benefits firsthand did the officers come to support and believe in foot patrol. For agencies considering implementing foot patrol, this is likely an important consideration to keep in mind.

Another point to consider is that a lack of internal support within an agency for foot patrol, particularly among patrol officers, may have a dampening effect on the psychological benefits foot patrol officers receive. In one agency in particular, foot patrol officers noted that a lack of support and respect from officers in motorized patrol was actually detrimental to their satisfaction in conducting foot patrol. One foot patrol officer commented, "If I didn’t believe in the work that we’re doing, I definitely wouldn’t be doing [foot patrol] right now." This organizational dynamic will be discussed in greater detail later in the report.

**Challenges for Implementation of Foot Patrol**

**Foot Patrol Is Manpower Intensive**

While interviews and field observations revealed a number of benefits associated with foot patrol deployments, they also provided some understanding of the challenges agencies may face when implementing a foot patrol deployment. One such challenge is cost. As one sergeant explained, "Foot patrol is taxing when it comes to manpower." Across study sites, 80% of officer focus groups and 47% of supervisory officers (including 60% of assistant/deputy chiefs) echoed this assessment. The point was particularly emphasized in Portland and New Haven, where, between the two sites, 71% of supervisory officers and 100% of officer focus groups mentioned resource constraints as a challenge of foot patrol. The fact that this point was particularly salient in New Haven and Portland may be due to the fact that these two agencies consistently deploy the greatest number of dedicated foot patrol officers out of the five study sites.

One of the biggest challenges agencies are facing is maintaining their foot patrols while also keeping enough officers available to respond to calls-for-service. One foot patrol officer highlights this struggle:

"Staffing ruins everything—if you don’t have enough bodies, the walking beats are the first to go—they’ll pull you out of the walking beats and put you somewhere else."
This struggle can be magnified when foot patrol officers are included in the minimum staffing on a patrol shift, as is the case in a few of the study sites. Officers indicated that this reduction in officers available to answer calls can cause frustration among the motorized patrol officers, who are then left with a disproportionate load of calls-for-service. This may subsequently cause tension and resentment towards the foot patrol officers, who are seen as the reason for the increased call load. One remedy suggested by some supervisors is to have foot patrol as a separate unit so as to not decrease the number of officers available for calls-for-service on any given shift. However, the issue here is that some departments simply do not have enough officers to have a separate foot patrol unit. The bottom line, explains a chief, is that foot patrol “costs more money. In a time of budget consciousness, you save money by putting officers in patrol cars…[Foot patrol] takes more officers to do.”

**Traditional Productivity Measures May Be Inappropriate for Assessing Foot Patrol Officers**

One theme that emerged among supervisory officers is the notion that traditional productivity measures, such as the number of arrests, citations, citizen contacts, etc., may be inappropriate or insufficient for assessing the performance of foot patrol officers. This theme was evident in 79% of interviews with supervisory officers, including 100% of interviews with chiefs. For example, foot patrol officers at one site remarked that they make less arrests while on foot patrol because they believe there is more compliance and voluntary desistance in response to officers’ attempts to address minor offenses, a result they attribute to the positive way in which the officers have engaged and developed relationships with the community. As such, evaluating foot patrol officers’ performance on the basis of arrest statistics may be inappropriate. Furthermore, traditional measures may insufficiently capture the full range and quality of activities performed by foot patrol officers. One foot patrol officer noted:

“We’ve gotten so used to, for several years, stats, custodies, citations—that’s the only way that a lot of police management have seen productivity; trying to measure it with a stat. And so much of what we do is just going out and talking with people. There are things you can’t really put a stat on.”

While some supervisors still discussed the applicability of some traditional measures of performance, like the number of citizen contacts or pre- and post-crime statistics, the majority made mention of or suggested alternative measures for assessing the performance of foot patrol officers. For example, one chief suggested foot patrol officers should be assessed based upon their effectiveness in resolving the problems identified by the community.

The majority of supervisors, however, indicated that they rely on the community’s feedback in assessing the performance of their foot patrol officers. If foot patrol officers are doing their job well and building relationships, the supervisors expect that the community will know the officers and provide positive feedback about them. Similarly, one shift commander relies on the number of requests he receives to have foot patrol appear at community events as a measure of how well the foot patrol officers are engaging the community. According to the commander, “That’s as important as any type of number that...”
can be produced by going out and doing enforcement.” Alternatively, another supervisor mentioned that the absence of citizen complaints about problems in an area is an indication that the foot patrol officers are performing well.

Given the feedback of supervisory officers across study sites, agencies interested in implementing a foot patrol strategy should consider relying on other measures of performance that more accurately capture the activities of foot patrol officers as opposed to solely relying on traditional measures such as the number of arrests, citations, etc. As the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing (2015) recommends, “Law enforcement agencies should evaluate officers on their efforts to engage members of the community and the partnerships they build. Making this part of the performance evaluation process places an increased value on developing partnerships” (p. 44).

Foot Patrol Focused on Community Engagement May Be Seen as Antithetical to the Traditional Crime Control Model of Policing

At two sites, researchers found a perceived lack of support for the foot patrol deployments among motorized patrol officers, a view voiced by 57% of supervisory officers and 100% of officer focus groups across the two sites. According to one foot patrol officer, “Everybody that we work with thinks foot patrol doesn’t do anything.” Adding to this, a couple of supervisors noted that motorized patrol units view the work of the foot patrol officers as “huggy” or “touchy feely” as opposed to “real police work.” One foot patrol officer explains:

“Sometimes foot patrol isn’t looked at as doing hard-nosed police work because we’re not out there locking people up every day; we’re not out there doing traffic stops every day; we’re not out there doing street stops every day and things like that. Community engagement is what we’re doing, and sometimes that gets lost in the police field nowadays.”

Echoing this, one of the shift commanders noted:

“What foot patrol is trying to do is return to a style of policing that existed long before anybody here was working as a patrol officer, but yet we’re so focused on 911 calls and racing from call to call that [officers] can’t imagine how something else can work that way.”

The underlying point made by these officers is that much of law enforcement is entrenched in the crime control model of policing emphasizing arrests, citations, and enforcement, so a strategy emphasizing anything else may not be viewed as legitimate or worthwhile to officers. Supporting this assessment, some of the officers drew attention to other specialty units in their department that “don’t get the positive feedback that [foot patrol does]”, but “because they have been around so long and because it fits that mold of traditional police work—hard chargers, arrests, kicking [expletive]” the department turns to foot patrol first when considering budget cuts.

Thus, one challenge that agencies may need to address when implementing a foot patrol deployment is the apparent disconnect between traditional crime control interventions and community engagement activities. Otherwise, as one assistant chief noted, a “rift” may result between foot patrol officers and motorized patrol officers which can cause conflict and, as previously mentioned, may be detrimental to an officer’s enjoyment of foot patrol.
It is important to note that fostering internal support for community engagement activities can be done, particularly by valuing these activities in the performance review process. One department involved in the study actively encourages all officers to help the community whenever the officers have an opportunity to do so, such as helping someone change a tire or giving someone a ride to the gas station if their vehicle ran out of gas. The department has created awards and recognition for such activity, which then become additional factors to consider for special assignments and future promotional opportunities. For rookie officers, community engagement activities are noted in the reports submitted by their field training officers. As a result of the department’s emphasis, community engagement activities have become a valued part of the performance process.

Foot patrol officers indicated that much of the internal negative perception associated with foot patrol may be due to a lack of understanding about exactly what foot patrol officers do and how these patrols benefit both the community and the department. As such, another way an agency may be able to foster internal support is by exposing motorized patrol officers to foot patrol. Indeed, officers indicated that once some of their colleagues actually experience what it is they do and/or see how the officers are able to talk with, and get information from, the people they contact, they begin to have a greater appreciation for the foot patrol officers.

**Summary of Benefits and Challenges**

Interviews and field observations across the five sites revealed a number of potential benefits of foot patrol deployments for law enforcement agencies. At a foundational level, foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between foot patrol officers and the community. These relationships, in turn, enhance the enforcement and problem-solving capability of law enforcement, change how community members view police officers, and increase the legitimacy of the police in the eyes of the community. Additionally, the increase in positive interactions foot patrol officers have with the community while on foot patrol, as opposed to the generally negative interactions motorized officers experience answering calls-for-service, are rewarding and psychologically beneficial to the officers.

However, agencies must balance these benefits with the potential implementation challenges posed by foot patrol deployments. One challenge most agencies will face is cost. Simply put, foot patrol is manpower intensive and expensive. Additionally, agencies may need to explore alternative ways for measuring the performance of foot patrol officers that more accurately assess and encourage relationship-building and problem-solving as opposed to traditional enforcement activity, such as arrests and citations. Finally, agencies may experience some internal tension between foot patrol officers involved in community engagement and motorized patrol officers who may view the work of the foot patrol officers as not real policing.
This study examined how five agencies across the United States use various foot patrol strategies to build stronger relationships with their communities. The report adds to the developing literature on foot patrol by providing nuanced detail about the attitudes and perceptions of officers and community members towards community-focused foot patrol efforts. Officers engaged in foot patrol across sites offered support for the efforts. Importantly, many of these officers expressed support despite having initially been resistant to their foot patrol assignments. Interviewed community members at all five sites, including some from challenging areas, expressed overwhelming support for the foot patrol officers, with their only criticism being that they would like to see even more officers on foot patrol.

The report supports prior research demonstrating benefits of foot patrol for both officers and citizens. The main findings suggest that foot patrol facilitates relationship-building between officers and community members consistent with previous work showing that foot patrol officers get to know their communities (Wood et al., 2014). Furthermore, officers and community members across all five study sites indicated that their experiences did create a sense of approachability, familiarity, and trust supporting earlier findings (Cordner, 2010; Kelling & Coles, 1996). These benefits, in turn, were found to enhance the exchange of information between officers and community members, aiding the problem-solving capability of law enforcement as previously suggested (Groff, 2013; Trojanowicz, 1984). Finally, officers reported psychological benefits associated with foot patrol that echo prior findings relating increased job satisfaction and support for police-community interactions to officers engaged in foot patrol (Hayeslip & Cordner, 1987; Pelfrey, 2004; Yates & Pillai, 1996).

Despite these benefits, the study identified several key challenges associated with implementing foot patrol. Agencies engaged in foot patrol in this study indicated that implementation resulted in issues related to cost, performance evaluation, and the potential for internal conflict between officers focused on community engagement and officers focused on the traditional crime control model of policing. Given these challenges, the potential benefits of foot patrol deployments must be balanced with implementation concerns. Thus, foot patrol requires significant planning and preparation by the agency prior to deployment. Likewise, key issues affecting the effectiveness of foot patrol, such as dosage and activity (Groff et al., 2015), suggest that planning and preparation are key components in achieving successful outcomes.

Implementation Guidance

The benefits achieved by the five agencies in the present study may be attributable to the way in which these agencies deploy their officers, and key similarities may provide a template for planning foot patrol implementations. All five agencies in this study:

1. Deploy foot patrol officers primarily for the stated purpose of community engagement.
2. Provide their officers with enough time during their shift to engage and build relationships with the community and to conduct problem-solving by largely freeing them from responding to calls-for-service.
3. Provide consistency to the community by deploying the same officers to the walking beats.
4. Have committed to long-term deployments of foot patrol officers.
These four characteristics suggest four key areas for planning and implementing foot patrol. Specifically, these four areas include:

(1) Purpose
(2) Resources
(3) Continuity
(4) Commitment

Purpose implies that agencies should understand their rationale for implementing a foot patrol deployment, particularly the officers engaged in foot patrol. There should be a clearly articulated reason why foot patrol is implemented. Given the present state of knowledge about the impact of foot patrol, implementation should be primarily motivated by a need to increase community involvement and interaction with officers and a need to generate mutual trust and respect, all of which can lead to improved policing. Likewise, purpose implies that there are well-established goals for the foot patrol implementation. Agencies should assess their own understanding of purpose by answering questions such as, *can the organization clearly articulate the reasons that they are choosing to implement foot patrol and the goals that they hope to accomplish?*

Resources imply that agencies should have evaluated their available resources and have determined that sufficient support exists to enact meaningful foot patrol dosages. Given that foot patrol efforts function differently than motorized patrol, adequate consideration of resource availability represents a substantial challenge. Foot patrol covers less area than motorized patrol per officer, and assignment of officers to foot patrol may reduce the available number of motorized patrol officers to respond to calls-for-service or other assignments. Determining the impact of these adjustments in advance in the context of desired dosage and duration is an important challenge. Essentially, the resource component relates to the fundamental question, *has the department identified the necessary resources to adequately implement foot patrol?*

Continuity implies that organizations have planned their foot patrol strategy to maximize the potential benefits. This implies that foot patrol will be maintained in areas where it is implemented rather than rotating foot patrol through different areas. Likewise, this implies that officers engaged in foot patrol efforts in specific areas continue to work in those areas to give officers the opportunity to develop in-depth relationships with members of the community. Given that these priorities raise substantial administrative issues, these concerns should be addressed prior to implementation. Continuity can be assessed by answering the question, *is there an established plan to assure continuity in foot patrol, including continuity of officers as well as continuity of patrol?*

Finally, commitment implies that there is sufficient support to maintain foot patrol over an extended period of time in areas where it is implemented. The key goals for foot patrol should be long term as temporary implementations are substantially less likely to achieve positive benefits for community-policing relations. Commitment is assessed by answering the question, *does the organization demonstrate a long-term commitment to implementing foot patrol, or is the decision reactionary or temporary in nature?*
Limitations

While the current study provides key details about foot patrol, several limitations are noteworthy. First, perceptions of community members within this study may be biased. Since all community members involved in the focus group interviews were selected for participation by their respective law enforcement agency, sentiments expressed by the focus groups may not be representative of the community at large. This issue may be more problematic given the small sample of community members interviewed. Similarly, the limited number of field observations and short duration for observation periods may have inadequately captured many activities and experiences related to foot patrol. However, these limitations must be considered in light of the use of the data collected from community members and through observation. Given that these data were used primarily to support the data collected through interviews with police officers and administrators, the findings of this study suggest strong consistency supporting the key conclusions.

Future Research

The findings of this study raise a number of considerations for future evaluations of foot patrol deployments. Namely, researchers and practitioners should take care in determining how to measure the effectiveness of a foot patrol strategy. Echoing our finding that traditional productivity measures may be inappropriate for assessing the performance of foot patrol officers, an evaluation focused solely on crime reduction may be inappropriate. While our study did not examine foot patrol’s impact on crime rates, it did find that the familiarity and relationships officers develop with community members has enabled them to be instrumental in closing criminal investigations at all five study sites, including a
murder investigation. As such, evaluators should consider how foot patrol, depending on how it is implemented, may have more of a direct impact on an agency’s clearance rate than an agency’s crime rate, given a large enough deployment.

Evaluators may also want to consider examining the impact of a foot patrol deployment on police legitimacy and community perceptions of procedural justice. Anecdotal evidence from the sites suggests that personal relationships between foot patrol officers and community members may be helpful in terms of how community members view the actions of the officers, particularly enforcement actions. Established relationships with the community also allow officers to explain enforcement activity to the community, which may result in greater understanding and an increased sense of fairness in the enforcement efforts of the police.

Furthermore, evaluations should consider the impact of a foot patrol deployment on the affected community. Our findings suggest that not only are citizens more satisfied with the policing they are receiving from the foot patrol officers, they are also more likely to discuss their problems and concerns with the foot patrol officers. This subsequently allows police to focus on the real concerns of a community, something officers indicated is difficult to do without a relationship with the community. Thus, the responsiveness of the police to community concerns should not be overlooked in an evaluation of a foot patrol deployment’s effectiveness. Finally, any evaluation of the impact on foot patrol should include fidelity measures to assess the dosage of the foot patrol deployment and the activities undertaken by the officers involved. Without this insight, a true understanding of the effectiveness of foot patrol may continue to be elusive.
The Police Foundation is a national, independent, non-profit and non-partisan organization dedicated to advancing policing. For 45 years, the Police Foundation has conducted research on all aspects of policing and has led the way in bringing evidence-based practices and innovation to law enforcement. The Foundation brings a highly specialized perspective to its work, aligning recommendations with evidence-based strategies and approaches. Our work includes:

- **Traditional research**: The Police Foundation has supported and conducted some of the most noteworthy and influential experiments in policing, including the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment.

- **Applied research**: The Police Foundation has worked with hundreds of local police agencies, as well as federal and state agencies and private entities, to conduct applied research and management studies.

- **Agency assessments**: We provide independent agency assessment support at the state and local level, including critical incident reviews designed to emphasize lessons learned.

- **Program assessments and evaluations**: The Police Foundation has designed and conducted program evaluations in a number of areas, including patrol operations, hot spots policing, eyewitness identification and others.

- **Training and technical assistance**: We provide training and technical assistance to law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and internationally.

For more information about the Police Foundation, please visit our website at [www.policefoundation.org](http://www.policefoundation.org) or follow us on Twitter @PoliceFound. If you are interested in working with the Police Foundation on research, please email us at info@policefoundation.org or call (202) 833-1460.
1. Where possible, focus group interviews with community members were held at an offsite location from the police department, such as a church, restaurant, or community management office. At one site, however, it was necessary to use an available conference room at the police precinct.

2. This group includes one officer not at the rank of Assistant Chief or Deputy Chief but with similar responsibilities for Operations. For the purpose of anonymity, that officer will still be referred to as an assistant/deputy chief.

3. This group is mostly comprised of lieutenants but does include one officer at the rank of commander.

4. At one site, walk-alongs were conducted in the evening and the following morning.

5. Only 40% of officer focus groups and 37% of supervisory officers discussed the humanizing effect of foot patrol.

6. This factor was mentioned by only 21% of supervisory officers and 20% of officer focus groups.

7. Two supervisors also supported this subtheme at another site.

8. For this particular theme, assistant/deputy chiefs were not included with supervisory officers because they were not exposed to a line of questioning pertaining to performance or productivity measures.

9. Kalamazoo may be an exception to this recommendation against rotating foot patrol to other areas on a frequent basis. However, the department’s citywide canvassing strategy may be successful because 1) the rotation is systematic, and 2) it ultimately brings officers back to neighborhoods previously covered by foot patrol.
REFERENCES


In fall of 2015, the Police Foundation, with support from the Charles Koch Foundation, conducted a national search for law enforcement agencies utilizing foot patrol to build stronger relationships with their communities. The search focused on agencies that are committed to foot patrol as a long-term strategy for community engagement as opposed to a short-term, intermittent tactic. With this focus, a number of criteria, largely adapted from the research literature on foot patrol, were developed to guide the selection of agencies for inclusion in the study:

1. The agency must be committed to a long-term foot patrol deployment (i.e., the foot patrol deployment is not ending within the next 12 months).
2. The foot patrol deployment must have specified goals that are communicated to the foot patrol officers.
3. The foot patrol deployment must have dedicated personnel (i.e., specific officers are assigned to foot patrol).
4. The foot patrol deployment must have a targeted deployment area or areas.
5. One of the specified goals of the foot patrol deployment must be community engagement.

Additionally, the agencies’ geographical locations and the uniqueness of their foot patrol strategies were also factored into the selection process.

Out of the agencies that responded to the Police Foundation’s website and social media solicitation, five were selected to participate in the study—the Cambridge (MA) Police Department, the New Haven (CT) Police Department, the Kalamazoo (MI) Department of Public Safety, the Evanston (IL) Police Department, and the Portland (OR) Police Bureau.

Data Collection

To examine how the selected agencies use foot patrol to build relationships with their communities and address crime concerns, a two-day site visit was conducted at each of the five sites. Individuals at each agency participated in semi-structured interviews. Interview participants included officers at almost every level of the foot patrol officers’ chain of command, including chiefs, deputy and assistant chiefs, shift/unit commanders, and sergeants. These interviews provided information about the agency’s foot patrol deployment, as well as the views, beliefs, and opinions of the supervisory officers involved. Additionally, focus group interviews were conducted with foot patrol officers and community members to maximize the number of interviewees, given the limited amount of time spent at each site. At some of the study sites, all of the agency’s foot patrol officers were able to participate in the officer focus group interview; at sites where this was not feasible, the agency and researchers tried to select a diverse sample of the available foot patrol officers.

Community focus groups were comprised of residents, clergy, members of local business alliances or community management teams, community leaders, business owners, and current and former members of local government. The racial composition of interviewed community members was 63% White, 32% African-American, and 5% Asian, with 63% male and 37% female. Foot patrol officer focus groups were 96% male, with a racial composition of 73% White, 19% African-American, and 8% Hispanic.

Semi-structured interviews with supervisory officers and focus group interviews with foot patrol officers focused on a number of key topic areas related to the agency’s foot patrol deployment, including:
1. the goals of the agency’s foot patrol strategy,
2. specific details about the foot patrol deployment, such as the number of officers assigned to foot patrol or the size of the walking beats,
3. the regular activities performed by the foot patrol officers during a shift, and
4. the interviewees’ general assessments of the advantages, disadvantages, challenges, and effectiveness of foot patrol.

Interview questions were generally tailored by rank across the five sites, but some questions were asked at all ranks. For example, assistant/deputy chiefs of operations received additional questions pertaining to the deployment of foot patrol officers, whereas all officers were asked if they thought foot patrol makes a difference with regard to crime or community relations.

A different set of questions was developed and used for the community member focus groups across the five sites. These questions dealt with how the community generally views the foot patrol deployment and whether or not they believe the deployment to be effective (Please see appendix B for a complete list of interview questions for each participant group).

A team of two researchers performed each semi-structured and focus group interview. These interviews ranged in length from 25 minutes to 109 minutes, with an average interview time of approximately 47 minutes. For each interview, one researcher was designated as the primary interviewer, while the second was primarily responsible for note-taking and time management. Additionally, all interviews were audio recorded for transcription purposes.

In total, researchers conducted 31 interviews (including focus groups) involving 64 interviewees across the five sites. This included:

- Four (4) Chiefs
- Five (5) Assistant/Deputy Chiefs of Operations
- Five (5) Shift/Unit Commanders
- Five (5) Sergeants
- Five (5) focus groups consisting of a total of twenty-six (26) foot patrol officers
- Seven (7) focus groups consisting of a total of nineteen (19) community members

The experience of interviewed foot patrol officers ranged from 1 day on foot patrol to 15 years, with an average of 2.5 years of foot patrol experience.

In addition to interviews, researchers also conducted field observations with foot patrol officers at each site to identify the activities regularly performed by foot patrol officers and observe the nature of the interactions between officers and community members. A team of two researchers participated in “walk-alongs” with foot patrol officers, with researchers generally splitting up with two groups of officers to maximize the number of field observations. While accompanying the foot patrol officers, researchers
documented all of the activities of the officers and noted the subject-matter of all conversations between officers and community members. Walk-alongs generally ranged from 2 – 5 hours at each site and took place during the afternoon/evening hours to correspond with the officers’ regular deployment schedule.

**Data Analysis**

The Police Foundation performed a thematic analysis with a grounded theory approach to analyze the qualitative data gathered from the five sites (Guest, MacQueen, & Namey, 2012; Creswell, 2003). Initially, researchers utilized the audio recordings from the semi-structured and focus group interviews to verify and bolster the accuracy and completeness of the notes taken during the interviews. These interview notes were subsequently compiled with field observation notes and reviewed to gain a comprehensive understanding of the data, and major categories of content were identified. Codes, derived from the text data, were then assigned to each category and used to code the aggregated data. Multiple researchers were consulted to ensure the validity and accuracy of the coding process.

Based on the frequency with which the codes appeared within the data, salient themes across the five research sites, as well as across specific participant groups (e.g. chiefs, foot patrol officers, sergeants, etc.), were identified. These themes are discussed in Section IV of the report.
1. **History**
   a. Tell me about the history of foot patrol in your agency.
      i. How long has the agency been using foot patrol?
      ii. When did the current foot patrol deployment begin?

2. **Goals, mission, philosophy**
   a. What are the goals of the current foot patrol deployment?
      i. How has this been communicated to officers?
      ii. Have the goals changed since the foot patrol deployment began?
   b. Why was foot patrol selected as the strategy for this community and not something else?
   c. Can you tell us about how the foot patrol deployment was announced to the community?
      i. What were they told the goal of the foot patrol deployment is?
   d. How does foot patrol fit into other policing strategies – is it part of a particular type of policing, or is it just an extension of patrol?

3. **Deployment and Tactics**
   a. What qualities, characteristics, and skills make a good foot patrol officer?
   b. Can you give me an example of something innovative or creative that the officers did with foot patrol to address an issue in the community?

4. **Performance Metrics & Feedback**
   a. If you were to give guidance to agencies on how to record or measure the quality of foot patrol, what do you think that would look like?
   b. What are the benefits or advantages of foot patrol?
   c. What are the disadvantages or challenges to doing foot patrol?
   d. Do you think foot patrol makes a difference with regard to crime or community relations, and why do you think that?
   e. Has the impact of the foot patrol been measured?
      i. If yes, how was it measured?
      ii. If yes, what kind of impact has it had?
   f. Have the foot patrol officers given any feedback on the foot patrol deployment?
   g. What has the community’s response been to the foot patrol deployment?
      i. How did you receive this feedback? Was it collected systematically or informally?
Deputy/Assistant Chiefs of Operations/Patrol

1. **Goals, mission, philosophy**
   a. What are the goals of the current foot patrol deployment?
      i. How has this been communicated to officers?
      ii. Have the goals changed since the foot patrol deployment began?
   b. Why was foot patrol selected as the strategy for this community and not something else?
   c. How does foot patrol fit into other policing strategies — is it part of a particular type of policing, or is it just an extension of patrol?

2. **Deployment and Tactics**
   a. Foot patrol personnel
      i. Across the department, how many officers are involved in foot patrol?
         1. How many total sworn officers in the department?
      ii. Tell me about how officers are deployed on foot. Is it part of a special unit, part of regular patrol, or something else?
      iii. How is it determined in your agency which officers will be on foot patrol?
      iv. What qualities, characteristics, and skills make a good foot patrol officer?
   b. Officer Training
   c. Deployment
      i. In any given shift, how many foot patrol officers are deployed in each walking beat?
      ii. At what times are foot patrol officers deployed and why?
      iii. Tell us about the areas where foot patrol officers are being deployed.
         1. Why were these areas chosen?
         2. Why are these good areas for foot patrol?
         3. Who chose them?
            a. (Prompt): District commanders, 1st line supervisors, command staff, etc.
         4. What are the sizes of these areas?
         5. How did the implementation of foot patrol impact response times?
         6. How did foot patrol impact the department’s ability to cover the patrol area?
      iv. How long are officers assigned to a particular foot patrol beat or area before being rotated to another area?
         1. How is the timing of the rotation determined?
      v. Are foot patrol officers responsible for calls for service in their assigned areas?
      vi. Do non-foot patrol officers avoid the areas included in the foot patrol?
d. Foot patrol tactics
   i. Are foot patrol activities/tactics tailored to specific walking beats? Provide some examples.
   ii. Are there certain types of crimes or problems that you believe foot patrol is more effective against than motorized patrol?

3. Performance Metrics/Feedback
   a. Do you think foot patrol makes a difference with regard to crime or community relations, and why do you think that?
   b. What are the benefits or advantages of foot patrol?
   c. What are the disadvantages or challenges to doing foot patrol?

Shift/Unit Commanders

1. Deployment and Tactics
   a. Officer Training
      i. If I were a new officer in your department selected for foot patrol, what would I hear my sergeant say to me at the time of my selection or at my first roll call briefing?
   b. Deployment
      i. How did the implementation of foot patrol impact the response times of your officers?
      ii. How did it impact their ability to cover the patrol area?
      iii. Do non-foot patrol officers avoid the areas included in the foot patrol?
      iv. How would you define a productive patrol officer?
      v. How does foot patrol impact officer productivity?
   c. Foot patrol tactics
      i. Are officers instructed to do certain things while on foot, or is it left to officers’ discretion?
      ii. Does foot patrol help the department engage with certain groups of people more effectively, such as juveniles, gangs, the mentally ill, or the homeless?
         1. If so, how?
      iii. Has actionable intelligence resulted from interactions between citizens and foot patrol officers? We define actionable intelligence as information that is useful in furthering a criminal investigation.
         1. Is it easier to collect actionable intelligence on foot patrol than it is in motorized patrol?
      iv. Are foot patrol officers engaging in problem-solving, and if so, how?
         1. Is it easier to identify problems within the community with officers on foot? Why?
      v. Are foot patrol activities/tactics tailored to specific walking beats? Provide some examples.
      vi. Are there certain types of crimes or problems that you believe foot patrol is more effective against than motorized patrol?
against than motorized patrol?

vii. Can you give me an example of something innovative or creative that the officers did with foot patrol to address an issue in the community?

2. Performance Metrics/Feedback
   a. What are your thoughts and views about foot patrol?
   b. Do you think foot patrol makes a difference with regard to crime or community relations, and why do you think that?
   c. What are the benefits or advantages of foot patrol?
   d. What are the disadvantages or challenges to doing foot patrol?

Sergeants

1. Goals, Mission, Philosophy
   a. What are the goals of the current foot patrol deployment?
   b. How does foot patrol fit into other policing strategies—is it part of a particular type of policing, or is it just an extension of patrol?

2. Deployment and Tactics
   a. Foot Patrol Personnel
      i. What qualities, characteristics, and skills make a good foot patrol officer?
   b. Officer training
      i. If I were a new officer in your department selected for foot patrol, what would you tell me at the time of my selection or at my first roll call briefing?
   c. Deployment
      i. How did the implementation of foot patrol impact the response times of your officers?
      ii. How did it impact their ability to cover the patrol area?
      iii. How would you define a productive patrol officer?
      iv. How does a foot patrol deployment impact officer productivity?
   d. Foot patrol tactics
      i. Are officers instructed to do certain things while on foot, or is it left to officers’ discretion?
      ii. Do foot patrol officers target specific places within their foot patrol area?
         1. How specific are these places? (Prompt) Streets, blocks, neighborhoods, specific addresses or intersections?
         2. Are officers told to target these specific places, or is it self-directed?
            a. Why are officers told to target these specific places?
            3. Do officers do anything specific in these places?
4. Are officers expected to be in these specific places for any length of time or with any frequency during a shift?

iii. Does foot patrol help the department engage with certain groups of people more effectively, such as juveniles, gangs, the mentally ill, or the homeless?
   1. If so, how?

iv. Has actionable intelligence resulted from interactions between citizens and foot patrol officers? We define actionable intelligence as information that is useful in furthering a criminal investigation.
   1. Is it easier to collect actionable intelligence on foot patrol than it is in motorized patrol?

v. Are foot patrol officers engaging in problem-solving, and if so, how?
   1. Is it easier to identify problems within the community with officers on foot? Why?

vi. Are foot patrol activities/tactics tailored to specific walking beats? Provide some examples.

vii. Are there certain types of crimes or problems that you believe foot patrol is more effective against than motorized patrol?

viii. Can you give me an example of something innovative or creative that the officers did with foot patrol to address an issue in the community?

3. Performance Metrics/Feedback
   a. Performance Metrics
      i. Do officers have to document what they do and where they go during their foot patrol shift? How?
         1. (Prompt) This excludes normal report-writing.
      ii. Are foot patrol officers evaluated differently than motorized patrol officers, and if so, how?
      iii. If you were to give guidance to agencies on how to record or measure the quality of foot patrol, what do you think that would look like?
      iv. Do you think foot patrol makes a difference with regard to crime or community relations, and why do you think that?

Foot Patrol Officer Focus Groups

1. Goals, Mission, Philosophy
   a. What are the goals of the current foot patrol deployment?
   b. How does foot patrol fit into other policing strategies—is it part of a particular type of policing, or is it just an extension of patrol?

2. Deployment and Tactics
   a. General info
      i. How long have you been assigned to foot patrol?
b. Officer training
   i. Did you receive any special training or guidance to prepare you for foot patrol?
   ii. What additional training would be helpful to you as a foot patrol officer?

c. Deployment
   i. While on foot, do you patrol together or separately?
   ii. How quickly can you cover your assigned area on foot?
   iii. Do you ever leave your assigned area, and if so, why?

d. Tactics
   i. Describe the regular activities an officer does while on foot patrol.
   ii. Explain how you do your jobs without regular access to the in-car CAD or laptops.
   iii. How are you balancing enforcement with community engagement?
      1. (Prompt) Do you focus more on enforcement, community engagement, or some combination of both?
      2. Do you conduct frequent pedestrian stops?
      3. How do you deal with people loitering, panhandling, or creating other disturbances?
   iv. How are you interacting with and engaging the community?
      1. What types of things are you doing to get to know people in your walking beat?
         a. Is it easier to do these things being on foot?
      2. Has being on foot changed how community members interact with you?
      3. Think about last shift—describe some of the interactions you had with the public. (Exclude calls for service)
         a. What were the interactions about?
   v. Can you give me an example of something innovative or creative that you did on foot patrol to address an issue in the community?

3. Performance Metrics/Feedback
   a. Officer feedback
      i. Tell me how foot patrol is viewed by other patrol officers in the department—is it generally seen as a good assignment or a bad one?
      ii. What are your thoughts and views about foot patrol?
         1. What do you like about it?
         2. What don’t you like about it?
         3. What would you change?
      iii. Do you think foot patrol makes a difference with regard to crime or community relations, and why do you think that?
      iv. What are the benefits or advantages of foot patrol?
v. What are the disadvantages or challenges to doing foot patrol?
vi. Has the foot patrol assignment changed some of your views about foot patrol or police work in general? How?
vii. How has foot patrol affected your job satisfaction, if at all?
viii. Can you think of 1-2 highlights from your time in foot patrol?

Community Focus Groups

1. Can you give me a brief description of yourself?
2. How have you interacted with the police?
3. How does the community view the foot patrol deployment?
4. What do you like about foot patrol?
5. Is there anything you do not like about foot patrol?
6. Do you think it is effective? Explain.
7. What do you think are the benefits of the foot patrol deployment?
   a. Does it improve trust between police and the public? If so, how?
   b. Does it improve cooperation between police and the public? How?
8. Do you think there are any disadvantages to the foot patrol deployment?
9. Are the police more likely to address neighborhood problems now that they are on foot?
10. If you could, what would you change anything about the foot patrol deployment?
11. Are community members getting to know the officers on foot?
    a. Has this changed how the police are viewed by the community?
12. Is it easier to approach the police now that they are on foot?
The Police Foundation also recognizes the following law enforcement agencies that reached out to us regarding the foot patrol study and provided valuable insights on their foot patrol strategies and outcomes:

Menlo Park Police Department
Menlo Park, California

Seattle Police Department
Seattle, Washington

Los Angeles Police Department
(Venice Beach) Los Angeles, California

We commend them for engaging their communities in this way and for their willingness to take part in research.
Example 5
MAINTAINING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND PUBLIC SAFETY IN NORTH MINNEAPOLIS

An After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to Protests, Demonstrations, and Occupation of the Minneapolis Police Department's Fourth Precinct

Frank Straub | Hassan Aden | Jeffrey Brown | Ben Gorban | Rodney Monroe | Jennifer Zeunik
This project was supported by grant number 2015-CK-WX-K005 awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of publication. Given that URLs and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity.

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Dear colleagues,

Maintaining the delicate balance between First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the need to maintain public and officer safety can be difficult even in the best of times. But the unique circumstances surrounding the demonstration at the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD)’s fourth precinct headquarters in 2015 made this balancing act unusually challenging.

In reaction to the fatal shooting of a member of their community, protestors occupied the area around the precinct’s headquarters for 18 days and also occupied its lobby by staging a sit-in for a short time. As the following report demonstrates, the department and its individual officers displayed commendable restraint and resilience in these extremely difficult circumstances. Yet there are always lessons learned from these experiences, and, to identify them, Chief Harteau and Mayor Hodges requested this after action review.

I applaud their leadership in doing so, for the findings and recommendations will not only benefit the MPD, but also provide a road map for other agencies dealing with similar challenging situations. I also commend the assessment team from the Police Foundation and the authors of this report for their valuable contributions to the body of knowledge that law enforcement, public safety agencies, and local government can draw upon to prepare for and respond to mass demonstrations and similar events. Critical incidents can arise anytime, anywhere—and while the occupation of the fourth precinct was unusual, many of the lessons learned from it can help other police departments and municipalities respond successfully.

Sincerely,

Russ Washington
Acting Director
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Summary of events
On the morning of November 15, 2015, two Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers were dispatched to an assault call in a North Minneapolis neighborhood just blocks from the police department’s Fourth Precinct station. Soon after arriving on scene, the officers fatally shot Jamar Clark. Following the shooting, community members marched to and organized outside the Fourth Precinct police station.

Over the course of the next 18 days—from November 15 through December 3, 2015—demonstrators occupied the lawn and street in front of the Fourth Precinct. For the first three days, a group of demonstrators also occupied the front vestibule of the Fourth Precinct station. The street and the surrounding neighborhood were the site of demonstrations, open fires, noisy gatherings, and encampments. The demonstrators called for police reform, and specifically for the release of video footage from the officer-involved shooting.

In the early morning hours of December 3, the occupation was successfully and peacefully resolved. After 18 days, the community response was mixed: while the large majority applauded the professionalism and restraint of the Fourth Precinct line officers, some perceived the response as overly-aggressive and unnecessarily forceful, and others questioned why the occupation was allowed to continue for 18 days. Ultimately, the total cost to the city was approximately $1.15 million. The majority of the expenses were for MPD overtime; however, there were also expenses for replacing and repairing barriers and fencing, squad repairs, and hardware replacements. Approximately $50,000 of costs to the city were in property damage.1 There were five injuries caused by a group of alleged White supremacists who shot into the crowd of demonstrators; however, no serious injuries were attributed to interactions between MPD officers and demonstrators.

Implications and challenges
Like every significant incident, the occupation posed a unique set of circumstances for city and MPD leaders—circumstances that were unpredictable and rapidly evolving. Significant challenges were associated with managing the demonstrators; the media; and the impacts of the occupation on the surrounding neighborhood, MPD employees, and their families. These issues were compounded by a police department that struggled with the command and control structure and fully implementing the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), inconsistent communication, and training and equipment deficiencies.

City leaders and MPD officials worked to maintain the First Amendment rights of the demonstrators while ensuring their safety, the safety of police officers, and the safety of the community as a whole. They were determined to bring a peaceful end to the occupation in a difficult national environment marred by civil disturbances spurred by officer-involved incidents in Ferguson, Baltimore, New York, and other cities nationwide. For city and law enforcement leaders, this environment reinforced their determination to exercise extreme caution throughout the response. In the end, the city and its police department brought the occupation to a peaceful conclusion and avoided the civil disturbances that occurred in other cities.

Public safety response
Officers throughout the MPD demonstrated extraordinary resilience and professionalism in their response to the occupation. Many officers worked long shifts and were subjected to verbal, and in some cases physical, assault. At various times, bottles, bricks, Molotov cocktails, bottles of gasoline, and other things were thrown over perimeter fences, threatening officers and damaging police vehicles and the precinct building. During the occupation, Fourth Precinct officers were instructed not to leave the building during their shifts except to provide perimeter security. Meals were brought into the station by
chaplains and other volunteers. The commitment of the city, the police department, and individual officers to a peaceful, measured response played a large role in keeping the occupation from escalating into violent riots.

**Key themes of the review**

This COPS Office Critical Incident Review (CIR) of the 18-day occupation of the front lawn and the street in front of the MPD Fourth Precinct, completed by the Police Foundation, provides a comprehensive overview of the occupation from the perspectives of the MPD, elected leaders, demonstrators, and community members. The CIR identifies findings and recommendations as they relate to the response in Minneapolis, but apply more generally to civil disturbances across the nation. While the authors understand the unique set of circumstances that surround the protests and occupation of the Fourth Precinct, they also understand that the decision-making framework for the police response to this incident can and should be reviewed within the context of other significant incidents to identify important lessons that can be applied if a similar event occurs in another city, as well as to critical incidents more generally.

The findings and recommendations in this report center on leadership; command and control; response to civil disorder; accountability and transparency; internal communications; public information and media; use of force; intelligence gathering; training; equipment and tools for managing demonstrations; officer safety, wellness, and resilience; and community engagement and relationships. Some of the key lessons learned include the following:

- **Clearly define leadership roles and responsibilities among elected officials, law enforcement, and other agencies to ensure a coordinated and collaborative response to civil disturbance and other critical incidents.** Strained relationships, lack of clearly defined roles and responsibilities, public disagreements, and lack of consistent internal communication contributed to the dynamic and varied response to this protracted incident. Unified leadership from elected officials, police executive and command staffs, and precinct personnel provides the foundation upon which a cohesive tactical and operational response is built and executed.
  
  » Findings related to establishing a unified leadership response include Findings 4.1 through 4.4.

- **Plan and exercise the unified command system for complex incidents during routine public safety response and operations.** A citywide understanding and familiarization with NIMS and ICS is necessary during civil disturbances and other critical incidents to ensure coordination and collaboration among all responding agencies and individuals. Consistent implementation of unified command system principles in response to routine events and pre-planned large-scale events builds confidence in the systems and facilitates their implementation in response to mass demonstrations and critical incidents.
  
  » Findings related to developing an effective plan, institutionalizing NIMS and ICS to implement that plan, and training on that plan include 4.5, 4.6, and 5.6.

- **Clear, concise, and consistent communication, particularly during critical incidents, is key to establishing trust and credibility.** Clear, concise, and consistent communication between the Mayor’s Office and the MPD, between elected officials, and within the MPD regarding the overall strategy would have led to a more coordinated and collaborative response to the occupation, provided context to the operational and tactical decisions that were made, addressed officer safety concerns, and positively impacted morale.
  
  » Findings related to communication and messaging include 5.1 through 5.4.

- **Prioritize officer safety, wellness, morale, and resilience before, during, and after a critical incident such as a protracted response to civil disturbance.** City and MPD leaders should have addressed and more fully accounted for the physical, mental, and emotional well-being of officers assigned to respond to the 18 days of protests, demonstrations and occupation.
  
  » Findings related to officer safety, wellness, morale, and resilience include 7.2 through 7.5.
Build on positive police-community relationships to help mitigate potential future critical incident responses. The MPD 2.0 model, the training and engagement being done as part of the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice, and the emphasis on positive interactions and fostering trusting partnerships should continue. Understanding and acknowledging the deep-seated racial and other issues, particularly in North Minneapolis, and building and fostering relationships with traditional and emerging community leaders will be instrumental in learning from the occupation and building opportunities to address areas of community tension and discord.

Findings related to community policing include 5.7 and 8.1 through 8.3.

Conclusion

Many of the findings and recommendations that resulted from the 18-day occupation and the MPD’s response build on an existing body of knowledge that can assist law enforcement agencies in their mission to protect, serve, and strengthen relationships with their communities. Given the unprecedented nature of the occupation, we hope that the lessons in this report will provide guidance to other agencies that may encounter similar events in the future and add to the growing body of literature that public safety agencies can use to enhance their preparation for, and response to, civil disturbances in their communities.
PART I. OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

In the early morning hours of November 15, 2015, two Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers were dispatched to an assault call in the North Minneapolis neighborhood. That call ended with alleged suspect Jamar Clark being fatally wounded in an officer-involved shooting. Immediately following the shooting, eyewitnesses and other community members organized outside the Fourth Precinct building of the MPD, just blocks away from the site of the shooting. Some witnesses claimed that Clark was compliant and handcuffed when he was shot, while others provided statements indicating Clark was not handcuffed and had reached for one of the officers’ guns during a scuffle.

Demonstrations, marches, and protests followed, lasting 18 days. Over the course of the 18 days, demonstrators called for police reforms and the release of video footage and shut down a major thoroughfare in North Minneapolis, turning it into an encampment with tents, food, music, and open fires. Some demonstrators breached the perimeter of the Fourth Precinct station and occupied the vestibule of the precinct building.

Meanwhile, City of Minneapolis and Minneapolis Police Department leaders worked to balance providing the demonstrators an opportunity to exercise their First Amendment rights with ensuring their own safety and the well-being of the community through an ever-evolving situation. Additionally, MPD personnel worked to bring a peaceful end to the occupation, which ultimately occurred in the early morning hours of December 3, 2015. The fact that the MPD did not arrest any of the demonstrators who physically occupied the vestibule, did not arrest or cite anyone peacefully demonstrating over the course of the 18 days (despite the fire codes and ordinances violated), and peacefully ended the occupation was noted by government and MPD officials during interviews with the assessment team as a successful outcome.

In March of 2016, Mayor Betsy Hodges and Chief Janee Harteau requested the COPS Office conduct a thorough critical incident review of the MPD and City of Minneapolis response to the protests, demonstrations and occupation of the Fourth Precinct station following the officer-involved shooting.

Figure 1. Map of Minneapolis

Source: All maps in this report created by the authors via the ESRI website, www.arcgis.com. ESRI data originally from USDA FSA, DigitalGlobe, GeoEye, Microsoft, and CNES/Airbus DS.
COPS Office Critical Response Technical Assistance

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) established the Critical Response Initiative – Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) program in 2013 to provide targeted technical assistance to law enforcement agencies dealing with high-profile events, major incidents, or sensitive issues of varying need.

The purpose of this COPS Office CRI-TA Critical Incident Review is to critically, objectively, and thoroughly examine the entirety of the response to the community protests, demonstrations, and 18-day occupation of the lawn and street in front of the MPD Fourth Precinct station following the officer-involved shooting, examining the tactics and strategies of the demonstrators, elected officials, and police. This review

- provides a detailed overview of the demonstrations and occupation of the MPD Fourth Precinct station from the perspectives of law enforcement; community members, groups, and leaders; the City of Minneapolis; and other stakeholders;
- identifies focus areas and observations from the law enforcement response to the demonstrations that provide learning opportunities for law enforcement, public safety departments, government officials, and community members nationwide;
- informs law enforcement and public safety as they prepare to respond to civil disturbances in their own communities.

Scope and goals of the review

This report will focus on the entirety of the response to the demonstrations and precinct occupation—including the roles of the MPD and local, state, and federal officials during the event—and address some of the residual effects from both the law enforcement and community perspectives. The assessment starts with the beginning of the community organization and demonstration on November 15, 2015, and extends over the course of the 18 days through the decampment on December 3, 2015. Reviewing every aspect of the occupation and response allows for a robust discussion of how decisions made and actions taken affected subsequent events, and provides opportunities to identify lessons learned that may inform responses to civil disturbances of all types.

This report will also examine the roles that law enforcement, the mayor, and other elected officials played in shaping the response to the protests, demonstrations, and occupation. The Minneapolis City Charter gives the civic government unusually broad and direct authority over law enforcement activity, and the mayor and other city officials were consequently highly involved in the law enforcement response.

The goal of this report is to critically assess the decisions made and the actions taken, not as criticism, but as part of careful study. We hope that this study will provide information that will ultimately assist agencies in the difficult job of balancing between protecting citizens’ rights to peacefully voice their opinions and ensuring the safety of protesters, the wider community, and police officers. This report will examine training, policies, and procedures; police-community relationships and engagement; response to civil disturbances; use of force; use of equipment; officer safety, wellness, and resilience; public information and media; accountability and transparency; and the importance of addressing and acknowledging the history of race relations as part of the process for building effective community-police relationships. Findings and recommendations throughout this report will inform the field with regard to responses to future similar events.

National and international implications

The occupation in Minneapolis was, at the time, the latest in a series of nationwide civil disturbances, particularly in response to officer-involved shootings, in communities across the United States. The events that are the focus of this report were preceded by demonstrations in Baltimore, Chicago, Ferguson, and New York City. Since the conclusion of the Fourth Precinct occupation in Minneapolis, civil disturbances have also occurred in Tulsa, Oklahoma; El Cajon, California; and, Charlotte, North Carolina. Each demonstration and subsequent response provides a unique set of challenges and promising practices. This critical analysis of the Minneapolis response, with a particular focus on the law enforcement response, is intended to add to a growing body of literature that national and international public safety agencies can use to prepare for civil disturbances.
Report organization

The introduction to this report provides an overview of the COPS Office CRI-TA process and the scope, goals, and implications of this review. Chapter 1 discusses the methodology used to complete this review. Chapter 2 includes contextual background on the history of the North Minneapolis community where the incidents occurred, the governance structure established by the Minneapolis City Charter and the roles of elected officials as they pertain to the police department, and an overview of the Minneapolis Police Department’s organization. Chapter 3 provides a timeline of the 18 days, highlighting important moments and decisions from the perspective of the law enforcement agencies involved, government officials, and the community. Chapters 4 through 8 focus on issues that impacted the response, including leadership; incident command and response to civil disorder; accountability and transparency; internal communications; public information and media; use of force; intelligence gathering; training; equipment and tools for managing demonstrations; officer safety, wellness, and resilience; and community engagement and relationships. Each of these chapters provides information on the identified topics as well as important findings and recommendations in those categories. The conclusion of this report, Chapter 9, summarizes the key themes.
CHAPTER 1. METHODOLOGY

In March 2016, at the request of the mayor of the City of Minneapolis and the chief of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD), the Police Foundation created a Critical Incident Review team (assessment team) under the direction of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). The assessment team, comprising subject matter experts in law enforcement, police-community relations, and public safety, developed a comprehensive methodology to thoroughly review and assess the public safety response to the occupation of the MPD Fourth Precinct building that began on November 15, 2015, following the fatal officer-involved shooting of Jamar Clark. The assessment approach involved three means of information-gathering and collection: (1) on-site data collection, (2) resource materials review, and (3) off-site data collection and research. Each method is described in more detail below.

On-site data collection

The assessment team conducted four site visits in the spring and summer of 2016: April 11–15, May 2–6, June 13–17, and August 8–11. During these visits, the assessment team conducted semi-structured individual interviews and meetings with state, county, and city government officials; MPD command staff and officers; and community activists and community members. More than 50 individuals were interviewed during these site visits and the subsequent phone interviews, including the following:

- Hennepin County sheriff and chief deputy
- Minnesota House of Representatives member
- Minnesota Department of Human Rights staff
- Minneapolis mayor and members of the mayor’s staff
- Minneapolis city councilmembers
- Minneapolis chief of police
- MPD executive staff

- MPD command personnel
- MPD officers
- Minneapolis community activists, including those representing Black Lives Matter, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and other community organizing groups
- Minneapolis community members, including residents, local business owners, and unaffiliated community members
- Minneapolis religious leaders
- National Black Police Association – Minnesota Chapter board member
- Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis executive

While on site, the assessment team also held a series of forums with MPD Fourth Precinct officers and participated in ride-alongs to conduct direct observations of officers’ day-to-day interactions with community members.

Resource review

The assessment team reviewed MPD policies, procedures, training curricula, after-action reports, and other documents and resources provided by the chief of police and the Fourth Precinct line officers and command staff. The assessment team also reviewed documents provided by the Mayor’s Office and by City Council members. Each resource was reviewed in an effort to better understand the department’s response to crowd control and civil disturbances, use of traditional and social media for outreach and engagement, and approach to police-community relations. Materials reviewed included the following:

- MPD after-action summaries from the demonstrations and Fourth Precinct occupation
- After-action reports from previous critical incidents in Minneapolis
Citywide and precinct-specific weekly crime and arrest statistics
- Cost details and summaries
- Daily Incident Action Plans
- Daily staffing rosters
- MPD 2.0: A New Policing Model
- MPD Chief’s Citizens Advisory Council meeting minutes
- MPD Policy and Procedure Manual
- Press conferences and public statements made by the mayor, MPD command staff, Fourth Precinct leadership, and the president of the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis
- Police radio traffic recordings from important days of the occupation
- Slides from an MPD PowerPoint presentation to law enforcement leaders
- Social media content and statistics
- Timelines detailing the response from the MPD's and Mayor's Office's perspectives
- Training outlines

Off-site data collection
In addition to the information collected from Minneapolis, and in an effort to ground the incident review in national standards, model policies, and best practices, the assessment team researched and reviewed scholarship on crowd control and civil disturbances, the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Incident Command System (ICS), community policing, and other relevant topics, published by researchers from academia and from organizations including the following:

- U.S. Department of Homeland Security
- U.S. Department of Justice
- Federal Emergency Management Agency
- International Association of Chiefs of Police
- Police Executive Research Forum
- Police Foundation

The protests, marches, and occupation were also extensively reported on television and the Internet and live-streamed on social media as they occurred. The team reviewed hours of open-source video footage and social media postings, read articles, watched news clips, and listened to relevant audio regarding the demonstrations.

Analysis and application of lessons learned
The assessment team used all of the information collected to conduct a gap analysis, which focused on identifying key areas to develop a set of findings and recommendations for the City of Minneapolis and the MPD. The team began by reviewing policies, procedures, protocols, and training for civil disturbances and crowd control in Minneapolis. Having these documents as the foundation, the team identified promising practices and challenges in the response to the occupation through interviews and other data collection methodologies. They then analyzed engagement and communication with the community before, during, and after the incident response. Based on this information, as well as best practices, model policies, and evidence-based protocols, the team produced a series of findings and recommendations for responding to future critical incidents—primarily civil disturbances—in Minneapolis. The findings and recommendations are also applicable to law enforcement agencies and communities across the nation faced with responding to civil disturbances. It should also be noted that the findings and recommendations in this document not only relate to law enforcement, but also have implications for elected officials, community members, and other stakeholders who played a role in the 18-day occupation of the lawn and street in front of the MPD Fourth Precinct station.
CHAPTER 2. MINNEAPOLIS: THE SETTING FOR THE OCCUPATION OF THE FOURTH PRECINCT

The Minneapolis Police Department

The Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) provides public safety services to the largest city in the state of Minnesota. In 2016, the police department employed approximately 870 sworn officers and approximately 160 civilians under a decentralized command structure led by the chief of police, an assistant chief, three deputy chiefs, and five precinct commanders. Its authorized strength for 2017 is 877 sworn officers. Precincts operate with significant latitude to employ neighborhood-specific crime prevention and community engagement practices, and commanders manage the day-to-day operations of their precincts as they see fit. Currently, the MPD is divided into five geographically-arranged precincts and four administrative/operational sections—the Patrol Bureau, Investigations Bureau, Office of Professional Standards, and a Leadership and Organizational Development Division. Figure 2 shows the location of the five MPD precincts and the neighborhoods they include.

Governance of the City of Minneapolis and the MPD

The governance of the police department is a unique aspect of Minneapolis city government, and factored into the City/MPD response to the occupation. The Minneapolis City Charter divides the majority of the roles and responsibilities for providing for and overseeing the operations of the police department between the city council and the mayor (figure 3). The mayor has five general duties:

“(1) take care that all laws and ordinances are faithfully observed and enforced within the City; (2) take care that each other officer discharges his or her duties, for which purpose the Mayor may seek a writ of mandamus or other appropriate action against any delinquent officer; (3) recommend action in the City’s interest by any other government; (4) address the City Council annually on the state of the City, and recommend appropriate measures for the City’s physical and economic development; and (5) notify the City Council and any other interested board, commission, committee, or department of any litigation against the City.”

The mayor also exercises power over the police department. According to Article VII, Section 7.3(a) of the City Charter,

“The Mayor has complete power over the establishment, maintenance, and command of the police department. The Mayor may make all rules and regulations and may promulgate and enforce general and special orders necessary to operating the police department. Except where the law vests an appointment in the department itself, the Mayor appoints and may discipline or discharge any employee in the department...”

All other authorities lie with the city council. As described in Article IV, § 4.1, “The governing body is the City Council, in which the City’s general legislative and policymaking authority resides.” In addition, the city council also serves as the statutory
board and acting body for any action on behalf of the city that is not otherwise referenced in the charter, and must also “establish, organize, and otherwise provide for” 14 specific city departments and positions—including a police department. Providing for the police department includes allocating funding of at least 0.0017 employees per resident and providing for the compensation of its employees. The city council is also responsible for confirming the police chief, who has been nominated by the mayor, and can provide orders relating to the preservation of health that the police department must execute.

At the outset of the occupation, the mayor exercised her authority established under Article VII, § 7.3(a), and members of the city council attempted to use their funding authority to exert power over the MPD response. As we detail in the timeline in chapter 3, the mayor provided approval when MPD took some actions and directed MPD to refrain from taking others. She participated in meetings and negotiations that she

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**Figure 2.** Police precincts and neighborhoods


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**Figure 3.** Minneapolis governance

was invited to with demonstration organizers without including MPD leadership. City councilmembers also involved themselves with the occupation—by participating in the protests as demonstrators themselves, by attempting to negotiate a peaceful end to the occupation, and in other ways. The mayor’s role as tactical and strategic commander of MPD and the city councilmembers’ roles as negotiators—not their political affiliations or positions—are profiled and reviewed in this report.

**North Minneapolis community**

The community’s initial reaction, response, and continued involvement in the occupation of the Fourth Precinct station were complex. In order to understand the perspective and actions of the demonstrators after the officer-involved shooting and throughout the subsequent occupation, it is important to consider the history of North Minneapolis.

**North Minneapolis: historical perspective**

Minneapolis is a city long known for its robust economy, affordability, and liberal politics. In the last half of the 19th Century, Swedish, Norwegian, and Danish immigrants flocked to Minneapolis, building churches, schools, and a fraternal insurance organization downtown. City Hall was built as the anchor from which the business district would expand.

But while the White population of Minneapolis was taking advantage of the city’s opportunities, they stymied the relatively small African-American population’s attempts to gain access to the city’s prosperity. Not only were multiple Ku Klux Klan chapters active, but in the downtown neighborhoods, White residents organized corporations to buy Black owners out, mobilized associations to block them from moving in, or intimidated them out of even making the attempt. North Minneapolis was the only section of the city where minority residents were accepted. In employment as well, widespread racism prevented African Americans from being hired for milling and finance-related jobs—two of the city’s largest industries—leaving many unemployed and impoverished.

Even today, according to New York Times reporter John Eligon, the city “finds itself confronting an open secret as discomforting as the bone-chilling winters. By several measures, its Black population, which has grown to 19 percent of its 400,000 residents, has been left behind.” Eligon goes on to quote Mayor Betsy Hodges’s acknowledgement that there are “deep divisions and divides and gaps between white people and people of color in the city of Minneapolis.” For more than five decades, the focal point of these divisions has been Minneapolis’s north side.
Civil unrest in North Minneapolis in the 1960s

Frustrated by decades of continued marginalization, the lack of employment opportunities and quality education, and the refusal of local politicians to acknowledge or correct institutionalized racism, Minneapolis's African American community erupted into civil unrest in 1966 when a group of approximately 50 youth vandalized and looted stores in North Minneapolis.14 Almost a year later, another group of youth set fire to a handful of buildings on Plymouth Avenue in an event that became known as the "Plymouth Riot."15 Unlike the previous year’s incident, the participants did not disperse when authorities arrived. More than 30 fires burned over three days and at least three people were wounded by gunfire. The riot continued until approximately 150 National Guard troops were deployed to the area.16 While the riots in North Minneapolis were less devastating than contemporary uprisings in Detroit, Newark, and other cities, the Plymouth Riot had a lasting impact on the North Minneapolis community. Of the dozen stores that once lined Plymouth Avenue, none remain. There were charges of police brutality before the 1967 riots, and those charges continued long after the riots and continue to fuel tensions between the community and the police department today.

Following the unrest of the 1960s, the city worked with community leaders to rebuild the Plymouth Avenue corridor. The city donated an abandoned building to a group of community leaders who opened The Way Opportunities Unlimited, Inc. (The Way)—a community center and organization dedicated to improving the quality of life for youth in North Minneapolis by providing cultural, social, and political education and opportunities, as well as a recreation center. The Way’s goal was to foster Black empowerment and self-determination, to seek power and legitimacy for the typically ignored, and to fill the traditional role of community leader.17 Named by the community, the center had dual functions—representing "the way of life" for those it served, and "the way out" of being isolated in North Minneapolis.18 The Way was a vibrant place of community life, and artists like Prince and record producers Jimmy Jam and Terry Lewis grew up within its walls.

In 1989, the City of Minneapolis took possession of The Way’s building after the organization lost its funding and converted it into the Minneapolis Police Department’s Fourth Precinct police station. Many of the community members interviewed acknowledged that the city was well-intentioned when it opened the station; nonetheless, replacing The Way with a police station became a source of anger and resentment. In a magazine article interview, a Black Lives Matter Minneapolis organizer described the symbolism of the Fourth Precinct building’s history as follows:

"The occupation is really interesting to me, I’ve come to view it as a revenge of the ancestors. If you know the history of that space, the Fourth Precinct used to be a community center called the Way. It was this space of black revolutionary love, they were doing the work that we’re trying to do right now, trying to build a better world. . . .

"The City of Minneapolis responded by saying, ‘oh you guys must need safety, let’s put in this fortress,’ and that is now the Fourth Precinct. So I honestly feel like the ancestors were kind of speaking through us, a little bit, because the occupation made it a community space again."

North Minneapolis today

Today, residents of the ’north side’ (North Minneapolis) continue to face many of the challenges that drove the riots of the 1960s. In 2014 (the most recent year for which detailed neighborhood-level statistics were available), the citywide unemployment rate was 9.5 percent, but in North Minneapolis that number was more than twice as high, 21.1 percent. Similarly, the unemployment rate by race was 6.3 percent for Whites citywide, compared with 22.9 percent for African Americans citywide. The difference in unemployment rate was even higher in North Minneapolis, where 28.9 percent of African Americans were unemployed, while 10.5 percent of Whites were jobless. Combined with the fact that the median household income was more than $17,000 less in North Minneapolis than citywide, and the African-American median income in North Minneapolis almost $9,000 less than that, it is no surprise that the poverty rate
in North Minneapolis is much higher than in the rest of the city. The overall percent of persons living below the poverty line in the city as a whole was 22.5 percent in 2014, but 36.6 percent of the population in North Minneapolis. African Americans were almost three times more likely to be below the poverty line than Whites—42.0 percent to 15.1 percent—in North Minneapolis.20

In 2015, more than 40 percent of the reported homicides and 42 percent of the aggravated assaults committed in Minneapolis occurred in the Fourth Precinct (which covers North Minneapolis). Additionally, more than 70 percent of the weapons offenses and almost one third of the simple assaults occurred in the Fourth Precinct (see table 1).21 A commonly expressed sentiment in the Minnesota media is that North Minneapolis is a dangerous place where youth and gang violence runs wild.22

The fractured relationship and history of mistrust among Black residents in North Minneapolis, city government, and the MPD, which have made the goal of community safety hard to reach, provide the backdrop against which the protests and occupation played out following the Jamar Clark shooting.23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reported Offenses 2015</th>
<th>Fourth precinct</th>
<th>Citywide Total</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population * †</td>
<td>62,621</td>
<td>410,939</td>
<td>15.24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>439</td>
<td>28.02%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>543</td>
<td>1,902</td>
<td>28.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggravated Assault</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>42.65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burglary</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>3,564</td>
<td>24.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny</td>
<td>1,779</td>
<td>12,122</td>
<td>14.68%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Vehicle Theft</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>1,740</td>
<td>30.63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arson</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>49.14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Part I</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,808</strong></td>
<td><strong>22,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>21.85%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple Assault</td>
<td>1,460</td>
<td>4,708</td>
<td>31.01%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vandalism</td>
<td>1,425</td>
<td>4,207</td>
<td>33.87%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Weapons</td>
<td>989</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>71.67%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prostitution</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>9.39%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sex Offenses</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>26.89%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Narcotics</td>
<td>685</td>
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<td>29.41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driving While Intoxicated</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>20.04%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Part II</td>
<td>3,186</td>
<td>19,452</td>
<td>16.38%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total Part II</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,959</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,127</strong></td>
<td><strong>24.03%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,767</strong></td>
<td><strong>55,127</strong></td>
<td><strong>23.16%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


* Fourth precinct population is an approximation gathered from the Office of the Mayor of Minneapolis.

PART III. INCIDENT DESCRIPTION

CHAPTER 3. 18 DAYS: PROTESTS AND OCCUPATION OF THE FOURTH PRECINCT OF THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Given that the assessment team interviewed Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers, city and government officials, and demonstrators who were all there at various points over the 18 days, it is to be expected that their perspectives and accounts may seem contradictory. For example, during some interviews demonstrators reported uses of force and harassment that the assessment team could not independently verify from reviewing video footage and talking to others at the scene who reported Fourth Precinct officers acted with restraint and professionalism. Even within a particular group, accounts varied; for instance, MPD command staff and line officers at the Fourth Precinct disagreed on when—or whether—orders and information were received. In an effort to provide all perspectives equal voice, and recognizing that all parties were reflecting on high-intensity events, we have organized the following timeline first by day and then by whether the information was obtained from law enforcement, government, or community members.

The timeline was developed through a review of the timeline of events prepared by the Minneapolis Mayor’s Office, the Minneapolis Police Department’s Incident Action Plans and After Action Report, on-site interviews, and media reports.

Figure 5. Fourth precinct police station

Source: ESRI; see note on figure
Incident description
Sunday, November 15, 2015

Law Enforcement

MPD: At 12:45 a.m., two Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers from the Fourth Precinct were dispatched to an assault call in the area of 1500 Plymouth Avenue. Before the officers arrived, the call was changed to a request for police assistance, as the suspect involved in the assault allegedly confronted paramedics. When the two officers arrived on scene, a confrontation and brief struggle ensued with the alleged assailant, Jamar Clark. During this confrontation, one of the officers discharged his service weapon, fatally wounding Clark.

Following accusations that the officers had shot Clark while he was handcuffed, the MPD issued an initial press release at approximately 3:00 a.m. stating that Jamar Clark was not handcuffed during the confrontation.

At approximately 4:00 a.m., MPD Deputy Chief Folkens briefed the media regarding the shooting. During the briefing, Deputy Chief Folkens confirmed that Clark and the two officers were involved in a physical altercation and that Clark was not handcuffed at the time of the shooting.

After speaking with the mayor, Chief Harteau contacted the superintendent of the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) to ask for an independent investigation. The superintendent agreed to conduct the investigation.

Government

According to an interview with the assessment team, Mayor Hodges received a text from Chief Harteau about the shooting in the early morning, and the two spoke about it at approximately 7:30 a.m.

At 9:00 a.m., Mayor Hodges and her staff and Chief Harteau and MPD leadership met to discuss the next steps. Following this meeting, Mayor Hodges made phone calls to notify other elected officials.

At a 2:00 p.m. press conference, the mayor announced that the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) would conduct an independent criminal investigation into the shooting of Jamar Clark. The mayor indicated it was the first time in recent memory that the MPD would not be investigating its own critical incident.

The mayor also hosted a 5:00 p.m. community meeting and public listening session at the Urban League in North Minneapolis near the locations of the shooting and the Fourth Precinct station. Prior to the meeting, the mayor addressed a group of protestors outside the Urban League and invited them inside. At the community meeting and public listening session, the mayor openly addressed the attendees regarding the independent investigation and encouraged any witnesses to speak with investigators. At the end of the meeting she

Community

Immediately after the shooting, witnesses and other community members lined Plymouth Avenue North and gathered outside the Fourth Precinct station. Fueled by conflicting accounts from witnesses regarding whether or not Clark was handcuffed and cooperative or uncuffed and combative, they began berating officers. In fact, according to the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office, 20 civilian witnesses were interviewed regarding what they saw: two said that Clark was definitely not handcuffed, 12 were certain that one or both of Clark’s hands were cuffed, and the remaining six did not know.

Frustrated by the public uncertainty regarding the shooting, a group of approximately 100–200 people marched the two blocks to the Fourth Precinct station and voiced their frustration that another young African-American man was shot and killed by the police and their anger at the perceived increase in police brutality nationwide. Those demonstrators that believed Clark was handcuffed during the shooting also called for the officers to be prosecuted.

At 3:00 p.m., another demonstration was organized via social media by community leaders from Black Lives Matter (BLM) Minneapolis and the Minneapolis chapter of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). This group of demonstrators gathered at the location of the shooting and followed the same route down to the Fourth Precinct station. From there, demonstrators spread out on the
CHAPTER 3. 18 DAYS: PROTESTS AND OCCUPATION OF THE FOURTH PRECINCT OF THE MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT

Law Enforcement

The first night the protestors gathered outside the precinct, the precinct station continued to be surrounded by demonstrators and vehicle exits at the back and side were blocked, leaving all MPD vehicles trapped in the precinct station parking lot. The tires of an unmarked squad car parked on the street were slashed; windows of cruisers and the precinct station were smashed out; and bottles, rocks, and bricks were thrown over the fence at officers. MPD officers were also subjected to verbal harassment. After a few hours, officers were finally able to bring their squad cars into the back parking lot and close the gate.

Government

spoke privately to many members of the Clark family, as well as to as many others that wanted to speak with her.

Community

sidewalks from Penn Avenue North to James Avenue North and across Plymouth Avenue North (approximately half a mile), linked arms to create a “No Cop Zone,” and chanted “No justice, no peace! Prosecute the police!” During the demonstration, six to 12 BLM Minneapolis members entered the front vestibule of the precinct and staged a sit-in, indicating that they would not leave until five demands—including viewing the footage from the incident, an independent investigation, media coverage of eyewitness testimony, community oversight of police with full disciplinary power, and a residency requirement for MPD officers—were met. These individuals also refused to attend the community meeting and listening session at the Urban League, demanding that the mayor and the chief of police meet them at the Fourth Precinct station. The proposed meeting did not take place that evening. While this occupation was taking place, approximately 150 community leaders and community members attended the listening session hosted at the Urban League, one block from the Fourth Precinct station. Attendees described the meeting as contentious, and attendees told personal accounts of harassment by Fourth Precinct officers, questioned the mayor and the chief of police regarding their ability to conduct an impartial internal investigation, and echoed many of the sentiments being expressed by the demonstrators who refused to attend.

Following the meeting, many of the attendees and other community members joined the demonstrators outside of the precinct station, bringing the total number up to approximately 300–400.
Law Enforcement

MPD: Over the course of the day, officers at the Fourth Precinct station guarded the side and back fences from being breached. According to officers’ radio traffic, for the most part, the demonstrators remained peaceful, though some officers continued to be subjected to verbal harassment.41

During a meeting between MPD command staff and the Fourth Precinct inspector, a first attempt to remove the individuals in the vestibule was planned. However, prior to the time designated to remove the protestors, administration made the decision to delay clearing out the vestibule for 24 hours. It was also suggested that protestors be offered the Fourth Precinct visitor parking lot (which is directly across the street from the precinct station) to continue their demonstration, that the weapons in the building be moved to secured storage in the firearms range, and that the safest route to the station for officers was through the back gate.42

Later that evening, as demonstrators began to march from the Fourth Precinct station to downtown Minneapolis, the MPD Bicycle Rapid Response Team (BRRT) was deployed to monitor their progress and ensure their safety. They were instructed to divert demonstrators away from Interstate 94 West (I-94 W); form a line to prevent them

Government

During a press briefing the mayor announced that she had contacted the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the U.S. Attorney for Minnesota, asking for concurrent independent investigations, including a civil rights investigation, into the shooting.49

The Hennepin County Chief Medical Examiner announced that Jamar Clark was removed from life support at 9:32 p.m.50

Community

Throughout the day, anywhere from 50–300 people remained outside the Fourth Precinct station.51 These demonstrators—from BLM, the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter, the Black Liberation Project, and unaffiliated community members—continued to demand the release of the video of the shooting and the firing and prosecution of the officers involved.52 Demonstrators took down the U.S. flag outside the precinct station and shattered one of the front windows.

Later that evening, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a group of approximately 300 demonstrators once again called for a “No Cop Zone” and began to march from the Fourth Precinct station towards downtown Minneapolis. From downtown, demonstrators marched up one of the ramps to I-94 W, formed a line of locked arms extending across the five-lane highway, and blocked traffic.53 According to the Minnesota State Patrol, 43 adults and eight juveniles were arrested after refusing multiple dispersal orders.54

Following the demonstration on the highway, many of the protestors returned to the Fourth Precinct station to continue the occupation. As the night progressed, demonstrators threw bottles and bricks over the wall at officers and squad cars guarding the side and back fences of the station.55

Incident description

Monday, November 16, 2015

Law Enforcement

MPD: Over the course of the day, officers at the Fourth Precinct station guarded the side and back fences from being breached. According to officers’ radio traffic, for the most part, the demonstrators remained peaceful, though some officers continued to be subjected to verbal harassment.41

During a meeting between MPD command staff and the Fourth Precinct inspector, a first attempt to remove the individuals in the vestibule was planned. However, prior to the time designated to remove the protestors, administration made the decision to delay clearing out the vestibule for 24 hours. It was also suggested that protestors be offered the Fourth Precinct visitor parking lot (which is directly across the street from the precinct station) to continue their demonstration, that the weapons in the building be moved to secured storage in the firearms range, and that the safest route to the station for officers was through the back gate.42

Later that evening, as demonstrators began to march from the Fourth Precinct station to downtown Minneapolis, the MPD Bicycle Rapid Response Team (BRRT) was deployed to monitor their progress and ensure their safety. They were instructed to divert demonstrators away from Interstate 94 West (I-94 W); form a line to prevent them

Government

During a press briefing the mayor announced that she had contacted the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ) and the U.S. Attorney for Minnesota, asking for concurrent independent investigations, including a civil rights investigation, into the shooting.49

The Hennepin County Chief Medical Examiner announced that Jamar Clark was removed from life support at 9:32 p.m.50

Community

Throughout the day, anywhere from 50–300 people remained outside the Fourth Precinct station.51 These demonstrators—from BLM, the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter, the Black Liberation Project, and unaffiliated community members—continued to demand the release of the video of the shooting and the firing and prosecution of the officers involved.52 Demonstrators took down the U.S. flag outside the precinct station and shattered one of the front windows.

Later that evening, at approximately 6:00 p.m., a group of approximately 300 demonstrators once again called for a “No Cop Zone” and began to march from the Fourth Precinct station towards downtown Minneapolis. From downtown, demonstrators marched up one of the ramps to I-94 W, formed a line of locked arms extending across the five-lane highway, and blocked traffic.53 According to the Minnesota State Patrol, 43 adults and eight juveniles were arrested after refusing multiple dispersal orders.54

Following the demonstration on the highway, many of the protestors returned to the Fourth Precinct station to continue the occupation. As the night progressed, demonstrators threw bottles and bricks over the wall at officers and squad cars guarding the side and back fences of the station.55
Law Enforcement

from getting onto the highway if necessary; and to arrest anyone committing assault or serious property damage or breaking the line to get on the freeway. According to an attendee at one of the assessment team’s anonymous officer forums, they also received a directive to refrain from physically engaging and let demonstrators onto I-94 W.43

By nightfall, the occupation turned violent again. Between 9:30 p.m. and 10:30 p.m., bottles and bricks were thrown over the walls in the back parking lot of the Fourth Precinct station.44 In addition to the violence targeted at the officers and the station building, two separate shootings occurred less than two blocks away on the 1600 block of Plymouth Avenue North.45 Though it could not be confirmed whether or not the gunshots were related to the occupation, the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team was deployed to investigate. According to an interview with a member of the SWAT Team, they were instructed not to take the MPD Bearcat, because it would appear “too militaristic.”46 This became a source of contention for SWAT officers who were concerned for their safety (and is addressed in Chapter 7 of this report).47

MSP: According to a Minnesota State Patrol (MSP) lieutenant, 43 adults and eight juveniles were arrested and booked into jail after marching onto I-94 W and blocking all five lanes of traffic for more than two hours.48 Most of the individuals arrested received misdemeanor citations for unlawful assembly and being pedestrians on the freeway.
Law Enforcement

MPD: Officers at the Fourth Precinct station began to put up fencing down both sides of the sidewalk in front of the precinct and also placed barriers on the sidewalk across the street.\(^{55}\) Once again, the demonstrators remained mostly nonviolent during the daylight hours, but began throwing rocks, bricks, bottles, and half-eaten food after dusk.

When the violence escalated, the MPD Chemical Agent Response Team (CART) was deployed to identify the individuals responsible. Some of the CART members were deployed with tactical helmets and vests, camouflage winter coats, and weapons capable of firing bean bags or marking rounds. This specialized unit also carried chemical agents that could be deployed if necessary.\(^{56}\)

BCA: At an afternoon press conference, the BCA superintendent indicated that after reviewing several sources of video obtained from the shooting—including from the ambulance on scene, a police camera, several public housing authority cameras, and cell phone videos from witnesses—none of the videos provided a definitive perspective and none would be released to the public.\(^{57}\) The superintendent also stated that the names of the officers would only be released once interviews were completed.\(^{58}\)

USDOJ: The USDOJ announced that they would open a civil rights investigation of the shooting.\(^{59}\) ■

Government

The mayor met privately with 10 members of Jamar Clark’s family and six members of BLM from 5:30 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. During the meeting, she expressed her sadness over their loss. The family members and activists requested three things from the mayor: (1) that she arrange for culturally-appropriate grief counseling for the family and community members; (2) that she convey the family’s request to view the video of the shooting privately to BCA and USDOJ representatives; and (3) that she publicly call for the release of any video of the shooting. The BLM attendees stated that if the mayor communicated publicly that she had relayed the request that the Clark family be allowed to view the video, they might end the occupation. The mayor agreed to the first two requests and asked for time to consider the implications of the third. The family and BLM agreed to reconvene the next morning. The mayor also contacted Jamar Clark’s brother following the meeting.\(^{60}\)

The Hennepin County Chief Medical Examiner conducted the official autopsy of Jamar Clark. The cause of death was determined to be a gunshot wound to the head and toxicology examinations showed that Clark had a blood alcohol concentration of .09 and had THC in his system. The autopsy also indicated that Clark’s wrists had “no occult contusions (bruises), or other injuries suggestive of restraint,” supporting the finding that Clark was not handcuffed during the shooting.\(^{61}\) ■

Community

At approximately 3:00 a.m., seven tents and four canopies were set up in front of the Fourth Precinct station, outside of the vestibule which demonstrators still occupied.\(^{62}\) Despite the fact that some of their leaders attended the meeting with the mayor and the Clark family, protestors continued to throw rocks over the precinct walls, attempted to breach the fences that had been set up in the morning, and damaged multiple vehicles belonging to neighborhood residents. Two men also attempted to force open the front doors from the vestibule into the precinct lobby, but were unsuccessful.\(^{63}\) ■
Law Enforcement

MPD: At 2:00 p.m. MPD officers cleared the vestibule, after being ordered by the chief to do so without tactical gear or helmets.64 As officers stood in a line to provide some space between the front of the station and the demonstrators, other officers approached the front doors to the vestibule and were hit by rocks and bottles being thrown by demonstrators from behind the line.65 After the vestibule was cleared, officers trying to restore order outside of the station were yelled at by demonstrators chanting obscenities.66 Some officers spoke to demonstrators and answered their questions regarding why the vestibule was cleared out.67

Additionally, after the vestibule was cleared, officers at the precinct felt the situation escalated to a level that required the deployment of the CART again.

Later in the afternoon, the chief of police spoke at a press conference where she stated that the decision had been made to clear the vestibule after demonstrators there had covered a security camera looking out from the vestibule to the front door, refused citizens entry to the building to speak with investigators and officers, and had made themselves "more comfortable" in the vestibule and smoked marijuana there.68 During this press conference, the commander of the Fourth Precinct also explained the deployment of the CART members, and

Community

In the early morning hours, a Black Bloc anarchist flag was raised.83 Five additional tents and two additional canopies were also erected to help serve as commissary/food areas, guarded by approximately 40 demonstrators.84

At 10:00 a.m., the Urban League held a press conference with members of BLM and the Clark family to officially demand the release of the tapes of the shooting. Jamar Clark’s family also spoke at the press conference and called for peaceful protests.85 During the day, the demonstrators remained mostly peaceful, with the occasional breakout of chants demanding that the officers be fired and prosecuted and the videos released.

However, once the vestibule was cleared, the dynamic of the demonstrators changed considerably. Some demonstrators felt that the clearing of the vestibule represented an escalation by the police department— a perception bolstered by the police’s deployment of militarized equipment, including camouflage coats and what appeared to be automatic weapons, and of the SWAT Team and CART unit. While the use of these items and personnel had been attributed to "safety concerns" at the press conference, demonstrators told the assessment team that officers on the ground had not shared that information with them, and many demonstrators took
justified the continuing use of military-looking equipment outside the station, based on safety concerns over demonstrators throwing rocks and bottles as officers were clearing the vestibule.69

At 4:30 p.m., the president of the Police Officers Federation of Minneapolis (the Federation) released a statement indicating that Clark reached for an officer’s gun before he was shot, and said that witnesses that claimed Clark was handcuffed at the time of the shooting should be charged with a crime if their statements turned out to be “blatantly false.”70

That evening, as the number and intensity of the protestors grew and it became apparent that demonstrations would continue for the foreseeable future, the MPD response shifted from being handled entirely at the Fourth Precinct—and overseen by the commander and lieutenants—to a department-wide response. The city’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated and MPD opened its own operations and command center next to the EOC staff in the Emergency Operations and Training Facility. The MPD command center coordinated staffing, operations, planning, logistics, and finance and held regular briefings for command staff and the chief and executive team.71

MPD officers were yet again pelted with bottles, bricks and rocks, and other projectiles, including Molotov cocktails.72, 73 At this point, officers from other precincts in Minneapolis were deployed to the exterior of the station, based on safety concerns over demonstrators throwing rocks and bottles as officers were clearing the vestibule.69

Relations Service (CRS) representatives arrived at the Mayor’s Office in the afternoon and led a meeting of representatives from the offices of the mayor, governor, city attorney, and city coordinator, in order to gather information and establish a timeline of significant upcoming events and discussion points.

A member of the Mayor’s Office staff stopped by and went into the Fourth Precinct station to observe the conditions firsthand. When demonstrators surrounded all access points, the mayor’s staff attempted to contact community members to assist with de-escalating the crowd and to get the crowd to move away from the access points. The crowd retreated from the access points and allowed people in the precinct station to leave safely.

Additionally, during the evening hours, three city councilmembers—Lisa Bender (Ward 10), Alondra Cano (Ward 9), and Cam Gordon (Ward 2)—arrived at the Fourth Precinct occupation.40 As one councilmember indicated during an interview, while she was initially hesitant to get involved in another councilmember’s ward, when her constituents began contacting her to participate and show her support, she did.41 When she found out that chemical irritants had been used by MPD, she immediately tweeted that the MPD should stop, but indicated that the department was not going to listen to any City Council calls for de-escalation.42 The other councilmembers also suggested during interviews that they wanted to show support and help the Clark family and the community grieve and heal.

During the night, a small number of demonstrators threw several Molotov cocktails, bottles of gasoline, and large cement blocks over the precinct station fence. Demonstrators also cut fencing and barbed wire on the west gate of the station and destroyed a mobile camera that had been positioned to collect images of the protestors.80

While the occupation was reaching one of its most violent points to date, a small group of approximately 13 protestors marched from the Fourth Precinct to the mayor’s house to voice their displeasure with her approval of the police action, highlight the violence used to remove the demonstrators from the vestibule, and attempt to diffuse the violence on both sides. While the mayor was not home, the group was “pleasantly surprised” when the mayor’s husband let them in and talked to them for about 10 minutes.89

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As demonstrations escalated, the mayor and the chief were in the Police Administration offices monitoring developments. In response to demonstrators tying tarps to the gate surrounding the back of the precinct and holding tarps up to protect those throwing projectiles, officers deployed chemical irritants and fired one marking round to tag an individual. In response to demonstrators tying tarps to the gate surrounding the back of the precinct and holding tarps up to protect those throwing projectiles, officers deployed chemical irritants and fired one marking round to tag an individual.

BCA: After completing all of the officer and witness interviews, the BCA released the names of the two officers involved in the shooting.
Incident description

Thursday, November 19, 2015

Law Enforcement

MPD: After the events of Wednesday evening, tension between officers and community demonstrators remained high; however, no significant activities took place during the morning and early afternoon hours.90

At a 2:00 p.m. press conference, the chief of police highlighted the threats to officer safety and showed a brick that had been thrown by a demonstrator. The chief also advised that chemical irritants had been used on officers and that damage had been done to MPD cruisers, equipment, and property totaling at least $38,000.91

During an afternoon radio show, the Federation president criticized the occupation, stating that it had nothing to do with the investigation of the officer-involved shooting but rather it was part of “an activism [sic] movement.” He also criticized city leadership, primarily the mayor, for not letting the police end the occupation because the protestors had voted her into office.92

Officers continued to deal with verbal threats and harassment and with spray paint on the station walls.93 MPD officers conducting patrol outside the precinct station, near the occupation, also recovered four Molotov cocktails.94

Government

A Joint Information Center (JIC) that included senior representatives from city and state government was established. Initially, the JIC was established without notifying the MPD incident commander, and did not include the MPD. However, a deputy chief and MPD public information officer (PIO) were eventually invited to participate.95 The JIC members conducted conference calls three or four times a day, primarily to document and review issues, discuss community flashpoints, and identify resource needs.96 MPD personnel were queried on operational and tactical questions and members of the JIC sought to have significant decisions and actions cleared through the JIC.97

During the 2:00 p.m. press conference with the chief of police, the mayor spoke about the need to “strengthen the bonds of our community with our police and one another, both short term and long term,” and reiterated her desire to appropriately maintain the First Amendment rights of the demonstrators while ensuring public safety.98 Later in the evening, the mayor arrived at the occupation to attend the vigil. Staff from the Mayor’s Office returned to the precinct during the evening to observe the conditions of the occupation.100

Community

On the heels of the violence the night before, demonstrators were much more calm. While some continued to direct verbal threats at officers standing guard of the precinct, other protestors assisted the MPD, tweeting photos of individuals they believed were “casing the area” and the protests to incite violence.100
Additionally, three city councilmembers and the U. S. Representative who represents the congressional district that includes Minneapolis joined BLM representatives and religious leaders to yet again demand the release of videos from the shooting. The congressman asked for protestors to acknowledge how quickly some of their demands had been met by officials, but indicated that officials needed to do more if they wanted to end the occupation. The city councilmembers echoed the need to release the videos and also highlighted the importance of elected officials standing with the community.99

A Minnesota Department of Human Rights executive also arrived at the occupation site to observe but, as he discussed during an interview with the assessment team, made no attempt to get involved. ■
**Incident description**

*Friday, November 20, 2015*

**Law Enforcement**

MPD: At approximately 2:30 a.m., protestors threatened officers with lit Molotov cocktails, and an intoxicated woman who tried to drive through the back fence of the Fourth Precinct station multiple times was arrested. Officers noted during interviews that these events escalated tension among their ranks, with one officer comparing the scene to his military tours in Afghanistan. He also noted that MPD and city leadership’s failure to authorize the use of force, even after the apparent attempt on the fence, led officers to conclude their leaders had sided with the community against them.

Throughout the rest of the day, officers continued to be subjected to verbal abuse, though physical violence stopped. During an interview with a local religious leader and MPD chaplain, the assessment team learned that officers were not allowed to leave the Fourth Precinct station during their shifts, or in some cases overnight, because it was too dangerous. Even when allowed, leaving was daunting as officers had to be bused in and out, the roads were closed, and there was a general feeling that no matter what they did, they could not win. African-American officers especially were specifically targeted for verbal abuse, with one woman calling a particular officer, “an Uncle Tom whose family should be ashamed of him,” and encouraging him to commit suicide.

**Government**

The mayor met at the governor’s residence with the NAACP national president, the NAACP Minnesota president, five local NAACP chapter presidents, executives from the Minnesota Department of Public Safety and Minnesota Department of Human Rights, and the governor. The meeting focused on improving police accountability, police-community relations, and resolving the occupation.

At around 8:00 p.m., the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and U.S. Attorney released a statement explaining why the videos from the shooting would not be released until the investigation was complete.

That evening, staff from the Mayor’s Office went to the precinct to observe the conditions of the occupation.

**Community**

At 2:30 a.m. a female driver was arrested and charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI) and damage to property after trying to drive through the back fence of the Fourth Precinct; at about the same time, two shots were fired within blocks of the site of the Clark shooting. While the shots were unrelated to the occupation, and it remains unclear whether the crash was related, nonetheless they created tension among the demonstrators.

Beginning at approximately 4:00 p.m., protestors held a candlelight vigil for Jamar Clark outside the Fourth Precinct station. The NAACP national president, the vigil’s guest of honor, called for justice and reiterated the importance of peaceful demonstrations.
Law Enforcement

During a regularly-scheduled 3:00 p.m. appearance on WCCO Radio, the Federation president called for political officials to remove themselves, relinquish handling of the occupation to the police department, and allow officers to end the occupation. The chief of police called in to rebut the Federation president, resulting in a heated and public discussion of each other’s experience and the best plan of action for the department.107

That evening, the chief of police visited with demonstrators. The MPD also issued a warning “asking gathered demonstrators to be vigilant and report any actions that may seem out of the ordinary,” based on information received from confidential sources.108 The occupation had its most peaceful night yet.
Incident description
Saturday, November 21, 2015

Law Enforcement

MPD: Graffiti was cleaned off the Fourth Precinct building. Otherwise, there was no significant police activity.

Government

In the morning, the mayor visited the Fourth Precinct to speak with officers and answer questions regarding the strategy to end the occupation.

The Mayor’s Office communicated with BLM representatives about scheduling garbage pickup and graffiti cleaning at the Fourth Precinct.

The governor and the U.S. Representative held a meeting with representatives of BLM to discuss ending the occupation. At the end of the meeting, the governor released a statement requesting that USDOJ investigate whether any police actions during the occupation violated anyone’s civil rights.114

The governor also called for a special session of the Minnesota legislature to address racial disparities in North Minneapolis and in Minnesota as a whole, and he committed to a meeting with BLM leaders.115 The governor asked that in exchange for his request that videos be shown to the Clark family and released to the public, BLM leaders commit to ending the occupation, but no explicit commitment was made by BLM.116

Community

During the morning and early afternoon hours, there were approximately 50 demonstrators outside the Fourth Precinct, but the number swelled to approximately 200 during the evening. There were no arrests and no violence.117
Incident description

Sunday, November 22, 2015

Law Enforcement
No significant police activity occurred on this day.

Government
A representative from the Mayor's Office attended a public meeting at Neighborhoods Organizing for Change (NOC), where BLM agreed to end the occupation by Tuesday, November 24. At the end of the meeting, it appeared that consensus had been reached and a schedule to end the occupation was drawn up.

Another group of USDOJ CRS personnel arrived in Minneapolis to assist city officials.

Community
For the second day in a row, during the morning and early afternoon hours, there were approximately 50 demonstrators outside the Fourth Precinct, but the number swelled to approximately 200 during the evening. There were no arrests and no violence.
Law Enforcement

MPD: While there was no significant police activity for most of the day, at 10:40 p.m., Fourth Precinct officers responded to the shooting of five protestors outside of the precinct station.

The shooting immediately escalated the tensions of MPD officers that responded to the scene. According to radio traffic recordings reviewed by the assessment team, dispatchers relayed that multiple shots were fired and officers relayed back that a large group of protestors were coming towards them. Responding officers indicated that the crowd surrounding the victims was hostile to them and paramedics. Some officers said that they were prevented from getting to the victims.

Many of the exchanges between MPD and dispatchers focused on what roads emergency medical responders should take to get to the victims of the shooting.

After the victims were transported for medical attention, officers and dispatchers worked to identify the perimeter of the crime scene and exchanged information about the suspects. MPD investigators worked into the night to identify and locate suspects. They indicated that they were searching for “three white male suspects.”

Government

While the Mayor’s Office requested a meeting to coordinate security around the end of the occupation with MPD and NOC, the meeting request was rejected by NOC. During the day, demonstrators and city officials made significant efforts to put a timeline in place for the agreed-upon withdrawal of the occupation; however, no agreement could be reached.

During a statement to the media, the governor explained that he was allowed to view videos related to the shooting because the BCA, a state agency, was conducting the investigation, they report to him, and therefore it is his responsibility to know the situation. The governor stated, “I’ve seen the tape. It doesn’t show anything that would be by any confirmation to one point of view or another.”

Three executives from the Minneapolis Department of Civil Rights met separately with NOC.

Community

For the majority of the day, demonstrators remained nonviolent and continued to call for the release of the videos. A national civil rights group, ColorOfChange, announced that they had collected nearly 70,000 signatures online to call for the footage to be released. Additionally, local NAACP leadership issued a statement denouncing the agreement to end the occupation and calling for it to continue.

When the five victims were shot, the dynamic between the demonstrators and officers changed as trust deteriorated and tensions about the shooting and the response increased. According to one demonstrator interviewed, the victims had to be taken to the hospital by other demonstrators because officers were too slow to respond. Another demonstrator interviewed indicated that officers deployed chemical irritants against community members who were applying pressure to the victims’ wounds and that officers yelled at demonstrators that they were “waiting to be shot” by supremacist groups. This information was spread among the demonstrators outside the Fourth Precinct station, heightening tensions between protestors and police.
Law Enforcement

MPD: After continuing the investigation from the previous night, the MPD identified five suspects. While the actual shooter was arrested in nearby Bloomington, two accomplices were arrested in Minneapolis, and two turned themselves in. Ultimately, only four of the men were charged with crimes and the fifth was released after MPD determined he was not at the scene during the shooting.

Officers continued to investigate the shooting. Others continued guarding the station against the occupation, and some provided an escort to a march of demonstrators from the Fourth Precinct station downtown to City Hall.

After the march, officers arrested a protestor who jumped the temporary barriers erected outside the Fourth Precinct station and banged on the glass. Officers also faced bottles, vegetables, and other assorted food items being thrown over the back and side fences of the precinct. Renewed threats and chants were directed towards officers standing outside the precinct.

Government

The mayor released a short video condemning the shooting of the demonstrators the previous night and reitering her commitment to ensuring the safety of all involved.

The Mayor’s Office also coordinated with the Minneapolis public schools, Parks and Recreation Board, and Youth Coordinating Board and with the Hennepin County and Minneapolis Health Departments to arrange security for student demonstrators participating in Minneapolis public high school walkouts in support of Jamar Clark.

The mayor, the governor, and the U.S. Representative spent six hours with CRS representatives preparing for a meeting in the evening. This meeting was supposed to include all of the government representatives and BLM activists and was designed to reach an agreement to end the occupation immediately, but never took place because some occupation leaders refused to attend.

The Hennepin County Attorney also announced that the decision regarding criminal charges against the two officers involved in the Clark shooting would be brought before a grand jury.

Community

Following the shooting of five demonstrators, the communications chair of the Minneapolis NAACP was interviewed on CNN and claimed that the MPD was facilitating injustices and the bullying of demonstrators, was supporting White supremacists, and was “involved in this shooting.” She also accused the MPD of purposely delaying their response to the shooting victims and making disparaging comments to eyewitnesses, condemned the use of chemical irritants against demonstrators, and indicated that BLM had no faith in the MPD to keep the community safe during the occupation.

Jamar Clark’s brother, Eddie Sutton, also issued a statement early in the morning in response to the shootings, thanking the community for their support and for keeping the occupation peaceful, but noting that in light of the shootings, “the family feels[.] out of imminent concern for the safety of the occupiers, we must get the occupation of the Fourth Precinct ended and on to the next step.”

At approximately 2:00 p.m., nearly 1,000 demonstrators marched from the Fourth Precinct, past the scene of the Jamar Clark shooting, and down to City Hall, again demanding the release of videos of the shooting.
Community

An additional 500 people remained at the precinct and listened to a concert.141

After the march, demonstrators returned to the Fourth Precinct. Some became violent, throwing bottles and other projectiles at officers and squad cars in the back parking lot.142
**Incident description**  
**Wednesday, November 25, 2015**

**Law Enforcement**
No significant police activity occurred on this day. Officers from the Fifth Precinct were called on to monitor and provide extra patrol during Jamar Clark’s funeral and the dinner his family hosted afterwards, but no incidents were reported.

**Government**
The U.S. Representative attended Jamar Clark’s funeral and afterwards, noting the unsafe conditions highlighted by the shooting of five demonstrators, called for the occupation to, “evolve beyond encampment.” He was the only elected official to attend Clark’s funeral.

CRS transitioned to a new on-the-ground team.

Staff from the Mayor’s Office returned to the precinct during the late evening to observe the occupation conditions.

**Community**
Between approximately 10:00 a.m. and 1:00 p.m., hundreds of people arrive at the Shiloh Temple International Ministries in North Minneapolis for Jamar Clark’s funeral. The service included speeches from religious leaders and Clark’s family members.

After the funeral, the President of the Minneapolis Urban League echoed the exhortations of the U.S. Representative and Clark’s family to end the occupation, saying that order needed to be restored and that the community around the Fourth Precinct had endured enough gunfire, traffic interruptions, smoke from demonstrators’ fires, and helicopters overhead. For the established ministers and traditional community leaders, this signaled the right time to end the occupation, and served as a distinct change in the dynamic of the occupation moving forward.

That sentiment was directly countered by another pastor who announced that another rally was planned after the funeral, that the videos had yet to be released, and that many people still sought justice for Clark. The crowd that returned to the Fourth Precinct to continue the occupation reached up to 100 people. Some protest leaders called for more attention to social services for the homeless and transient individuals who had showed up for help, some of whom were beginning to live at the
Community

Growing camp. Protest leaders also held trainings, speakouts, and concerts and kept the area supplied with food. As one demonstrator noted during an interview, leaders touted their occupation efforts as a "beautiful attempt to build the beloved community."149 The demographics of the demonstrators also became increasingly diverse, with members of all races referring to themselves as Allies joining the occupation. According to some demonstrators, many of the protesters were from outside North Minneapolis.
Incident description
Thursday, November 26, 2015 (Thanksgiving)

Law Enforcement
No significant police activity occurred on this day.

Government
The mayor met with USDOJ CRS personnel to negotiate terms of a meeting with the presidents of the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter and the NAACP Minnesota Chapter. Among the terms agreed to by all parties was the removal of three large tents by 8:00 a.m. the following day.150

The mayor also visited the Fourth Precinct station to thank officers for their service and to allow them an opportunity to express their feelings and ask her questions.151

Community
About 100 people gathered around fires and prayed together outside the Fourth Precinct to “reject a history of violence, genocide, and oppression, and host a #Blacksgiving.”152 Community members from across North Minneapolis donated heaters, tents, and traditional Thanksgiving food.153
**Incident description**

*Friday, November 27, 2015*

**Law Enforcement**

No significant police activity occurred on this day. However, officers heard several gunshots east of the Fourth Precinct station, and a window on the west side of the building was damaged when a large rock was thrown through it.153

**Government**

The mayor and her chief of staff had a meeting with the presidents of the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter and the NAACP Minnesota Chapter, mediated by two CRS representatives.154 The mayor expressed her openness and willingness to advance most of the items on the NAACP’s police reform and equity agenda, in exchange for extinguishing the fires on Plymouth Avenue North—a violation of city ordinances and an increasing public health and safety problem.155

Staff from the Mayor’s Office returned to the precinct during the late evening to observe the occupation conditions. ■

**Community**

The three tents that all parties had agreed to remove by 8:00 a.m. were not removed, and fires continued to burn in the street. While the number of demonstrators at the station varied from 40 during the day to approximately 20 overnight, 50 other demonstrators marched to downtown Minneapolis in support of increasing the minimum wage and 30 other demonstrators conducted a “Solidarity with the Northside” march on the south side of Minneapolis, which ended at the Third Precinct station without incident.156 ■
Incident description  
Saturday, November 28, 2015

**Law Enforcement**

No significant police activity occurred on this day.

**Government**

The mayor participated in eight hours of negotiations, from noon to 8:00 p.m., with the president of the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter regarding removing the fire pits on Plymouth Avenue North. The mayor offered to allow demonstrators to bring in their own heaters and use them in the Fourth Precinct visitor parking lot across the street from the station and offered to facilitate the acquisition of a legal permit for doing so.

**Community**

During eight hours of negotiations with the Mayor, the president of the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter agreed to have all of the fires on Plymouth Avenue North extinguished if the city agreed to purchase eight heaters and supplies for the demonstrators. When these stipulations were not met, the negotiations ended unsuccessfully. Meanwhile, the number of demonstrators varied from 80 during the day to approximately 10–15 overnight, and there were no problems.
Incident description
Sunday, November 29, 2015

Law Enforcement
No significant police activity occurred on this day.

Government
A staff member from the Mayor’s Office and the chief and assistant chief of the Minneapolis Fire Department visited the Fourth Precinct station to inspect the fire pits and to encourage demonstrators to extinguish them. In advance of this visit, the mayor’s office contacted occupation leaders and USDOJ representatives to inform them of the purpose of the visit.\(^160\)

The mayor continued to work through CRS representatives to negotiate terms with BLM for an end to the occupation the following day. When the mayor was unable to grant the requests and meet the demands of BLM, the negotiations ended unsuccessfully.\(^161\)

Community
According to the mayor’s timeline, BLM negotiators made the following demands:

- That Minnesota law be changed to enhance civilian review of police departments
- Changes to Minneapolis’ contract with the Federation
- That prosecutors charge those arrested in connection with the shootings of the five demonstrators with terrorism
- A federal investigation into the shootings of the demonstrators
- That charges for all involved in blocking I-94 W be dropped

They also demanded that the mayor advocate for the Working Families Agenda, which works for a higher minimum wage; paid sick days, family leave, and predictable schedules; and equal pay.\(^162\) Finally, BLM demanded to be allowed to continue the occupation through December.\(^163\)
Incident description

Monday, November 30, 2015

Law Enforcement
No significant police activity occurred on this day.

Government
The mayor, the U.S. Representative, a Minnesota Department of Human Rights executive, and multiple former and current elected officials including city councilmembers signed a message calling for an end to the occupation. The message reemphasized the safety concerns for demonstrators, neighborhood residents, officers, and bystanders and emphasized the “many wins . . . already . . . attained.” The mayor also reiterated her intention to work with community leaders to advance a comprehensive agenda surrounding racial equity and police-community relations.

The mayor also visited the Fourth Precinct station again to thank officers for their service and to answer questions.

Community
While some community members signed the message along with government officials, BLM and the president of the NAACP Minneapolis Chapter responded to the message to end the occupation by fortifying their position and stating that they would not leave until the videos were released. Many protestors continued to refer to the occupation site as their “healing place” and began to circulate rumors that a police raid to shut down the occupation was “imminent.” As the rumors increased, the encampment was enhanced with more permanent and robust structures.
Incident description
Tuesday, December 1, 2015

On December 1, four men connected to the shootings of five protestors made their first court appearance. One was charged with five counts of second-degree assault and one count of second-degree rioting. The other three were each charged with one count of second-degree rioting.168

Law Enforcement
The MPD planned an operation to clear the encampment at 4:00 a.m. However, the operation was deemed unsafe and called off after a Department of Public Works employee leaked the details to the press.169 For the rest of the day, officers monitored the peaceful group of 30–35 demonstrators that remained.170

Government
The governor called on demonstrators to “move on” and allow residents to regain their neighborhood, and to “look at the bigger picture and build the community together,” though he did not indicate a timeframe to remove demonstrators. He also proposed a special session of the state legislature to address racial disparities in Minnesota.171

Community
At approximately 4:00 p.m., a group of clergy and BLM members marched to City Hall again to demand the release of videos of the shooting. Otherwise, no significant community activity occurred as the occupation continued.172
Incident description

Wednesday, December 2, 2015

Law Enforcement

MPD released data on response times as evidence that the occupation had affected community safety. The data showed that Priority 1 call response time—from phone pickup to arrival of officer—had increased almost three minutes, Priority 2 call response time had increased almost nine minutes, and Priority 3 call response time had increased more than 10 minutes. For the first time, MPD leadership explained that officers from other precincts were answering calls for service, mainly because Fourth Precinct officers had been forced to stay inside and protect their station, leading to some of the delays.

Additionally, the MPD finalized staffing and plans for an early morning operation to clear the encampment, scheduled for the following day, December 3.

Officers continued to monitor the occupation as the number of demonstrators remained static.

Government

No significant government activity occurred on this day.

Community

Rifts between the North Minneapolis community and the demonstrators that first arose when the Clark family requested the occupation end continued to grow. After the MPD released its data showing slower response times, traditional faith leaders echoed the need to end the occupation, with one saying, “We need to do something different than this occupation in our own community” and claiming that the demonstrators had lost sight of what was important. The emerging community leaders from the occupation, particularly from BLM, continued to declare that they would not move until the video was released.
Incident description
Thursday, December 3, 2015

Law Enforcement
At approximately 3:45 a.m., the MPD conducted a coordinated operation involving over 145 officers, city crews, firefighters, and private contractors to officially remove the encampment in front of the Fourth Precinct. The MPD removed tents and supplies and took valuable items to the Property and Evidence Unit; the Minneapolis Fire Department extinguished the remaining fires; street sweepers drove down Plymouth Avenue North to clean the garbage that was left; and the street was reopened. Officers gave the dispersal order to approximately 35 people, and seven demonstrators were willingly and peacefully arrested.

At 10:27 a.m., the chief of police sent an email to all MPD personnel—sworn and civilian—expressing her gratitude, respect, and unwavering support. The email explained, “This movement is much larger than just the MPD as it is a pivotal time for law enforcement across our county as changes need to be made and our profession is being tested. I am proud that we lead the way in best practices in 21st Century policing.”

Following the email, the chief of police briefly addressed officers at the Fourth Precinct directly. She reiterated many of the points in her email and noted that they had garnered public support and won because they had that support.

Government
The Mayor’s Office staff was present at the Fourth Precinct to observe the removal of the encampment.

The mayor spoke at a press conference at the Special Operations Center, indicating that the increasing safety risks to the neighborhood and the demonstrators made it the right time to end the occupation. She reiterated the city’s commitment to balancing First Amendment rights with public safety and thanked both officers for their professionalism and the demonstrators for withdrawing peacefully.

Community
After the encampment was cleared, some demonstrators—believing they had been evicted—gathered at City Hall to protest and march further, reiterating that the end of the occupation would not be the end of the protests.
**Law Enforcement**

Later in the day, the chief of police publicly expressed her support for officers who helped manage the occupation and many marches, investigated shootings, and continued to conduct their jobs, all while being “consummate professionals” to the media. The chief also thanked the other law enforcement agencies that assisted in the cleanup of the encampment and thanked the residents near the Fourth Precinct for their patience over the course of the 18 days.182

**Summation**

Overall, the occupation cost the City of Minneapolis more than $1.15 million, with almost $1 million accounting for MPD overtime and $165,000 for barriers and fencing, repairs, services, and miscellaneous costs.185 Unlike some of the demonstrations in other cities nationwide that preceded this event, there were no large scale riots and property damage, and none of the officers or demonstrators sustained significant injuries. As concluded in the Minneapolis Police Department After Action Report:

“This protest and three week occupation of a police precinct was a situation never previously encountered by the MPD. It was unlike a traditional public safety operation in that it was politically charged and solely focused on the police department, echoing national concerns raised over racial equity. The City and the MPD had to weigh all of its actions, carefully considering the consequences of those actions and whether such actions would diffuse and de-escalate the situation, or further inflame and escalate an already tense and tenuous situation.”186
PART IV. CRITICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSESSMENT AND ANALYSIS

CHAPTER 4. LEADERSHIP AND INCIDENT COMMAND LESSONS

Leadership
The 18-day occupation of the lawn and street in front of the Minneapolis Police Department’s (MPD’s) Fourth Precinct station—including three days of occupying the front vestibule of the station—disrupted a wide range of social, political and organizational processes. While some of these disruptions may have been unavoidable, many were due to preventable or ameliorable causes: lack of coordination among federal, state, and local efforts to resolve the occupation; informal communication issues within the MPD executive and command staff that created confusion among the officers working the front lines; chaotic and extended illegal, and often dangerous, behavior by demonstrators; mixed messages to the public; and extended inconvenience and difficulty for community members living and working in the Fourth Precinct.

Situational complexity
As shown by the incident description of the 18 days, the occupation was a dynamic and chaotic process, and one that was unprecedented in the Minneapolis area. Many of the involved political, police, and community leaders struggled with the open-ended nature of the occupation and their inability to bring closure to the event. Like many protests, the Fourth Precinct occupation ebbed and flowed throughout the 18 days based on the specific incidents occurring, as well as on the general public’s interpretation of the incident through the lenses of mass and social media and politics. At the beginning of the occupation, demonstrators had significant public support; however, the longer the occupation lasted the more neighborhood and public support wavered. This balance among First Amendment protections, law enforcement’s desire to quickly end civil disturbances in the interest of public safety, and the complexities surrounding each of these imperatives created a difficult environment in which to quickly and definitively make decisions, with few models or examples to follow.

The scope, complexity, ambiguity and political salience of the occupation raised the stakes for the MPD’s leadership team, policy makers and elected officials. The protests, demonstration, and occupation together comprised a major political event, following as they did on similar responses to officer-involved fatalities of young African-American men in Ferguson, New York City, and Chicago. In Minneapolis, a variety of actors worked to resolve the event at various levels of coordination and collaboration—and, at times, in conflict with each other, as city and other officials participated in the protests.

In addition, the City of Minneapolis did not have a specific formalized policy, practice, or process for managing demonstrations or protests of this complexity and ambiguity, nor was any situation-specific policy disseminated as the occupation unfolded. While Minneapolis has a general policy regarding responding to civil disturbances (7-805) and a general policy outlining the use of force during civil disturbances (5-312), neither of these policies nor the trainings associated with them were adequate or applicable to the situations that arose. In addition, as the assessment team noted during an interview with an MPD Commander, the formal MPD Guidelines/Rules of Engagement were not written until after the 18-day occupation: MPD wanted to make sure that officers had something in writing to look at if an incident like this arose again. Significant coordination and communication gaps also existed as federal, state, and city officials, as well as other community leaders, worked to resolve the occupation.

Collaboration
A fundamental principle of crisis and civil disturbance management is that an effective response requires partnership among multiple levels of government. In a civil disturbance or other critical incident that may require a joint response from the city and the state, collaboration between officials is imperative. Strong baseline relationships among officials
provide a foundation for effective collaboration during critical events and alleviate many of the potential issues that arise during high-stakes scenarios. As exemplified both by the mayor exerting her authority to make policing decisions and weigh in on operational processes, and by the manner in which press conferences were conducted, these baseline relationships—both among city officials and between city and state officials—either didn’t exist or were strained. The time to build these relationships was not during the occupation.

**Politics**

While the Minneapolis Police Department was the lead city agency for response to the occupation, the police chief’s authority as incident commander was limited, intentionally or not, by the involvement of the mayor and city council acting on their own given authority, as well as by other individuals with authority and influence in the city, state, and federal government. In an operation of this magnitude, officials must respect each other’s areas of authority, responsibility, and operational expertise. They must also clearly communicate and articulate these roles among themselves and to others.

**Effects of the national landscape**

While the occupation of the Fourth Precinct station was unprecedented in its nature (physically occupying part of a police building for three days) and its length (18 days), neither it, nor the officer-involved shooting which precipitated it took place in isolation; rather, they occurred within the context of police-involved shootings and subsequent protests, civil disturbances, and riots in other American cities. Minneapolis elected officials, police, and community leaders were aware of these events and focused on preventing violence and property destruction while also providing the community an opportunity to grieve and heal together. That MPD did not arrest any of the demonstrators who physically occupied the vestibule, did not arrest or cite anyone demonstrating at the Fourth Precinct station despite the fire code and ordinance violations, and peacefully ended the occupation was noted as a success by government and MPD officials during interviews with the assessment team.

Elected officials, without the inclusion of or coordination with MPD leadership, chose to resolve the occupation through negotiated management —the use of dialogue among elected officials, community leaders, the police, and demonstrators. This strategy was consistent with current best practices and with the 2015 report of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing (established by President Obama in 2014) which recommends that law enforcement agencies consider identifying and using 'least harm' resolutions and issuing citations in lieu of arrest for minor infractions. In light of the complexity and ambiguity of the occupation, clear policies should have been established and communicated to guide MPD personnel in determining the conditions for arrest and the use of force in order to effectively maintain public safety and prevent escalation of the occupation; clear and accurate reporting mechanisms for uses of force and citizen complaints should have been established or clearly communicated to ensure accountability and transparency; and a clear strategy and mission should have been communicated regularly to officers. Without these clear policies and accurate reporting mechanisms, disparities arose in some of MPD’s data—there were 19 arrests; 10 uses of force documented in the MPD Computer-Assisted Police Records System (CAPRS), though with only three associated incident numbers; and no documented demonstrator or officer injuries other than the 5 shooting victims. According to a report by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), leadership must “decide ahead of time which behaviors will or will not be tolerated” and “allow officers to exercise discretion in regard to arrest.” In that regard, leaders should “clearly convey factors that officers should consider when exercising their authoritative discretion to arrest.”

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**MPD National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice Site**

Minneapolis is one of six pilot sites for the National Initiative for Building Community Trust and Justice (National Initiative). The National Initiative centers on building trust between police departments and communities based on three pillars: enhancing procedural justice, reducing the impact of implicit bias, and fostering reconciliation. For more information about Minneapolis’s participation and progress in the National Initiative, visit [https://trustandjustice.org/pilot-sites/info/minneapolis-minnesota](https://trustandjustice.org/pilot-sites/info/minneapolis-minnesota).
MPD officers in the Fourth Precinct did not receive clear vertical communication from their precinct commander or command and executive leadership regarding the strategy of negotiated management, nor did they receive clear orders regarding the factors to consider in using force or making arrests. In part, that lack of clarity may have derived from inconsistent horizontal coordination and communication among elected officials, between civic and police leadership, and within MPD’s executive and command structure regarding the strategy and process to resolve the occupation. As detailed in the timeline (chapter 3), Fourth Precinct officers told the assessment team in interviews that there were several times they received a message to prepare to remove occupiers from the vestibule, but then just minutes later were ordered to refrain from doing so until further notice. It is difficult to determine the exact content and context of these directives from leadership because they were purposely not put in writing, but instead communicated verbally through the chain of command.

The role Chief Harteau played was inconsistent over the course of the occupation, in part because Mayor Hodges led the decision-making and operational processes at different points, which is legally within her authority based on the City Charter. The apparent strained relationship between Mayor Hodges and Chief Harteau, and the mayor’s unfamiliarity with the implications of the terminology she used when in charge, likely contributed to the inconsistent direction given to MPD personnel and the resulting frustration among officers over poor communication and inconsistent, uncoordinated leadership.

Incident Command System

The MPD’s own After Action Report indicates that on November 18, three days after the Jamar Clark shooting and the beginning of the occupation, the city’s emergency operations center (EOC) was activated and the MPD established a command center adjacent to it and implemented the Incident Command System (ICS).¹⁹⁶

Within this same timeframe, a work group was established to manage the city’s response to the occupation, consisting of representatives from the Mayor’s Office, the City Communications Office, the City Coordinator’s Office, the City Attorney’s Office, and representatives from Governor Dayton’s staff, as well as federal representatives. This work group, sometimes referred to as a Joint Information Center (JIC), was based out of the mayor’s conference room and worked to resolve the incident through negotiations with occupation leaders. The JIC also sought to direct the strategies, operations and tactics employed by the MPD. While this would typically be the function of the incident command structure, led by the chief of police, the JIC by some accounts was making operational decisions for the MPD, and was not well coordinated with the MPD ICS. The lack of coordination between the JIC and the MPD was exacerbated by other officials who worked to end the occupation outside the city’s efforts.

The After Action Report identifies the disconnect that developed between MPD’s incident command structure and political leaders:

“Beginning on the morning of Thursday, November 19, city representatives outside of the MPD began meetings via conference calls to discuss the situation which had escalated the night before. Initially, this group established a “JIC” (joint information center). When initially established, MPD incident command was not notified, nor was the IC (incident commander) aware of its existence. . . . The stated primary purpose of these conference calls and purpose of this group was to document and review issues, community flashpoints, and resource needs.

“This JIC however became involved into operational issues, discussions, and resource needs. Further, [neither] the City’s Emergency Operations Center nor MPD incident command were involved. . . .

“Due to concerns over operational security and role of this group [the JIC], the MPD representatives of the group typically would provide only limited information of crowd estimates, number of temporary structures in place, as well as dispel any rumors that might be coming from protestors or others. . . .
“The tenor of the group was that [it] should be consulted prior to the MPD taking any significant actions and that any such actions should be cleared through this group. While MPD was working within an established incident command structure and in communication with the City’s EOC on the public safety operations, the joint information system seemed to be working in a parallel direction on more of a political level.”\(^{197}\)

The After Action Report and interviews conducted by the assessment team also identified inconsistent, disconnected, and conflicting leadership within the MPD. For example, according to one interview,

“The Fourth Precinct established its own command structure during the three weeks of protests. . . . One of the issues identified was that although an IC was established (in the precinct), there were no other specific support roles established nor was a more formal ICS structure established at the precinct level which would include Operations, Logistics, Planning (Staffing) positions . . . .”\(^{197}\)

One Fourth Precinct official who had recently attended ICS training attempted to follow the ICS structure but received little support, meaning many areas were left unattended when he was off duty.

“The lack of a clearly identified ICS structure at the precinct level complicated the process and created some level of confusion. It also contributed to delays in communication between the MPD Command Post and the precinct IC[,] particularly relating to staffing and logistical issues. Further, Fourth Precinct supervisory staff did not believe they had decision-making authority on matters and [believed] that all operational decisions were being made by the offsite command post.”\(^{198}\)

ICS emphasizes the importance of a single, unambiguous incident commander who has the authority to manage the incident and to delegate authority to personnel within the ICS structure to perform their roles. Knowing who is in command during an incident is of the utmost importance to the execution of clear and consistent operational tactics.

Many of the issues that arose during the occupation pertained to an inadequate incident command structure. While there are unique circumstances in every response to a critical incident, ICS is a key component of the response to any critical incident or emergency situation. The ICS does not negate the role of elected officials or collaborative leadership, but provides a framework to enable smooth cooperation between all leaders and responders. For example, in response to the Boston Marathon bombing, Boston elected and law enforcement officials developed a collaborative and coordinated response to the bombing and investigation as well as for a unified communications strategy.

The Boston Marathon bombing required political and public safety leaders, in numerous jurisdictions and with different authorities and priorities, to respond rapidly to the terrorist attack, search for the terrorists, and direct the city’s recovery from the attack. According to a report prepared by the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative, city, state and federal leaders “set a tone of remarkable collaboration and interagency leveraging among one another.”\(^{199}\)

**Swarm Intelligence**

Boston’s multiagency response was based on the principles of **swarm intelligence**:

1. “Unity of mission and connectivity of action;
2. A spirit of generosity that rallied groups and individuals to assist one another;
3. Respect for the responsibilities and authorities of others, described as ‘staying in one’s lane,’ while assisting others to succeed in their lane to accomplish mission critical duties and tasks;
4. Neither taking undue credit nor pointing blame among key players, oftentimes portrayed as ‘checking your ego at the door’;
5. Genuine interpersonal trust and respect developed well before the event so that existing and dependable leadership relationships, integrity, and camaraderie can be leveraged during the event . . . .”\(^*\)

The critical feature of leadership in the Boston Marathon bombing response, which is applicable to the occupation and critical issues more generally, was the dedicated coordination of decision making, action and communication among city, state, and federal government leaders; elected officials; and law enforcement agencies. By effectively linking and leveraging their collective knowledge, assets, resources, and operations, officials in Boston quickly and efficiently met the unique challenges posed by the bombing, investigation and recovery. Similar collaboration and coordination can be seen in San Bernadino’s response to the terrorist attack among federal, state, county and local law enforcement officials, despite changes in jurisdiction as the investigation progressed.

The City of Minneapolis, Hennepin County, and state and federal partners demonstrated the strength and efficiency of collaborative leadership in response to the I-35W Mississippi River Bridge collapse on August 1, 2007. The bridge fell into the river and onto the river banks below, killing 13 people and injuring more than 90 others. The U.S. Fire Administration’s Technical Report explains, “strong working relationships and knowledge of roles and procedures were arguably the greatest strengths of the Minneapolis emergency services community’s response. The city had invested heavily in the development of those relationships, which were built through plan development, universal National Incident Management System (NIMS) training, appropriate use of exercises, and strategic planning over several years. These factors contributed heavily to creating an environment in which key players not only knew each other, but were familiar with the operations and disaster assignments of others. When it came time to pull together efficiently as a team—they did. One example of how relationships made a difference can be found in the request that the governor and the mayor speak with one voice from the EOC to avoid the potential for releasing different information during the response to the bridge collapse.”

Minneapolis should build on the leadership lessons from its response to the bridge collapse, the lessons learned from the Boston Marathon bombing response, and other crisis events, as well as on recommendations from the Task Force on 21st Century Policing, to develop and implement a coordinated and scalable interagency response to critical events based on the principles of the ICS.

Findings and recommendations

Leadership

Finding 4.1

The City of Minneapolis lacked a coordinated political, tactical, and operational response to the protests, demonstrations, and occupation of the Fourth Precinct police station.

Recommendation 4.1.1

City officials and MPD command personnel should discuss, plan, and practice a coordinated response to critical incidents, to include the level of tactical engagement as well as negotiation and other strategies.

Recommendation 4.1.2

Planning and training for responses to civil disturbances and critical incidents should include elected and appointed officials, law enforcement, other public safety agencies (fire, EMS, emergency management), other relevant government agencies (e.g., Corporation counsel, finance, public works), and non-government and private sector organizations (Red Cross, utility companies, business improvement districts, neighborhood councils, etc.) as appropriate. Annual tabletop exercises and biennial full-scale exercises (FSE) should focus on coordinated planning, implementation, and follow-up across all city agencies. The tabletop exercises and FSEs should be observed by and include appropriate roles for elected officials.

Finding 4.2

City officials and the MPD did not have a process to change its strategy for managing civil disturbances as they develop from short-term into protracted events.

At the beginning, elected officials and the MPD focused primarily on immediate political and tactical responses and did not entirely anticipate that the demonstrations would be long term, or that the occupation of the Fourth Precinct station would occur. As the occupation continued, they did not recognize the changing dynamics and plan for a long-term operation.
Recommendation 4.2.1
Agencies should develop strategies, based on timely and accurate intelligence and assessments, to identify the shift from routine events to protracted complex events that demand significant human and material resources as well as a well-coordinated and collaborative response from elected officials and law enforcement leaders.

Recommendation 4.2.2
City agencies should develop comprehensive plans that recognize that a negotiated management response to a civil disturbance, such as the Fourth Precinct occupation, will require the careful and intentional coordination of the response by elected and law enforcement officials, taking into account the human and resource challenges that develop during a protracted event.

Recommendation 4.2.3
The City of Minneapolis and the MPD should review lessons learned from other large-scale civil disturbances across the country—and previous MPD critical incident after-action assessments—to improve citywide and police department planning, preparedness, and response to unique critical events.

Recommendation 4.2.4
The City of Minneapolis should have a crowd control plan in place that clearly defines the city’s overall political, strategic, and tactical response framework for reacting to protests that develop beyond ‘routine’ events.

According to Howard Rahtz, “a review of previous riots reveals . . . [that a] major lesson is that the lack of planning and leadership in the early stages of [civil] disorder is a recipe for disaster.”204

Recommendation 4.2.5
The MPD must assume a lead role, or be provided frequent updates by elected officials, during protracted negotiations so that appropriate operational strategies and tactics can be developed and implemented consistent with the actions being taken by elected officials and others outside the police department.

Finding 4.3
Disagreements between City of Minneapolis, MPD, and Fourth Precinct leadership resulted in inconsistent messaging, unnecessary confusion, and poor communication that significantly and negatively affected the response.205

Inconsistent, and at times contradictory, public comments by the mayor and city council, as well as public arguing between the chief of police and the Federation president, created clear divisions which hampered the ability to find a unified resolution to the conflict and which continue to inhibit department and community healing.

Recommendation 4.3.1
All leaders, elected and appointed, should recognize the impact that their messaging, both formal and informal, and their actions contributed to the management and operational difficulties of MPD and its ability to effectively resolve the 18-day occupation.

Recommendation 4.3.2
All leaders, elected and appointed, should avoid engaging in public arguments and rhetoric that detract from the goals of keeping the community and police officers safe and resolving civil disturbances.

Finding 4.4
Elected officials, the chief, and the Fourth Precinct inspector failed to define and implement a clear, unified response to the occupation.

Recommendation 4.4.1
Messaging from the city as a whole must be unified and delivered in a manner that shows the city leadership is not divided in any fashion. Therefore, it is important to ensure that messages from city and police department leadership are clear, consistent, and coordinated to provide appropriate direction and support for all personnel involved in the response to civil disturbance or critical events.
Finding 4.5
Efforts to resolve the occupation lacked consistent coordination and collaboration among elected officials and operations personnel.

A number of officials—including city and state elected officials and the USDOJ CRS—engaged in negotiations with leaders from Black Lives Matter, Neighborhoods Organized for Change (NOC), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and did not coordinate their efforts among themselves or with the MPD.

Recommendation 4.5.1
Federal, state, and city elected officials should plan and practice a coordinated response to civil disturbance and critical incidents on a regular basis. For example, in their review of the Boston Marathon bombing, the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative (a joint program of the Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Center for Public Leadership) found that “leaders set a tone of remarkable collaboration and interagency leveraging among one another.” Leaders operated in concert and achieved something together—both order and outcome—which they never would have been able to accomplish on their own.206 Similar observations were made in the assessment of the response to the San Bernardino terrorist attack, and about the Minneapolis region’s response to the bridge collapse.

Recommendation 4.5.2
Responses to civil disturbance events that originate and occur entirely within the city limits should be led by the City of Minneapolis, with the MPD assuming the lead role in coordinating planning, operations, negotiations, and messaging in concert with elected officials.

Incident Command System
Finding 4.6
The City of Minneapolis did not fully implement NIMS or ICS, which would have provided a structure to organize and coordinate the city’s response to the occupation.

Although the Emergency Operations Center was activated and MPD established incident command, a JIC was established that operated separate and apart from the EOC and MPD ICS, leading to inconsistent communication, uncoordinated operations, and disconnected negotiations with protestors.

Recommendation 4.6.1
All City of Minneapolis personnel, including elected officials, should complete ICS training.

A U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance report advised, “Incident management organizations and personnel at all levels of government and within the private sector and nongovernmental organizations must be appropriately trained to improve all-hazards incident management capability. . . . Training involving standard courses on incident command and management, incident management structure, operational coordination processes and systems—together with courses focused on discipline and agency-specific subject matter expertise—helps ensure that personnel at all jurisdictional levels and across disciplines can function effectively together during an incident.”207

Recommendation 4.6.2
Minneapolis should establish one citywide incident management team (IMT) to lead its response to future large-scale incidents that involve a multiagency, multijurisdictional response. The IMT should include operational personnel as well as representatives from the mayor’s staff to ensure collaboration, coordination, and unity of command. The IMT should also train through tabletop exercises and FSEs.

Recommendation 4.6.3
The City of Minneapolis and MPD should use ICS principles to manage everyday situations, as a way to practice established protocols and training.
Finding 4.7

Fourth Precinct supervisors and line officers did not receive consistent communication regarding strategies and tactics to be employed.

The lack of consistent communication from the precinct commander and senior and executive MPD leadership regarding strategies and tactics left many officers in the Fourth Precinct feeling as if they were left to deal with the occupation on their own, and in many cases unable to use the authority vested in them to enforce laws and ordinances to protect their community and their property.

Recommendation 4.7.1

MPD Policy 5-312 “Civil Disturbances” should be expanded to clearly define Minneapolis leadership structure, roles, responsibilities, strategies, goals, and objectives for resolving civil disturbances.

Recommendation 4.7.2

Agency supervisors must ensure that first responders trust that leadership is supporting efforts to resolve critical incidents, even if they are not heard or seen.

Recommendation 4.7.3

Managers and supervisors, responsible for carrying out day-to-day operations, must be included in daily briefings and operational planning. This will help to ensure their complete understanding of operational strategies and what messages should be relayed to their subordinates, and give them the opportunity to communicate their observations and understanding.
CHAPTER 5. OPERATIONS

Internal communications

“The single biggest problem in communication is the illusion that it has taken place.”

– George Bernard Shaw

The Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) experienced multiple breakdowns in internal communication and messaging over the course of the occupation. Communication between the MPD executive staff and the precinct commander was strained and affected how information was given to line officers at the Fourth Precinct. Communication within the Fourth Precinct took place informally between supervisors and officers, sometimes without the knowledge of precinct or department leadership. This created confusion regarding who the Incident Commander (IC) was, which officers were working different shifts, and what the overall strategy was for the law enforcement response. Additionally, the roles and responsibilities of those at the Fourth Precinct were not clearly defined or communicated, creating confusion in the response to certain events and uncertainty regarding decision-making authority.

On top of the communication challenges within the precinct, communication failures between the Fourth Precinct and MPD command staff complicated the response. For example, while MPD’s Strategic Information Center (SIC) produced daily intelligence briefs which included overviews of the previous day’s activities, lists of upcoming events, officer safety information, and other useful information, the briefs were only sent to MPD command staff and did not make it down to line officers in the precinct who stood to benefit the most from having that information. This furthered the perception among Fourth Precinct officers that they were isolated and uncared for by their leadership.

Other unintended consequences of the MPD’s communications breakdowns included officers frustrated over the tone and message conveyed publicly by command staff and city leadership, missing and mixed internal messages within the department, and divisiveness in the department.

The Incident Command System (ICS) establishes basic principles and a definitive communications structure to be implemented during the response to an emergency or critical incident. Under the ICS, communications and information management are interwoven throughout the response; this is imperative to establishing and maintaining a common operating picture and ensuring the accessibility of all stakeholders.

Having a common operating picture provides on-scene and off-scene personnel the same information about the incident, including availability of additional resources if needed, and gives them an incident overview that enables all of the relevant agencies and individuals to make effective, consistent, and timely decisions. In order for this to occur, ICS emphasizes common terminology, clear determination of roles and responsibilities, and a clear chain and unity of command.

Using common terminology is identified as an essential feature to avoid misunderstandings in relaying commands across personnel and disciplines. Over the course of the occupation, differences in terminology being used by the Mayor’s Office, the Joint Information Center (JIC), and the rank and file in the Fourth Precinct led to misunderstandings and inaction. For example, MPD officers advised the assessment team that they understood that their instructions were to “stand down” and “move back,” but interviews with the executive staff, including the chief and her deputies, indicated that no such commands were given. While some MPD leaders took the phrases figuratively and directed the rank and file to delay conducting certain operations, others interpreted them as literal commands and entirely disengaged. The lack of common terminology used by those making and relaying the decisions led to the clearing of the vestibule taking much longer than expected and ultimately delaying it until more demonstrators were present.
outside—inflaming an already tense situation—and to demonstrators freely walking up an exit ramp onto the interstate. Even during some of the more violent nights of the occupation, varying definitions affected operations and led to the operating picture being seen differently by the rank and file and off-site leadership.

Confusion and inaction also resulted from the lack of clearly defined and communicated roles and responsibilities. Initially, the protests were handled entirely at the Fourth Precinct. However, after the first night, and the escalation of violence and the increasing number of demonstrators, the city’s Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was activated and run by the Office of Emergency Management staff. The MPD also opened and staffed its own command center and set up its version of an incident command structure. Meanwhile, city representatives outside of the MPD, including the Mayor’s Office, the City Communications Office, the City Coordinator’s Office, the City Attorney’s Office, and representatives from the governor’s staff, established a virtual JIC, holding regular conference calls and formulating both internal and external messaging. According to the ICS, a JIC is, “a facility established to coordinate all incident-related public information activities. It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident.” However, when an MPD deputy chief and public information officer were finally invited to participate, the focus of the JIC shifted from coordination and dissemination of information to involvement in operational decisions and resource needs. This created a parallel structure in which the MPD was working with the EOC on public safety operations, and personnel in the JIC were making operational and political decisions. Ultimately, the parallel processes slowed the timeframe for decision making, communication to the Fourth Precinct, and implementation of policies and practices to manage the occupation.

Establishing and communicating the chain of command and unity of command are essential features of ICS. These two features clarify reporting relationships, eliminate confusion caused by multiple or conflicting directives, and provide incident managers at all levels a clear picture of personnel under their supervision. Both during the initial phase of the response, where information is still being gathered and the full scope of the problem and necessary response has not yet been determined, and as the size and complexity of the situation evolves, there should be a clear understanding of who is responsible for various aspects and decisions and who any individual officer should be taking commands from.

Over the course of the 18 days there were instances where specialized teams deployed to the Fourth Precinct in an uncoordinated fashion and had to rely on other specialized teams to extract them. For example, on multiple occasions the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team was deployed to the Fourth Precinct without specific directions or full knowledge of what the situation was. This created situations where the SWAT van was quickly surrounded by demonstrators and the Bicycle Rapid Response Team (BRRT) had to be deployed to escort the SWAT Team to safety. Also, officers inside the precinct station gates deployed marking rounds without communicating with officers outside the gate to ensure that they were available to detain the marked individuals. Even within the station itself, decisions being made on one side of the building were not being communicated to teams on other sides, leading to situations where officers responsible for maintaining the security of the east gate were pushing demonstrators to the west gate and vice versa. Officers also indicated they received conflicting directives from multiple personnel and were unsure which command they were to follow. Likewise, they were unsure with whom to share their concerns regarding officer and precinct safety.

Incident Action Plans

Another key feature of the ICS structure regarding communication is the formation and dissemination of an Incident Action Plan (IAP). An IAP “is a written plan that defines the incident objectives and reflects the tactics necessary to manage an incident during an operational period.” While there are five phases of an IAP, the final two—“Prepare and disseminate the plan” and “Execute, evaluate, and revise the plan”—involve significant amounts of communication. Ideally, IAPs should be updated daily, but at a minimum they should be updated based on new intelligence and additional information, and each update should include assessments of what was accomplished during the previous operational period. Each IAP should be distributed via email and posted to intranets and other internal message boards so that all task force leaders, team and field leaders, and incident support leaders can easily access them and further disseminate them to their staffs. While the MPD drafted IAPs daily from November 19 through 26 (eight days), the practice was stopped after Thanksgiving weekend and only resumed on the final day of the occupation.
Public information and media

The MPD Public Information Office (PIO) is a three-person team comprising a former police officer and two former members of the media. Together, the team is responsible for managing relationships with the news media, posting on the MPD's social media accounts and website, and managing relationships with the public. One team member is responsible for handling media inquiries and records requests, responding to the scene of every fatality in the city, and contributing to the department's social media presence. Another team member has trained a cadre of MPD officers in every unit and precinct on how to use social media to communicate with the public. The third team member captures, produces pictures and videos to share with the public and the media.

Between the PIO and the MPD command staff, the department leveraged both news media and social media during the occupation to share updates and messages. The chief made the significant decision—learned from previous critical incidents—to include the PIO in all command-level briefing and strategy sessions. With unfiltered access to the discussions being had at the highest levels of the city, regarding both the physical response and the overall messaging response to the occupation, the PIO was able to determine the appropriate media strategy.

The MPD also leveraged its social media platforms—including Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Periscope—to share information and updates during developing incidents. On one of the most volatile nights of the occupation, the MPD employed its Twitter account to clarify its use of force, acknowledging that one marking round was deployed and that officers were being sprayed with mace by demonstrators. MPD even retweeted an individual who confirmed that mace was being used by both sides. MPD also tweeted pictures of the Molotov cocktails that were recovered near the Fourth Precinct station and provided information about the demonstrators who were shot and the subsequent arrests made.

The department also used Periscope to livestream entire press conferences so that clips could not be taken out of context and later posted them on YouTube for those who were unable to watch the press conferences live. At the height of the occupation, departmental Facebook posts were reaching more than 100,000 people and the department’s tweets were generating over 1 million impressions.

Figure 6. Screenshot of MPD Twitter timeline from November 18, 2015


In addition to the MPD’s press conferences and use of social media, more than 400 news stories were produced, predominately by local media outlets including four television channels, two radio channels, and two newspapers. The MPD responded to most of the media inquiries and, as a result of the preexisting relationships between the PIO and the media, was afforded an opportunity to provide a quote or respond to each of the stories produced. The MPD was given the opportunity to provide updates about the status of the occupation, details of any arrests made, the accessibility of the precinct to citizens, and notable events during the occupation. On Tuesday, November 24 alone—the day immediately following the shooting of five demonstrators—the MPD received and answered 179 media inquiries. MPD also disseminated information about officer and precinct safety, the destruction of property at the Fourth Precinct station, and the difference between exercising First Amendment rights and engaging in illegal activities.
Over the course of the 18 days, MPD leadership participated in seven press conferences and issued three press releases. During each of the press conferences, emphasis was placed on projecting citywide calm and control, speaking with a unified voice, and highlighting the fact that there were no large scale riots like those seen in other cities. The chief was accompanied at these conferences by the command staff on the ground, the mayor, and members of the city council. Some of the press conferences also included community leaders encouraging demonstrators to remain peaceful.

The city’s and MPD’s public information and media strategy—including holding multiple press conferences, leveraging both news media and multiple social media platforms, and acknowledging the peacefulness of the demonstrators—provided important information to the community throughout the occupation. Despite these efforts and accomplishments, some community leaders criticized the MPD for their lack of transparency regarding the shooting and investigation, as well as their defense of the involved police officers.

Use of force
According to the Minneapolis Police Department Policy and Procedure Manual, which was in place at the time of the occupation, use of force is defined as “Any intentional police contact involving: the use of any weapon, substance, vehicle, equipment, tool, device, or animal that inflicts pain or produces injury to another; or any physical strike to any part of the body of another; any physical contact with a person that inflicts pain or produces injury to another; or any restraint of the physical movement of another that is applied in a manner or under circumstances likely to produce injury.”

During a critical incident, the on-scene Incident Commander (IC) is responsible for evaluating and determining whether it is reasonable and appropriate to use less-lethal weapons to address the threat. Until the IC completes this evaluation and officially authorizes the deployment of less-lethal weapons, officers must refrain from deploying the systems “[u]nless there is an immediate need to protect oneself or another from apparent physical harm[.]”

Over the course of the occupation, officers used force on multiple occasions. These uses of force in response to the demonstrators’ actions ran the gamut from “necessary” to “unnecessary but legally justified” according to MPD’s executive staff. For example, during the first two nights of the occupation, when demonstrators were their most aggressive, officers used a marking round to target an individual who was allegedly throwing bricks. Chemical irritants were used multiple times, and some demonstrators alleged that they were hit and poked with batons by officers inside the station fence while they were holding up tarps to prevent mace getting in their eyes. In another incident, officers used a joint lock and a takedown to arrest a demonstrator who jumped over a police barricade and exposed him or herself to officers.

Depending on the level of force used, officers are required to complete a Computer Assisted Police Records System (CAPRS) report no later than the end of the shift during which the force was used. Based on the type of force, supervisor notification may be required to determine whether or not the use of force was necessary. For the most part, all of the uses of force that occurred during the occupation required a CAPRS report. According to an MPD commander and a review of Internal Affairs documents, there were only three force reports filed during the occupation over the 18 days. This was, in part, because of a command staff decision made on the first or second night of the occupation to open only one CAPRS incident per day. As a result, individual uses of force that occurred on a given day were recorded as one incident, when they should have been recorded under individual incident numbers.

Accountability and transparency
According to Walter Katz, Deputy Inspector General, Los Angeles County Office of Inspector General, “[T]here are few acts committed by local government that draw more controversy than a police department’s use of lethal force.” Mr. Katz continues, “broad cross-sections of the public have lost trust in local law enforcement agencies due to their perception of biased investigations of such deadly force incidents. This loss of trust can threaten the legitimacy of local law enforcement institutions.”

The 2015 report of the Task Force on 21st Century Policing notes that “the public confers legitimacy only on those whom they believe are acting in procedurally just ways . . . [and] law enforcement agencies should establish a culture of transparency and accountability.
to build public trust and legitimacy.” The Task Force encourages departments to adopt policies that mandate the use of external and independent investigations and prosecutions of officer-involved shootings and use of force situations.

Legislators/elected officials across the nation are striving to regain the public’s trust and confidence in their police departments by increasing accountability and transparency, particularly in instances of officer-involved shootings and use of force incidents. For example, Colorado, Wisconsin, and Utah have passed legislation mandating that outside agencies either conduct or lead investigations of officer-involved deaths. Along the same lines, many local departments have partnered with county, state, and other police agencies to form officer-involved shooting task forces. Other agencies are entering into memoranda of understanding (MOU) or other contracts to have impartial investigators conduct officer-involved shooting investigations. “Including outside agencies in an investigation promotes and encourages a level of transparency and objectivity that provides increased credibility to the final outcome. . . . Including outside agencies eliminates biases, whether real or perceived, which in turn strengthens public confidence in the outcomes of such investigations.”

Request for independent investigations of the Jamar Clark officer-involved shooting

Police-involved deaths are typically investigated on two tracks—the first to determine whether the officer(s) committed a crime, and the second to determine whether the officer(s) violated department policies or tactics.

In the immediate aftermath of the Jamar Clark shooting, Mayor Hodges and Police Chief Harteau requested that the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA) investigate the incident. Mayor Hodges also requested a separate investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (USDOJ). The BCA agreed to conduct the independent investigation and presented its findings to Hennepin County Prosecutor Michael Freeman. Taking into account the popular public sentiment, and understanding the importance of the result, Prosecutor Freeman determined that he would not present the findings to a grand jury, but would make the final determination himself. After reviewing the case, he declined to bring charges against the two officers involved in the incident. Following his own independent review of the case, United States Attorney Andrew Luger also declined to pursue civil rights charges against the officers. As noted, two separate criminal investigations, one by the county prosecutor and the second by the USDOJ, have been completed and prosecution has been declined in both instances.

Findings and recommendations

Internal Communications

Finding 5.1
Neither MPD nor the City of Minneapolis leadership ensured that appropriate strategies, directives and rationales were adequately communicated to line officers.

For example, once the decision to end the occupation through negotiations rather than direct police action was made, the decision was not clearly communicated to the Fourth Precinct.

Recommendation 5.1.1
Once decisions are made that result in operational directives, those decisions, directives, and instructions should be clearly communicated to all relevant personnel (the MPD Fourth Precinct in this case) through the chain of command, using clearly defined communication protocol to ensure personnel are fully aware and to avoid distortion or lack of clarity.

Finding 5.2
Breakdowns in communication within MPD—among the chief of police, command staff, Fourth Precinct command, and Fourth Precinct rank and file—compounded communication issues between city and MPD officials and impacted the ability of line officers to carry out the response.

While Fourth Precinct leadership participated in daily conference calls to discuss the activities of the previous day and determine strategies for the upcoming day, they sometimes transmitted those strategies and other messages inaccurately in roll calls with
the line officers, according to Fourth Precinct staff interviewed. Although daily written IAPs and intelligence briefings were distributed to precinct-level commanders, they were not routinely disseminated to Fourth Precinct line officers.227

**Recommendation 5.2.1**

MPD leaders should establish a clear and concise messaging strategy so that officers know from whom and how they are to receive directives. As addressed in a previous critical incident review,

> “Agency leadership must take significant, affirmative steps to communicate frequently with their line personnel about the current status of the situation, what is being done to protect their safety, and to offer an avenue to dispel rumors. Regularly scheduled information briefings, even if done over email or Twitter, are better than leaving an information vacuum that will predictably be filled with negative, speculative information.”228

**Recommendation 5.2.2**

Precinct leadership must provide consistent, timely, and accurate information regarding the strategies and tactics to be employed in response to mass demonstrations and held accountable for delivering accurate information and directives to their subordinates.

**Recommendation 5.2.3**

Genuine concern for officer safety and support should be communicated and demonstrated by the executive staff and through the chain of command to ensure the well-being of officers responding to mass demonstrations.

**Recommendation 5.2.4**

The MPD should provide strategies to ensure two-way communication so that frontline officers are able to input information about what they are experiencing on the line to members of their command staff through email, a dedicated Twitter account, etc. This would provide an opportunity for line officers to convey feedback regarding operations, intelligence, and officer safety to department leadership.

**Finding 5.3**

The lack of consistent strategy and the unclear communication of policy by MPD leadership inhibited effective crowd management and negatively impacted the morale of Fourth Precinct and other officers assigned to the occupation.

Clear and consistent communication of the city's response strategy to the occupation would have eliminated confusion and helped to alleviate frustration on the part of supervisors and the rank and file in the Fourth Precinct, who were often left wondering as to the proper response to incidents.

**Recommendation 5.3.1**

City and MPD leaders should ensure a clear communication strategy exists to avoid frustration and misunderstanding, in particular on the part of supervisors and line personnel responsible for operational implementation of the approved response strategy.

**Finding 5.4**

Leadership decided to use verbal communications instead of issuing written directives, in order to prevent compromise or leaks of operational information. This contributed to confusion and the dissemination of inaccurate or incomplete information to rank-and-file officers.

**Recommendation 5.4.1**

Invest in a secure, encrypted Incident Management System to support ICS communications by facilitating two-way information-sharing; tracking multiple incidents and events; providing real-time mission updates, direction, and safety messages; and coordinating tasks, goals, and actions. The ability to communicate using encrypted channels improves communication without jeopardizing officer and community safety.229
Public information and media

Finding 5.5
Preexisting relationships with local media afforded MPD the opportunity to respond to many of the stories produced during the protests, which led to increased accuracy in reporting.

Recommendation 5.5.1
Build and maintain relationships with local media prior to a major event, and prioritize those relationships during events that draw national and international media attention.

Finding 5.6
Although a JIC was established, the public information process between city agencies and officials was uncoordinated.

In addition, information sharing with the Governor’s Office was inconsistent and at times uncoordinated. In fact, it was reported during interviews that some in the ICS began purposefully keeping information from the JIC in an effort to keep the information ‘safe’ from public release.

Recommendation 5.6.1
Include PIOs from all city and state stakeholders in command-level briefings and strategy sessions to increase coordination and project one voice. Lessons learned from previous critical incident reviews highlight the importance of including the PIOs in all political, command-level briefings and strategy sessions to help determine the appropriate media strategy.

Recommendation 5.6.2
Develop plans for coordinating public information efforts among multiple participating agencies through the ICS and the creation of a JIC.

Finding 5.7
The MPD’s extensive use of social media during the occupation itself helped keep the public informed as individual incidents occurred.

Recommendation 5.7.1
Continue and expand the use of various social media platforms to inform the public and traditional media about unfolding events and provide information regarding specific incidents to facilitate transparency and build trust.

Use of force

Interviews and a review of documents provided by the MPD indicate that 10 citizen complaints were received during the 18-day occupation. However, during interviews conducted by the assessment team, protestors enumerated many use of force incidents and inappropriate police-citizen interactions that went unreported. Because protestors did not report these incidents, the assessment team could not determine the veracity of their complaints. The 10 citizen complaints have been or continued to be investigated by the MPD and the Office of Police Conduct Review.

Finding 5.8
During the occupation at the Fourth Precinct, MPD employees deployed less-lethal and non-lethal weapons without clear authorization from the incident commander, in violation of policy 5-312.

MPD policy 5-312 “Civil Disturbances” states in part, “Unless there is an immediate need to protect oneself or another from apparent physical harm, sworn MPD employees shall refrain from deploying any less-lethal or non-lethal weapons upon any individuals involved in a civil disturbance until it has been authorized by the on-scene incident commander.”

During interviews, some demonstrators claimed they were hit with nightsticks while holding up tarps to protect themselves from chemical irritants. Multiple officers expressed confusion regarding who the on-scene incident commander was and indicated that authorizations regarding use of force were coming from various MPD command staff, making it difficult to verify who specifically authorized particular uses of force.
Recommendation 5.8.1
The MPD should establish a clear incident commander and strengthen, train on, adhere to, and enforce the use of force policy—especially as it relates to civil disturbances (MPD Policy 5-312).

Recommendation 5.8.2
MPD use of force policy 5-312 “Civil Disturbances” should clearly delineate levels of approval to be obtained—and a specific individual to seek that approval from—prior to the donning of personal protective equipment or equipment which may intimidate or threaten protestors (typically characterized as “military-style equipment”), the use of marking rounds, and additional uses of force.

Finding 5.9
MPD deployed chemical agents without prior authorization, in violation of policy 5-313.

MPD policy 5-313 “Use of Chemical Agents – Policy” states in part, “Sworn MPD employees shall exercise due care to ensure that only intended persons are exposed to the chemical agents.” In interviews, demonstrators claimed that chemical irritants were deployed by MPD officers, including against demonstrators who were trying to administer first aid to the five shooting victims the night of November 23. It should be noted that no official complaints were filed by the demonstrators regarding the indiscriminate deployment of chemical agents.

Recommendation 5.9.1
The MPD should strengthen, train on, adhere to and enforce the use of force policy—especially as it relates to the use of chemical agents (MPD Policy 5-313).

Recommendation 5.9.2
MPD use of force policy 5-313 “Use of Chemical Agents – Policy” should clearly delineate levels of approval—and a specific individual to seek approval from—to be obtained prior to the donning of personal protective equipment and equipment which may intimidate or threaten protestors (typically characterized as “military-style equipment”) and additional uses of force.

Finding 5.10
The policy on documenting uses of force, as laid out in the MPD Policy and Procedure Manual, may not have been followed.

Demonstrators claimed that officers used chemical irritants the night five demonstrators were shot (November 23), but there is no official MPD record of chemical irritants being used nor were any pertinent complaints filed by the demonstrators. Because of the inconsistent way uses of force were documented, the veracity of the demonstrators’ claims could not be confirmed or disproved by the assessment team.

Recommendation 5.10.1
The MPD Use of Force Policy (5-306)—especially as it relates to CAPRS reports—needs to be strengthened, trained on, adhered to, and enforced.

Recommendation 5.10.2
Supervisor notification should be required for chemical agent exposures, especially during civil disturbances and crowd control, to ensure that these uses of force comply with overall strategies and best practices. While supervisor notification is not required for chemical agent exposures according to MPD Policy 5-306, it is contradictory to policy 5-312, which states in part, “The on-scene incident commander shall evaluate the overall situation and determine if it would be a reasonable force option to use less-lethal or non-lethal weapons to best accomplish that objective.”

Recommendation 5.10.3
The MPD should document each use of force case separately.
**Accountability and transparency**

**Finding 5.11**

The decision to document multiple uses of force under a single case number led to failure to accurately account for and track uses of force.

According the MPD Policy & Procedures Manual policy 5-306 “Use of Force – Reporting and Post Incident Requirements,” CAPRS Reports are required for each use of force incident.\(^\text{234}\) During the 18 days, the MPD categorized and recorded all uses of force under one case number per day. In total, MPD collected three force reports for the 18-day occupation, but they account for nine uses of force. For example, on November 19, 2016, there is only one force report (FR), but six separate uses of force were reported by officers and supervisors.\(^\text{235}\) While there is no evidence that the MPD deliberately attempted to underreport the use of force, the decision to capture incidents by assigning one incident case number per day caused confusion as to the actual number of incidents reported by officers and supervisors. The information below was provided by the MPD\(^\text{236}\) and indicates the official number of uses of force reported:

**Incident #1 (11/19/2015)**
- FR #1: 40MM [marking round] less lethal round (Torso)
- FR #2: MACE – crowd control
- FR #3: Improvised Weapon – (Firearm as striking tool) – (Torso)
- FR #4: 40MM [marking round] less lethal round (Legs)
- FR #5: 40MM [marking round] less lethal round (Legs)
- FR #6: 40MM [marking round] less lethal round (Torso)

**Incident #2 (11/25/2015)**
- FR #1: Body Weight to pin (Torso)
- FR #2: Joint Lock and Body Weight to pin (arms/hands) & (Torso)

**Incident #3 (12/11/15)**
- FR #1: Body Weight to pin (Torso)

**Recommendation 5.11.1**

MPD should require that officers and supervisors complete a use of force report for each incident and assign unique case numbers to each incident to increase accuracy and transparency.

**Recommendation 5.11.2**

Policy 5-306 “Use of Force – Reporting and Post Incident Requirements” should be enhanced to officially codify that each use of force report require the officer to submit a narrative surrounding the use of force, who authorized it (if necessary), and if there were witnesses present that can be interviewed.

**Recommendation 5.11.3**

All commanders and supervisors should ensure the thorough and accurate documentation of all events, facts, and uses of force as soon as practicable after an event or decision.

**Recommendation 5.11.4**

To promote transparency, use of force data should be reported to the public in a timely and accurate manner via the MPD website, the Office of Police Conduct Review’s website, and other state or federal databases.

**Finding 5.12**

All citizen-initiated complaints may not have been formally reported, recorded, or investigated.

The assessment team was unable to determine if all complaints were captured and investigated due to inconsistent record keeping.

**Recommendation 5.12.1**

All citizen complaints should be individually recorded to ensure that they are investigated and adjudicated in a manner consistent with MPD policies, Office of Police Conduct Review policies, and law enforcement best practices.
CHAPTER 6. PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Training in civil disturbances and crowd management

Minnesota POST requirements

The Minnesota Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training (MN POST) is the governing and licensing body of all peace officers, has the authority to establish policies and standards for peace officers, and develops and approves continuing education for peace officers in Minnesota. While MN POST oversees the certification and recertification of officers statewide, it does not mandate what courses a prospective or current officer must take, nor how long each subject should be. In fact, pursuant to state statute, the only MN POST requirement is that every active and part-time peace officer in the state be trained annually on use of force. Peace officer instruction must be based on learning objectives developed by MN POST and must be consistent with the individual agency’s policy; however, MN POST does not require a specific number of hours of training for each officer.237 Additionally, MN POST requires agencies to have 10 policies and learning objectives, covering such topics as allegations of misconduct, professional conduct and conduct unbecoming, and avoiding racial profiling. It also requires five other standards—including reporting bias-motivated crimes and reporting the circumstances of discharging a firearm during the course of duty—that agencies must fulfill in order to be state-certified.238

Minneapolis Police Department training

The Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) meets all required MN POST standards for training and required policies. MPD also provides training on a variety of topics for recruits, cadets, lateral hires, and for current employees as part of its in-service training program. All recruitment and training is conducted in accordance with MPD Policy 2-500 “Training and Recruitment.”239 All newly-hired officers must attend the Minneapolis Police Academy before entering the additional five-month Field Training Program.240 At the academy, recruits receive approximately 14 to 16 weeks of classroom instruction and practice in a number of topics. The recruit class that graduated in December 2015 received a total of 89.5 hours of training and practice in defensive tactics, by far the largest amount of time on an individual subject. They also received a total of 19 hours of community policing–related instruction, with 13 hours dedicated to cultural communications and foreign cultures (including training blocks dedicated to individual cultures prominent in the city), four hours dedicated to Fair And Impartial Policing, and two hours of de-escalation training. Recruits also received 6.5 hours of Mobile Field Force (MFF) instruction, three hours of use of force training and instruction, and two hours of officer-involved shooting instruction. They also received one hour of National Incident Management System (NIMS) training.241

Meanwhile, the Field Training Program cadet class that graduated in October 2015 received 30 weeks of classroom instruction and training on many of the same topics as the recruits. However, they received a total of 134.5 hours of training and practice in defensive tactics—again, by far the largest amount of time on an individual subject. They also received a total of 46 hours of community policing–related instruction, with 22 hours dedicated to cultural communications and foreign cultures, 12 hours to communications, six hours to general community policing instruction, four hours to Fair And Impartial Policing, and two hours to de-escalation. The cadets also received 9.5 hours of MFF instruction, three hours of use of force training and instruction, four hours of officer-involved shooting instruction, and nine hours of NIMS training.242

In-service and specialized training courses on a number of emerging and relevant issues are also offered and taught by MPD instructors on an annual basis. All employees are required to meet or exceed continuing education requirements of POST, the department,
and the City of Minneapolis and to attend and participate in other training as assigned. By policy, MPD requires all sworn employees to complete 48 hours of POST-approved training every three years to be eligible for re-licensing.

**MPD specialized training**

In addition to its normal training regimen, the MPD has also provided specialized training in preparation for large events hosted in the Twin Cities area, including the 2008 Republican National Convention (RNC) and the 2014 Major League Baseball All Star Game. The department also provides specialized training and instruction for specific units, including the Bicycle Rapid Response Team (BRRT) and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team.

In 2008, the MPD invested heavily in equipment and training to prepare its members for the RNC. The majority of MPD personnel received special crowd management equipment, provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) primarily through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and trained in topics associated with managing such an event. Several MPD officers also received extensive Civil Disturbance training from DHS in preparation for the RNC, focusing on MFF training, First and Fourth Amendment Rights, and chemical agents. The MPD also received legal training from the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office, which included information on state and local laws, incident report writing, elements of riots, and Fourth Amendment rights.

In advance of the RNC, MPD also established a bicycle team, known as the BRRT, which remains an active unit today. BRRT officers receive specialized training as part of their duties. According to one of the BRRT team leaders, who is also a certified bicycle instructor, approximately 175 to 200 MPD officers have completed the five-day International Police Mountain Bike Association (IPMBA) training program. Of those officers, approximately 50 received an additional three-day training that covers topics such as crowd dynamics and management, formations, transitions, escorts, target hardening, and arrest dynamics and arrests.

At the time of the RNC, the SWAT Team was a full-time engagement for a subset of MPD officers, though it has since been downgraded to a part-time team of officers drawn from each precinct. The SWAT team “is available as a resource to assist with or assume control of large civil disturbances and other events at the discretion of the Chief of Police or his/her designee.” The unit is overseen by a commander—normally the Emergency Services Unit (ESU) lieutenant—who is responsible for setting performance standards, and by a SWAT Coordinator who is in charge of SWAT equipment, training, schedules, and other tasks. In an interview with an MPD lieutenant and SWAT Team member, he indicated that SWAT gets one day per month for the specialty units—entry, rifle, chemicals, and logistics—to train separately, and that they try to get together as a whole team when possible. While MPD SWAT attempts to adhere to National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) standards, they are not able to do so because of limitations on training time and resources; neither do they receive any additional specialized crowd management training.

Training on specific policies and procedures for personal protective gear, less-lethal instruments, and arrest protocol is imperative for fundamental law enforcement operations and maintenance of public safety during civil disturbances and beyond. Inadequate training on use of force, less-lethal weapon deployment, proper use of personal protective gear, and arrest procedures leaves personnel unprepared for the requirements of their roles, puts undue judgement stress on personnel in the line of duty, and results in unpredictable individualized decisions; most significantly, it increases the risk of inappropriate use of force and the associated risk to the safety of both the public and police personnel.

**Civil disturbance training**

Uniform and consistent training of law enforcement personnel is the foundation of successful agencies. Training prepares officers for the various situations they may encounter on a daily basis and prepares them to address circumstances—such as civil disturbances—that occur infrequently but have lasting implications. In today’s environment, officers, supervisors, and senior and executive staff members must be prepared to manage crowd control at events where community members seek to express their Constitutional rights to free speech and assembly.
Police leaders and officers should be well trained in NIMS and ICS, crowd management, MFF, authorized use of force, constitutionally protected behaviors, communication and de-escalation, bias awareness, procedural and impartial policing, cultural responsiveness, and community policing. The MPD's training in these areas—or in some cases, lack thereof—played a significant role in its response to the Jamar Clark protests, particularly in the early days.

"Training for managing a mass demonstration," according to a report by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), “is essential to success.” Training must begin with incident command for elected officials, department heads, police department leadership, and the rank and file. The management of civil disturbances must be grounded in the MPD’s core values, a commitment to protecting the First Amendment rights and civil liberties of all members of the community, de-escalation, the appropriate use of force, less-lethal weapons, and the proper use of personal protective equipment.

Elected officials, department heads, and police leaders should recognize the complexity of civil disturbances and develop and practice the skills and tactics necessary to respond to them, using not only online and classroom training but also tabletop and other reality-based exercises.

Effective and appropriate training, based on the best practices of policing, is essential to keeping community members and police officers safe during both routine operations and critical incidents. A review of after-action reports following civil disturbances in Ferguson, Baltimore, and other cities highlights the importance of training in police agencies’ response to civil disturbances.

**Equipment and tools for managing civil disturbances**

**Civil disturbance equipment in Minneapolis**

During the 2008 RNC, the MPD purchased helmets, batons, shields, and gas masks for the majority of its officers and established an MFF unit. According to some MPD employees, since then, the MFF Unit has been disbanded. The gas masks are still accounted for on a yearly basis (during firearms training) and tested to ensure proper fit. However, based on interviews, the rest of the equipment has gone unaccounted for over the years, with no current inventory or maintenance record available. During the occupation, the MPD’s leadership followed best practices and deployed officers in their normal duty uniforms; however, when tension and violence escalated, many of the officers responding to the Fourth Precinct protests lacked personal protective equipment and some lost time to locating or repairing appropriate gear.

During the Fourth Precinct station occupation, the MPD’s Chemical Agent Response Teams (CART) were responsible for the deployment of chemical and non-lethal munitions. These teams are currently equipped with various chemical agents and marking rounds. Several members of the CART Team are also members of the SWAT team. It was noted in the MPD After Action Report and in several interviews that members of the CART did not have clear written rules of engagement. It should also be noted that, according to an Internal Affairs report, non-lethal marking rounds were deployed in a total of four instances during the occupation. It is unclear, based on interviews and the documents reviewed, who authorized the firing of the marking rounds. It also does not appear that any arrests were made of individuals hit by marking rounds.

Since the RNC, the MPD has used the BRRT to control crowds during most major events, including the occupation of the Fourth Precinct station. The BRRT is frequently the first specialty unit to be deployed because officers’ bicycles provide a natural barrier and do not present a negative appearance to the crowds or demonstrators. BRRT officers are equipped with collapsible batons, pepper spray, and Tasers, to be deployed in response to behavior by demonstrators that threatens community or police officer safety. Bicycle helmets are part of their issued equipment but do not provide ballistic protection, nor do they have face shields. During the occupation, the MPD relied on the BRRT to provide barriers between officers and the community members during tense moments and to protect groups during demonstrations at facilities beyond the Fourth Precinct and during marches. The use of BRRT officers is consistent with emerging best practices in crowd management; however, the MPD should establish and consistently train a mobile field force to respond to large crowds, protracted events, property destruction, and violence.

During the occupation, the MPD also purchased/leased several barricades and fencing and deployed them around the station.
Use of equipment
In addition to adequate intelligence gathering and training, effective and safe management of demonstrations relies heavily on acquiring and maintaining the necessary civil disturbance equipment. Equipment can be divided into three categories: protective equipment, less-lethal devices, and crowd barriers.257

Each type of equipment serves the distinct purpose of not only effectively managing the event, but also ensuring the safety of officers and demonstrators, protecting property, affording individual rights under the First Amendment, and establishing the image of the department.

Equipment considerations
Along with the equipment itself, departments must have comprehensive policies and directives that guide its purpose and deployment. Equipment deployment must take into consideration how, when, and why to use it to ensure its effectiveness. Equipment must be well maintained and not stagnate on a shelf or in the trunk of a police vehicle where it will deteriorate. According to a recent PERF report on managing mass demonstrations, all civil disturbance equipment should be “reviewed for applicability, proper utilization, and officer proficiency.”258 Departments must train periodically to ensure officer familiarity and proficiency with its equipment, as well as to review use of force procedures. Proper equipment deployment should reduce the negative effect of a crowd without jeopardizing the department’s ability to manage the event peacefully or demonstrators’ ability to exercise their First Amendment rights.

Protective equipment
Police departments, while prioritizing officer safety, must carefully consider the balance between the need for protection and the image presented by a frontline clad in protective gear. Historically, protective gear has been thought to have a deterrent effect on violent protest behavior; however, in recent events, police departments equipped with protective gear have been perceived as contributing to the escalation of civil disturbances—for example, the media has shown police officers in full protective gear facing demonstrators, portraying police officers in a heavy-handed or militaristic light.

Nonetheless, protective equipment may be essential to officer safety during civil disturbances. Its deployment should be a thoughtful, well-timed and well-planned decision on the part of commanders—part of a tiered approach to managing civil disturbances. All deployment of protective gear should be recorded in an event log for reference during after-action reviews.

Less-lethal devices
Deployment of less-lethal devices is usually a response to escalating violence and disorder in civil disturbances. However, departments must balance the need for deployment of such devices against the consequences of employing any level of force against demonstrators. A thoughtful, measured approach must be taken to their use. According the PERF report on managing mass demonstrations,

“Use [of less lethal devices] must be balanced against the threat faced by frontline officers, as well as the goals officers are attempting to accomplish (e.g., contain, make arrests, quell disorder). The option should be used only until the desired effect is achieved. Use should be frequently reassessed to ensure continued need for deployment. Deployment and use should be authorized at the agreed supervisory/command level. The decision and the circumstances leading to the use should be documented to support after-action reporting and any subsequent inquiry or litigation. The incident commander, operational commander, tactical commander, and public information officer must be kept accurately informed on use to allow them to update media spokespersons and to maintain the media initiative. The incident commander, operational commander, tactical commander, field officers and supervisors must have detailed knowledge of the effect and limitations of each option to assist in authorizing use.”259

PERF recommends that officers deployed in the field with less-lethal devices must be fully trained, aware of the devices’ capabilities and limitations, and empowered to make the final decision to use or not use the device based on the circumstances.260 Many police department officials believe that a command-level officer should not authorize the deployment of less-lethal options unless there is an immediate and direct threat
to community or officer safety. While individual officers may have the final decision regarding the deployment of less-lethal options, the PERF report recognizes that their deployment and use should be authorized at the agreed supervisory or command level. The Seattle Police Department, for example, requires an order from the incident commander to use chemical agents and other less-lethal systems to disperse crowds.\textsuperscript{261} Additionally, the decision and circumstances leading to the use should be documented to support after-action reporting and any subsequent inquiry or litigation.\textsuperscript{262}

**Barriers**

Use of barriers during civil disturbances can provide much needed supplementation to personnel during civil disturbances. Barriers can control crowd management, prevent access to restricted or vulnerable areas, and guide demonstrators down a particular route. Use of barriers should be guided by policies and scaled to circumstances, and officers should be trained on their use. Perimeter fencing, cement walls, and bicycle teams are all types of barriers that can be deployed by police departments during civil disturbances.

**Findings and recommendations**

**Training in civil unrest and crowd management**

**Finding 6.1**

The Minneapolis Police Department did not have adequate department-wide training on crowd management, negotiated resolution, de-escalation, the use of personal protective equipment, or the use of less-lethal instruments prior to the occupation.

The last documented department-wide training regarding crowd management strategies and tactics was conducted in preparation for the 2008 RNC.

**Recommendation 6.1.1**

Curricula to train all MPD personnel on crowd management strategies and tactics should be developed from current best practices, policy recommendations, and lessons learned from after-action reviews of similar events, and implemented in the Minneapolis Police Academy to reflect the core values of the MPD.

At a minimum, future department-wide training should include the following:

- First Amendment rights and protections, legitimacy, and procedural justice
- Crowd management, MFF operations, de-escalation, negotiated management, and problem solving
- ICS training that builds on the FEMA curricula as a foundation for the MPD, its regional public safety partners, and elected officials
- Use of force and less-lethal instrument deployment in accordance with MPD’s recently released use of force policy\textsuperscript{263} and best practices
- Hands-on personal protective equipment training

**Recommendation 6.1.2**

The MPD should return to the pre-RNC practice of sending personnel to the FEMA Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama or to another similar-quality provider to ensure that MPD crowd management training is consistent with national best practices. All MPD personnel should understand the rules of engagement, how to evaluate and de-escalate police-citizen encounters, use of force policies, and arrest procedures.

**Recommendation 6.1.3**

The MPD should provide annual training and updates to all members of the department regarding its policies and procedures regarding civil disturbances.

**Equipment and tools for managing demonstrations**

**Finding 6.2**

The MPD effectively deployed bicycle unit officers during the occupation as barriers to mitigate aggressive actions by the demonstrators, gather intelligence, and protect moving demonstrations.

Bicycle officers are more able than squad cars to maneuver quickly through large crowds and are often seen by demonstrators as less intimidating and more approachable. For these reasons, the use of bicycle officers is consistent with best practices for police crowd management.\textsuperscript{264}
Recommendation 6.2.1
The MPD should continue the practice of deploying well-trained and well-equipped bicycle officers during protests and demonstrations. Bicycle officers were thanked by demonstrators who marched from the Fourth Precinct station to City Hall for their professionalism and protection. Some demonstrators and officers interviewed by the assessment team report that at one point, when the BRRT formed a line at the Fourth Precinct, one officer shared food with demonstrators, successfully defusing a volatile confrontation.

Finding 6.3
No recent inventory of civil disturbance equipment has been conducted within the department, nor is anyone responsible for inventory, maintenance, or disbursement of MFF equipment.

Recommendation 6.3.1
All previously issued equipment should be turned in and the MPD should purchase new protective gear, to ensure that everyone is operating with the same modern, functional, approved, fit-tested gear. This will also aid administrative staff in keeping track of the equipment's distribution.

Recommendation 6.3.2
Establish a quartermaster system within the Special Operations Division for the accounting, inventory, purchase, and deployment of all MFF equipment. The commander of the Special Operations Division or their designee should also be responsible for ensuring that inventory is managed and inspected regularly. Any worn or outdated equipment should be identified and replaced on a biannual basis.

Finding 6.4
The Minneapolis Police Department had inadequate policy, guidelines, training, and equipment for crowd management.

Recommendation 6.4.1
The MPD should develop written policies, guidelines, training, and exercises regarding crowd management. These should define the department’s overall strategic approach as well as its tactical response framework. These policies, guidelines, and training should build on police best practices for crowd management, negotiated resolution, de-escalation, problem-solving, and force restraint.

Recommendation 6.4.2
The MPD should employ tiered intervention and response strategies consistent with the challenges posed by demonstrators, recognizing the department’s priority is to value and preserve human life, with a strategic goal of de-escalation, containment, prevention of further escalation, and officer safety. This strategy should be codified in policy.

Recommendation 6.4.3
The MPD should train all personnel in crowd management operations in order to strengthen the capacity for a coordinated response to civil disturbances. Particular attention should be given to the role of patrol officers, who may be the first on the scene of an escalating event. Such officers and their supervisors will need to be trained to make an initial assessment and to provide the information that will inform incident management decisions and, ultimately, ensure an appropriate response at the precinct and department level.

Finding 6.5
No departmental policy currently exists on MFF equipment type, use, or training. Also, no policy exists to define who receives equipment, training on equipment, or the inspection and deployment of equipment.

Recommendation 6.5.1
Develop policy that directs the purpose of MFF equipment, ensuring its proper training and issuance. The policy should address the deployment of MFF equipment and its capabilities and limitations, based on a continuum of use and deployment. Finally, the policy should address who is authorized to deploy protective equipment and chemical agents and establish barriers when managing demonstrations.
Finding 6.6
Currently, no unified training of MFF units accompanies identified MFF equipment.

Recommendation 6.6.1
Establish a team to help identify and recommend the types of MFF equipment needed within MPD to effectively manage major events and demonstrations. Develop regular training on the various types of equipment, whereby officers can demonstrate proficiency in their purpose, use, and effects.

Finding 6.7
The deployment of less-lethal weapons during the 18-day occupation of the Fourth Precinct station was not centralized or tracked.

The unprecedented nature of this event does not justify the lack of documentation and need to track the use of less-lethal responses.

Recommendation 6.7.1
The MPD should establish a system to accurately record and document the deployment of less-lethal weapons. The system should include the date, time, and circumstance for each deployment.

Finding 6.8
Marking rounds were deployed without plans for the subsequent extraction and arrests of the individuals who were marked.

Recommendation 6.8.1
The MPD should direct by policy and training that marking rounds only be used when specific protocols for safe extraction and arrest of individuals are in place.

Finding 6.9
The MPD does not have policy, procedures, or training regarding the deployment of marking rounds.

Civil disturbance best practices recommend that marking rounds be used under strict policy guidelines only, to assist in identifying and arresting individuals exhibiting dangerous behavior in a crowd during civil disturbances.

Recommendation 6.9.1
The department must develop policies, procedures, and training before marking rounds are deployed.

Recommendation 6.9.2
The MPD should consistently record uses of marking rounds or any other less-lethal technology to avoid claims of harassment or inappropriate use of force.
CHAPTER 7. OFFICER WELLNESS AND RESILIENCE

Officer wellness and resilience

“In addition to working with difficult—even hostile—individuals, responding to tragic events, and sometimes coming under fire themselves, they suffer from the effects of everyday stressors—the most acute of which often come from their agencies, because of confusing messages or non-supportive management; and their families, who do not fully understand the pressures the officers face on the job.” – Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing

Officer mental health and wellness

The prioritization of officer resilience and mental health and wellness is critical to the success of individual police officers, their families and departments, and the communities they serve. According to the COPS Office’s After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstration in Ferguson, Missouri, mass demonstrations pose a unique risk to officer wellness:

“While research shows that officers’ work exposure has a cumulative effect on stress, being deployed in a critical situation . . . can significantly increase the stressors and their effects. . . . A prolonged situation . . . can be stressful and fatiguing for various personnel, from the incident commander to the officer. . . . In times of prolonged and stressful duty, law enforcement agencies should closely monitor officers’ emotional and physical well-being and develop a resilience support program that includes peer support. . . . In prolonged stressful situations, agencies should consider deploying a trained police counselor or psychologist who can discuss stress issues with individual officers and offer some stress management or reduction strategies or advice, as well as provide crisis intervention or make appropriate referrals for officers and their family members.”

Officer morale

Within hours of the officer-involved shooting, protests began in the area surrounding the Fourth Precinct station. That evening, the number of demonstrators in front of the precinct swelled into the hundreds. Some demonstrators threw bottles, rocks, and food at officers and the precinct building, while other demonstrators blocked exits for police vehicles. In addition, six to twelve demonstrators entered and took over the precinct’s front vestibule and refused to leave. Police vehicles were damaged and at least one window in the precinct was damaged. The costs of repairs—including replacing windows, tires, fences, cruisers, and cameras that had been damaged or destroyed—totaled more than $50,000, which was slightly higher than the figure the chief mentioned in a November 19 press conference while the occupation was still ongoing.

Throughout the 18-day occupation, Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) officers—especially minority officers—were subjected to significant amounts of verbal abuse, and the precinct, police vehicles, and cameras were damaged by demonstrators. At various times, unknown individuals fired weapons in the vicinity of the precinct, attempted to breach the precinct’s security fence, threw Molotov cocktails into the precinct’s parking lot, and attempted to block ingress and egress from the station. Individuals also threw rocks, bricks, and Molotov cocktails at officers and squad cars.

Police officers assigned to the Fourth Precinct were ordered by their superiors to remain at the precinct station and precluded from responding to calls for service during the occupation. While at the station, they provided perimeter security or remained inside the building. Officers from other MPD precincts were assigned to respond to calls for service in North Minneapolis. As mentioned above, officers assigned to perimeter security were subjected to significant verbal abuse, particularly officers of color. Despite the verbal abuse and assaults on the precinct, by many accounts Fourth Precinct officers...
demonstrated professionalism and restraint in their use of force throughout the occupation. It should be noted, however, that some protesters did describe instances in which they believed officers to have acted inappropriately during the response.

Several issues emerged during interviews of Fourth Precinct and other officers involved in the department’s response to the occupation.

Officers, including some command level personnel, were angry and frustrated for the following reasons:

- They were not authorized to take or direct actions that they believed would have ended or controlled the protest before it became an occupation.
- They were confined to the precinct and not allowed to respond to calls from “their” residents asking for assistance.
- They were assigned to perimeter security without personal protective equipment. In some cases, officers were not allowed to wear the protective equipment they had because it appeared too militaristic.
- They lacked information and received inconsistent orders from command personnel.
  - Several officers noted the significant disconnect between precinct commanders, the chief, and the MPD’s leadership team.
  - Officers felt unsupported by the mayor, chief, and MPD’s leadership team during and after the occupation. It was not until the occupation had ended that the chief sent an email to the entire department stating “You have my gratitude, my respect and my unwavering support.”
  - Officers advised the assessment team that they are frequently asked by Fourth Precinct residents why they didn’t end the occupation and assist them when they called the precinct asking for assistance. Some officers even commented that residents told them the department lost a certain amount of legitimacy because they allowed demonstrators to openly break laws and do drugs in the vestibule in order to maintain the optics of protecting the First Amendment.

Many officers advised that they no longer engage in proactive policing activities and are reluctant to write traffic and quality-of-life violations because they feel unsupported by the department.

The MPD command staff and the Mayor’s Office advised that debriefing sessions were held at the Fourth Precinct station following the occupation by a mental health practitioner/facilitator with funding from either Target or the Minneapolis Foundation. It should be noted that none of the officers interviewed discussed the debriefing sessions.

Negotiated management, led by police officials, is the current best practice in police response to civil disturbances. Because the practice differs from traditional approaches to protest response that were based on the philosophy of escalated force, in which increasing disruption and violence on the part of demonstrators would be met with increasing force on the part of the police, it is imperative to conceptually connect these policies with traditional law enforcement culture and the mission of protecting the public. Reinforcement should occur throughout the organization, including via training on policy rationale, verbally in roll calls, during Mobile Field Force (MFF) training, in written communications, and structurally with related commendations and incentives.
Findings and recommendations

Officer resilience

Finding 7.1
MPD officers and supervisors maintained perimeter security at the Fourth Precinct to the best of their ability, while protecting the First Amendment rights of the civil protesters.

By all indications, MPD officers acted in a professional manner and demonstrated great restraint while holding the line, even as they encountered verbal abuse (especially toward African-American officers), threats, and risks to their safety from some elements within the protest gathering. Videos and social media posts of the protests and occupation showed incidents of protestors verbally abusing officers and throwing Molotov cocktails, bottles filled with gasoline, bricks, rocks, and other objects at officers, vehicles, mounted cameras, and the precinct station.

Recommendation 7.1.1
Support for wellness and safety should permeate all police practices and be expressed through changes in procedures, requirements, attitudes and behaviors. Special attention should be paid to frontline officers who may be subjected to abuse based on their race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation. The physical and mental health of officers is critical to their safety, their families, the department, and the community they serve. An officer whose capabilities, judgement, and behavior is adversely affected by poor physical or psychological health may not only be a danger to her or himself, but also to other officers and to the community she or he serves.

Finding 7.2
City officials and the MPD did not sufficiently plan for a protracted deployment.

They did not anticipate that the occupation of the Fourth Precinct would last for 18 days, and thus did not adjust the operational strategy, including wellness and support of officers, accordingly. For example, MPD did not take into account the impact of extended shifts, overtime, and the physical and mental stress associated with maintaining perimeter security as protestors verbally abused officers and threatened their physical safety by throwing Molotov cocktails, bottles filled with gasoline, bricks, rocks and other objects at officers, vehicles, and the precinct station.

Recommendation 7.2.1
Agencies should transition from a short-term response plan to an operational strategy that provides assistance and support to officers and their families during multi-day events. Having enough staff that officers have opportunities to get off of the line and rest—even if that involves requesting mutual aid—is important for ensuring officer well-being.

Finding 7.3
Fourth precinct officers continue to express frustration and anger with the occupation more than six months after the incident, suggesting that many issues remain unresolved.

Recommendation 7.3.1
The MPD should assign the duty of a wellness coordinator to an existing Incident Command System (ICS) position during all critical events to ensure physical and mental health issues are addressed.

Recommendation 7.3.2
The MPD should develop guidelines regarding the provision of mental health and other services to the officers assigned to critical incidents and civil disturbances, and to their families, particularly if the events are prolonged or violent.

Recommendation 7.3.3
The MPD should continue to conduct debriefings and engage officers in discussions regarding the occupation at, or in close proximity to, the one-year anniversary of the officer-involved shooting and occupation.
Finding 7.4
Fourth precinct officers felt unsupported and undervalued before, during and after the occupation.

Recommendation 7.4.1
Organizational leadership should ensure that all involved in the response feel valued through open communication and the provision of mental health and other services to the officers and their families.273

Recommendation 7.4.2
The department should also consider greater use of chaplains or other professionals trained in psychological first aid or critical incident stress management (CISM) to provide assistance to personnel during and following a critical incident.

Officer safety and wellness
Finding 7.5
MPD Officers expressed concern regarding their physical safety when deployed to provide perimeter security at the Fourth Precinct station during the occupation.

Recommendation 7.5.1
The MPD should purchase, issue, and familiarize its officers with personal protective gear. Officers should be required to conduct formal training and routine exercises with their personal protective equipment to ensure the ability to function effectively under the different dynamics of wearing such equipment.

Recommendation 7.5.2
The MPD should have a clearly defined and communicated tiered strategy for deployment of personal protective gear.
CHAPTER 8. COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE AND ENGAGEMENT

Community response
For some in the North Minneapolis community, the shooting of Jamar Clark further exposed two key fissures in North Minneapolis: one between the community and the Fourth Precinct officers, and one between community organizations.

Police-community relations
Relationships between the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) and the North Minneapolis community had long been strained, and the occupation was another event in a long chain that intensified the tension.274 As a result of previous officer-involved shootings and encounters, some community leaders had previously called for a U.S. Department of Justice investigation to mandate changes. Although there had been some recent attempts on the part of MPD leaders to engage the community through meetings and listening sessions, from the community perspective, significant change was not occurring. According to one community member who participated in the listening sessions, the police largely ignored relationships with committee members in the days after the shooting—with the single exception of the Fourth Precinct inspector, whom many local residents said made tremendous efforts to continue to be present in the community, engage community members, and be responsive to their needs.275 However, the behaviors of the responding MPD officers during the initial days were interpreted by all leaders of the community as overly aggressive.

Intracommunity relations
Additionally, within the Black community of North Minneapolis, leadership tensions between different generations impacted the occupation. The continued occupation exposed a fractured relationship within the community of color, one which continues to deepen. For the younger, newer leaders, the occupation was a demonstration affirming their larger understanding of how society should change. For the older, traditional leadership, the occupation went entirely too long, disrupted day-to-day community life, and became a platform for fringe political groups and immature leadership from within the community.

Findings and recommendations

Finding 8.1
Historical and contemporary tensions between the community and the MPD in North Minneapolis continue to inform perceptions of the police.

Recommendation 8.1.1
The MPD should continue to invest in community policing efforts, particularly in North Minneapolis, to include acknowledging the history of race relations in the community and develop a process and programs to move the community and the MPD toward reconciliation.276

Recommendation 8.1.2
The MPD’s training programs on positive community-police interactions, implicit bias, and building and maintaining trust should continue and build on lessons learned during the 18-day occupation.
Finding 8.2
Tensions within the North Minneapolis community complicated the law enforcement and city response to the occupation.

Recommendation 8.2.1
The MPD should identify and work closely with emerging and traditional community leaders to ensure inclusion and representation from all members of the Minneapolis community.

Recommendation 8.2.2
The MPD should discuss its strategy and equipment for responding to civil disturbance with community members to increase transparency and to solicit ideas to prevent and resolve incidents without injury or property damage.

Finding 8.3
Relationships between the North Minneapolis Community and the MPD remain challenged; this continues to leave the community, and the officers serving them, vulnerable to increased crime and violence in the area.

Recommendation 8.3.1
The MPD should more fully engage the Chief’s Citizens Advisory Council, the Chief’s Youth Advisory Council, and the MPD Chaplains and increase its access to community boards and groups to help facilitate communication, build trust, and enhance police-community relations. The MPD’s Police Community Support Team (PCST), an all-volunteer group of civilians, responds to all critical incidents in Minneapolis and provides timely and accurate information to residents.

Recommendation 8.3.2
The MPD should more fully engage community members in strategic planning, hiring, promotion, training, and other activities to improve community-police relations and build trust and legitimacy. This type of community input into actual policing decisions also provides the community a voice and meaningful involvement in how its police department operates and polices the community.
PART V: CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSION

The 18-day occupation of the front lawn and street of the Fourth Precinct station—including three days in which demonstrators occupied the front vestibule—of the Minneapolis Police Department (MPD) by community members and activists in North Minneapolis was undeniably an unprecedented event. While the MPD frequently manages peaceful protests and demonstrations in Minneapolis, the MPD and the City of Minneapolis were unprepared for the level of complexity that this protracted event would bring. The city’s unconventional governance structure, as well as the often public political discord between city, police, and union leadership, added to this complexity and detracted from identifying and working toward a unified goal reaching a peaceful resolution to the occupation.

The city and the police department endeavored to provide community members the opportunity to exercise their First Amendment freedoms and to avoid violent confrontations. The City of Minneapolis and the Minneapolis Police Department resolved the occupation without any significant injuries and/or property damage, and prevented the violence and riots seen in other cities following officer-involved shootings. The decisions made by city and police leaders were set within the context of the national conversation regarding police legitimacy and the relationship between the police and the communities they serve. However, the extended incident took a toll on the city, the police department, and the North Minneapolis Community. Damage caused to city and police property, as well as the cost of extended overtime and additional personnel was significant. In addition, community residents suffered consequences of the 18-day occupation. They struggled with the smoke from fires and increased response time from emergency medical services when needed. Neighbors around the Fourth Precinct complained about helicopters overhead all night; bottles, food, garbage, and human waste in their yards; cars damaged; and feeling unsafe in their own houses. Additionally, neighborhood businesses suffered lost sales and revenues. Finally, Fourth Precinct MPD officers continue to struggle with low morale, frustration, and anger stemming, at least in part, from the way the 18-day occupation happened, and was handled by city and MPD leadership.

This review, and the lessons learned within, are designed to assist the City of Minneapolis and the MPD analyze and reflect on the decisions made in response to the 18-day occupation. Key lessons focused on leadership, operations, planning and preparation, officer wellness and community impact can be gained by studying the response to this incident.

While the occupation of the Fourth Precinct police station was an unprecedented event, many of the lessons learned throughout the 18 days, and in the reflection that has happened since, are applicable to police response to incidents that have occurred or may occur in U.S. cities in the future. These lessons continue to build on the body of knowledge that assists law enforcement agencies in their ability to respond to civil disturbances. The findings and recommendations in this report, and throughout the COPS Office CRI-TA program, add to the growing body of literature that public safety agencies can use to enhance their preparation for, and response to, mass demonstrations, civil disturbances, and other critical incidents.
APPENDIX A. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 4.1
The City of Minneapolis lacked a coordinated political, tactical, and operational response to the protests, demonstrations, and occupation of the Fourth Precinct police station.

Recommendation 4.1.1
City officials and MPD command personnel should discuss, plan, and practice a coordinated response to critical incidents, to include the level of tactical engagement as well as negotiation and other strategies.

Recommendation 4.1.2
Planning and training for responses to civil disturbances and critical incidents should include elected and appointed officials, law enforcement, other public safety agencies (fire, EMS, emergency management), other relevant government agencies (e.g., Corporation counsel, finance, public works), and non-government and private sector organizations (Red Cross, utility companies, business improvement districts, neighborhood councils, etc.) as appropriate. Annual tabletop exercises and biennial full-scale exercises (FSE) should focus on coordinated planning, implementation, and follow-up across all city agencies. The tabletop exercises and FSEs should be observed by and include appropriate roles for elected officials.

Finding 4.2
City officials and the MPD did not have a process to change its strategy for managing civil disturbances as they develop from short-term into protracted events.

At the beginning, elected officials and the MPD focused primarily on immediate political and tactical responses and did not entirely anticipate that the demonstrations would be long term, or that the occupation of the Fourth Precinct station would occur. As the occupation continued, they did not recognize the changing dynamics and plan for a long-term operation.

Recommendation 4.2.1
Agencies should develop strategies, based on timely and accurate intelligence and assessments, to identify the shift from routine events to protracted complex events that demand significant human and material resources as well as a well-coordinated and collaborative response from elected officials and law enforcement leaders.

Recommendation 4.2.2
City agencies should develop comprehensive plans that recognize that a negotiated management response to a civil disturbance, such as the Fourth Precinct occupation, will require the careful and intentional coordination of the response by elected and law enforcement officials, taking into account the human and resource challenges that develop during a protracted event.

Recommendation 4.2.3
The City of Minneapolis and the MPD should review lessons learned from other large-scale civil disturbances across the country—and previous MPD critical incident after-action assessments—to improve citywide and police department planning, preparedness, and response to unique critical events.

Recommendation 4.2.4
The City of Minneapolis should have a crowd control plan in place that clearly defines the city’s overall political, strategic, and tactical response framework for reacting to protests that develop beyond ‘routine’ events.

According to Howard Rahtz, “a review of previous riots reveals . . . [that a] major lesson is that the lack of planning and leadership in the early stages of [civil] disorder is a recipe for disaster.”
Recommendation 4.2.5
The MPD must assume a lead role, or be provided frequent updates by elected officials, during protracted negotiations so that appropriate operational strategies and tactics can be developed and implemented consistent with the actions being taken by elected officials and others outside the police department.

Finding 4.3
Disagreements between City of Minneapolis, MPD, and Fourth Precinct leadership resulted in inconsistent messaging, unnecessary confusion, and poor communication that significantly and negatively affected the response.

Inconsistent, and at times contradictory, public comments by the mayor and city council, as well as public arguing between the chief of police and the Federation president, created clear divisions which hampered the ability to find a unified resolution to the conflict and which continue to inhibit department and community healing.

Recommendation 4.3.1
All leaders, elected and appointed, should recognize the impact that their messaging, both formal and informal, and their actions contributed to the management and operational difficulties of MPD and its ability to effectively resolve the 18-day occupation.

Recommendation 4.3.2
All leaders, elected and appointed, should avoid engaging in public arguments and rhetoric that detract from the goals of keeping the community and police officers safe and resolving civil disturbances.

Finding 4.4
Elected officials, the chief, and the Fourth Precinct inspector failed to define and implement a clear, unified response to the occupation.

Recommendation 4.4.1
Messaging from the city as a whole must be unified and delivered in a manner that shows the city leadership is not divided in any fashion. Therefore, it is important to ensure that messages from city and police department leadership are clear, consistent, and coordinated to provide appropriate direction and support for all personnel involved in the response to civil disturbance or critical events.

Finding 4.5
Efforts to resolve the occupation lacked consistent coordination and collaboration among elected officials and operations personnel.

A number of officials—including city and state elected officials and the USDOJ CRS—engaged in negotiations with leaders from Black Lives Matter, Neighborhoods Organized for Change (NOC), and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and did not coordinate their efforts among themselves or with the MPD.

Recommendation 4.5.1
Federal, state, and city elected officials should plan and practice a coordinated response to civil disturbance and critical incidents on a regular basis. For example, in their review of the Boston Marathon bombing, the National Preparedness Leadership Initiative (a joint program of the Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Center for Public Leadership) found that “leaders set a tone of remarkable collaboration and interagency leveraging among one another.” Leaders operated in concert and achieved something together—both order and outcome—which they never would have been able to accomplish on their own. Similar observations were made in the assessment of the response to the San Bernardino terrorist attack, and about the Minneapolis region’s response to the bridge collapse.

Recommendation 4.5.2
Responses to civil disturbance events that originate and occur entirely within the city limits should be led by the City of Minneapolis, with the MPD assuming the lead role in coordinating planning, operations, negotiations, and messaging in concert with elected officials.
Finding 4.6
The City of Minneapolis did not fully implement NIMS or ICS, which would have provided a structure to organize and coordinate the city’s response to the occupation.

Although the Emergency Operations Center was activated and MPD established incident command, a JIC was established that operated separate and apart from the EOC and MPD ICS, leading to inconsistent communication, uncoordinated operations, and disconnected negotiations with protestors.

Recommendation 4.6.1
All City of Minneapolis personnel, including elected officials, should complete ICS training.

A U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance report advised, “Incident management organizations and personnel at all levels of government and within the private sector and nongovernmental organizations must be appropriately trained to improve all-hazards incident management capability. . . . Training involving standard courses on incident command and management, incident management structure, operational coordination processes and systems—together with courses focused on discipline and agency-specific subject matter expertise—helps ensure that personnel at all jurisdictional levels and across disciplines can function effectively together during an incident.”

Recommendation 4.6.2
Minneapolis should establish one citywide incident management team (IMT) to lead its response to future large-scale incidents that involve a multiagency, multijurisdiction response. The IMT should include operational personnel as well as representatives from the mayor’s staff to ensure collaboration, coordination, and unity of command. The IMT should also train through tabletop exercises and FSEs.

Recommendation 4.6.3
The City of Minneapolis and MPD should use ICS principles to manage everyday situations, as a way to practice established protocols and training.

Finding 4.7
Fourth Precinct supervisors and line officers did not receive consistent communication regarding strategies and tactics to be employed.

The lack of consistent communication from the precinct commander and senior and executive MPD leadership regarding strategies and tactics left many officers in the Fourth Precinct feeling as if they were left to deal with the occupation on their own, and in many cases unable to use the authority vested in them to enforce laws and ordinances to protect their community and their property.

Recommendation 4.7.1
MPD Policy 5-312 “Civil Disturbances” should be expanded to clearly define Minneapolis leadership structure, roles, responsibilities, strategies, goals, and objectives for resolving civil disturbances.

Recommendation 4.7.2
Agency supervisors must ensure that first responders trust that leadership is supporting efforts to resolve critical incidents, even if they are not heard or seen.

Recommendation 4.7.3
Managers and supervisors, responsible for carrying out day-to-day operations, must be included in daily briefings and operational planning. This will help to ensure their complete understanding of operational strategies and what messages should be relayed to their subordinates, and give them the opportunity to communicate their observations and understanding.

Finding 5.1
Neither MPD nor the City of Minneapolis leadership ensured that appropriate strategies, directives and rationales were adequately communicated to line officers.

For example, once the decision to end the occupation through negotiations rather than direct police action was made, the decision was not clearly communicated to the Fourth Precinct.
Recommendation 5.1.1
Once decisions are made that result in operational directives, those decisions, directives, and instructions should be clearly communicated to all relevant personnel (the MPD Fourth Precinct in this case) through the chain of command, using clearly defined communication protocol to ensure personnel are fully aware and to avoid distortion or lack of clarity.

Finding 5.2
Breakdowns in communication within MPD—among the chief of police, command staff, Fourth Precinct command, and Fourth Precinct rank and file—compounded communication issues between city and MPD officials and impacted the ability of line officers to carry out the response.

While Fourth Precinct leadership participated in daily conference calls to discuss the activities of the previous day and determine strategies for the upcoming day, they sometimes transmitted those strategies and other messages inaccurately in roll calls with the line officers, according to Fourth Precinct staff interviewed. Although daily written IAPs and intelligence briefings were distributed to precinct-level commanders, they were not routinely disseminated to Fourth Precinct line officers.

Recommendation 5.2.1
MPD leaders should establish a clear and concise messaging strategy so that officers know from whom and how they are to receive directives.

Recommendation 5.2.2
Precinct leadership must provide consistent, timely, and accurate information regarding the strategies and tactics to be employed in response to mass demonstrations and held accountable for delivering accurate information and directives to their subordinates.

Recommendation 5.2.3
Genuine concern for officer safety and support should be communicated and demonstrated by the executive staff and through the chain of command to ensure the well-being of officers responding to mass demonstrations.

Recommendation 5.2.4
The MPD should provide strategies to ensure two-way communication so that frontline officers are able to input information about what they are experiencing on the line to members of their command staff through email, a dedicated Twitter account, etc. This would provide an opportunity for line officers to convey feedback regarding operations, intelligence, and officer safety to department leadership.

Finding 5.3
The lack of consistent strategy and the unclear communication of policy by MPD leadership inhibited effective crowd management and negatively impacted the morale of Fourth Precinct and other officers assigned to the occupation.

Clear and consistent communication of the city’s response strategy to the occupation would have eliminated confusion and helped to alleviate frustration on the part of supervisors and the rank and file in the Fourth Precinct, who were often left wondering as to the proper response to incidents.

Recommendation 5.3.1
City and MPD leaders should ensure a clear communication strategy exists to avoid frustration and misunderstanding, in particular on the part of supervisors and line personnel responsible for operational implementation of the approved response strategy.

Finding 5.4
Leadership decided to use verbal communications instead of issuing written directives, in order to prevent compromise or leaks of operational information. This contributed to confusion and the dissemination of inaccurate or incomplete information to rank-and-file officers.

Recommendation 5.4.1
Invest in a secure, encrypted Incident Management System to support ICS communications by facilitating two-way information-sharing; tracking multiple incidents and events; providing real-time mission updates, direction, and safety messages; and coordinating
tasks, goals, and actions. The ability to communicate using encrypted channels improves communication without jeopardizing officer and community safety.

Finding 5.5
Preexisting relationships with local media afforded MPD the opportunity to respond to many of the stories produced during the protests, which led to increased accuracy in reporting.

Recommendation 5.5.1
Build and maintain relationships with local media prior to a major event, and prioritize those relationships during events that draw national and international media attention.

Finding 5.6
Although a JIC was established, the public information process between city agencies and officials was uncoordinated.

In addition, information sharing with the Governor’s Office was inconsistent and at times uncoordinated. In fact, it was reported during interviews that some in the ICS began purposefully keeping information from the JIC in an effort to keep the information ‘safe’ from public release.

Recommendation 5.6.1
Include PIOs from all city and state stakeholders in command-level briefings and strategy sessions to increase coordination and project one voice. Lessons learned from previous critical incident reviews highlight the importance of including the PIOs in all political, command-level briefings and strategy sessions to help determine the appropriate media strategy.

Recommendation 5.6.2
Develop plans for coordinating public information efforts among multiple participating agencies through the ICS and the creation of a JIC.

Finding 5.7
The MPD’s extensive use of social media during the occupation itself helped keep the public informed as individual incidents occurred.

Recommendation 5.7.1
Continue and expand the use of various social media platforms to inform the public and traditional media about unfolding events and provide information regarding specific incidents to facilitate transparency and build trust.

Finding 5.8
During the occupation at the Fourth Precinct, MPD employees deployed less-lethal and non-lethal weapons without clear authorization from the incident commander, in violation of policy 5-312.

MPD policy 5-312 “Civil Disturbances” states in part, “Unless there is an immediate need to protect oneself or another from apparent physical harm, sworn MPD employees shall refrain from deploying any less-lethal or non-lethal weapons upon any individuals involved in a civil disturbance until it has been authorized by the on-scene incident commander.” During interviews, some demonstrators claimed they were hit with nightsticks while holding up tarps to protect themselves from chemical irritants. Multiple officers expressed confusion regarding who the on-scene incident commander was and indicated that authorizations regarding use of force were coming from various MPD command staff, making it difficult to verify who specifically authorized particular uses of force.

Recommendation 5.8.1
The MPD should establish a clear incident commander and strengthen, train on, adhere to, and enforce the use of force policy—especially as it relates to civil disturbances (MPD Policy 5-312).
Recommendation 5.8.2

MPD use of force policy 5-312 “Civil Disturbances” should clearly delineate levels of approval to be obtained—and a specific individual to seek that approval from—prior to the donning of personal protective equipment or equipment which may intimidate or threaten protestors (typically characterized as “military-style equipment”), the use of marking rounds, and additional uses of force.

Finding 5.9

MPD deployed chemical agents without prior authorization, in violation of policy 5-313.

MPD policy 5-313 “Use of Chemical Agents – Policy” states in part, “Sworn MPD employees shall exercise due care to ensure that only intended persons are exposed to the chemical agents.” In interviews, demonstrators claimed that chemical irritants were deployed by MPD officers, including against demonstrators who were trying to administer first aid to the five shooting victims the night of November 23. It should be noted that no official complaints were filed by the demonstrators regarding the indiscriminate deployment of chemical agents.

Recommendation 5.9.1

The MPD should strengthen, train on, adhere to and enforce the use of force policy—especially as it relates to the use of chemical agents (MPD Policy 5-313).

Recommendation 5.9.2

MPD use of force policy 5-313 “Use of Chemical Agents – Policy” should clearly delineate levels of approval—and a specific individual to seek approval from—to be obtained prior to the donning of personal protective equipment and equipment which may intimidate or threaten protestors (typically characterized as “military-style equipment”) and additional uses of force.

Finding 5.10

The policy on documenting uses of force, as laid out in the MPD Policy and Procedure Manual, may not have been followed.

Demonstrators claimed that officers used chemical irritants the night five demonstrators were shot (November 23), but there is no official MPD record of chemical irritants being used nor were any pertinent complaints filed by the demonstrators. Because of the inconsistent way uses of force were documented, the veracity of the demonstrators’ claims could not be confirmed or disproved by the assessment team.

Recommendation 5.10.1

The MPD Use of Force Policy (5-306)—especially as it relates to CAPRS reports—needs to be strengthened, trained on, adhered to, and enforced.

Recommendation 5.10.2

Supervisor notification should be required for chemical agent exposures, especially during civil disturbances and crowd control, to ensure that these uses of force comply with overall strategies and best practices. While supervisor notification is not required for chemical agent exposures according to MPD Policy 5-306, it is contradictory to policy 5-312, which states in part, “The on-scene incident commander shall evaluate the overall situation and determine if it would be a reasonable force option to use less-lethal or non-lethal weapons to best accomplish that objective.”

Recommendation 5.10.3

The MPD should document each use of force case separately.
Finding 5.11
The decision to document multiple uses of force under a single case number led to failure to accurately account for and track uses of force.

According the MPD Policy & Procedures Manual policy 5-306 “Use of Force – Reporting and Post Incident Requirements,” CAPRS Reports are required for each use of force incident. During the 18 days, the MPD categorized and recorded all uses of force under one case number per day. In total, MPD collected three force reports for the 18-day occupation, but they account for nine uses of force. For example, on November 19, 2016, there is only one force report (FR), but six separate uses of force were reported by officers and supervisors. While there is no evidence that the MPD deliberately attempted to underreport the use of force, the decision to capture incidents by assigning one incident case number per day caused confusion as to the actual number of incidents reported by officers and supervisors. The information below was provided by the MPD and indicates the official number of uses of force reported:

Incident #1 (11/19/2015)
FR #1: 40MM [marking round] less lethal round (Torso)
FR #2: MACE – crowd control
FR #3: Improvised Weapon – (Firearm as striking tool) – (Torso)
FR #4: 40MM [marking round]less lethal round (Legs)
FR #5: 40MM [marking round]less lethal round (Legs)
FR #6: 40MM [marking round]less lethal round (Torso)

Incident #2 (11/25/2015)
FR #1: Body Weight to pin (Torso)
FR #2: Joint Lock and Body Weight to pin (arms/hands) & (Torso)

Incident #3 (12/11/15)
FR #1: Body Weight to pin (Torso)

Recommendation 5.11.1
MPD should require that officers and supervisors complete a use of force report for each incident and assign unique case numbers to each incident to increase accuracy and transparency.

Recommendation 5.11.2
Policy 5-306 “Use of Force – Reporting and Post Incident Requirements” should be enhanced to officially codify that each use of force report require the officer to submit a narrative surrounding the use of force, who authorized it (if necessary), and if there were witnesses present that can be interviewed.

Recommendation 5.11.3
All commanders and supervisors should ensure the thorough and accurate documentation of all events, facts, and uses of force as soon as practicable after an event or decision.

Recommendation 5.11.4
To promote transparency, use of force data should be reported to the public in a timely and accurate manner via the MPD website, the Office of Police Conduct Review’s website, and other state or federal databases.

Finding 5.12
All citizen-initiated complaints may not have been formally reported, recorded, or investigated.

The assessment team was unable to determine if all complaints were captured and investigated due to inconsistent record keeping.

Recommendation 5.12.1
All citizen complaints should be individually recorded to ensure that they are investigated and adjudicated in a manner consistent with MPD policies, Office of Police Conduct Review policies, and law enforcement best practices.
Finding 6.1

The Minneapolis Police Department did not have adequate department-wide training on crowd management, negotiated resolution, de-escalation, the use of personal protective equipment, or the use of less-lethal instruments prior to the occupation.

The last documented department-wide training regarding crowd management strategies and tactics was conducted in preparation for the 2008 RNC.

Recommendation 6.1.1

Curricula to train all MPD personnel on crowd management strategies and tactics should be developed from current best practices, policy recommendations, and lessons learned from after-action reviews of similar events, and implemented in the Minneapolis Police Academy to reflect the core values of the MPD.

Recommendation 6.1.2

The MPD should return to the pre-RNC practice of sending personnel to the FEMA Center for Domestic Preparedness in Anniston, Alabama or to another similar-quality provider to ensure that MPD crowd management training is consistent with national best practices. All MPD personnel should understand the rules of engagement, how to evaluate and de-escalate police-citizen encounters, use of force policies, and arrest procedures.

Recommendation 6.1.3

The MPD should provide annual training and updates to all members of the department regarding its policies and procedures regarding civil disturbances.

Finding 6.2

The MPD effectively deployed bicycle unit officers during the occupation as barriers to mitigate aggressive actions by the demonstrators, gather intelligence, and protect moving demonstrations.

Bicycle officers are more able than squad cars to maneuver quickly through large crowds and are often seen by demonstrators as less intimidating and more approachable. For these reasons, the use of bicycle officers is consistent with best practices for police crowd management.

Recommendation 6.2.1

The MPD should continue the practice of deploying well-trained and well-equipped bicycle officers during protests and demonstrations. Bicycle officers were thanked by demonstrators who marched from the Fourth Precinct station to City Hall for their professionalism and protection. Some demonstrators and officers interviewed by the assessment team report that at one point, when the BRRT formed a line at the Fourth Precinct, one officer shared food with demonstrators, successfully defusing a volatile confrontation.

Finding 6.3

No recent inventory of civil disturbance equipment has been conducted within the department, nor is anyone responsible for inventory, maintenance, or disbursement of MFF equipment.

Recommendation 6.3.1

All previously issued equipment should be turned in and the MPD should purchase new protective gear, to ensure that everyone is operating with the same modern, functional, approved, fit-tested gear. This will also aid administrative staff in keeping track of the equipment’s distribution.

Recommendation 6.3.2

Establish a quartermaster system within the Special Operations Division for the accounting, inventory, purchase, and deployment of all MFF equipment. The commander of the Special Operations Division or their designee should also be responsible for ensuring that inventory is managed and inspected regularly. Any worn or outdated equipment should be identified and replaced on a biannual basis.
Finding 6.4
The Minneapolis Police Department had inadequate policy, guidelines, training, and equipment for crowd management.

Recommendation 6.4.1
The MPD should develop written policies, guidelines, training, and exercises regarding crowd management. These should define the department’s overall strategic approach as well as its tactical response framework. These policies, guidelines, and training should build on police best practices for crowd management, negotiated resolution, de-escalation, problem-solving, and force restraint.

Recommendation 6.4.2
The MPD should employ tiered intervention and response strategies consistent with the challenges posed by demonstrators, recognizing the department’s priority is to value and preserve human life, with a strategic goal of de-escalation, containment, prevention of further escalation, and officer safety. This strategy should be codified in policy.

Recommendation 6.4.3
The MPD should train all personnel in crowd management operations in order to strengthen the capacity for a coordinated response to civil disturbances. Particular attention should be given to the role of patrol officers, who may be the first on the scene of an escalating event. Such officers and their supervisors will need to be trained to make an initial assessment and to provide the information that will inform incident management decisions and, ultimately, ensure an appropriate response at the precinct and department level.

Finding 6.5
No departmental policy currently exists on MFF equipment type, use, or training. Also, no policy exists to define who receives equipment, training on equipment, or the inspection and deployment of equipment.

Recommendation 6.5.1
Develop policy that directs the purpose of MFF equipment, ensuring its proper training and issuance. The policy should address the deployment of MFF equipment and its capabilities and limitations, based on a continuum of use and deployment. Finally, the policy should address who is authorized to deploy protective equipment and chemical agents and establish barriers when managing demonstrations.

Finding 6.6
Currently, no unified training of MFF units accompanies identified MFF equipment.

Recommendation 6.6.1
Establish a team to help identify and recommend the types of MFF equipment needed within MPD to effectively manage major events and demonstrations. Develop regular training on the various types of equipment, whereby officers can demonstrate proficiency in their purpose, use, and effects.

Finding 6.7
The deployment of less-lethal weapons during the 18-day occupation of the Fourth Precinct station was not centralized or tracked.

The unprecedented nature of this event does not justify the lack of documentation and need to track the use of less-lethal responses.

Recommendation 6.7.1
The MPD should establish a system to accurately record and document the deployment of less-lethal weapons. The system should include the date, time, and circumstance for each deployment.
Finding 6.8
Marking rounds were deployed without plans for the subsequent extraction and arrests of the individuals who were marked.

Recommendation 6.8.1
The MPD should direct by policy and training that marking rounds only be used when specific protocols for safe extraction and arrest of individuals are in place.

Finding 6.9
The MPD does not have policy, procedures, or training regarding the deployment of marking rounds.

Civil disturbance best practices recommend that marking rounds be used under strict policy guidelines only, to assist in identifying and arresting individuals exhibiting dangerous behavior in a crowd during civil disturbances.

Recommendation 6.9.1
The department must develop policies, procedures, and training before marking rounds are deployed.

Recommendation 6.9.2
The MPD should consistently record uses of marking rounds or any other less-lethal technology to avoid claims of harassment or inappropriate use of force.

Finding 7.1
MPD officers and supervisors maintained perimeter security at the Fourth Precinct to the best of their ability, while protecting the First Amendment rights of the civil protesters.

By all indications, MPD officers acted in a professional manner and demonstrated great restraint while holding the line, even as they encountered verbal abuse (especially toward African-American officers), threats, and risks to their safety from some elements within the protest gathering. Videos and social media posts of the protests and occupation showed incidents of protestors verbally abusing officers and throwing Molotov cocktails, bottles filled with gasoline, bricks, rocks, and other objects at officers, vehicles, mounted cameras, and the precinct station.

Recommendation: 7.1.1
Support for wellness and safety should permeate all police practices and be expressed through changes in procedures, requirements, attitudes and behaviors. Special attention should be paid to frontline officers who may be subjected to abuse based on their race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation. The physical and mental health of officers is critical to their safety, their families, the department, and the community they serve. An officer whose capabilities, judgement, and behavior is adversely affected by poor physical or psychological health may not only be a danger to her or himself, but also to other officers and to the community she or he serves.

Finding 7.2
City officials and the MPD did not sufficiently plan for a protracted deployment.

They did not anticipate that the occupation of the Fourth Precinct would last for 18 days, and thus did not adjust the operational strategy, including wellness and support of officers, accordingly. For example, MPD did not take into account the impact of extended shifts, overtime, and the physical and mental stress associated with maintaining perimeter security as protestors verbally abused officers and threatened their physical safety by throwing Molotov cocktails, bottles filled with gasoline, bricks, rocks and other objects at officers, vehicles, and the precinct station.

Recommendation 7.2.1
Agencies should transition from a short-term response plan to an operational strategy that provides assistance and support to officers and their families during multi-day events. Having enough staff that officers have opportunities to get off of the line and rest—even if that involves requesting mutual aid—is important for ensuring officer well-being.
Finding 7.3
Fourth precinct officers continue to express frustration and anger with the occupation more than six months after the incident, suggesting that many issues remain unresolved.

Recommendation 7.3.1
The MPD should assign the duty of a wellness coordinator to an existing Incident Command System (ICS) position during all critical events to ensure physical and mental health issues are addressed.

Recommendation 7.3.2
The MPD should develop guidelines regarding the provision of mental health and other services to the officers assigned to critical incidents and civil disturbances, and to their families, particularly if the events are prolonged or violent.

Recommendation 7.3.3
The MPD should continue to conduct debriefings and engage officers in discussions regarding the occupation at, or in close proximity to, the one-year anniversary of the officer-involved shooting and occupation.

Finding 7.4
Fourth precinct officers felt unsupported and undervalued before, during and after the occupation.

Recommendation 7.4.1
Organizational leadership should ensure that all involved in the response feel valued through open communication and the provision of mental health and other services to the officers and their families.

Recommendation 7.4.2
The department should also consider greater use of chaplains or other professionals trained in psychological first aid or critical incident stress management (CISM) to provide assistance to personnel during and following a critical incident.

Finding 7.5
MPD Officers expressed concern regarding their physical safety when deployed to provide perimeter security at the Fourth Precinct station during the occupation.

Recommendation 7.5.1
The MPD should purchase, issue, and familiarize its officers with personal protective gear. Officers should be required to conduct formal training and routine exercises with their personal protective equipment to ensure the ability to function effectively under the different dynamics of wearing such equipment.

Recommendation 7.5.2
The MPD should have a clearly defined and communicated tiered strategy for deployment of personal protective gear.

Finding 8.1
Historical and contemporary tensions between the community and the MPD in North Minneapolis continue to inform perceptions of the police.

Recommendation 8.1.1
The MPD should continue to invest in community policing efforts, particularly in North Minneapolis, to include acknowledging the history of race relations in the community and develop a process and programs to move the community and the MPD toward reconciliation.

Recommendation 8.1.2
The MPD’s training programs on positive community-police interactions, implicit bias, and building and maintaining trust should continue and build on lessons learned during the 18-day occupation.
Finding 8.2
Tensions within the North Minneapolis community complicated the law enforcement and city response to the occupation.

Recommendation 8.2.1
The MPD should identify and work closely with emerging and traditional community leaders to ensure inclusion and representation from all members of the Minneapolis community.

Recommendation 8.2.2
The MPD should discuss its strategy and equipment for responding to civil disturbance with community members to increase transparency and to solicit ideas to prevent and resolve incidents without injury or property damage.

Finding 8.3
Relationships between the North Minneapolis Community and the MPD remain challenged; this continues to leave the community, and the officers serving them, vulnerable to increased crime and violence in the area.

Recommendation 8.3.1
The MPD should more fully engage the Chief’s Citizens Advisory Council, the Chief’s Youth Advisory Council, and the MPD Chaplains and increase its access to community boards and groups to help facilitate communication, build trust, and enhance police-community relations. The MPD’s Police Community Support Team (PCST), an all-volunteer group of civilians, responds to all critical incidents in Minneapolis and provides timely and accurate information to residents.

Recommendation 8.3.2
The MPD should more fully engage community members in strategic planning, hiring, promotion, training, and other activities to improve community-police relations and build trust and legitimacy. This type of community input into actual policing decisions also provides the community a voice and meaningful involvement in how its police department operates and polices the community.
APPENDIX B. MPD Organizational Chart

Minneapolis Police Department
Organizational Structure January 14, 2016

Source: Minneapolis Police Department
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ACRONYMS</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BCA</td>
<td>Bureau of Criminal Apprehension</td>
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<td>BLM</td>
<td>Black Lives Matter</td>
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<td>BRRT</td>
<td>Bicycle Rapid Response Team</td>
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<td>CART</td>
<td>Chemical Agent Response Team</td>
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<td>DHS</td>
<td>Department of Homeland Security</td>
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<td>EOC</td>
<td>Emergency Operations Center</td>
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<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Federal Emergency Management Agency</td>
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<td>Computer Assisted Police Records System</td>
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<td>CIR</td>
<td>Critical Incident Review</td>
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<td>Office of Community Oriented Policing Services</td>
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<td>Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance</td>
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<td>Community Relations Service</td>
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<td>IAP</td>
<td>Incident Action Plan</td>
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<td>Incident Commander</td>
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<td>Incident Command System</td>
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<td>Incident Management Team</td>
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<td>Joint Information Center</td>
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<td>Mobile Field Force</td>
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<td>Minneapolis Police Department</td>
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<td>Minneapolis State Patrol</td>
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<td>MN POST</td>
<td>Minnesota Peace Officer Standards and Training</td>
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<td>National Association for the Advancement of Colored People</td>
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<td>NIMS</td>
<td>National Incident Management System</td>
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<td>Neighborhoods Organizing for Change</td>
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<td>Police Foundation</td>
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<td>Republican National Convention</td>
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<td>Special Weapons and Tactics</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDOJ</td>
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ENDNOTES


3. Team member biographies can be found at the end of this report.

4. MPD 2.0: A New Policing Model 2013-2015 (Minneapolis, MN: Minneapolis Police Department, 2013), https://issuu.com/mpd2.0/docs/mpd_2.0_fdb7662b00bc77.


7. See figure 3 for an organizational chart.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., § 4.1.


15. Ibid.


24. The following day, November 16, Clark was removed from life support.


29. Minneapolis Police Department resources shown to assessment team during interview, August 10, 2016.


32. “Timeline of Mayor, Mayor’s Staff, and Senior City Staff Contacts with Protestors, and Responses to Protestor Requests” (Minneapolis, MN: Office of the Mayor, 2015). Reviewed by assessment team April–November 2016.


34. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).


38. Ibid.


40. Harteau, ”18 Days” (see note 25).

41. MPD internal radio traffic, November 15 (see note 28).

42. MPD resources shown in interview, August 10 (see note 29).

43. Minneapolis Police Department officer forum with assessment team, August 9, 2016.

44. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).


46. Assessment team interview with MPD employee, August 9, 2016.

47. See Chapter 7, “Officer Safety, Resilience, and Wellness” beginning on page 115.


50. Report of the Hennepin County Attorney’s Office (see note 2).

51. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).


53. Ibid.


59. Ibid.

60. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).

61. Report of the Hennepin County Attorney (see note 2).

62. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).

63. Ibid.

64. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).

65. “Chief Harteau Addresses Safety and Access” (see note 56).


67. Ibid.

68. “Chief Harteau Addresses Safety and Access” (see note 56).

69. Ibid.

70. “Timeline of the Jamar Clark Case” (see note 58).

71. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).

72. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).

73. Minneapolis Police Department, Twitter post, November 18, 2015, 6:09 PM, https://twitter.com/minneapolispd/status/667162767636488193.

74. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).

75. Minneapolis Police Department, Twitter post, November 18, 2015, 5:58 PM, https://twitter.com/minneapolispd/status/667160002449264642.

76. “Timeline of the Jamar Clark Case” (see note 58).

77. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).

78. “Chief Harteau Addresses Safety and Access” (see note 56).


81. Assessment team interview with City Council member, May 5, 2016.

82. Ibid.

83. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).

84. Ibid.


86. Assessment team interview with community member, May 5, 2016.

87. “Minneapolis Police Try to Crush #Justice4Jamar Camp” (see note 66).

88. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).


90. “Timeline Of The Jamar Clark Case” (see note 58).

91. “Chief Harteau and Mayor Hodges Media Briefing; Thursday, November 19,” YouTube, published November 19, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wV22Mt1uyaA.
93. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
95. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. “Chief Harteau and Mayor Hodges Media Briefing” (see note 91).
99. “Ellison, Mpls. Councilmembers Stand With BLM” (see note 80).
100. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
101. Fourth Precinct officers resolved the problem by suggesting tactical placement of barricades in the street to secure the perimeter. That plan was quickly approved by a deputy chief who was at the precinct station and the plan was executed immediately.
102. MPD officer forum, August 9 (see note 43).
103. Harteau, “18 days” (see note 25).
105. Officers’ personal cars were moved to the city garage so that they would not get damaged. Additional officers were brought in to work the street, roll calls were held at the garage, and officers were assigned from there. Buses provided transport to the precinct for that reason.
109. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).
112. Ibid.
115. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).
116. Ibid.
117. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
118. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).
119. “Timeline of the Jamar Clark Case” (see note 58).
120. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
122. Harteau, “18 Days” (see note 25).
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid.


127. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).


129. Assessment team interview with community member, May 4, 2016.

130. Ibid.

131. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27). Four of the men connected to the shooting made their first court appearance on December 1, 2015 (see page 66 for more information).

132. Ibid.

133. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid.


140. “BLM: Fourth Precinct Occupation Will Continue” (see note 139).

141. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).

142. Ibid.


145. Ibid.

146. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).

147. “Funeral for Jamar Clark” (see note 144).


149. Assessment team interview with community member, May 4, 2016.

150. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).


154. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).

155. Ibid.

156. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
157. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).
158. Ibid.
159. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
160. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).
161. Ibid.
163. “Timeline of Mayor’s Staff” (see note 32).
165. Ibid.
166. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).
167. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
170. Ibid.
172. “Timeline of Events” (see note 27).
175. Chapman, “As 4th Precinct Protest Continues” (see note 173).
176. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).
177. Chapman, “As 4th Precinct Protest Continues” (see note 173).
178. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).
179. Harteau, “18 Days” (see note 25).
180. Minneapolis Police Department internal email, reviewed by assessment team August–November 2016.
181. Minneapolis Police Department internal video, reviewed by assessment team October–November 2016.
183. Ibid.
185. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1). Ultimately, the total cost to the city was approximately $1.15 million. The majority of the expenses were for MPD overtime; however, there were also expenses for replacing and repairing barriers and fencing, squad repairs, and hardware replacements. Approximately $50,000 of costs to the city were in property damage.
186. Ibid.
189. Assessment team interview with MPD employee, October 14, 2016.


192. The assessment team's sources conflict as to the number of documented uses of force and complaints made against the MPD during the occupation: a September 13, 2016 email to the authors from MPD Strategic Operations Center reported only two complainants, a PDF of a communication from the assistant to the assistant chief reported six complaints, and the commander of the Internal Affairs Unit (IAU) in an August 9, 2016 interview with the assessment team reported three or four complaints. On top of these discrepancies in the MPD's own accounting, one demonstrator told the team in interviews that they filed a complaint, but their complaint was not found in the documents reviewed.


195. The first section of chapter 5 focuses in greater depth on internal communications.

196. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).

197. Ibid.

198. Ibid.


200. Ibid.


203. Rick Braziel et al., Bringing Calm to Chaos (see note 201).

204. Howard Rahtz, Race, Riots and the Police (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2016).


206. Marcus et al., Crisis Meta-Leadership, 8-10 (see note 199).

207. Mutual Aid: Multijurisdictional Partnerships for Meeting Regional Threats (US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, 2005), NCJ 210679.

208. Braziel et al., A Heist Gone Bad (see note 205).


213. “5-300 Use of Force” (see note 188).
215. Minneapolis Police Department, Twitter post, November 18 (see note 75).
217. For more information about the total number of incidents of use of force reported, see Finding 5.11 on page 77.
219. Ibid.
220. President’s Task Force, Final Report (see note 191).
221. Ibid.
227. After Action Response: MPD (see note 1).
229. Braziel et al., Bringing Calm to Chaos (see note 201).
230. According to the MPD After Action Report (see note 1), “operational security became a concern on several occasions with details of MPD plans leaked both intentionally as well as possibly unintentionally to the media and the protestors.”
231. Braziel et al., Bringing Calm to Chaos (see note 201).
232. “5-312 Civil Disturbances” (see note 214).
233. Ibid.
234. “Escort holds, joint manipulations, nerve pressure points (touch pressure), handcuffing, and gun drawing or pointing” are the only uses of force that do not require a CAPRS Report unless injury or alleged injury occurred. “5-306 Use of Force – Reporting and Post Incident Requirements” (see note 216).
235. Email from MPD employee sent to assessment team member on August 9, 2016.
236. Minneapolis Police Department, Internal Affairs Division, personal communication, August 9, 2016.
237. The only other required training is that all non-exempt officers must complete an eight-hour course covering emergency vehicle operations and the conduct of police pursuits every five years. Both requirements are available at https://dps.mn.gov/entity/post/model-policies-learning-objectives/pages/default.aspx.

242. Ibid.


245. “RNC Legal Training,” presented to the Minneapolis Police Department by the Minneapolis City Attorney’s Office, 2008.


248. Ibid.


250. Ibid.

251. Assessment team interview with MPD employee, August 9, 2016.


255. Institute for Intergovernmental Research, After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, 68 (see note 194); Links et al., Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness (see note 252).

256. After Action Report: MPD (see note 1).

257. Police Management of Mass Demonstrations (see note 254).

258. Ibid.

259. Ibid.

260. Ibid.


262. Police Management of Mass Demonstrations (see note 254).


264. The Police Response to Mass Demonstrations (see note 253).

265. Assessment team interview with community members, June 16, 2016.

266. Links et al., Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness (see note 252).

267. Institute for Intergovernmental Research, After-Action Assessment of the Police Response to the August 2014 Demonstrations in Ferguson, 68 (see note 194).

268. According to the Minneapolis Police Department After Action Report (see note 1), as of December 22, 2015, the total estimated costs were $1.155 million. The majority of the expenses were for MPD overtime; however, there were also expenses for replacing and repairing barriers and fencing, squad repairs, and hardware replacements.

269. Minneapolis Police Department internal email, reviewed by assessment team August–November 2016.
270. The MPD did several debriefings with Fourth Precinct officers so that they could share their thoughts and concerns about the occupation. Administrators also met with Fourth Precinct supervisors to conduct a debriefing and have launched a trauma campaign—working with a clinical psychologist who is a certified trauma expert—geared towards officer wellness and health.

271. Links et al., *Recommendations for Enhancing Baltimore City’s Preparedness* (see note 252).


273. Braziel et al., *Bringing Calm to Chaos* (see note 201).

274. Assessment team interview with Minneapolis Foundation executive, September 23, 2016.

275. Assessment team interview with community member, September 26, 2016.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Minneapolis After-Action Team

Chief Frank Straub (Ret.), PhD – Dr. Straub provided on-site project management, coordinating the work of subject matter experts and providing law enforcement guidance and expertise to the project. He managed the document review process and worked closely with Jennifer Zeunik to ensure that all on- and off-site decisions and activities met project goals. A 30-year veteran of law enforcement, Dr. Straub currently serves as the Director of Strategic Studies for the Police Foundation. He last served as the chief of the Spokane (Washington) Police Department, where he received national recognition for the major reforms and community policing programs he implemented and significant crime reductions achieved during his tenure. Dr. Straub also served as director of public safety for the City of Indianapolis, Indiana, during which time the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department reduced homicides to the lowest level in 20 years. Dr. Straub has also served as the public safety commissioner for the City of White Plains, New York, where his department reduced serious crime by 40 percent. He established the first police-community mental health response team in Westchester County to proactively assist persons challenged by mental illness, homelessness, and domestic violence. Dr. Straub previously served as the deputy commissioner of training for the New York City Police Department and as a federal agent. He holds a BA in Psychology from St. John’s University, an MA in Forensic Psychology from John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and a PhD in Criminal Justice from the City University of New York's Graduate Center. He co-authored a book on performance-based police management and has published several articles regarding community policing, police reform, and jail management.

Chief Rodney Monroe (Ret.) – Chief Monroe has over 37 years of law enforcement experience serving in various positions and overseeing a vast array of specialized commands, including handling of large events and mass demonstrations. He has 12 years of senior executive level experience as the chief of police for the Cities of Macon, Georgia; Richmond, Virginia; and Charlotte, North Carolina. Chief Monroe has extensive experience in organizing communities and developing meaningful partnerships with youth, residents, businesses, and faith-based organizations with a common goal of reducing crime, improving the quality of life, and reducing citizens’ fear level. Chief Monroe served 25 years as a seasoned manager with senior executive level experience for the Metropolitan Police Department in law enforcement, financial planning, personnel logistics, major criminal investigations, and has planned and managed initiatives to implement Community Policing strategies with emphasis on youth development and engagement and special events within three major police agencies. He also has experience in planning, organizing, and managing major special events and criminal investigations, involving multiple federal and local law enforcement agencies including the FBI, United States Secret Service, DEA, ATF, and United States Capitol Police. Chief Monroe has extensive experience in managing and assessing responses to mass demonstrations. During his time at the Metropolitan Police Department, he coordinated and managed the 1995 Million-Man March and the 1997 Presidential Inauguration. During his tenure with the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department, Chief Monroe was responsible for the safety of the Democratic National Convention, as well as managing occupier groups throughout the city. In 2015, Chief Monroe testified in front of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing on the issue of Mass Demonstrations.

Reverend Jeffrey Brown – Rev. Brown is a nationally recognized leader and expert in coalition-building, gangs, youth, and urban violence reduction. He has over 20 years of experience of gang mediation and intervention and developing dialogues in police/community relations in the United States and around the world. He has developed expertise in helping faith-based organizations and law enforcement, among other key stakeholders, increase their capacity for solving gang violence in the community. His work builds on the idea that while community policing is an effective policing tool, in many urban areas, the relations between the urban, often minority community and law enforcement is poor, which inhibits effective policing and prevents the community from getting the quality of life it deserves. Rev. Brown’s experience has led to his successful work nationally in cities like Boston, Massachusetts; Camden, New Jersey; and Salinas, California to help build a strong community component into any public safety crime reduction strategy. Rev. Brown is the founder of RECAP (Rebuilding Every Community Around Peace), a new national organization organized to assist cities build
better partnerships between community, government, and law enforcement agencies to reduce gang violence. He is also one of the co-founders of the Boston Ten Point Coalition, a faith-based group that was an integral part of the “Boston Miracle”—a process where the city experienced a 79 percent decline in violent crime in the 90s—and spawned countless urban collaborative efforts in subsequent years that followed the Boston Ceasefire model. Rev. Brown consults with municipalities and police departments on issues around youth violence and community mobilization and has provided expertise to Fortune 25 corporations and the World Bank for the past 14 years on Collaborative Leadership and Managing Change. In October of 2014, Rev. Brown traveled to Ferguson, Missouri to be a part of a national clergy group to support the efforts of Hands Up United and to participate in and serve as a buffer between residents and the police during protests, as well as to assist in moving forward.

Chief Hassan Aden (Ret.) – Chief Aden provided on-site project management, coordinating the work of the on-site team and providing law enforcement guidance and expertise for the project. He worked with Jennifer Zeunik to ensure that all on- and off-site decisions and activities fed project goals. After more than 28 years in law enforcement and executive leadership experience, Chief Aden currently serves as the Senior Advisor on Policing for the Police Foundation. Chief Aden’s police experience includes serving as the Chief of Police with the Greenville (North Carolina) Police Department. He has extensive experience in the administrative, investigative, and operational aspects of policing, and has demonstrable success in working with questions such as crime control policies, community engagement, and strategic planning. While Chief of Police at the Greenville Police Department, he and all of the Greenville Police staff were deeply committed to community partnerships aimed at reducing crime and improving the quality of life in the City of Greenville. Prior to his appointment as Chief of Police for the Greenville Police Department, he served in the Alexandria (Virginia) Police Department for 26 years, rising to the rank of deputy chief of police. He also previously served as the Director of Research and Programs at the International Association of Chiefs of Police, overseeing a large portfolio of operational programs and research projects aimed at advancing professional police services and promoting enhanced administrative, technical, and operational police practices and policies.

Ben Gorban, Police Foundation Policy Analyst – Ben Gorban is a Policy Analyst with over eight years of experience supporting law-enforcement related projects, including the provision of technical assistance and policy analysis support on projects related to community policing and the role of social media in law enforcement. His areas of expertise include research, resource development, and information dissemination. Ben received his M.S. in Justice, Law and Society from American University in 2011 and received his BA in both Philosophy and Justice, Law and Society from American University in 2009.

Jennifer Zeunik, Director of Programs, provided overall project structure and oversight. She worked with project staff in driving toward goals and deliverables and coordinated activity of on- and off-site staff and SMEs. She also served as a writer, editor and quality control manager on the final report, ensuring report cohesion and clarity. Ms. Zeunik has twenty years of public sector and nonprofit project management experience, working closely with all levels of government. In her career, Ms. Zeunik has provided strategic management expertise to international, federal, state, and local criminal justice clients focused on justice policy research, business development activities, program management, strategic planning, training and technical assistance management, and development of strategic communications. She served as a lead writer on numerous published reports throughout her career, including the IACP National Policy Summit on Community-Police Relations: Advancing a Culture of Cohesion and Trust Report, as well as the COPS Office–funded Police Foundation Collaborative Reform Initiative: An Assessment of the St. Louis County Police Department and the San Bernardino Terrorist Shooting critical incident report, Bringing Calm to Chaos.

Also on the Project Team

Jim Buermann, President, provided organizational oversight for the Police Foundation.

Blake Norton, VP/COO, provided high-level strategy and coordination and served as one of the primary liaisons to the COPS Office throughout the project.

Joyce Iwashita, Project Assistant, provided project support; document writing, review, and editing; and technical and mapping support.
ABOUT THE POLICE FOUNDATION

The Police Foundation is a national nonmember, nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that has been providing technical assistance and conducting innovative research on policing for nearly 45 years. The professional staff at the Police Foundation works closely with law enforcement, community members, judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and victim advocates to develop research, comprehensive reports, policy briefs, model policies, and innovative programs. The organization’s ability to connect client departments with subject matter expertise, supported by sound data analysis practices, makes us uniquely positioned to provide critical response and technical assistance (CRTA).

The Police Foundation has been on the forefront of researching and providing guidance on community policing practices since 1985. Acceptance of constructive change by police and the community is central to the purpose of the Police Foundation. From its inception, the Police Foundation has understood that in order to flourish, police innovation requires an atmosphere of trust; a willingness to experiment and exchange ideas both within and outside the police structure; and, perhaps most importantly, a recognition of the common stake of the entire community in better police services.

The Police Foundation prides itself in a number of core competencies that provide the foundation for CRTA, including a history of conducting rigorous research and strong data analysis, an Executive Fellows program that provides access to some of the strongest thought leaders and experienced law enforcement professionals in the field, and leadership with a history of exemplary technical assistance program management.
ABOUT THE COPS OFFICE

The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) is the component of the U.S. Department of Justice responsible for advancing the practice of community policing by the nation’s state, local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement agencies through information and grant resources.

Community policing begins with a commitment to building trust and mutual respect between police and communities. It supports public safety by encouraging all stakeholders to work together to address our nation’s crime challenges. When police and communities collaborate, they more effectively address underlying issues, change negative behavioral patterns, and allocate resources.

Rather than simply responding to crime, community policing focuses on preventing it through strategic problem solving approaches based on collaboration. The COPS Office awards grants to hire community police and support the development and testing of innovative policing strategies. COPS Office funding also provides training and technical assistance to community members and local government leaders, as well as all levels of law enforcement.

Another source of COPS Office assistance is the Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRI-TA). Developed to advance community policing and ensure constitutional practices, CRI-TA is an independent, objective process for organizational transformation. It provides recommendations based on expert analysis of policies, practices, training, tactics, and accountability methods related to issues of concern.

Since 1994, the COPS Office has invested more than $14 billion to add community policing officers to the nation’s streets, enhance crime fighting technology, support crime prevention initiatives, and provide training and technical assistance to help advance community policing.

- To date, the COPS Office has funded the hiring of approximately 129,000 additional officers by more than 13,000 of the nation’s 18,000 law enforcement agencies in both small and large jurisdictions.
- Nearly 700,000 law enforcement personnel, community members, and government leaders have been trained through COPS Office-funded training organizations.
- To date, the COPS Office has distributed more than eight million topic-specific publications, training curricula, white papers, and resource CDs.
- The COPS Office also sponsors conferences, roundtables, and other forums focused on issues critical to law enforcement.

The COPS Office information resources, covering a wide range of community policing topics—from school and campus safety to gang violence—can be downloaded at www.cops.usdoj.gov. This website is also the grant application portal, providing access to online application forms.
Following the fatal police shooting of a member of their North Minneapolis community in 2015, a group of residents demonstrated at the Minneapolis Police Department’s (MPD) Fourth Precinct headquarters, blocking access to the building and occupying the area around it for 18 days. Though the incident was handled with restraint and did not escalate into significant violence and property damage, there were still a number of lessons learned in multiple areas. This COPS Office After-Action Assessment, completed in partnership with the Police Foundation, provides a comprehensive review of the response to the protests from the perspectives of the MPD, elected leaders, and demonstrators and community members. The report presents findings focused on leadership; command and control; response to civil disorder; accountability and transparency; internal communications; public information and media; use of force; intelligence gathering; training; technology; and officer morale. Though the protests and temporary occupation of the precinct headquarters was a unique incident, the lessons learned from it can be applied to mass demonstrations, civil disturbances, and similar critical incidents in other communities.
Example 6

THE WILMINGTON PUBLIC SAFETY STRATEGIES COMMISSION

Final Report
March 31, 2015
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Acknowledgements
The Police Foundation and Vigilant Resources International (VRI) wish to acknowledge the tremendous amount of support, encouragement, sharing and guidance offered by members of the Commission and members of the community, including citizens, business and agency leaders and organizations. We particularly acknowledge Chief Bobby Cummings, his staff, and the men and women of Wilmington Police Department for their participation in and support of the Commission and study team. We want to thank many leaders and staff from Delaware state agencies including the Office of Attorney General Matt Denn and the Delaware Criminal Justice Council, the City Council and various City agencies and offices, and the leaders and staff of many community organizations who took time to share their stories with us or to allow us to meet within their facility. We must also thank the Delaware State Legislature and, in particular, the Wilmington delegation, which led efforts to pass House Resolution 2 which authorized the Commission.

We wish to acknowledge Governor Markell who, along with the Wilmington Delegation of the Delaware State Legislature championed the effort to support the citizens of Wilmington.

Last, but certainly not least, we offer our thanks for the support and guidance of the Commission Co-Chairs, The Honorable Lewis D. Schiliro, Secretary of the Department of Safety and Homeland Security, and The Honorable Joseph Bryant, Jr., Director of Public Safety, New Castle County, Delaware and all of the Commission Members. The members of the Commission are:

- Chief Bobby Cummings of the Wilmington Police Department, appointed by Mayor Dennis P. Williams;
- State Prosecutor Kathy Jennings of the Attorney General’s Office, appointed by Attorney General Matt Denn;
- Governor Markell’s Deputy Chief of Staff Drew Fennell, representing the Office of the Governor;
- City resident Cassandra Marshall, representing the Wilmington community and currently President of the Quaker Hill Neighborhood Association;
- City resident Darryl Chambers, representing the Wilmington community, and currently a researcher at the University of Delaware’s Center for Drugs and Health Studies;
- Rick Gessner, Vice President and Delaware Market Liaison at Capital One, representing the Wilmington business community; and
- James Wright, a retired officer of the Wilmington Police Department.

Methodology & Limitations
Vigilant Resources International (VRI) and Police Foundation were given a broad set of issues to assess in approximately 50 days. The issues to be addressed were identified in House Resolution (H.R.) 2 and as described by a key sponsor of the legislation at the first Commission meeting, the short timeframe required by H.R. 2 was designed to address the violence issues before warm weather arrives in Wilmington, which often brings with it an increase in street crimes.
Both groups attended all of the Commission meetings to hear presentations and public comments first hand. VRI spent hundreds of hours with and in the Wilmington Police Department (WPD), talking with groups of line and management staff and engaging in numerous individual interviews of same and reviewing hundreds of pages of materials from WPD and other agencies. VRI staff attended multiple WPD roll calls and Targeted, Analytical, Policing System (T.A.P.S.) meetings and participated in many visits with other agencies in Wilmington, New Castle County and the State.

The Police Foundation coordinated with the Violence Reduction Network (VRN) and engaged Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe of Temple University in Philadelphia to conduct the crime analysis. Dr. Ratcliffe collected 5 years worth of crime incident and computer-aided dispatch records from the City and State and completed an analysis of crime using this data.

The Police Foundation conducted document reviews and interviews with political leaders, program directors, and budget staff to conduct the resource analysis, and hundreds of hours were spent in various areas of the City to collect the views of the community. In addition to larger gatherings organized by various groups, interviews were conducted with many individuals, including neighborhood association leaders, informal leaders from the community, and the faith community. An informal survey was administered in many of these settings and was shared through several of the community organizations, resulting in responses from 150 members of the community who offered to share their views on the crime issues, the Wilmington Police Department’s approach, and offering input into the solutions needed. We also conducted interviews with business leaders and documented the views of more than 275 community members who attended the Commission’s public meetings, many of whom addressed the Commission.

The Police Foundation’s best practices assessment was completed by first listening to the needs of the community and then completing a review of evidence-based and innovative programs in other jurisdictions, resulting in a description of these approaches to aid in their exploration and possible implementation.

While both organizations would have preferred the opportunity to develop and implement more scientific and thoughtful processes of survey and exploration and the opportunity to spend more time in the community meeting with additional individuals and youth, time did not permit this type of inquiry.

Additionally, as noted on several occasions throughout the process, while there is near unanimous agreement that studying the root causes of the issues affecting Wilmington should be a part of the larger solutions to address public safety and a variety of other issues, this process was designed as a short-term assessment to address the public safety threats and issues bringing victimization and loss of life and property to Wilmington each week. Mayor Williams has announced the formation of another Commission that will reportedly study these issues and make recommendations to address the root causes of crime and violence in Wilmington. We attempted to meet with Mayor Williams to hear more about the Commission he has announced and to gain his perspective on the issues we were tasked with addressing, however two meetings
with him were unfortunately cancelled by the Mayor upon our arrival in Wilmington or his office and ultimately, the study period ended before a third meeting could be scheduled.

Our reviews and conclusions were largely drawn from data and information provided to us by city officials and others in Wilmington. Time limitations prevented us from verifying the accuracy and completeness of information provided and unfortunately, there were many situations where the information we were provided from one source contradicted the information we were provided by another source, partially or completely. For this reason, we have attempted to note discrepancies, provide citations for sources, or to provide the information presented from both points of view or sources.

Further, in some places within our recommendations or discussion, we cite a best practice or potential resource that happens to be or rely on a proprietary approach, program, product or technology. Although we have allowed these references to remain as a pointer for the City, no endorsements are intended by these references whatsoever.

**Format of this Report:**
Because of the need to have simultaneous lines of inquiry completed by multiple parties, this report is organized in a way that summarizes the key recommendations and findings up front, while providing readers with access to the full reports for each major line of inquiry in the Appendices. This format allowed the report components to be written simultaneously by multiple staff, and thus allowing the project to be completed within the expedited timeframe. In the Findings and Recommendations section, readers will find a short synopsis of each major finding, along with recommendations and alternatives for addressing the issue(s).

* * * * *

Vigilant Resources International (VRI) is a company founded by former New York City Police Commissioner Howard Safir. VRI provides consulting services to public safety organizations in the area of crime reduction, crime analysis, technology, and effective organization. Through teams of subject matter experts with many years of experience, it helps public safety agencies reengineer their activities to more effectively reduce crime, relate to their citizens and do so in a cost effective manner. VRI provides public safety agencies with advice on best practices to achieve results, and often will assist those agencies in implementing those recommendations. VRI has Offices in New York and the Baltimore/ Washington DC area.

The Police Foundation is the only nationally-known, non-profit, non-partisan, and non-membership-driven organization dedicated to improving America’s most noble profession – policing. The Police Foundation has been on the cutting edge of police innovation for 45 years since it was established by the Ford Foundation as a result of the President’s Commission on the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society.

The Police Foundation, relying on its in-house staff, executive and research fellows and consultants, provides actionable technical assistance and conducts innovative research to accomplish its mission of improving policing through science and innovation. The Police Foundation is headquartered in Washington, D.C.
Overview of Commission

The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission was established by House Joint Resolution 2 of the 148th General Assembly (“HJR 2”). As set forth in HJR 2, the Commission was established “to conduct a rapid, intensive, and comprehensive examination of public safety strategies in the City of Wilmington.” The overall purposes of the Commission are:

- To examine which public safety strategies work and which strategies do not—not only within the City of Wilmington, but regionally and nationally as well;
- To better coordinate existing public safety strategies at the local, county, state, and federal levels; and
- To recommend effective, data-driven public safety policies that could be implemented immediately to mitigate Wilmington’s unacceptably high rate of violent crime.

Over the past two months, the Commission—through its outside consultants, The Police Foundation and Vigilant Resources International (VRI) (the “Consultants”)—conducted an in-depth analysis of crime data in the City of Wilmington (the “City”). In addition, the Consultants interviewed and listened to hundreds of people inside and outside law enforcement, including City residents, representatives of the business community, community leaders, current and former Wilmington Police Department (“WPD”) officers and executives, representatives of the City, New Castle County, and the State of Delaware, and others. During that same period, the Commission held 5 public meetings to discuss the foregoing issues, and to gather input regarding possible recommendations of the Commission and their potential impact. Those meetings, and the work of the Commission, were led by the Commission’s co-chairs, Lewis D. Schiliro, Secretary of the Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland Security, and Joseph Bryant Jr., Director of the New Castle County Department of Public Safety.

In accordance with HJR 2, topics considered by the Commission and its Consultants included, among other things:

- A review of the City of Wilmington’s and WPD’s existing operational and monetary resources, including resources provided by state, county, and federal agencies;
- A review of WPD’s existing organizational structure and deployment strategies; and
- Consideration of alternative public safety strategies, including (a) the development of policing districts or other geographic areas of accountability and (b) an examination of effective public safety strategies in other jurisdictions.

Under HJR 2, the Commission must submit a Report and Recommendations to the Governor and the General Assembly no later than March 31, 2015.
Executive Summary

The City of Wilmington is the largest and the most culturally and economically diverse city in Delaware. The ability of the City to grow and improve the lives of its residents depends on its ability effectively to provide public safety. The residents, employers, and civic and community leaders with whom we speak routinely cited public safety as a principal concern affecting their decisions about where to live, where to locate their business, and how to lead the City to a better future.

Like many cities, Wilmington experiences a significant amount of crime, including crimes of violence, drug crimes and nuisance crimes. However, many cities across the country have experienced significant reductions in crimes in all categories in recent years – often attributed to improved policing strategies.

Wilmington is not one of those cities. According to the FBI, Wilmington ranks third in violence among 450 cities of its size and sixth among all cities over 50,000. Crime in Wilmington – and particularly homicides – has reached record numbers in recent years. Over the past decade, the City of Wilmington has averaged 118 shooting victims per year, reaching a record high of 154 shootings victims in 2013. In 2014 alone, there were 127 shooting victims and 23 shooting deaths in the City.

The principal questions facing the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission are why the City of Wilmington has not experienced the same crime reductions enjoyed by similarly situated municipalities across the country and what Wilmington can do about that. This report offers our examination of the strategies currently being employed by the City and the WPD, and our proposal of strategies that might be employed to better address the WPD’s core mission of creating a safer Wilmington.

Improving public safety in Wilmington is challenging, but it is certainly not impossible. Wilmington has three built-in advantages.

First and most significantly, Wilmington has a sufficiently large police force to bring appropriate resources to bear on this issue. While we make clear in this report that there are several areas of police work that deserve additional resources, and that a reorganization of some functions would assist the Department, the WPD begins this work with a force large enough to effectively patrol and fight crime in Wilmington.

Second, as the Crime Analysis and CAD Incident Analysis done by Temple University’s Jerry Ratcliffe, Ph.D. make clear, “[s]mall areas of the city account for a large proportion of the crime and community harm.” As a result, if appropriate strategies are brought to bear on those small areas, significant reductions in crime can be obtained.

Third, many people with whom we spoke in the WPD, from the leadership to rank-and-file officers, recognize that there is a need for and opportunity to change for the better. Significant cultural and organizational changes can be made only with buy-in from those tasked with the need to lead and implement those changes, and the recognition of the need for and inevitability of change was evident in many of the law enforcement professionals with whom we spoke.

Generally, we found that WPD has a respond-and-react orientation and structure that focuses on resolving calls for service rather than proactively implementing crime reduction strategies. Although WPD is sufficiently staffed, the department does not deploy sufficient officers in patrol and key investigatory functions. WPD is behind other law enforcement
agencies in its use of technology (some of which it already owns) to both analyze and predict crime, as well as to provide accountability of its officers as to whereabouts and activities. The WPD's investigatory units do not solve a sufficient number of crimes - particularly homicides - and can improve its investigatory functions and victims’ services. The Wilmington community appreciates the dedication and effort of the Department's officers, but some community relationships have become strained and can be improved.

All of the issues identified in this report are fixable, and none is exclusive to Wilmington. Many of the building blocks for reform are already in place - a city and community that recognizes the need for change, a WPD administration that is open to new strategies, and supportive local partners.

Our principal findings and recommendations are organized below:

**On the Front Line: Officers on the Street:**

The WPD has existing monetary and operational resources to adequately fight crime in the City. Wilmington spends more on its police and on police overtime than many other cities, according to law enforcement benchmarking data.

However, those numbers do not tell the whole story. The WPD is frequently below full strength because it does not plan for attrition by recruiting officers and holding regular police academy classes. The WPD also has a high number of excused absences, caused in part by use of accrued vacation or compensatory time. As a result, there are frequently far fewer officers on a shift than needed.

In addition, the current sector approach allows for unnecessary and unhelpful disconnects between officers and their command staff. The three-sector strategy being used by WPD is a viable way of organizing police efforts, but it has been implemented in such a way that lieutenants have been distanced from their officers and assigned sectors. Patrol officers and community policing officers in the same area report to different supervisors, and staffing of the Criminal Investigations Unit and the Vice Unit is inadequate.

Operation Disrupt, the WPD’s recent effort to reduce violence by flooding hot spots with a large number of officers, has shown that a visible police presence can impact crime. But Operation Disrupt is being implemented with overtime and the use of officers with other important responsibilities, for example community policing assignments as well as federal task forces, such as the DEA Task Force, the U.S. Marshals’ Warrant Task Force and the FBI Safe Streets Task Force.

We make a variety of recommendations focused on ensuring that WPD has a large enough and visible enough presence in the City. Those recommendations include implementing minimum staffing levels to ensure there are sufficient officers working per shift; planning for attrition and managing personnel to maintain appropriate officer strength; returning lieutenants to the platoon structure; creating a Community Stabilization Team that can work in emerging and chronic hotspots; and strengthening the Criminal Investigations Unit and Vice Unit.
**Bringing Policing Back to Neighborhoods & Engaging With the Community:**

The WPD provides a small number of “community policing officers” in neighborhoods across the City, but it lacks a community policing strategy that effectively engages the community, performs law enforcement functions, and locates officers in hotspots over sustained periods. The department frequently changes community policing assignments, and community policing officers lack empowerment to solve problems in the community.

Relatedly, feedback collected from the community suggests the WPD could enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the community. While the importance of the police is recognized in the community, many report that some in the WPD can be at times disrespectful, insensitive to the needs of crime victims, and apathetic to community problems, which serves as a disincentive for the community to offer its support and assistance to the WPD. WPD leadership has tried to build better community relations and emphasized community cooperation in solving crimes, but more can be done.

WPD’s approach to receiving complaints against officers is thought by the community to discourage complaint filing and is not as transparent as it could be. The approach requires citizens to appear in police headquarters during working hours on weekdays and once a complaint is filed, citizens report not hearing the status or outcome of the complaint process.

We recommend that the City implement a community policing strategy, better train assigned officers, focus on hot spots and other high crime areas, empower officers to partner with the community and fix neighborhood problems, and undertake other efforts and partnerships that build legitimacy for the department. WPD should also make it easier to file and get resolution of citizen complaints.

**Remaining Accountable & Transparent to the Community:**

We heard a variety of community complaints about not frequently seeing officers, or that officers congregate in particular areas, or that the community was not sure what officers were doing to reduce crime.

WPD does not have records tracking where officers are during their shifts. It is only now implementing GPS tracking within its Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system. WPD does not have a desk sergeant who reports when officers are entering or leaving the department for duty on their tour. While on tour, officers rarely document contacts with suspects using Field Service Reports.

We recommend that WPD fully implement and utilize its new GPS capacity to ensure officer safety, accountability, and hotspots policing, assign a desk sergeant or otherwise track when officers are in the department and on the streets, and begin using mobile digital terminals to enter contacts with suspects.

**Preventing & Solving Homicides & Shootings and Supporting Victims:**

In 2014, 118 people were shot in the City of Wilmington, resulting in 23 of the 28 total homicides experienced that year. Of those 28 homicides, only four were “closed” or solved after an arrest was made. We heard conflicting reports of how WPD responds to those incidents – varying response times, varying investigative and violence reduction practices, varying
responders, and varying amounts of follow-up. Five homicide detectives handle 78 open homicide cases (of which 41 are defined as cold cases, usually unsolved for a year or more), while other shootings are separately investigated. These investigations and others are undertaken by detectives, but the process of assignment of detectives to the investigatory units lacks consistency.

We recommend a formalized initial response protocol for all shootings, with appropriate responders including management, investigators and patrol officers, and strategies to support victims and intervene to avoid retaliation. We recommend investigators meet with prosecutors and others within 48 hours of every homicide/shooting to ensure the investigation is proceeding appropriately, with regular follow-up.

We propose creation of a Homicide/Violent Crime Unit within the Criminal Investigations Division with sufficient staffing and resources to focus on all homicides, attempted homicides, aggravated assaults and shooting incidents. We believe this can be done within the current complement of current sworn officers. Detectives are key to this work, and we recommend development of a career path for detectives with an assignment structure that promotes those who demonstrate superior investigatory skills. We also recommend significantly enhancing the WPD’s response to crime victims.

We also found that shooting and firearms investigations are not sufficiently leveraging the tools available to solve open cases and prevent additional shootings, and we recommend standardization of practices and adoption of a protocol for forensic firearm investigations.

WPD has implemented several community-based violence prevention models in recent years, to mixed success, and without sustained implementation. Programs like Operation Safe Streets, Operation Night Light, and Cease Violence were implemented, but there have been varying degrees of continuity and connectedness to the work of the WPD. Cease Violence, for example, is currently being implemented with well-selected “violence interrupters,” but is being managed by the Wilmington Department of Parks and Recreation, an agency that is not accustomed to supporting a rapidly evolving 24x7 operation involving high-stakes negotiations. We recommend the City strengthen the existing Cease Violence program with administration in an agency that is aligned with the mission of preventing violence and possessing the resources needed to implement this public health approach as designed and proven effective.

**Using Data to Guide Strategy & Solve Problems:**

The WPD is largely reactive to crime, as opposed to proactive, and does not have systems in place to allow for an intelligence-led model of policing that attempts to predict and stop crime in place before it occurs. The WPD conducts T.A.P.S. (Targeted Analytical Policing Systems) meetings that are beginning to use the data visualization tool Crime View, but these meetings are largely informational and not promoting problem solving or accountability of senior leaders to reduce crime.

WPD’s crime analysis is currently limited to standard statistical analyses, and does not use the sophisticated analysis of crime patterns and high-risk offenders to guide deployment and crime prevention. Moreover, the analysis being done is not being shared sufficiently with supervisors or patrol officers. For example, information is often distributed by email, some of which may go unopened, and the roll call room does not include crime maps, most wanted list, or other information that could inform officers on patrol and in the community policing unit.
We recommend WPD adopt a data-driven approach to police strategies and deployment, including use of the CompStat management approach to ensure that all supervisors and officers have fully briefed on criminal activity and use that information to guide their deployment and investigatory resources. WPD already has much of the technology needed to undertake this work, but additional technology could be procured through grants. In addition, substantial additional training of crime analysis for both staff and most officers is recommended. We recommend establishment of a Real Time Crime Center approach, to conduct rapid crime analysis and share it more quickly with officers and investigators to prevent additional crimes.

**Leveraging Available Resources:**

No police organization exists in a vacuum, but all must leverage resources and information from partner law enforcement organizations, community groups, and other institutions. WPD’s most important partners are aligned and supporting agencies in the city and state, agencies its works with every day, including neighboring jurisdictions, and federal agencies and task forces. But, WPD has withdrawn from task forces and collaboration with partner agencies could be improved, including restoring assignments to the federal task forces.

The City’s principal camera coverage is provided by Downtown Visions on behalf of the City and the business community. While that system appears to work, the City has its 70 cameras being monitored by one staff person for each 8-hour shift, and are typically only monitored for portions of the day. We recommend the Attorney General and Department of Safety and Homeland Security work with the City to strengthen that system and add cameras in the most violence-prone areas as necessary.

**Strengthening the WPD:**

The WPD is organized beneath the Chief of Police in a manner supportive of its respond-and-react orientation. Generally, one inspector is responsible for patrol activities, with the other responsible for investigative efforts. Several administrative positions (e.g., PIO, computer maintenance, grant writing) are undertaken by sworn officers, when that work could be undertaken by civilians who have specialized expertise in these areas. WPD officers are not competitively compensated and do not receive training opportunities that might enhance their careers and capacity.

We recommend the creation of several positions that will support intelligence-led policing efforts, such as a Deputy Chief for Operations, focused on accountable, intelligence-led and data-driven policing, an additional crime analyst, and a Chief Information Officer to integrate and promote utilization of the vast amount of technology available to the department. We also recommend the creation of an Inspector to handle supporting services (e.g., Property, vehicle maintenance, school officers, evidence control) and having some jobs be undertaken by civilians when a sworn police officer is not required. We recommend a compensation study be undertaken and that officers receive additional training, with a particular focus on data-driven and problem-oriented policing.

We believe this report and its recommendations give the WPD a roadmap to become more effective in reducing violent crime and better serving the citizens of Wilmington. In fact, in
recent weeks as we have engaged and talked with Chief Cummings and the WPD staff, we have already seen steps taken to address several of the issues we asked about, demonstrating not only a willingness, but the capability to take swift action to improve public safety in Wilmington.

The City of Wilmington and WPD are capable of meeting the challenges ahead. Both VRI and the Police Foundation appreciate the support, encouragement and guidance offered by members of the Department, particularly Chief Bobby Cummings, who fully engaged in the review process, openly and candidly providing information in an effort to improve the Department. He is clearly dedicated to the community and to the rank and file officers and staff who courageously serve every day.

Importantly, we found that the men and women who serve in WPD, whether on the front lines or in managerial positions, are committed to ending violence in the City. We are grateful for their service and believe they can succeed.
ON THE FRONT LINE: OFFICERS ON THE STREET

Finding: On a per-capita basis, WPD would appear to have more than a sufficient number of officers to police the City. However, the City’s needs are great, and the numbers do not tell the whole story.

The WPD currently has an authorized strength of 320 sworn personnel and 64 civilian support staff to cover Wilmington’s 10.9 square miles with a population of approximately 71,000 residents. Currently, WPD has 286 officers.

Relative to population, the City of Wilmington has among the highest number of police officers per 1,000 residents of any city in the nation. Nationally, according to the FBI’s “Crime in the United States 2013” report, the average number of officers per 1,000 population for cities of 50,000 to 99,000 is 1.6 (1.9 for cities in the Northeast). Here is how Wilmington compares:

- At the WPD’s current strength of 286, Wilmington has 4.0 officers per 1,000 residents. By comparison, of the 405 cities nationwide having a population of 50,000-99,999, only 3 cities have an officer-per-population ratio of 3.6 per 1,000 residents or higher. In addition, for all cities having a population of 50,000 or more, only 13 out of 671 cities nationwide have an officer-per-population ratio of 3.6 or higher.

- At WPD’s authorized strength of 320 officers, the City would have 4.5 officers per 1,000 residents. At that level, according to the FBI report, out of 671 cities nationwide with a population of 50,000 or more, only 1 city would have a higher ratio of officers per 1,000 residents.

On a per-capita basis, Wilmington’s existing and authorized staffing levels would appear to be more than sufficient, at least in comparison to other cities. However, these figures do not necessarily tell the whole story. Based on our analysis of geography, workload, calls for service (CFS), and demands for non-criminal services, we do not believe this formula is an accurate way to determine adequate officer coverage for Wilmington—particularly in light of the City’s pervasively high crime rate. Different cities have different coverage needs, and some cities with high crime have more officers. Camden, New Jersey, for example, has 375 officers for a larger population of 87,000 but is only 8.82 square miles.

In order to achieve an effective deployment, we recommend that the WPD’s current complement of 286 sworn officers be increased to its authorized strength of 320, and be maintained at that level. Currently, there are 110 officers assigned to one of four platoons that are responsible for responding to calls for service 24 hours per day. As is explained in the next section, this number is too low and should increase to a recommended 124 or more. This increase in platoon size would be possible when the current Police Academy class graduates in May. At that time, however, attrition would immediately begin and currently there are not clear plans for when the next Police Academy class begin. The WPD should hire more regularly in order to maintain its deployable personnel at or near the authorized 320 sworn officer number.
Recommendation:

In order to maintain its deployable personnel at or near the authorized 320 sworn officer number, the City should plan ahead and hire more regularly. The City’s plan should utilize smaller Police Academy classes when needed to keep these staffing levels.
Finding: Due to leave and other excused absences, WPD’s on-duty staffing levels are at times insufficient. Minimum staffing levels should be maintained throughout each day.

In 2014, the WPD implemented an 11-hour rotation. Working an 11-hour rotation allows for a 6-1/2 hour training day once a month. Given that the WPD has in the recent past given limit training to its members, this increased availability in training time is to be welcomed. For this reason, and because other recommendations proposed in this Report are responsive to concerns about overtime and other issues, we do not recommend changing the 11 hour rotation at this time.

Under its existing deployment plan, WPD has 4 platoons (A,B,C,D) with 2 platoons working in any 24 hour period providing day and night coverage. Currently, the platoon sizes range from 26 to 29. Up to 6 officers may be on leave during each of the two tours, and some officers may not be present due to illness, emergency excusal, or commitments such as court testimony.

Although officers are assigned to two platoons, they have 4 different reporting times during a 24 hours period to ensure there is adequate coverage during the busiest hours (generally from about 2 p.m. until 11 p.m.) and also provide coverage from 3 a.m. to 6 a.m. when the fewest number of calls for service occur and when the least number of officers are working. While the deployment system is at first difficult to understand, it does achieve the Department goal of having the greatest number of officers working when the largest number of calls for service occur.

However, the current system does not provide for adequate staffing of each rotation because of the relatively small number of officers assigned to each platoon and the large number of excused absences that are allowed to occur. For example, the B platoon has only 26 officers, and six of them may be excused on any given day. Other emergencies or assignments can decrease the number present to 18 or fewer.

When the number of officers present drops as low as it has recently, it is difficult to effectively manage radio call response. The existing power tour of additional officers working from 2 p.m. to 1 a.m. assists to some degree during the busiest hours, but since it is comprised of officers from the day and night platoons, it too is affected by the excessive excusals. When we asked about minimum staffing levels and the use of overtime to supplement patrols, we received several answers indicating that the Department lacked clarity in this area. Still it was evident that a large amount of overtime is being used to sustain the present deployment.

In order to address this issue, additional officers should be assigned to each platoon and minimum staffing levels should be designated. Currently the WPD attempts to deploy one 2-person police car for each of its nine districts and additional one-person cars as resources allow. Based on historical call for service data, we recommend a minimum staffing level of 24 officers actually working on each platoon rotation. Such a deployment would allow nine two-person cars and six one-person cars to be deployed during the tour. Our analysis indicates this number of officers is adequate to answer calls for service even during busy tours. Further refinement of this model would be possible once a crime analysis function is developed, and would include better planned deployment of foot patrols.
To achieve this goal, we recommend that upon graduation of the current Police Academy class in May of this year each of the platoons should be increased to 31 officers. In addition, when at that staffing level excused absences should be limited so that no more than 7 officers are excused, even allowing for emergencies. We do note that there are other officers deployed during the day and evening who may also assist with calls when needed. These include the 12 officers assigned to canine units who are in marked police vehicles and 20 officers assigned among the Community Police Units including those assigned to the downtown area and Riverfront District. These officers do assist and should be used when needed. Importantly, this deployment plan would maintain officer assignments to community policing and foot patrols in the business district. As the recommended deployment approach begins to have impact, officers on patrol would be able to spend more time on proactive engagement citywide.

**Recommendations:**
The staffing levels in the 4 patrol platoons should be increased to 31 officers in each platoon upon graduation of the current Police Academy class in May 2014

The deployable patrol strength of each platoon should be kept at 24 or more officers.
Finding: WPD should retain the 3-sector model of accountability, with captains responsible for sector crime and problem solving and lieutenants responsible for team-led, proactive enforcement and collaboration between and across sectors.

In 2014, the WPD divided the City into 3 sectors (geographic areas) each of which is commanded by a captain. WPD adopted this model in an effort to bring greater focus, structure, and organizational accountability to policing efforts throughout the City. As part of this three-sector plan, the platoon lieutenants were removed from working the same hours as the platoon sergeants and officers. They effectively became sector administrators. As a result, the highest-ranking supervisors regularly working on each platoon are sergeants assigned to each sector, and his or her primary responsibility is to that sector. Because no platoon lieutenant is working, no one is responsible in real- or live-time to look at crime from a citywide perspective during the individual tour.

The 3-sector model is one of many viable ways for policing Wilmington and, given its recent implementation we recommend it be maintained at this time. At the same time, we believe lieutenants should be returned to the platoon model and work alongside their sergeants and officers. Additionally, we recommend that these lieutenants become less administrative and engage as leaders in proactive, team-led enforcement. With their ability to look at citywide needs, the platoon lieutenants would be able to address emerging issues by using existing patrols or by requesting specialized units. By using effective crime analysis and mapping, the lieutenants could work closely with the sector captains to be sure the 3 sectors do not become isolated geographic areas. In addition, the lieutenant would be the authorized officer for overtime approval. Over time, this citywide approach to patrol, along with larger platoons and fewer excusals, should reduce the amount of overtime needed to provide adequate patrol coverage.

We also note that the Community Policing officers do not currently report to the sector captains who are responsible for the area in which they work. This means the sector captains do not determine their hours or grant excusals. While we believe a Community Policing Unit should continue to exist for administrative and training purposes, the officers should report to the sector captain through the sergeants and lieutenants assigned to that sector.

Under the sector deployment plan, WPD documents indicate neighborhoods are the focus of attention. The sector captains are accountable to ensure the police and neighborhood residents work together to create safe and strong neighborhoods. The WPD has established the following metrics to assess progress: reduce crime rates, increase clearance rates, decrease physical and social disorder; increase cooperation and “willingness to intervene” in the neighborhood; improve police/community relationships; and move toward the “strong neighborhood” type of community policing. A number of these metrics are difficult to measure—and we were unable to find any current analysis that was attempting to do so. There was some basic crime data analysis provided, for example, the number of shootings in each sector. If the WPD is to continue to use these metrics for measuring success, they should define carefully what each one means and begin actively recording results on weekly, monthly and yearly basis. There are tools available to measure less tangible metrics, including the National Police Research Platform Public Satisfaction Survey, which is designed to capture the quality of police-citizen interactions.
Additionally, we did not find full collaboration among the sector captains and the investigatory and specialized units. There is a compartmentalizing of efforts in many cases that did not ensure that deployment efforts were being focused on the locations with the greatest violence within the City. The clear exception was Operation Disrupt where there is precise focus on hotspots.

Recommendations:

The current model that divides Wilmington into three sectors each commanded by a Captain is viable and should be maintained.

Lieutenants should be assigned to work the same days and hours as their platoons.

The efforts of lieutenants should be focused on ensuring proactive policing and conducting team-led enforcement.

Community Policing officers should be assigned under the command of the sector captains to allow for greater accountability.

A Community Policing Unit should continue to exist with one sergeant for citywide record keeping and training purposes. He should also be assigned to Sector 2, where the majority of Community Policing Officers are assigned.

Specific metrics for success in each sector should be defined and measured, including crime reduction among the major crime categories (murder, robbery, sexual assault, burglary, aggravated assault, etc.)

The WPD should strive to achieve greater coordination between its sector captains and other units. This increased coordination can be achieved by sector captains identifying specific hotspot locations and developing specific plans for enforcement in coordination with the captains in the Criminal investigations Division and the Drug, Organized Crime, and Vice Division.
Finding: Notwithstanding recent short-term successes, Operation Disrupt is not sustainable or recommended in its current form as a long-term strategy for preventing crime and engaging the community.

On January 26, 2015, the WPD initiated Operation Disrupt, which assigned 1 Captain, 1 Lieutenant, 5 Sergeants, and 23 experienced officers from Investigative, Community Policing, and other units to patrol in areas with recent homicides and shootings. The initiative has been successful in the short term in reducing violent and other crime, as well as calls for service. However, it is not sustainable in the long term due to the logistical effect the deployment has on other aspects of the Department. Detectives are no longer participating in joint task forces, and WPD’s Community Policing Unit has been severely limited in performing its duties because of the deployment. In the short term, the overtime money obtained by Attorney General Denn—which provides funding for 1 sergeant and 5 officers 7 days a week from 6 p.m. to 2 a.m.—will assist in maintaining this effort.

What Operation Disrupt shows is that when officers are effectively deployed to violence prone hotspots, they can have an immediate impact on reducing violence. We have already noted that we recommend an increased assignment of 14 officers to patrol platoons upon the Police Academy class graduation. These new officers should be able to assist in continuing the focus on hotspot locations.

We also recommend the establishment of a Community Stabilization Team of 1 sergeant and 8 experienced officers. These officers would work during high-crime hours and should be deployed 5 days per week with 8-hour tours. Similar to Operation Disrupt, they would be responsible for responding to the hotspot areas, where they would take enforcement action against offenders committing quality of life offenses and major crimes. They should also interact with residents and business people in the locations to provide reassurance and explain the police efforts. Within the context of the larger intelligence-led and problem-oriented policing described later in this document, these teams would operate in a context that assures appropriate engagement with the community in addition to enforcement services.

At the same time, we note that both the Criminal Investigative Division and WPD’s drug unit (which is called the Vice Unit) require additional personnel. The needs of the Criminal Investigation Unit are more adequately discussed in a section that follows, however the 28 homicides and 118 shootings that occurred in 2014, for which there are very low clearance rates, points in part to the need for additional personnel. Equally, in a City with open-air drug markets, the current assignment of 1 lieutenant and 7 officers to drug enforcement is inadequate. We recommend the assignment of an additional 6 officers to each of these units.

To create these changes, all 34 graduating officers would be assigned to patrol for their training, and 20 experienced officers would be assigned to the units as indicated below:

- As per above, the new Community Stabilization Team should have 1 Sergeant and 8 experienced police officers. If current administrative positions are civilianized, this Team could be expanded.
As discussed in a prior section, the 4 existing Uniformed Operations platoons should each be increased to 31 officers or 124 total. Currently there are currently 110 officers within platoons ranging from 26-29 officers assigned.

• An additional 6 officers should be assigned to the Criminal Investigation Division.

• An additional 6 officers should be assigned to narcotics enforcement.

• See the discussion and recommendations later in this report for an explanation of how WPD could approach staffing a to combat guns, violent crime and, in particular, homicide.

The WPD should also examine whether its existing deployment of civilians is appropriate and if some duties and responsibilities can be completed utilizing technology. For example, we have been told that each patrol officer fills out a daily activity sheet that is then given to a civilian for manual input into a computer. Officers should be able to input this information via Mobile Digital Terminals (MDTs) or computers in the WPD Headquarters, thereby freeing them for other assignments. We believe assignment of a civilian to the three-sector captains could assist in creating greater efficiency.

Recommendations:

Upon graduation of the Police Academy class, officers should be assigned as follows:

• 34 academy graduates to patrol platoons
• 8 experienced officers to a newly created Community Stabilization Unit
• 6 experienced officers to the Criminal Investigations Division
• 6 experienced officers to the Drug (Vice) Unit.

The WPD should also examine whether its existing deployment of civilians is appropriate and if some duties and responsibilities can be completed utilizing technology.
Finding: The City spends more on police overtime than comparable cities, and consistently underestimates its overtime needs.

From FY2013 through FY2015, the Wilmington Police Department’s actual budget comprised, on average, 37.8% of the City’s total budget. As a point of comparison, for the 30 cities participating in the 2013 Benchmark City Survey,¹ the average police department budget comprised 29% of the overall city budget.

One factor driving this trend is overtime. Within limits, overtime is an unavoidable cost of policing. However, the City spends more on police overtime than comparable cities and consistently underestimates its overtime needs. In FY2014, WPD’s overtime costs comprised approximately 5.1% of its overall personnel budget. By comparison, the average overtime costs of the 30 police agencies participating in the 2013 Benchmark City Survey was 3.5%. Stated differently, as a percentage of its overall personnel budget, WPD’s overtime costs are on average 46% higher than those of comparable cities.

In addition, although overtime assignments are primarily funded from the General Fund of the police budget, a substantial amount of overtime is also paid from grant funding. It is unclear if the grant-funded overtime is included in the City’s figures on overtime spending, but we suspect it is not. Thus, it is likely that overtime spending is substantially higher than the City’s figures reflect.

In recent years, the City has consistently underestimated its annual overtime budget needs. In FY2014, the Department’s overtime budget was $1.7 million, but its actual cost ($2.9 million) exceeded that figure by more than 75%. For FY2015, the City allocated $1.9 million for overtime. However, in large part due to “Operation Disrupt,” the City has already spent more than $2.6 million on police overtime as of March 25, with three months remaining in the fiscal year.

The impact of these overtime expenses may best be understood by calculating how many additional officers could be added if these costs were converted to new hires. Using a WPD patrol officer’s starting salary of $65,000 (including benefits), the conversion of the City’s approved FY15 overtime budget (approximately $1.9 million) would result in the hiring of 28 new patrol officers. Even more striking, the conversion of the City’s actual FY15 overtime costs as of March 25 ($2.6 million) would result in an additional 40 patrol officers. Alternatively, conversion of some or all of these overtime costs could also compensate for many of the recommendations in this report.

Based on interviews with WPD personnel, there appears to be a lack of urgency with respect to managing overtime. Paying overtime is viewed as a routine solution to real or perceived personnel shortages. In most police departments, overtime is approved by first-line supervisors (i.e., sergeants). Our review revealed that in the WPD, lieutenants are tasked with approving overtime—oftentimes without knowledge of whether the overtime is justified because these lieutenants are not involved in enforcement supervision in the field. More importantly, we were

¹ More information about the Benchmark City Survey, which is administered by the Overland Park, KS Police Department, can be found at (www.opkansas.org/maps-and-stats/benchmark-cities-survey/).
advised that supervisors are not provided with adequate record keeping and analysis of overtime usage—a key tool that could be used to monitor overtime worked by officers.

Supervision is the first line of defense against overtime abuses. However, factual information about overtime is required by supervisors to assist in controlling the usage of overtime. Because overtime represents police work performed at premium rates (i.e., time and a half plus shift differential), WPD should conduct a thorough analysis of overtime expenditures to ensure that overtime is being used effectively, efficiently, and responsibly. The analysis should be conducted in a way that assesses both individual officer use and unit use, as a means to identify patterns of overtime spending. For example, large, undetected overtime earnings by individuals or units may indicate supervision deficiencies, including potential overtime abuses.

**Recommendation:** WPD should analyze overtime expenditures, with a view toward ensuring better data about overtime use and closer supervision of the resource.
Finding: Community policing should be restored and effectively implemented in Wilmington.

The Wilmington Police Department lacks a community policing strategy that provides a roadmap to effectively engage the community while performing law enforcement functions, and that puts community oriented policing officers into hotspots over sustained periods of time. The Department’s current approach of providing a small number of designated “community policing officers,” assigned with community input, is well regarded and should be expanded into hotspot areas consistent with community policing. But, this limited practice does not allow for a wider adoption of community policing and engagement strategies department wide.

The assessment team was able to identify that the Department’s designation of community policing officers is undermined by frequent changes in assignment and by an apparent lack of empowerment of these officers to solve problems in the community, as noted in the community’s input as they talked about officers who recognize problems, but must make phone calls and sometimes wait days or weeks for a response or approval to move forward in addressing the problem. While strong community policing orientation, capabilities and tactics currently exist in pockets of the Wilmington police department, leadership should examine these successful strategies and develop a Department-wide strategy for community policing and implement these practices city-wide, to increase the Department’s interactions with the community. This wholesale change in how the police engage with the community at all levels of the Department is essential to be effective in providing police services and ensuring community safety over the long term.

By developing a Department-wide transition to a community policing focus, the Wilmington Police Department should be more effective in reducing crime in hotspots. Establishing new community policing practices would result in a combination of strong enforcement (place-based, offender-based) with problem solving approaches (through WPD and partner agencies), which represents a community policing best practice. The community may observe changes in their neighborhoods, through problem solving endeavors that result in tactical police operations that address improved street lighting, improved video surveillance (CCTV), addressing public order offenses such as loitering, code inspections, and cleaning up abandoned properties. More engagement would be experienced by the community as officers engage and mentor youth, providing referrals to opportunities such as jobs, recreation, tutoring, as well connections to social services and resources.

Recommendation(s):

Review recruit and in-service training to determine how best it prepares officers to implement community-policing principles within their patrol area and provide necessary training to all officers, supervisors and civilians.
Develop and implement a community policing strategy that incorporates community oriented policing throughout the Department and effectively enables every officer on patrol and other units with public contact to provide community-policing services.

Empower community-policing officers to solve community problems by providing the appropriate authorities, tools, and resources to get the job done, as described by the community during Commission meetings.

Increase designation and assignment of community policing officers into hot spots and other high crime areas.

Develop policing strategies that focus on place- and offender-based enforcement. As implemented, these strategies should focus on respectful engagement and joint problem solving with members of the community.

As part of the place-based strategies, Wilmington Police Department should be as surgical as possible in the community problem solving efforts, focused on ‘block level’ partnerships involving both adults and youth in the community.

Conduct a community asset assessment to identify social services agencies and organizations that can provide community services within hot spots and other high-crime areas, both at the agency or executive level and at the front line levels.

Develop partnerships with community providers in the hot spot areas.

Implement the Police-Citizen Satisfaction Survey of the National Police Research Platform, University of Illinois at Chicago, which measures citizen satisfaction with police performance, a critical issue for gaining the community’s support and trust. This would allow Wilmington’s results to be benchmarked against as many as 60 other agencies in the U.S.

Best Practice(s):

Hot Spots Policing in Lowell, Massachusetts (Found “Effective” by CrimeSolutions.gov)

Spokane, Washington Police Department’s Neighborhood Policing Plan

Cambridge, Massachusetts Smart Policing Initiative

Minneapolis, Minnesota Hot Spots Policing Experiment (Found “Effective” by CrimeSolutions.gov)

Stockton, California’s Operation Peacekeeper (Found “Effective” by CrimeSolutions.gov)

Gang Resistance Education And Training (G.R.E.A.T.) Program – demonstrated to improve youth attitudes towards law enforcement and short-term improvement in gang resistance skills.
**Finding:** Community and organizational fairness are necessary for engaging the community and maintaining a cohesive and engaged workforce in the WPD.

Feedback collected from the community (see Appendices) and from organizations and agencies in the City suggests that the Department could enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the community, leaving them less likely to want to support the Department’s efforts. Feedback from the rank and file officers within the Wilmington Police Department also suggests that organizational legitimacy within the Department could also be enhanced. Specifically, community interviews, focus groups and surveys found that, despite the recognition of a need for police in the community and an expressed appreciation for the job they do, many in the community report the belief that some police are disrespectful towards the community, lack sensitivity, and show apathy towards the community’s problems. This is evidenced by allegations of disrespectful treatment, insensitive comments regarding crime victims or incidents and similar concerns as documented in the community input section of this report. As a result, the community – both citizens and organizational leaders – have reported a lack of confidence and trust in the police, which has impacted the ability of the police to engage the community.

According to the Campbell Collaborative, an international research network, “Research shows that citizens are more likely to comply and cooperate with police and obey the law when they view the police as legitimate. The most common pathway that the police use to increase citizen perceptions of legitimacy is through the use of procedural justice. Procedural justice, as described in the literature, comprises four essential components. These components are citizen participation in the proceedings prior to an authority reaching a decision (or voice), perceived neutrality of the authority in making the decision, whether or not the authority showed dignity and respect toward citizens throughout the interaction, and whether or not the authority conveyed trustworthy motives.” Chief Cummings in interviews with the assessment team has repeatedly pointed to his commitment to having police department personnel engage and build trust with residents, business owners, and other community stakeholders in Wilmington. However, in its current construct, it will be difficult to effectively engage the community and build trust.

Similarly, feedback gleaned from focus group sessions and meetings with Department personnel suggests that fairness and procedural justice is lacking within the Department, causing morale, attrition and other issues within the workforce. The Ethics Resource Center, in a document it authored concerning procedural fairness and legitimacy in the workplace regarding reporting of unethical behavior and workplace rule violations, found that a procedurally just process – defined as fair decision-making process and respectful treatment of employees and their concerns – substantially increases the chances that employees accept outcomes of decisions and workplace processes, whether or not their feedback was acted on.

From the observations made by the assessment team, there is a tremendous need for the leadership at the Wilmington Police Department to consider both the need for legitimacy and procedural fairness within the Department and how that is translated to the community.
Recommendation(s):

The Department should systematically review its policies, procedures and protocols after training is completed to ensure that these documents are consistent with community oriented policing, procedural justice, and legitimacy.

The Department should Implement the National Police Research Platform’s Public Satisfaction Survey, which measures citizen satisfaction and procedural fairness within police performance. This would allow Wilmington’s results to be benchmarked against as many as 60 other agencies in the U.S. that have used this tool.

WPD should consider leveraging the Blue Courage Training program for the entire WPD. Initial engagement through the Blue Courage Executive Overview, designed to give insight on topics such as the Nobility of Policing, Respect, and Critical Thinking/Effective Decision Making, is recommended. The Bureau of Justice Assistance, DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, the National Law Enforcement Officers’ Memorial and the International Association of Directors of Law Enforcement Standards and Training (IADLEST) are partnering with Blue Courage as it is delivered around the U.S.

Best Practice(s):

Chicago’s Project Safe Neighborhoods Policing Strategy

Washington Metropolitan Police Department
Finding: The Wilmington Police Department process for receiving complaints from the community does not sufficiently promote accountability and should be more transparent.

Feedback from the community indicates that citizens are discouraged from making complaints against the WPD and its officers as a result of the complaint submission process that requires citizens to appear in WPD’s headquarters during weekdays between the hours of 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., where they are greeted by a WPD supervisor. Community feedback suggests that the would-be complainants often encounter the officers that they are there to file a complaint against and in many cases, the supervisor that meets with them asks questions in a way that appears to discourage the citizen from filing complaints. According to the WPD’s website, it only received 49 citizen complaints in 2013, which appears low compared to knowledge of other agencies’ processes. A report provided on the same website indicates that of the 49 received, 32 were substantiated (i.e., sufficient proof to confirm the allegation) and 6 were unsubstantiated. The remaining 11 complaints are unaccounted for in the WPD’s report. No information is provided for any complaints, internal or external, regarding the disciplinary process. The community provided further feedback that once a complaint is filed, they are not informed of the outcome of the process, which creates concerns in the community that the complaints are not investigated and there is no accountability.

Agency and officer accountability in the complaint process is a critical for community trust and legitimacy. The process of filing a complaint should be made accessible without having to appear in WPD headquarters during times when most citizens are working. Care should be taken to ensure that complainants do not feel dissuaded by the process (particularly the interview) and should not have to encounter the officer(s) that are the subject of the complaint, to avoid an appearance of attempts to intimidate complainants. Once a complaint is filed, the complainants should be notified via a method of their preference (mail, call, electronic, follow-up meeting) and should be provided with an outcome of the process, i.e., “founded” vs. “not-founded.” Ideally, complainants should be afforded an opportunity to discuss the result and to request a second-level review of the finding by a higher-level official.

Recommendation(s):

WPD should consider allowing complaints to be filed online or at a location outside of WPD headquarters, such as the Downtown Safety Office at 217 Market Street or another location, and the available days/times for doing so should include evening and/or weekend hours.

WPD should take steps to ensure that the interview process does not result in citizens feeling intimidated or “talked out of” filing a complaint.

WPD should provide complainants with the opportunity to choose a preferred method of follow-up and learning the outcome of the complaint, such as letter, e-mail/text, or call.

Best Practice(s):

Camden County Police Department’s online complaint initiation process (in process)
REMAINING ACCOUNTABLE TO THE CITIZENS

Finding: Additional steps should be taken to ensure accountability in patrol operations.

As part of our efforts to examine patrol accountability, we participated in “ride alongs” and interviewed officers and supervisors. We were aware of community complaints that residents do not frequently see officers; that officers congregate in certain locations; and that community members were not sure what steps the officers were taking to reduce violence in the city.

We were not able to dispel these concerns. Records do not exist that show where officers are specifically located while they are on duty. This is problematic. To have an effective deployment strategy, you need to know where your officers are. Knowing the location of officers on duty is a fundamental part of ensuring officer safety and accountability. Additionally, as the best practice portion of this report identifies, effectively reducing crime through hotspot policing is enhanced by ensuring officers are spending the necessary amount of time in the hotspots multiple times each shift.

We understand the Department now has the technology to determine officers’ locations in real time, and to create records of that information. They should begin to do so immediately.

The most viable method we identify to ensure accountability regarding officers’ locations is through the new Computer Assisted Dispatch (CAD) software installed this month and the new GPS capacity which we are told is available in its police cars. These systems should allow for better tracking of officers’ locations while they are on duty, as well as better deployment of officers into hotspots by ensuring the officers are in the hotspots multiple times each shift.

We also believe sector captains have a responsibility to ensure accountability from their subordinates and to focus on violence reduction through constant instruction to supervisors and officers, the monitoring of the police radio, and their unannounced presence at incidents and on patrol. The captains assure us they are aware of this responsibility and actively take part in these activities. We also believe at least 1 of the 3 sector captains should work an evening tour to ensure crime conditions are addressed citywide and that officers are held to the high standard of accountability. All captains should also perform unannounced tours in the late evening and early morning hours. Currently, one captain does have a 24-hour duty each day, where they work 8 hours often in the evening and are on call from home. The unannounced tours would be in addition to those duties.

As we noted in an earlier section, one challenge to accountability is that lieutenants currently do not work the same tours as their platoons and are increasingly involved in administrative matters. Sergeants then are chiefly responsible for accountability. We found there is at least some “sector integrity,” in that both officers and supervisors believe in the importance of officers being responsible for calls for service in their designated area of patrol and that each works to ensure this occurs. We were less sure regarding the degree that officers stay in their area of assignment when not on call. Here, too, no electronic records were available to assist us.
We found it unusual that there was not a desk sergeant to whom officers report when entering and leaving the Department during the tour of duty. Officers do electronically clock in and out when they arrive and leave work, but they are not required to do so when entering and leaving the stationhouse during the tour. It is not clear that the present electronic login system, Kronos, would allow for such multiple time recordings. As such, sergeants on patrol must keep track of who is in the stationhouse, which is not realistic unless officers indicate to the radio dispatcher that they are leaving patrol.

We believe the booking sergeant area could be reconfigured to create a desk officer area where officers would have to check in when entering and leaving the building. The booking sergeant and officers should also have their hours and schedule changed to match that of the platoons and become a more integral part of them.

One additional area of accountability that causes concern is that officers appear not to be documenting contacts with suspects in the field through the creation of Filed Service Reports that can be entered through the Mobile Digital Terminals. In 2014, according to the DELJIS system, only 126 such reports were submitted. Supervisors should ensure that these reports are being prepared.

Recommendations:

The full capacity of the new CAD system and GPS technology should be utilized to map the position of each police car and track their movement and time at locations. Patrol supervisors should be able to view this mapping on their MDT and screens should also be available for viewing by the booking/desk officer and in the respective offices of chief through platoon lieutenants. An alert should occur at the communications section if a police car has not moved in 30 minutes and the patrol sergeant should be immediately notified.

Sector captains should make clear that units are to maximize time on patrol and avoid administrative or other tasks that unnecessarily take them out of sector. The officers’ efforts should be specifically focused and directed toward violence reduction rather than response to past crimes.

The WPD should establish a confidential schedule of unannounced tours worked by its 7 captains that focus on the late evening/night tour.

The 3 sector captains should also schedule their tours to ensure at least one is working during the high activity hours in the evening and ensures that any serious conditions that develop regardless of sector boundary are addressed.

Patrol members should be required to report to a supervisor when entering and exiting the stationhouse during the tour. We recommend the booking sergeant area be reconfigured to create a desk officer position and that the booking sergeant maintains an interrupted patrol log noting the reason and time of arrival and departure of officers and supervisors into the stationhouse once the tour has commenced. To increase accountability, the booking sergeants and officers should also be placed in the platoon schedule.
Sergeants entering the stationhouse during the tour should also make an entry concerning their time of entry and leaving and the reason for being in the building.

Captain and lieutenants should regularly inspect the interrupted patrol log, question the desk sergeant regarding officers being in the stationhouse, and inspect the inside of the stationhouse particularly on the midnight tours to ensure no unauthorized officers are present.

Officers should whenever possible complete paperwork in the field utilizing their Mobile Digital Terminals and only leave the field with their supervisor’s approval and upon notifying the radio dispatcher.

Supervisors should ensure officers prepare Field Service Reports when suspects are stopped. Both monitoring the police radio and reviewing dispatched calls for suspicious persons should assist in evaluating the compliance rate.
PREVENTING & SOLVING HOMICIDES & SHOOTINGS AND PROVIDING SUPPORT TO VICTIMS

Finding: To improve investigative success and to better support crime victims and the community, the WPD should create a homicide/shooting incident response plan that addresses scene response, the initial 48-hours of the investigation, and victim support.

In 2014, there were 28 homicides, including 23 by shooting, and 118 people shot in Wilmington. Although the WPD responds to this large number of incidents, it does not have a formalized initial response protocol.

In our discussions with WPD and community members, we heard conflicting accounts concerning the response to homicides and shootings. There was general agreement that there is not a standardized response protocol and that a team of investigators does not respond to all incidents. In the case of a person shot, sergeants may be the highest-ranking officers at the scene. The response time to incidents can vary significantly because investigators respond from home to incidents that occur during early morning hours. Community members complain of officers and investigators acting in an indifferent manner or laughing at the incidents. There were also complaints of investigators not returning victim family calls on case status.

We believe a central component in increasing the successful apprehension of offenders for these crimes is moving responsibility upward within the WPD to maximize the attention and resources that can be brought to focus on each case. The Investigative Inspector should respond to all homicides to take command including those that occur during non-working hours. A captain should respond and take command at every shooting regardless of the degree of injury. Among the captain’s duties would be coordinating with the State Prosecutor to ensure every appropriate step is taken to ensure a successful prosecution upon apprehension of the offender. As is currently policy, an investigative supervisor should respond to lead the investigation at all shootings. We recommend checklists also be used to ensure all available steps are considered and, if appropriate, used in solving homicides and shootings.

Although statistics were not available, we were told that retaliation is common after shootings in Wilmington. The responding captain should consider a wide range of options to prevent any additional violence. These would include placing a Staffed Mobile Command Post or similar vehicle at the scene of the shooting. After conferral with the on-scene investigative supervisor, the captain should make a determination how long to maintain the staffed vehicle at the location (e.g., 24 hours, 3 days, etc.). Consideration should also be given to deploying pole cameras to shooting and violence prone locations as part of intelligence gathering, in an attempt to locate wanted individuals, and to prevent further violence.

Within 48 hours of each unsolved homicide/shooting, the Investigative Operations Inspector and Uniformed Operations Inspector should jointly chair a meeting with subordinates, other involved law enforcement, and the State Prosecutor’s Office. The meeting should focus on ensuring that adequate resources are being dedicated to the case and that all investigative leads and appropriate proactive policing tactics to solve the case are being used. The meetings should also be used to
determine if best practices were followed in responding to the incident and to determine how the WPD’s response plan can be improved. These meeting’s agenda should include a review of other recent homicides and shootings that remain open after 14 days. The Chief and Deputy Chief Operations may wish to attend these meeting, when available.

In addition to the 48-hour meetings, monthly meetings should be held by the investigative inspector and captain with the Attorney General and his staff to review cases, discuss suspects and prosecutions of cases, and identify steps to be taken to move toward arrest and prosecution. At these meetings, a comprehensive review of the existing 42 homicide cold cases should be conducted to determine if additional leads may be available for follow up. Consideration should be given to using retired homicide detectives and the resources of Department of Justice Violence Reduction Network for this evaluation. Supervisors from the proposed Homicide and Violent Crime Unit (HVCU) should meet regularly with their counterparts at NCCPD and DSP to discuss linkages on open violent crime investigations, joint suspects, trends and patterns, and to ensure deconfliction.

**Recommendations:**

The WPD should implement a homicide/shooting response plan that requires the response of high-ranking members of the Department to take command and ensure every possible step is being taken to apprehend the offender and prevent additional shootings or retaliation.

The WPD should conduct meetings chaired by the two Investigative and Operational Inspectors within 48 hours of a shooting to ensure maximum follow up. The meetings should include representatives from all involved law enforcement agencies and the State Attorney’s office.

The Investigative Captain and supervisors should meet monthly with the Attorney General to review active and cold cases and determine steps to move forward.
Finding: WPD’s homicide unit is not sufficiently staffed, is stove-piped in its investigations, and requires improved investigative approaches and scope to improve the clearance rate.

In 2014, there were 28 homicides with four closed or solved after an arrest was made, which equates to a 14.3% closure (or solved) rate, well below the national average of 64.1%. Currently, there are 78 open homicide cases assigned to the five detectives in the homicide unit, which includes 41 that are considered a “cold case” (defined by WPD as an unsolved case for a year or more, no further leads and initial investigating officer reassigned). While the establishment of this unit is based on the premise that greater focus can be brought to each case, it also separates homicide investigations from other shootings and violent crimes that could have become a homicide had the victim’s life not been saved. The current number of cases compared to the number of investigators exceeds recommended levels and could therefore impact the ability of the detectives to close cases quickly. Additionally, no homicide or shooting incident protocol exists that spells out who must respond to a homicide or violent crime scene from CID, the command staff, and from patrol, and both VRI and the Police Foundation, independently and jointly, heard many community concerns about how homicide/shooting crime scenes and victim support is handled. Appropriate and timely services to crime victims is essential.

We found no evidence of use of investigative checklists and noted that not all of those assigned to the homicide unit, while all are professional investigators, have the extensive investigative experience or recent training that may be necessary to ensure optimal functioning of the unit. Last, sharing of criminal intelligence and coordination with other agencies at the City, county, state and federal level could be improved.

In order to effectively and comprehensively address the interrelatedness of these violent crimes, the WPD should create a Homicide and Violent Crime Unit (HVCU), within the Criminal Investigations Division by reassigning existing personnel.

This unit would be comprised of one lieutenant with investigative experience, 2 sergeants (each leading a platoon), and 17 detectives including the 5 detectives currently in the homicide unit. The additional 12 detectives would be assigned from the current major crimes and other investigative units. The HVCU would have a total of 17 detectives and handle the following cases: homicides, attempted homicides, aggravated assaults, shooting incidents with a victim and armed robberies. In the deployment section, we recommend the assignment of an additional 6 officers to the Criminal Investigations Division to assist in other investigations. This staffing configuration would provide for unity of command and provide for a team response to homicide and other violent crime scenes involving firearms.

The HVCU would allow for connectivity between all violence crimes, especially those with a firearm. The increased size would allow better coverage during the prime crime hours, allow for HVCU to be on call during off hours, and allow for a multiple person response to homicides and other serious crimes.

The WPD should also consider requesting the assignment of two trained investigators from the State Police and two from the New Castle County Police Department to assist in addressing open homicides and shootings, in addition to the two ATF agents assigned. Given the
disproportionate number of homicides and shootings in the City (51.5% of the State’s 2012 homicides occurred in the City, according to a state report), these assignments would be an appropriate use of State and County resources. They would also allow for sharing of ideas, intelligence, and methodologies for solving crimes that occurred in the City, as well as the County and within the State Police jurisdiction.

We also recommend a thorough review of detective assignments, caseloads, case-closures and overall effectiveness of each unit and member be initiated to ensure detectives are assigned appropriately, in adequate numbers, and that they are result oriented in their investigation.

The WPD should also develop a career path process for detectives. The current process that allows detectives to shift in and out of the investigative units is counterproductive. The process of assignment to investigative units is not understood by members of the department and lacks consistency. Detectives in the Criminal Investigations Division who demonstrate superior skills investigating routine cases should be elevated to the elite HVCU when vacancies occur. Additionally, supervisory personnel in all ranks in the Criminal Investigations Division should be required to have a solid investigatory background that qualifies them to direct and sustain major investigations.

The WPD Detective Units also needs a more current and sophisticated automated Case Management System to track cases, leads, suspects, etc. The homicide unit personnel require additional training in case management and investigations. The U.S. Department of Justice Violence Reduction Network is providing assistance and may be able to assist with the case management system and continue providing technical assistance in homicide investigations.

Recommendations:

Note: Recommendations provided below should be implemented along with the homicide response plan recommendations provided elsewhere, to ensure appropriate victim response and to effectively respond to crimes involving firearms.

The WPD should create a Homicide/Violent Crime Unit as described above that would allow for a comprehensive approach to investigating violent crime in the City.

The Inspector Investigative Operations should arrange for the HVCU Detective Commanders to meet with the State Prosecutor a minimum of once a month to review pending cases, investigative leads, forensic results, and additional investigative steps needed for successful prosecution on cases pending trial.

The Inspector for Investigative Operations should lead a process to review the 43 cases with a “cold case” status to determine if they can be returned to active case status and assigned to investigators in the HVCU along with reviewing the definition of “cold case”.

CID, including the proposed HVCU, needs an automated case management system to track case, lead, suspect, person of interest, etc.
The unit (and the Forensic Crime Unit) needs training in a variety of areas, such as case management, technological tools, evidence control and ballistics. WPD may also consider sending one or more evidence technicians to the U.S. DOJ-funded National Forensics Academy for intensive training and certification.

The WPD should continue to utilize the services the Violence Reduction Network and consider utilizing experienced retired homicide detectives to assist with cold case reviews.

The WPD should also consider requesting the assignment of two trained investigators from the State Police and two from the New Castle County Police Department to assist in addressing open homicides and shootings.

The WPD should establish a career path for assignment to detective duties.

The WPD should ensure all supervisors in Investigative Operations have an investigatory background.
Finding: The WPD should significantly enhance its use of firearms investigative and intelligence tools and ballistics technology in investigating and preventing violent crime.

WPD, through patrol, the Safe Streets Unit and other units, seized 277 crime guns last year. However, we were not able to learn if a seized or recovered firearm protocol exists within the WPD or if any information is collected on the type of guns recovered, where they came from, or how they were acquired. Our review found that while the WPD takes some steps to leverage ballistics evidence, the timeliness of such use and the full array of firearms investigative and intelligence resources is not being utilized in ways that can solve open cases and prevent additional shootings by identifying and incapacitating shooters. We could not identify any protocols for responding to gunshot detections or calls from citizens that require, for example, the attempted collection of ballistic evidence when no victim is found or to process recovered evidence in any meaningful timeframe. We were advised that the WPD Forensic Crime Unit does respond to most incidents involving shots fired if there is evidence at the scene. However, if the only evidence at the scene is shell casings and there is no victim present, the uniformed patrol officers are responsible for recovering the shell casings. WPD patrol officers do not have training on how to do this, nor do they have the appropriate protective gloves and evidence containers to secure the materials. Further, it is our understanding that ballistics best practices are not consistently used at this point in the process.

By statute, the State of New Jersey requires all law enforcement to conduct a series of evidentiary procedures within 24 hours of a shooting incident. As a result, significant improvements in investigative outcomes and the ability to disrupt violence has been improved. According to the New Jersey State Police:

“Through the Rapid Assessment in NIBIN protocol (RAIN), the New Jersey State Police Ballistics Unit has created the capability to assess each case for evidence suitable for NIBIN entry and insure the timely submission into NIBIN. Since its beginning in April 2014, the RAIN protocol has realized its goal of a 24 hour turnaround time for priority cases and has yielded a significant amount of positive NIBIN correlations that have resulted in leads and arrests for investigators. Building upon the success of the RAIN protocol, the Forensic Investigations Bureau has implemented a Crime Gun Protocol, which provides for a thorough forensic examination of every crime gun before the gun is test-fired for NIBIN entry. The objective of the Crime Gun Protocol is to provide timely, actionable, leads to investigators while supporting aggressive enforcement and prosecution of gun crimes in New Jersey. Public Law 2013, Chapter 162 requires police agencies to submit gun crime information into systems such as NIBIN, CJIS, and E-Trace in a timely manner. This protocol allows the New Jersey State Police to comply with the statute, in both practice and spirit, while maintaining the highest standards of forensic analysis.”

The New Jersey statute requires that each recovered firearm (including a shell casing) shall be subjected to consistent set of procedures within 24 hours of recovery. These procedures include multiple methods of inspecting/testing the firearm or shell casing for additional trace evidence, checking relevant databases for information about the firearm, submitting information to tracing and ballistics imaging systems and sharing information quickly with investigators that can be
used to identify the shooter and prevent additional shootings. This protocol leverages state of the art technology from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) and other agencies.

**Recommendation:**

The State of Delaware should consider replicating the New Jersey statute.

The Wilmington Police Department and New Castle County Police Department and other agencies in the immediate area should work with the Delaware State Police to create a similar protocol, which should be immediately implemented and monitored monthly through discussions between the leadership of both agencies.

WPD should consider participating in ATF’s Collective Data Sharing initiative. Doing so would allow the WPD to access crime gun trace information as a result of other Delaware law enforcement agency traces of crime guns, which may assist in identifying crime gun sources.

No-cost training and technical assistance from partner agencies such as ATF and forensics providers such as Forensics Technologies, Inc. (produces IBIS technology) should be leveraged to improve ballistics capabilities.
Finding: Improved response to and support of crime victims is needed.

On several occasions during Commission meetings and in community input sessions, crime victims and their family members raised concerns about the responsiveness of the Wilmington Police Department to their inquiries and needs. It was alleged on multiple occasions that victims call the Department to determine the status of the investigation and never receive a call or wait weeks for a call back. It was also apparent during these discussions that misinformation is a consistent problem, as evidenced by concerns about competing stories of the presence or lack of video evidence and whether or not a case that has been open for less than two months had been labeled a “cold case” by the Department. Through discussions, we learned that WPD provides victim services for cases prior to an arrest being made and the State Prosecutor’s Office provides victim services for cases after an arrest has been made. We also received input that the Department’s victim services professionals do a good job serving victims, but not all of the calls come directly to them. When they do, the professionals cannot always get the details they need from the Department.

It is imperative that crime victims are given priority response by the investigating agency, both at the crime scene and during the investigative and adjudication process. Providing the services and supports needed, either directly or through partner organizations in the community, is important for humanitarian reasons but also impacts the community’s perception of the police (as can be seen from the comments and input from the community) and can have a direct impact on the solvability of the case. According to the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), “responding effectively and appropriately to all victims is not only the right thing to do for victims, their families and communities, but it is also in law enforcement’s best interest. It contributes to:

- **Increased Case Clearance Rates.** Victims who are treated with sensitivity and respect are more likely to participate in the investigation of crimes and are more willing to report future crimes. This support can increase the likelihood that offenders are arrested and successfully prosecuted.

- **Decrease in Crime.** When victims are treated with empathy and respect, they are more receptive to receiving crime prevention tips that may minimize their potential risk of re-victimization.

- **Improved Efficiency.** One component of providing an enhanced response to victims is establishing more effective collaboration between law enforcement and victim service providers and advocates. These partnerships can increase victims’ access to support and compensation, thereby freeing officers to focus on investigating crimes.
• **Heightened Job Satisfaction.** By building relationships with the community, a law enforcement agency can improve its reputation with stakeholders, thus heightening job satisfaction.”

In addition to ensuring that its own resources are available to crime victims and their families, the Wilmington Police Department should strengthen partnerships with community organizations that can provide supplemental services to victims that may not be readily available through the City.

**Recommendation(s):**

*The following recommendations are made in appreciation of the Brooks and Sellers Families and all other crime victims in Wilmington:*

The Wilmington Police Department should conduct an assessment of its victim services strategies, to include investigations, to ensure that there are no barriers to communications with victims and family members and that proper protocols for prioritizing such communications are in place and followed.

The Wilmington Police Department should conduct an assessment of victim/witness risk assessments to ensure the existing process considers each case comprehensively.

Establish a protocol (SOP) requiring phone calls from victims and/or family members be returned within 24 hours by a victim services professional or investigator, if requested.

Establish a protocol (SOP) requiring phone calls from survivors of homicide victims be returned immediately by a victim services professional or investigator.

The Wilmington Police Department’s victim services professionals should be available to respond to crime scenes as necessary and leverage the assistance of community victim services organizations as needed.

The Wilmington Police Department should request and receive training and technical assistance from DOJ’s Office for Victims of Crime through the Violence Reduction Network (VRN), which can provide assistance in improving response to crime victims.

**Best Practice(s):**

**Cleveland, Ohio Violent Loss Response Team (VLRT)**

According to its website, the FrontLine Service organization operates the Violent Loss Response Team in partnership with the Cleveland Police Department. VLRT seeks to provide comprehensive, practical, as well as emotional, supportive services to family members of homicide victims. It is recognized that these family members are in severe crisis from the moment they are notified of their loved one’s death and therefore immediate intervention and assistance is warranted. The nature of the families’ crisis often leaves them feeling overwhelmed and at times immobilized. VLRT provides compassionate care, practical planning and service coordination coupled with clinical intervention related to trauma and loss.
Boston Police Department Victim-Witness Resource Officers
(http://bpdnews.com/homicide-unit/)

According to the website, the Victim-Witness Service component of the Boston PD Homicide Unit advocates for loved ones of victims during the stages of grief and recovery. The purpose of Victim-Witness Resource Officers is to maintain positive communication between detectives and these survivors through meetings, forums, initiatives, and other community events. Advocates work with investigators to help grieving families by connecting families to funeral and burial resources and making referrals to public and non-profit counseling and trauma services.
Finding: The City should be consistent in implementing, with fidelity, proven community-based violence reduction strategies.

Our review found that Wilmington has a history of seeking out proven models of community-based violence prevention and failing to follow through on effective implementation. Examples include those cited by the community and by public safety and criminal justice agencies, such as Boston’s Ceasefire (called Operation Night Light in Wilmington) implemented in the mid-’90s; the Drug Market Intervention Model; and more recently Cure Violence, a public-health based approach demonstrated to reduce violence in other cities, when the model is implemented with fidelity (as intended). Other models exist in the community that should also be explored for greater support, such as Operation Peacekeeper and the Community Development-Community Policing (CD-CP) approach that Chief Cummings has indicated is currently being implemented by the Department.

A specific example is Cease Violence (known nationally as Cure Violence), a model being implemented by the City’s Department of Parks and Recreation. According to the Mayor’s Office, the program was never intended to remain at Parks and Recreation, but resides there currently and has for several months. We contacted the national Cure Violence office at the University of Illinois at Chicago to seek their input on Wilmington’s implementation of the model, in light of the fact that so much of what we hear is related to retaliatory violence, which the Cure Violence model is exceptionally good at interrupting. We wanted to know why it was not having a greater impact here. We examined the Wilmington Cease Violence program’s Facebook page, met with program staff, discussed the program with the University of Delaware and reviewed news coverage of the program. It appears to us, based on this review, that the program has hired strong candidates as “interrupters” but the program is not sufficiently supported in terms of intervention operations. These efforts require intensive management and oversight of the problem-solving process and the ability to leverage resources from other agencies in the City. This requires strong and committed leadership to violence reduction. In light of this, we believe that the Parks and Recreation Department is not the best-suited organization to support this intervention in the City.

Recommendations:

The City should move the Cease Violence model administration to an agency within the City with a mission that is directly aligned with public safety and is capable of leveraging criminal justice, economic and social resources.

Cease Violence program administration should be strengthened to support the violence interruption process, including daily staffing meetings and 24/7 support for interrupters who may need to engage other agency resources to prevent violence. Although intensive in time and focus, this is essential in order to prevent violence that will not wait until the next business day.

The City should engage with the University of Illinois Cure Violence Program staff. The staff has agreed to come to Wilmington for a sustained period of intensive technical support to ensure the program is operating as intended.
USING DATA TO GUIDE STRATEGY & SOLVE PROBLEMS BY ENGAGING THE COMMUNITY

Finding: The WPD Targeted Analytical Policing Systems (T.A.P.S.) meetings should be more focused on ensuring effective sharing, coordination, and accountability in crime reduction efforts.

The WPD utilizes T.A.P.S. meetings as part of its efforts in understanding and addressing crime conditions. We were able to attend several of these meetings and observed that the Department is beginning to use Crime View and other technology in its mapping and crime analytics. While there were limited times when the meetings were used as an opportunity for questions and holding commanders accountable, the meetings were largely used to provide information concerning recent shootings or crimes, as opposed to discussing response strategies and ensuring accountability for reducing crime and preventing further instances.

To ensure greater accountability and constant focus on violence reduction, the WPD should adopt a CompStat management approach into its T.A.P.S. meetings. The CompStat management approach seeks to utilize real-time crime analytics to help ensure effective tactics and strategies are being used to address crime. Commanders, detectives, narcotics, and other supervisors give joint presentations during which they are expected to exhibit a comprehensive understanding of crime conditions within their area of responsibility. They are required to present the plans they have implement; discuss the tactics being used and how those tactics have been successful or are being revised; and exhibit seamless coordination with their partners in other units in their knowledge and anti-crime efforts. The Department’s executive staff then ask probing questions, offer thoughts on existing efforts, make recommendations, and demand accountability for follow through.

CompStat helps ensure the collection and analysis of accurate and timely intelligence; prompt implementation of effective strategies and tactics; the breaking down of bureaucratic silos; the constant sharing of information; and relentless follow-up. There are numerous police departments on the east coast that have adopted CompStat into their management system. Members of the WPD’s ranking staff may wish to visit several of them to glean the best elements from each. CompStat meetings are also effective for coordinating among law enforcement agencies.

Recommendations:

The WPD should create a T.A.P.S./CompStat meeting as part of its management system.

WPD executives may wish to visit several other departments using such a model to ensure best current practices are included in development of T.A.P.S./CompStat.
Monthly T.A.P.S./CompStat meetings should be held in partnership with the New Castle County Police Department to address emerging issues, trends and patterns, that cross geographic boundaries and to establish a joint plan to address the issues.
Finding: WPD should establish a true crime analysis function and make use of crime analysis.

Crime analysis in the Wilmington Police Department for purposes of informing Department strategy and patrol resource allocation is generally limited to standard statistical analysis of incidents/arrests, computer-aided dispatch counts, comparison of the number of crimes committed over a certain time period and basic visualization processes. Other analysis is developed in support of investigations and intelligence functions. The hardware and software infrastructure does not allow the staff to make use of more sophisticated tools, such as geospatial analytic tools that can handle large volumes of computer aided dispatch and Law Enforcement Investigative Support System (LEISS) data to inform patrol operations. While implementing MapView is a positive step, the system provides limited capabilities compared to what an analyst would need.

Our crime analysis report clearly identifies that crime and disorder problems are concentrated in five areas at certain times and that the criminogenic nature of these areas differ in types of crime and problems, which permits a very focused and tailored response by not only the Police Department, but other agencies in the community as well. To adequately support hot spots-based deployments relying on problem-oriented policing approaches, analysts would need to consistently and proactively analyze crime patterns involving offenders, places, and the circumstances that bring them together in order to best guide deployment and enforcement and prevention strategies.

The nature and scope of public safety responsibilities that the Wilmington Police Department carries today is substantially beyond the level of analysis currently being conducted. The level of leadership and management support and consumption of crime analysis by the same is also inconsistent with the level needed. Unfortunately, the Department does not currently have the information technology infrastructure (hardware & software) or the crime analysis capacity (expertise & staffing) to move its crime analysis capability substantially forward as needed to ensure public safety and efficient and best use of resources. A proposal is currently pending with U.S. DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) that would provide resources to enhance the technology capacity of the Police Department and add an additional crime analyst, if funded.

VRI’s findings describe how the Department’s policing strategies and resource allocation is undermined by a lack of such analysis and the report in the appendix titled Analysis of Crime and CAD Data 2010-2014, prepared by Temple University at the request of the Police Foundation, is illustrative of the crime analysis needed in Wilmington on a regular basis.

Recommendation(s):

Weekly crime analysis outputs should include social network analysis as well as hot spots analysis and other techniques to identify chronic, high-rate offenders and the networks they operate within, in order to prioritize patrol and investigative efforts.

A partnership with a criminologist or academic institution with experience in supporting the practical analysis of crime, offender and place-based policing, and developing crime
reduction strategies should be developed to permit the regular infusion of such experience and learning while the crime analysis capacity of the Department is being enhanced.

Crime analysis should be conducted in ways that permit it to be used in informing prevention activities and strategies, guiding mid-level operational decisions, and conducting analysis and benchmarking of the Department’s progress and outcomes at preventing and reducing crime.

Mid-level management and senior leaders should receive training in data interpretation and its use in the development and implementation (leading) crime reduction strategies.

Best Practice(s):

Embedded criminologists or criminologist partnerships such as those that exist in Philadelphia and formerly in Boston and Redlands, CA.
Finding: WPD lacks focused crime analytics that provide real time crime analysis and intelligence that can be used to make rapid, data-driven changes to deployment or tactics.

Interviews with supervisors and officers throughout the ranks revealed that there is a current lack of analytics available to them that would allow for pinpoint focus in deployment and adaption of tactics or interventions. For example, the following questions could not be answered:

- What hour of the day are the most shootings?
- What locations have had multiple shootings?
- What are the age breakdowns of people shot?
- And how many people and who are the people who have been shot more than once in the last 5 years?

While numerous members of the WPD had insights regarding these kinds of questions, their knowledge is based on their experience and is not data driven.

Through its own technology and other governmental resources, WPD has access to several high-quality databases and analytical programs that can support basic to intermediate analysis. These include:

- COGNOS
- Crime View
- CAD’s system

COGNOS and Crime View are analytical software programs with mapping ability that identify crime locations, trends and patterns. They can be used to link crimes, determine offender characteristics, and study victimization.

Computer Assisted Dispatch (CAD) system is used to assign police vehicles to calls for service. It records extensive information including the type of call (e.g., disorderly group, burglary etc.); the time officers are sent to those calls and their disposition (e.g., unfounded, arrest, etc.). The software allows for extensive analysis including identifying repeated unnecessary calls for service and locations most prone to violence.

In addition to these systems, the WPD has access to other sources of intelligence through its partnerships with other federal, state and local agencies. Among the many qualities of these software programs are the abilities to streamline paperwork; identify hotspot areas, including by hour and day of week; identify trends and patterns; identify possible suspects; determine likelihood of recidivism, and assist in evaluate effectiveness of deployments. Overall, they provide the technology required to answer the type of questions that should be answered to allow for effective analysis and deployment decisions. As its ability to take advantage of the systems it currently possesses increases, WPD should be able to use more sophisticated analytics such social network analysis, space and time analysis, and other new means of solving and preventing crime.

There is one crime analyst and one intelligence analyst working in separate units that systematically work with these databases. They will be discussed in a section to follow, but the
Immediate challenge that should be addressed is that most supervisors do not have access to or know how to effectively utilize the existing quality systems to gain useful crime analysis data. They are not able to perform basic queries that would assist them in viewing crime maps, for example.

**Recommendation:**

The WPD should complete the comprehensive training of all supervisors in the use of the existing analytical software programs within 60 days.

WPD supervisors should have to exhibit proficiency with these systems to ensure they are able to use them in their daily performance.

After completion of supervisor training, the WPD should train all officers in Crime View and other crime analysis software they already possess. Due to the complexity of some of the topics, the training should involve multiple sessions.
Finding: Crime analysis is not consistently shared with patrol officers, including community policing officers.

Visual display of crime information is critical for officer safety and departmental effectiveness. Packages of information concerning crime analytics are provided by the Department’s crime analyst for distribution at T.A.P.S. meetings and maps with crime information are presented at those meetings, but there appears to be limited distribution of important information beyond those meetings. There is some distribution of information through e-mail, which we are told in many cases remain unopened.

The most distinct example of where this information should be placed is in the roll call room where officers begin their tour. Currently there are not maps posted displaying the locations and times of recent shootings, robberies, burglaries, etc., nor information on patterns and trends. Also absent are photographs of the most wanted individuals, individuals known to carry guns, parolees or others who officers should be able to identify. Currently supervisors at roll calls give limited briefings concerning crime, which may in part result from their own limited understanding of conditions.

WPD personnel also indicate that the type of information discussed above is not currently provided to officers on patrol via the police car’s Mobile Digital Terminals (MDT) but the capacity to do so does exist. The Department could continue to use e-mail to provide certain crime information, but tracking technology needs to be used to ensure the e-mails are being opened. We are told that the New Castle County Police Department utilizes a portal system to expedite the exchange of internal information and finds it effective. Beyond internal communication, the crime analysis needs to be more systematically shared with area police departments, and other law enforcement partners.

Recommendation

The WPD should immediately create a crime information board in the roll call room for the posting of important data. Among the items on the board should be:

- Maps with crime locations broken down by hour and day;
- Information on current hotspots, trends or patterns;
- Photographs of 25 most wanted individuals;
- Photographs of known offenders (burglary, robbery, etc.);
- Photographs of individuals know to carry a gun;
- Photographs of individuals on parole/probations;
- Safety warning for officers concerning any threats

The Information Board should be updated weekly or sooner if patterns change or additional information needs to be immediately provided.

The Information Board should initially be created using display boards or cases to expedite its creation, but should over time move into largely electronic format.
WPD should ensure that supervisors who turn out platoons of officers are thoroughly aware of the most current crime information and trends and provide thorough briefings concerning them to the officers.

WPD should also create brief packages of intelligence information including crime maps and photographs of wanted individuals that would be sent to officers via their MDTs.

WPD should utilize a receipt system to allow tracking of Department emails to ensure all personnel are reviewing their content.

The WPD should examine the portal system utilized by the New Castle County Police Department for internal information exchange to determine if it is appropriate for use by the WPD.

The information provided to officers should also be provided electronically to the State Police, New Castle County Police Department and other partner law enforcement agencies.
Finding: The WPD’s crime and intelligence analysis capabilities are, at present, extremely limited.

The WPD relies on one civilian crime analyst. He performs a variety of functions, maintaining information both through computer analysis and manual record keeping. The analyst makes weekly presentations regarding recent crime at the Department’s T.A.P.S. meeting. The level of analysis presented is limited, but the crime analyst attended additional training this month and is working to increase the analysis being performed. There are a number of certifications, trainings and professional organizations available to increase the capacity of the crime analyst function.

A second resource in the Department is one detective assigned to intelligence analysis who divides his time between WPD headquarters and the Attorney General’s office, where he works with a part-time civilian analyst from the State. He engages in analytics to identify violent individuals, and those in crews and gangs who may be involved in illegal activities. His analysis is highly sought after by those involved in investigations. He also provides e-mails throughout the WPD providing safety warning including photographs of select suspects or potential violent individuals.

To improve on this approach, and create a department focused on intelligence-led policing, the WPD should establish a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) that would provide instant information to WPD personnel regarding emerging crime trends and patterns, victimization, recidivism, release of offenders, and other critical information for crime reduction. The unit should also map arrests, calls for service, narcotics locations, and quality of life enforcement to ensure enforcement is occurring in the violence prone areas. The RTCC should be a proactive intelligence-based unit that provides information to be immediately acted upon. The newly created Chief Information Officer recommended elsewhere in this document should be integrally involved in the creation of this center. A fully functional RTCC led by a CIO as described below would take time to assemble, but an embryonic unit could be put together almost immediately.

The RTCC would be comprised of a Crime Analytics Section and an Investigations Section. The Crime Analytics Section would provide mapping, data analysis, hotspot identification, and linkage analysis. The Investigations Section of the RTCC would provide immediate support to detectives in solving cases through the use of law enforcement and public databases. The Investigation Section would also work to identify gang and crew members engaged in criminal activity and provide actionable intelligence to enforcement personnel. The RTCC should be situated organizationally under the proposed Deputy Chief of Operations and be fully responsive to the needs of both the Uniformed Operations and Investigative Operations.

The recommended staffing of the RTCC includes one existing investigative detective, one existing civilian crime analyst, one existing technology analyst and one new Intelligence analyst, who will also coordinate with the Delaware Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC). The City of Wilmington has already applied for funding for a similar position. In addition, DIAC may have assets to contribute, as the New Jersey Regional Operations and Intelligence Center does in Newark and Camden. The RTCC members should be cross trained to perform each other’s functions. The identified individuals already existing within the WPD are fulfilling some of the required functions and could be trained in the other areas with the assistance of the Delaware
Information and Analysis Center (DIAC) and other local analysis centers. As the RTCC develops, consideration should be given to placing an analyst in the DIAC for further training.

The RTCC personnel should coordinate regularly in the exchange of information with their counterparts in the New Castle County Police, the Delaware State Police, and the Federal law enforcement partners.

The RTCC should work to link the viewing capabilities of Downtown Visions to the RTCC and expand them beyond the one screen currently available for viewing within the Communications Center.

**Recommendations:**

The WPD should establish a Real Time Crime Center (RTCC) for the comprehensive analysis and dissemination of information.

The RTCC should be comprised of a Crime Analytics Section and an Investigations Section.

The WPD staff of the RTCC should include one existing Investigative Detective, one existing civilian Crime Analyst, one existing Technology Analyst and one new Intelligence Analyst.

The RTCC should coordinate the exchange of information with other law enforcement agencies.

The RTCC should work to link the viewing capabilities of Downtown Visions and other camera systems to the RTCC.
LEVERAGING AVAILABLE RESOURCES

Finding: The WPD should return personnel to joint federal task forces and engage in greater coordination to ensure its members are assigned to Wilmington cases.

The WPD until recently participated in a number of joint Federal Task Forces, including with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), the U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF). Two members of the ATF are currently assigned to the WPD Homicide Squad. When Operation Disrupt was begun by the WPD in February of this year, police department personnel were removed from these task forces and assigned to patrol duty. While Operation Disrupt is reducing violence, it is not a sustainable strategy in current form. In the deployment section of this document we make recommendations concerning assignment of officers to platoons and for the creation of a Community Stabilization Team to perform a function similar to Operation Disrupt.

We have heard complaints from within the WPD that officers assigned to joint task forces do not regularly work on cases affecting Wilmington. WPD personnel should be returned to these task forces and the Chief of the WPD should meet quarterly with his federal counterparts to review existing cases, define needs, and ensure his officers are specifically working on cases that will assist Wilmington in reducing violence.

In maximizing the resources of federal law enforcement, we recommend that the WPD request the assistance of the U.S. Marshals Service in establishing a Wilmington dedicated Task Force. The WPD should provide space as needed to allow the Task Force to function directly out of WPD headquarters.

Recommendations:

The WPD should reassign officers to joint federal/WPD task forces.

The Chief of the WPD should coordinate with federal counterparts to ensure officers’ efforts are focused on Wilmington cases that will assist in reducing violence.

The WPD should request the creation of a U.S. Marshals Service Task Force dedicated exclusively to Wilmington.
Finding: Wilmington’s security cameras appear underutilized and undersupported

(Note: A more detailed summary regarding the use of video cameras may be found in the appendix of this document.)

Wilmington’s CCTV or camera system is operated by Downtown Visions, the non-profit organization that runs Wilmington’s Business Improvement District and its for-profit sister organization, Clean & Safe Services. According to Downtown Visions, a total of 95 cameras located throughout the city are monitored, 25 that are owned and supported2 by the Business Improvement District and 70 owned and supported by the City. We found little evidence to support the claims that the cameras don’t work. In fact, Downtown Visions allowed us to review its status reports in two different weeks. These reports are completed multiple times each week to assess camera functioning. According to those records, at least 92% of the cameras in the system were functioning.

We did, however, find many reasons to suggest that the system is not properly supported or used. As one organization noted, the cameras are largely unused and this became evident during our review. For example, not all of the cameras are monitored daily and the City’s 70 cameras are monitored by one staff person per 8-hour shift, a ratio that is likely insufficient without technological support. We also heard feedback that investigators may not make best use of available video to solve crimes. Last, we learned that an effort is currently underway and being led by Attorney General Matt Denn and the State Department of Safety and Homeland Security (DSHS) to assess and strengthen the Wilmington CCTV system, including the consideration of adding additional cameras into the City. Because this effort appears to be a thoughtful and strategic approach consistent with our recommendations, we recommend support of the initiative. A full explanation of our findings can be found in the appendix.

Recommendation(s):

These recommendations are made in appreciation of the Goins family and all crime victims in the City of Wilmington.

The Wilmington Police Department should develop a protocol that describes how the CCTV system will be used within the agency, setting expectations and standards for interaction with Downtown Visions, and requiring consultation with Downtown Visions regarding investigations.

The City should increase funding to Downtown Visions to add two additional staff and requiring that the City’s 70 neighborhood cameras be monitored seven days per week and at least 16 hours each day.

The Wilmington Police Department should place a “light-duty” officer within the Downtown Visions camera control room to serve as the liaison between Downtown Visions and the Department’s Dispatch Center while cameras are monitored.

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2 An outside consultant’s report from February 2015 provided to us by the Attorney General’s office suggests that Downtown Visions owned and managed 32 of these cameras and the City owned and managed 63. We were not able to reconcile the different understandings conclusively.
Consider broader transparency including potential crowdsourced video monitoring with partner organizations or potentially more broadly, and providing open data to allow anyone to map the locations of the cameras for crime deterrence purposes.

Enhance transparency to address the community’s belief that the cameras don’t work, sharing data publicly about the number of cameras not working on a weekly basis.

Data should be maintained within the CAD system to track calls or referrals from Downtown Visions to the Wilmington Police Department regarding incidents. This data should be reviewed monthly by the Police Department leadership in consultation with Downtown Visions leadership and frequently shared with City Council and the community to ensure referrals are acted on appropriately.

Before adding new cameras, conduct an analysis of the camera system to examine factors such as camera placement, hotspot coverage, camera monitoring, control room set up/operations, use of the video, and technical capabilities before adding new cameras.

Best Practice:

City of Baltimore Citiwatch Services (Mayor’s Office of Information Technology)
Finding: The WPD engages in extensive warrant enforcement but needs coordinate and sharpen its focus on violent offenders.

An important aspect of enforcement efforts to address violence and hotspot areas is the arrest of individuals wanted on warrants. Last year, the WPD apprehended over 2,000 individuals on warrants. When we asked how this was achieved, we were told that it largely relied on officers’ individual initiative. When we inquired about team-led enforcement that prioritized and served warrants, we were also told this was not regularly done.

As of March 10, 2014, there were 141 WPD felony warrants in DELJIS and another 36 felony warrants out of the Superior Court for Wilmington. There are also 354 misdemeanor warrants from Wilmington in DELJIS, a Delaware State tracking program. Other documents we reviewed indicate larger numbers of various warrants.

We believe lieutenants should coordinate the prioritization of warrants and ensure patrol sergeants lead weekly operations to serve felony and other serious warrants. Supervisors should ensure that warrant checks are conducted whenever an individual is stopped for investigation or summons. WPD should analyze the misdemeanor warrant cases using the criminal history background of the offender to ascertain if their past criminal history would indicate a propensity for violence even though the charge they are wanted for is not a crime of violence. Those with a violent history should receive priority for investigation and warrant execution. A list with photographs of the 25 most violent offenders should be created and updated monthly. A prior existing program that freed officers for additional patrol duties by allowing them to surrender individuals arrested on warrants to the booking officer for processing should be reinstated.

Recommendation:

The Department should continue its warrant enforcement efforts, but engage in greater focus through prioritization of warrants concerning the most violent wanted individuals and those who frequent or live in hotspot locations.

Lieutenants should ensure sergeants weekly engage in team-led warrant enforcement.

The WPD should establish a list with photographs of the 25 most violent wanted offenders and focus on their apprehension.

A prior existing program that allowed officers to surrender arrestees from warrants to the booking officers for processing should be reinstated.
Finding: Leveraging technology and strategically procuring additional equipment can serve as a force-multiplier for the WPD.

WPD should conduct a comprehensive review and audit of its equipment to determine its resources. Knowledge and training on available equipment can be an advantage to assist in the reduction of violence and the promotion officer safety.

One significant deficiency that was identified was a lack of Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (ALPRS). LPRs are a proven and efficient tool to enable patrol officers to identify vehicles that are the subject of traffic or criminal related warrants. The WPD should obtain a minimum of 12 LPRs to deploy in sector cars, 4 per sector. The State of Delaware may be able to assist in the acquisition of the LPRs through highway safety or other block grants. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) provides policy and procedure information for APLRS in their publication titled: Automated License Plate Recognition Systems available on line at IACPtechnology.org.

Equipment is available through the Regional Information Sharing Program and will lend equipment to police departments. There is also money through HIDTA and the Governor’s Highway Safety program that the WPD should avail itself of.

Recommendation:

The WPD should work with the State of Delaware to obtain Automated License Plate Recognition Systems (ALPRS).
STRENGTHENING THE WPD

Finding: WPD lacks a Deputy Chief for Operations whose primary function is to ensure that enforcement operations across all sectors is intelligence-led, data-driven and appropriately staffed.

Currently the WPD is largely reactive as opposed to proactive and does not have systems in place to allow for an intelligence led-model of policing that attempts to predict and stop crime before it occurs. There is a significant amount of excellent police work that occurs within the organization, as seen in the over 4,100 arrests and over 2,000 individuals returned on warrants in 2014. There needs to be a significant increase in cooperation and intelligence sharing among the patrol and investigatory units in the department. The current 2014 clearance rate of 15% of homicides is indicative of how important the need for intelligence sharing is among divisions.

The WPD should review available data constantly to engage in predictive policing and deploy its resources based on the most current trends and patterns. Moreover, as discussed in the crime analytics section, the WPD should train and ensure that all supervisors and officers have the ability to access and understand current crime analysis data. As Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe’s analysis, which can be found in the appendix to this document, indicates a large amount of the City’s crime occurs in a few specific areas he identifies as hotspots. Based on the ongoing analysis, the WPD should take proactive steps to address conditions at hotspots before crime occurs, including addressing narcotics and quality of life conditions, enforcing curfews, serving warrants, and deploying officers on foot to their areas to stabilize area particularly after shootings or narcotics arrests.

We note the current Chief of the WPD understands the significance of this issue and is taking steps to create a more comprehensive response to violence within the City. In order to fully implement and manage a comprehensive strategy, we believe the Chief of Police should appoint a Deputy Chief Operations as second-in-command whose sole responsibility is crime and violence reduction. While some may suggest that this is the role of the Chief of Police, the large number of responsibilities of any Chief of Police limits his or her ability to bring full focus to the mission of crime reduction. The appointment of a Deputy Chief Operations would provide a strategist and police manager who could ensure the development of an intelligence-based policing model that focuses on hotspots and patterns of crime. The Deputy Chief Operations should ensure comprehensive intelligence development, sharing of information, proactive coordinated policing, follow up, and full accountability. The Deputy Chief Operations would also be responsible for development of the current Target Analytical Policing System (T.A.P.S.) into T.A.P.S./CompStat model of management accountability. This T.A.P.S./CompStat model ensures greater coordination and accountability among Supervisors and is discussed in a different section. Candidates outside the Department who possess strong management and crime analytical skills should be considered for this position.
Recommendations

Enforcement efforts should focus on hotspots and crime patterns.

The Department should appoint a Deputy Chief Operations who would serve as the Department’s chief crime strategist and be responsible for crime control initiatives throughout the Department, including developing the existing Target Analytical Policing System (T.A.P.S.) program into a T.A.P.S./CompStat accountability and management system.
Finding: Low salaries and less favorable benefits are making it more difficult for WPD to attract recruits and retain officers.

In preceding sections, we discussed our conclusion that WPD’s excessive and unplanned overtime spending has jeopardized a rational budgeting process and eliminating opportunities to fund needed increases in capacity and in other areas. This need for overtime is influenced by a number of factors, including the current deployment strategy, attrition, and hiring challenges.

WPD advises that its normal attrition rate averages 12 officers per year. However, the Department also has 51 officers eligible for retirement. The large scale loss of officers through either retirement or other attrition has the potential to have a dramatic impact on deployment and policing.

In assessing the issue of attrition, we learned that the WPD’s starting annual base salary is among the 5 lowest paying in the region. Specifically, the Department’s $42,000 starting annual base salary is approximately $7,000 less than its county neighbors and almost $12,000 less than the state’s. In addition, WPD does not offer the same benefits as several other agencies, such as take home cars. We also learned that no labor contract has been approved since 2010.

The issue of “under-compensation” can generally be extrapolated beyond entry-level recruits and patrol officers to other ranks within the Department. It also creates and exacerbates conditions favorable to lateral moves. In that regard, the WPD advised the predominant reason cited in exit interviews for leaving the Department was for better salary and benefits.

Recommendation:

The City should work with the Fraternal Order of Police in an effort to make its salary and benefits package more competitive with police departments in surrounding communities.
Finding: WPD should develop a strategic communications approach that ensure that the community and stakeholders are informed of the successes of WPD in improving public safety and engaging the community.

A consistent point made across community and business interviews was that most are unaware of the details regarding WPD strategies or what the WPD is doing to address crime and violence. When asked to describe the substance of communications from the WPD, most pointed to notices in social media and press accounts of more crime or arrests, which some noted simply reminds them that a major crime had occurred. Many in the business community noted that the perception of Wilmington’s crime and violence is often driven by what is read in the news and in social media accounts, which is not always factual and often becomes embellished as the story is told and retold through word of mouth within local companies. A review of the Department’s social media accounts shows some attempts to post positive information, however these stories are often overshadowed and inconsistent. Additionally, a review of recent media reports and WPD communications regarding requests for the public’s assistance in relation to criminal activity found that it is not easy or intuitive for the public to submit anonymous tip information to WPD investigators. In multiple stories, a web address was provided that took citizens to a webpage for a company that is apparently providing anonymous tip collection services for the WPD, potentially discouraging information sharing. Other stories only listed a phone number to call.

It is imperative that the communications role and function be seen as requiring proactive engagement with the community and communicating the work of the WPD through various channels, including in-person, the media, and electronic means such as social media. No longer can agencies rely on the news media to find good news about law enforcement and to share it effectively – positive content and messaging must be proactively and regularly created by the WPD and shared with the community, including business partners who are willing to assist in messaging the positive work of the WPD. Communicating in this way can also encourage the community to become more involved in supporting the work of the WPD to improve the community and can begin to erode the effects of street-level “stop snitching” campaigns.

Encouraging the public to provide anonymous tip information can be done very effectively with various solutions that make it easy, intuitive, and quick to anonymously provide information. In addition to providing these tools to the public, agency marketing of the resource and strong assurances of anonymity are critical. The Atlantic City, NJ Police Department more than doubled the tips they receive from 2013 to 2014 by using such a system and the Yonkers, NY Police Department experienced a 40% increase in the first two years of its use of such as system.

Recommendation(s):

Hire a non-sworn Communications Director/PIO with the training and skills needed to effectively communicate the positive efforts of the WPD and the community

Engage a law enforcement communications consultant to assist in immediately improving WPD communications with the public and media.
Best Practice:

Prince George’s County, Maryland Police Department

Boston Police Department

Yonkers, New York Police Department “Tip411 Program” -
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9zUzpbbSTo and tip411.com

Master Cpl. Anthony Harris’ Outreach Efforts as noted in delawareonline.com week of 3/23
Finding: WPD has as many as 9 officers currently assigned to administrative positions that could be fulfilled by civilians or officers in light-duty status.

To address concerns regarding the belief that an excessive number of officers might be assigned to the WPD headquarters performing administrative of other non-enforcement duties we examined the organization and asked various members of the Department about such assignments. As is common in many Departments officers are deployed to administrative tasks when they are injured or temporarily not able to perform full patrol duties. Overall we identified fewer than ten officers assigned to administrative duties and we recommend each position be reviewed to determine if the position can be civilianized.

The increased presence of lieutenants in the station that occurred when their role was changed to focus more administrative duties may have led to a perception that many officers were solely involved in administration of the department. In our recommendations in an earlier section of this report, we address the role of lieutenants and believe that tying their role more closely to patrol leadership would change this perception.

Recommendation:

The WPD should consider civilianization of a number of positions in the Department including Public Information Officer, and officers assigned to the Computerized Assisted Dispatch system, computer maintenance, asset forfeiture, grant writing, accreditation, court liaison, planning, and evidence control. We note that the assignment of these officers to patrol could in part reduce the expenditure of overtime and contribute to paying for civilian salaries.
Finding: The creation of select staff positions within the WPD would allow for greater structural alignment and increase focus on violence reduction.

WPD is commanded by a Chief of Police with two high ranking direct-reports by Inspectors, one of whom supervises Uniformed Operations and the other who supervises all Investigative Operations. A Public Information Officer and a small staff also report directly to the Chief.

In order to increase efficiency within the Department and allow for greater focus on violence reduction, we recommend the creation of the following positions.

Deputy Chief Operations

The Deputy Chief Operations would be the second in command in the WPD and would be the Department’s Chief crime strategies and be responsible for implementation of all crime and violence reduction strategies. He or she would chair the Department’s T.A.P.S./CompStat meetings and ensure coordination and accountability throughout the WPD in the area of crime reduction initiatives.

Chief Information Officer (CIO)

In our review of staffing, organizational structure, and Department needs, it is clear that among the greatest challenges to the WPD is the integration of the vast amount of technology available that could assist the Department in both its crime reduction efforts and in increasing accountability and administrative efficiency. Currently the Department has one civilian, a retired Sergeant, who is responsible for the vast majority of its technology needs and challenges. He performs a wide variety of tasks from running cable and setting up computers to making queries within the CADS and other computer systems.

Our interviews indicate that many different understandings exist regarding the quality, availability, and adequacy of technology in the WPD. Negative comments we heard include the quality of Kronos, the time management system used by the WPD. We have also been told that a civilian is assigned to input hundreds of documents by hand, including daily activity sheets of patrol officers. It is not possible to work through each of these issues in the brief time allotted for this consultation. Pending the appointment of a Chief Information Officer, we recommend immediate establishment of a working committee for technology. The committee should be comprised of sworn officers and civilians, including those with and without expertise in technology. Its members should identify all areas where technology or training regarding it can be improved, particularly in those cases where the process can be quickly implemented.

Many others throughout the Department have knowledge and skills related to specific systems. To the organizations benefit, the Chief himself has significant technological knowledge, which he shares. However, the Department lacks a Chief Information Officer whose sole focus is the identification, procurement, installation, and maintenance of the best available technology that would support the Department’s vision for crime reduction. A CIO would also have a major role in working with the Training Unit to ensure comprehensive ongoing training concerning available technology that can assist in crime reduction and investigations.
Creation of an Inspector for Support Services

In continuing our review we examined the role and organizational reporting structure to the two existing Inspector positions. We note that each of the existing Inspectors has responsibility for managing resources that do not align with his primary role. The role of the Uniformed Operations Inspector should be focused on patrol operations to reduce violence and crime. Currently the Uniformed Operations Inspector is additionally responsible for such support functions as running radio communications, the property unit, and vehicle maintenance. The Uniformed Operations Inspector supervises three Captains (who supervise patrol) and three lieutenants who oversee the special operations (e.g., emergency services unit, K-9 unit, school officers); prisoner booking; and special services (e.g., communications, evidence control, and vehicle maintenance).

The Investigative Inspector supervises four captains who oversee: Criminal Investigations; Drugs, Organized Crime and Vice; Professional Standards; and Human Resources.

We believe the Investigative Inspector’s efforts should be focused on solving past crimes and disrupting illegal drug sales and violence through investigations. Currently he is also responsible for human resources, including training, budget, and planning, and accreditation, as well as professional standards throughout the organization. A more thorough discussion of professional standards can be found elsewhere in this report.

In examining the structure, we also note that Professional Standards has two units under it that it might be required to investigate. Professional Standards also reports to one of the Inspectors who has numerous units reporting to him that at times require investigation.

Recommendations:

A Deputy Chief Operations position should be created.

A civilian Chief Information Officer position should be established within the Department. The salary should be adequate to ensure the hiring of highly skilled individuals. In recognition of the importance of technology to the reduction of crime throughout Wilmington, the Chief Information Officer should report directly to the Chief.

A Support Services Inspector should be created, who would assume responsibility for many of the functions not directly related to Patrol Operations or Criminal Investigations.

The Professional Standards Unit should report directly to the Chief of Police to avoid inherent conflicts of interest and ensure integrity issues are reported to and addressed at the highest level of the organization.

As part of moving the Profession Standards Division directly under the Chief, we would also recommend moving the Court Liaison Officer and the Extra Job Coordinator, currently under Professional Standards, to Support Services. By moving these two units, Professional Standards avoids any conflict of interest when an audit or investigation of these two subunits is required.
The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

Crime Analysis & CAD Incident Analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14)
Crime analysis and CAD incident analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14)

Prepared for the Police Foundation
March 2015
Crime analysis and CAD incident analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14)

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The information provided in this report is compiled from data provided to the analysis team by third parties at DELJIS or the Wilmington Police Department. The people named above, on behalf of the Center for Security and Crime Science, the Department of Criminal Justice, and Temple University, have made extensive efforts in this report to convey our interpretation of this received information as clearly and accurately as possible. However, neither the individuals nor the University can assume any legal responsibility for the information contained herein, which is provided "as is" with no warranties of any kind. Furthermore, the aforementioned people and entities are not responsible for any omissions or errors of information from the third parties, any errors or misinterpretation as a result of any stages of analysis, intermediate or otherwise, or any liability stemming from any community or police department strategies determined after reading this analysis. The reader acknowledges that many crime analysis techniques involve data abstraction and/or aggregation, the geocoding of incident data introduces error and imprecision, and the need for succinctness in a final product necessitates the omission of some information that might in hindsight appear relevant. Recommendations are made (as requested) but the reader should recognize that they are made without the time to develop a more detailed and nuanced understanding of the nature of each crime hotspot, and without the ability to better understand the data, the community, the city, or the police department. Given the time constraints placed on this analysis, the authors advise that recommendations are made in good faith but the authors reserve the right to change the data interpretation and recommendations if other information comes to light subsequent to report submission.

Version 2.1
March 2015
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SUMMARY OF COMMUNITY HARM IN WILMINGTON

Two data sources are used in this report, each telling a different part of the story. LEISS is the statewide repository system for recording all formal crime information, including victim and suspect data. We examine these incident data first. The second data source is the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data set retained and managed by the Wilmington Police Department (WPD). This data source is less reliable regarding crime; however, it does include information about where the WPD are called to problems related to disorder, drugs, quality of life, traffic activity, and community maintenance, and medical assistance to the public (these categories are explained later). The CAD data also show where proactive investigative work of the police department occurs. These include pedestrian field interviews and searches, and suspicious vehicle stops. For all data sources, we examine five years of each data source (2010 to 2014).

Small areas of the city account for a large proportion of all the crime and community harm. To demonstrate the contribution of specific places, the following map shows a count of five years of violent incidents in 500 foot square boxes. Highlighted in the map are all cells with more than 20 violent crimes over five years. These 36 cells comprise only 3.5% of the area of the city, yet they contain nearly 25% of the city’s violence.

**Violent crime frequency, 2010-2014**
We measure harm by weighing crime by the community harm the crime contributes. This is achieved using median sentencing guidelines as a weight so that violent predatory crime counts more to the analysis of harm than drug sales, which in turn count more than trespass and minor theft, and so on (more details in the notes at the end of this report). When every offense incident is included and weighted, the weighted hotspot map distribution is shown below.

If we narrow down the harm calculation to all incidents of a more serious nature, the map doesn’t really change that much. These incidents include all violent crimes, robberies, burglaries, drug incidents and vehicles crimes. We can also examine them at a slightly different hotspot resolution below. This shows that the specific hotspots that create so much of the community harm suffered by the people of Wilmington are highly concentrated in a few very harmful places. This map – and a zoomed map of the same harm picture – are shown next.
It is clear that although there are sporadic crime problems in different parts of the city, there are roughly five areas which dominate the crime problem for the city (proposed target areas based on these five areas are shown after the recommendations). These are relatively concise (in the maps here we have excluded events at the public safety building on Walnut Street so that we are examining only the harm suffered by the community directly).

The hotspot to the NE along Market Street is a hotspot for robbery and violence, but not for drug incidents or burglary. The central hotspot around Washington is also a violence and robbery area, but also a drug market with a lot of disorder and other drains on police resources. The hotspot to the west around Clayton and 4th Street has lower levels of violence, but does attract a lot of disorder and burglary, as well as functioning as a drug market.
Temporal patterns indicate there is little morning activity, and all these hotspots appear to (in aggregate) be active from noon onwards, with peak activities in the late afternoon and early evening hours. The following daily/hourly chart relates to violent street crime, but essentially epitomized the general pattern for the data set: concentrated crime in the late afternoon and evening, with little to differentiate days of the week. Red indicates greater crime intensity.

The five main harm hotspot areas recommended for concentrated efforts are shown after the recommendations.
**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The crime analysis suggests the following recommendations (but see title page for caveats):

1. Involved agencies to recognize that crime and disorder problems are concentrated in about five areas at certain times, and permit a concentration of effort in these areas.

2. Involved agencies recognize that the criminogenic nature of the five areas differs in types of crime and problem, and a tailored response for each will be necessary.

3. WPD concentrate patrol resources in these hot areas and hot times to achieve any short-term crime reduction benefits, and gain community and criminal intelligence to inform long-term efforts; however, WPD should also recognize these are only stop-gap measures.

4. WPD reinstate the community policing unit in these long-term crime problem areas to work on long-term crime prevention solutions that will in time free up police patrol resources.

5. Involved agencies (especially at the state and federal levels) collaborate to identify in which of the five areas their unique ability to target serious, recidivist offenders would be best to maximize the return on that investigative investment.

6. Additional crime analysis resources be made available to assist the city with more insightful analysis than is currently available within the WPD. These resources should concentrate on spatial and temporal analysis, long-term assistance to crime prevention efforts, informed mid-level decision-making, and the integration of criminal intelligence into the overall analytical effort.

7. Mid-level and senior police command training in data interpretation and the development and leadership of crime reduction strategies should be instigated so that analytical improvements are not wasted.
POTENTIAL GEOGRAPHIC TARGET AREAS

The five areas identified below are the main areas that persevere through many of the analyses shown in this report. In other words, they are not only violent crime areas, but also places with burglary, drug dealing, disorder and other community harms. Please note that the areas are identified without knowledge of the specific streets and whether these boundaries would coalesce with local neighborhood or police administrative boundaries.

Potential target areas
LEISS INCIDENT ANALYSIS

**Analysis notes**
LEISS system data were provided by DELJIS for this project. Data were provided in five yearly Excel spreadsheets for 2010 to 2014 inclusive. When appended, this resulted in 81,754 incidents; however, 12,119 cases had duplicate complaint numbers. When these were adjusted and removed as necessary, the data set reduced to 69,663 individual cases. We were unable to geocode 2,943 cases resulting in a 95.7 percent geocoding success rate. A geocoding failure rate of less than 4 percent was deemed acceptable for purposes and within the constraint of this project’s limited timeline. For more information on geocoding hit rates see Ratcliffe, J. H. (2004). Geocoding crime and a first estimate of an acceptable minimum hit rate. *International Journal of Geographical Information Science*, 18(1), 61-73.

Weekly hour-by-hour charts are shown in the data below, color coded by incident likelihood. Blue cells indicate a relatively low frequency of incidents, white indicate a moderate crime rate, and red areas indicate the greatest volume of criminal activity. Numbers in cells relate to a rounded sum indicating likelihood of the offense happening in the time period, based on an aoristic analysis. For more information on aoristic analysis see Ratcliffe, J. H. (2002). Aoristic signatures and the temporal analysis of high volume crime patterns. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 18(1), 23-43.

Three locations were excluded from the analysis, depending on the map type. For most of the maps, the location of 300 Walnut Street was excluded due to the significant number of incidents reported at the Public Safety Building. These incidents would have swamped the display and provide no indication of community crime and disorder problems. For the medical map, we excluded two locations that would have also dominated the display; the correctional institution and the hospital.

**Repeat victimization and near repeat victimization**
Repeat victimization occurs when a location or address (here defined as the same x and y coordinate) suffers a repeat of the same type of crime shortly after an initial incident. A common example is that of a residence that is the victim of a burglary within a few weeks of an initial burglary, likely caused by the same offender returning for goods not carried away first time, or with the hope that the victims have replaced sought-after items. Near repeat victimization is a phenomenon observed in many crime series, where the risk of increased victimization not only affects the site that was the source of the first crime, but also locations nearby for a short period of time.

Repeat and near repeat analysis is designed to identify the places that are at an increased risk of victimization. This can be useful to plan patrol strategies or the attendance of crime prevention personnel. In the analyses that follow, we employed the Near Repeat Calculator (full citation: Ratcliffe, JH, *Near Repeat Calculator* [version 1.3] Temple University, Philadelphia, PA and the National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC. August 2009). Note that one constraint of WPD data is a tendency for
officers to report crimes occurring in the street with a house number of xxx9. This has the result of over-estimating the repeat victimization frequency. For this reason, we exclude addresses with a house number ending in 99.

**Violent street crime**

LEISS data clearly show that violent street crime is concentrated in a couple of highly focused areas.

Space-time analysis of violent street crime indicates a clear pattern of activity in the latter part of the day, starting around noon and peaking during the evening hours. This is shown in the graph where blue cells show low offense activity for a particular day/hour combination, white indicates a moderate amount of crime, and red indicates the greatest volume of criminal activity.
Violent street crime repeat victimization

Based on analysis of more than 2,700 violent street crimes over five years in Wilmington, the risk of another offense at the same location doubles (100% increased risk) over the next 14 days. The blocks where these locations are found are in the table below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Address block</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>37</td>
<td>300 N WALNUT ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>400 E 12TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Homicides and shootings

When the homicides and shootings are isolated from the crime CAD calls, we can see particular hotspots are apparent in the City of Wilmington (see next page).
Shootings and homicides, 2010-2014

Shootings and homicides, 2010-2014 (central area)
Robbery

The violent street crime problem identified in the previous section is largely driven by robberies, as can be seen here.

The temporal pattern by hour of the day and day of the week shows the overall trend is between about midday and 11pm, with a peak in the early evening hours after schools let out and before 10pm.
Drugs

Drug arrests are more spatially distributed than violent street crime, and it is worth noting that one of the robbery/violent street crime areas from the previous analysis does not make it into the highest mapped drug incident class: Not all drug markets in Wilmington are equally violent.

The temporal pattern is however very similar to the violence and robbery analysis.
Burglary

Burglary is concentrated in the west of the city, in the area around Lancaster Avenue and W Fourth Street, and along North Franklin Street. Some of these burglaries may be related to the drug market operating in the area.

Space-time analysis of the patterns of burglary from Wilmington across three years (2012-14) shows that there is little burglary activity in the early hours of the morning (shown in blue in the following graphic), with most burglary activity occurring during the daytime and early evening. There is no particular weekend pattern.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>00-01</th>
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**Burglary repeat victimization**

Running the near-repeat calculator on 3,478 burglary incidents identified a significant repeat victimization pattern; however, it also identified a significant near-repeat pattern up to 400ft and 3 days of the initial burglary incident. The chance of another burglary in this space-time vicinity is 51% greater than if there were no near-repeat pattern. The pattern is also significant for up to 400ft and 7 days. This finding suggests that there is a value in making homeowners and renters in the same block as a new burglary aware that there is an increased risk to their home over the next week or so. Preventing this near repeat victimization could help reduce the burglary problem in the city.

Since there was a statistically significant repeat victimization pattern detected up to 14 days after the initial incident, a list of addresses that experienced more than ten burglaries between 2010 and 2014 was generated (this list excludes addresses that end in “99”). For this report only the block is shown.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Address block</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>700 W 34TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>800 W 4TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>300 S HARRISON ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>500 W 14TH ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>500 S WALNUT ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>300 N WALNUT ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>500 N KING ST, WILMINGTON, DE, 19801</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CAD DATA ANALYSIS

The maps and charts that follow show that crime and disorder calls for service are highly concentrated into a few small hotspot areas, and that the time period for these incidents is in the late afternoon and early evening. The areas immediately around the intersections at Clayton and 4th Street, and 4th Street and North Adams Street, are particularly prevalent in the CAD data. The drug incident map highlights a completely different location - Jensen Drive. This differs significantly from the drug crime map earlier in this report, and is likely explained by a couple of factors related to particular conditions in that area that are less prevalent in 2015.

Analysis notes
Wilmington CAD data for 2010 to 2014 (inclusive) were provided by the IT manager at Wilmington PD, Mr. John Martin. In total there were 528,073 records, though it was noted that 12,655 did not have an incident number assigned by the Wilmington PD system. These represented 2.40% of the data set. Removing them left 515,418 CAD incidents for analysis. Of these, 20,938 (4.06%) did not have latitude or longitude in the GRS 1980 (spheroid) geographical location format. This gives us a geocoding hit rate of approximately 96% from the records with an incident number, and 93.6% of all records.

In the analysis that follows we show maps comprising the geocoded CAD records that fall in the City of Wilmington (489,019), and present analysis of temporal charts using the full data set (515,418). Crime and call hotspots are indicated with a kernel density estimation technique applied using the ERSI ArcGIS program. For convenience, we use the default analytical parameters to generate the kernel density estimation. We generate information for calls for service related to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Example call descriptions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crime</td>
<td>Assault, burglary, homicide, robbery, shooting, shoplifting, and theft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disorder</td>
<td>Drunkenness, fights, criminal mischief, noise violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality of life</td>
<td>Prostitution, solicitation, truancy, loitering, and harassment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic</td>
<td>Accidents, DUI, moving and parking violations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drugs</td>
<td>Possession, distribution, manufacturing, and trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community maintenance</td>
<td>Fires, alarms, missing persons, recovered vehicles, and lost property.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigations</td>
<td>Suspicious persons, fugitives, suspicious vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical assistance</td>
<td>Causalities, overdoses, suicides, medical transportation requests.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Crime

The crime category consists of calls for service related to crimes, including assault, burglary, homicide, rape, robbery, shooting, shoplifting, and theft. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with a concise and substantial hotspot centered on the intersections of W 4th Street and N Adams Street.

Over the last five years, the number of crime-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing, though this decrease is masked by significant seasonality. Crime-related CAD calls can be seen to have a significant rise during the summer months.
The temporal pattern of incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to crime peak in the hours immediately around school closing.

Disorder

The disorder category consists of calls for service related to disorder, including drunkenness, fights, criminal mischief, noise violations, and persons with a weapon. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with the largest hotspot centered on the intersections of Clayton Street and 4th Street.
Over the last five years, the number of disorder-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing, though this decrease is masked by significant seasonality. Disorder-related CAD calls can be seen to have a significant rise during the summer months.

The temporal pattern of disorder incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to disorder gradually increase during the afternoon then peak between 9 PM and 11 PM.
Quality of life

The quality of life category consists of calls for service related to quality of life, including prostitution, solicitation, truancy, loitering, and harassment. There are a number of moderate hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with an acute hotspot centered on the intersection of Clayton Street and 4th Street.
Over the last five years, the number of quality of life-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing, though this decrease is masked by significant seasonality. Similar to crime and disorder CAD calls, quality of life-related CAD calls can be seen to have a significant rise during the summer months.

**Quality of life CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**

The temporal pattern of quality of life incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to quality of life gradually increase during the afternoon then peak between 6 PM and 9 PM.

**Quality of life CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014**

**Traffic**

The traffic category consists of calls for service related to traffic, including accidents, driving under the influence, traffic violations and parking violations. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with a concise hotspot centered on the intersection of Lancaster Avenue and S Jackson Street. There is also a hot line running along 4th Street between Lincoln Street and Washington Street.
Over the last five years, the number of traffic-related CAD calls has been declining. Unlike the seasonality witnessed in crime, disorder, and quality of life CAD incidents, traffic CAD calls do not follow seasonal trends.

Excluding the early morning hours, the temporal pattern of traffic incidents is spread fairly evenly throughout the day. Traffic CAD calls spike during the morning rush and peak as people are returning home from work.
Drugs

The drugs category consists of calls for service related to drugs, including possession, distribution, manufacturing, and trafficking. There are three primary hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD drug-related incidents over five years, with a concise hotspot centered on Jensen Drive. We have been told that the drug problem in this area around the Riverside housing project has been slowly declining over the last five years. The recent closing of the Mother Club of the Thunder Guards Motor Cycle Club is likely not reflected in this data so some caution in the interpretation of this map is advised. Please also note that there is a difference between this map and the drug-related crime data from the LEISS data set.
Over the last five years, the number of drug-related CAD calls has been declining, especially after mid-year 2011. Similar to other CAD calls, drug-related CAD calls increase during the summer months.

The temporal pattern of drug incidents is also determined by time of day. Looking across five years of data, we can see that the early morning hours see little activity; however, CAD incidents related to drugs peak in the hours immediately around school closing.
Community maintenance

The community maintenance category consists of calls for service related to community maintenance, including fires, alarms, missing persons, recovered vehicles, and lost property. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with the two largest hotspots centered on the intersections of N Market Street and W 7th Street and also around Washington Street and W 6th Street.

Over the last five years, the number of community maintenance-related CAD calls has been gently decreasing. There is modest seasonality, although it is not as significant as other types of CAD calls.
Community maintenance-related CAD calls can be seen to have a slight rise during the summer months, with a spike in July each year.

**Community maintenance CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014**

The temporal pattern of community maintenance incidents remains rather static throughout the day. There is a lower amount of community maintenance CAD calls in the early morning hours; however, beginning at 8 AM the number of community maintenance CAD calls remain relatively steady throughout the rest of the day.

**Community maintenance CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014**

**Investigations**

The investigations category consists of calls for service related to investigations, including suspicious persons, suspicious vehicles, and known fugitives. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen
in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with the largest hotspot centered on the intersection of Clayton Street and 4th Street.

All investigation incidents, 2010-2014

Over the last five years, the number of investigation-related CAD calls fluctuate. Beginning in 2012 and lasting through 2013, the number of investigation-related CAD calls decline; however, there is a significant increase in investigation-related CAD calls in 2014. In general, investigation-related CAD calls increase during the summer months; however, this trend is not visible in 2014. This is due to a large increase in investigation CAD calls during the winter season of 2013-2014.

Investigation CAD calls, monthly, 2010-2014
Excluding the early morning hours, the temporal pattern of investigation-related CAD calls is spread fairly evenly throughout the day. Investigation CAD calls peak during the late morning hours, then hold steady during the afternoon and evening.

**Investigation CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014**

**Medical**

The medical category consists of calls for service related to medical care, including casualties, overdoses, suicides, and medical transport cases. There are a number of hotspot areas, as can be seen in the map of CAD incidents over five years, with two hotspots located near the intersection of 4th Street and Walnut Street. Note that the map excludes the hospital and correctional institution, as these locations would otherwise dominate the display.
From January 2010 through February 2014, there was a slight decline in the number of medical-related CAD calls. Starting in March 2014 and continuing through December 2014, there has been an increase in the number of medical-related CAD calls to the police.

Similar to the other CAD call temporal patterns, there are fewer medical CAD calls in the early morning hours. However, the difference between early morning medical CAD calls and “traditional” hours are not as extreme as the other CAD call categories. Beginning at 9 AM and lasting until 11PM there is a steady number of medical-related CAD calls.
Medical CAD calls, hourly, 2010-2014
TIME PER CALL TYPE

We calculated the time spent on each call by subtracting the call creation time from the call completed time, where available from the CAD records. Because of possible outliers that might skew the data analysis (such as some calls closed immediately for administrative reasons or other calls that are not closed out for days), we examine the data using a trimmed mean. For example, a 5% trimmed mean ignores the lowest 5% and the highest 5% of calls in each category, and calculates the mean for the middle 90%.

In the tables below, we show the analysis based on data from five years (2010-2014), with a 5 percent trimmed mean. Call trimmed means over 100 minutes are rounded to down to their integer value. Calls are shown with their exact call type as shown in the CAD log.

Top ten calls by the number of calls

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call type</th>
<th>Number of calls</th>
<th>Mean time on call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TS (traffic stop)</td>
<td>73139</td>
<td>15.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dis Group</td>
<td>33357</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dis per</td>
<td>27381</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS (pedestrian stop)</td>
<td>24608</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm Burg</td>
<td>18565</td>
<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>14969</td>
<td>49.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theft</td>
<td>14671</td>
<td>94.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Med Unk</td>
<td>13059</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW (park and walk)</td>
<td>12826</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parking Violatio</td>
<td>10935</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Top ten calls by the time on the call

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call type</th>
<th>Number of calls</th>
<th>Mean time on call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homicide</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapon other</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>566</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pursuit</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CH (chase)</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death Inv</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting Arr</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabbing</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sex Offns</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
When we examine where officers spend their on-call time – based on calls from the public¹ - we can see that many of the crime hotspots identified earlier in this report are locations where officers spend a great deal of their on-call time. The map below shows all 2014 CAD calls that predominantly were initiated by the public weighted by the amount of time on the call.

¹ This therefore excludes all calls predominantly initiated by the police department ("ctype" = 'CH' OR "ctype" = 'Conf Investigation' OR "ctype" = 'Custody' OR "ctype" = 'PS' OR "ctype" = 'PW' OR "ctype" = 'Resisting Arr' OR "ctype" = 'Traffic Violation' OR "ctype" = 'TS' OR "ctype" = 'Warrant service')
### Where officers spend time on public calls for service

![Map showing where officers spend time on public calls for service.](image)

### All calls in alphabetical order

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Call type</th>
<th>Number of calls</th>
<th>Mean time on call</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>911D Cellular</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>911D Land Line</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>19.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandoned</td>
<td>2811</td>
<td>18.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abuse/Neglect</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acc Depart</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acc HR PD</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acc HR PI</td>
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<td>119</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acc PD</td>
<td>10088</td>
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<td>Acc PI</td>
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<td>Acc Unk</td>
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<td>Alarm Bank</td>
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</tr>
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<td>Alarm Burg</td>
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<td>15.3</td>
</tr>
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<td>Alarm Fire</td>
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<td>29.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm Holdup</td>
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<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alarm Panic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alarm Veh</td>
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<td>20.7</td>
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<td>Amb Assist</td>
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<td>25.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Animal</td>
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<td>Assault</td>
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<td>Assault w/ Wpn</td>
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<td>90.1</td>
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<td>Category</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
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<td>Assist DFS Emerg</td>
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<td>Asst other Agcy</td>
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<td>B of P</td>
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<td>Bomb threat</td>
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<td>102</td>
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<td>Burglary</td>
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<td>CH</td>
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<td>CPR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Carjacking</td>
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<td>Casualty</td>
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<td>Drunk</td>
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<td>Escape</td>
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<td>Explosion</td>
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<td>Found Adult</td>
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<td>Event Type</td>
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<td>Percentage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Found Auto</td>
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<tr>
<td>Found Gun</td>
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<tr>
<td>Found Juvenile</td>
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<td>Med Unk</td>
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<td>Medical transpor</td>
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<td>Missing Person</td>
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<td>Noise Violation</td>
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<td>29.4</td>
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<td>Off Touch</td>
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<td>Officer in Troub</td>
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<td>Open Hydrant</td>
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<td>36.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Open door/window</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overdose</td>
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<td>56.6</td>
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<tr>
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<td>24608</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PW</td>
<td>12826</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
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Acknowledgements

We would like to recognize and thank the following people for assistance with data provision, data explanations, and some interpretation of the resultant analysis. Any errors of data interpretation remain that of the authors (with the caveats explained in the title page).

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- Lynn Gedney, DELJIS
- Lt. William D. Crotty, DIAC, Delaware State Police
- John Martin, IT, Wilmington Police Department
- Doug Iardella, Public Safety Liaison for the City of Wilmington
- John Skinner, VPN lead for Wilmington, BJA

Harm weighting

The harm weighting was achieved by applying the median recommended sentence in months from the Offense Gravity Score, as determined by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing. Example indications of their relative offense gravity are shown in the table below. More details of how this technique is applied is available from report authors Jerry Ratcliffe and Amber Perenzin.

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Cover photo

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The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

A Review of Operational and Monetary Resources
Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission:
Review of Resources

Introduction

Delaware House Joint Resolution No. 2 authorizes the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission ("the Commission") to consider "A review of existing operational and monetary resources provided by state, county, and federal agencies, with a view toward ensuring such resources are sufficient, well-coordinated, and effective."

This report provides a review of the Wilmington Police Department’s (WPD) Budget for Fiscal Years 2013 to 2015 and resource allocation, certain funding resources (e.g. grants), and a discussion of federal, state, and county operational resources (e.g., task forces, supplemental patrols, etc.) that were able to be identified within the assessment period.

The review of monetary resources primarily focuses on existing operational/financial resources within the Department’s budget that supports police officer staffing.

The review of operational resources provided by federal, state, and county agencies is primarily focused on priority services such as supplemental patrols/enforcement and other resources that support the public safety process. As with all municipalities within the State of Delaware, Wilmington is heavily dependent on state and county services in areas such as education and social services, for example. While these services and resources are undoubtedly linked to community well being, and ultimately to safety, this review was limited to those resources that directly contribute to primary police operations.

Methodology

Interviews were conducted with the City Council, members of the City Finance Department, and WPD’s Human Resource Division. Data was also requested and obtained from the Delaware Criminal Justice Council. Documents produced as a result of these interviews and requests were reviewed and analyzed in order to complete this analysis. The assessment of operational resources contributed by federal, state, and county agencies was conducted through interviews with dozens of members of WPD, other city, county, and state agencies and with selected federal officials and agencies. Additional information was gleaned from Vigilant Resources Inc.’s (VRI’s) in-depth interviews with WPD officers and officials and from materials associated with the Bureau of Justice Assistance Violence Reduction Network initiative (VRN)1.

1The VRN, funded by the Department of Justice, is a national comprehensive approach to reduce violent crime in communities. VRN provides intensive training and technical assistance for anti-violence strategies to combat violent crime.
Limitations
The most significant limitation encountered in this analysis was time. In order to assess resource gaps, key resource and/or operational needs need to be identified first, allowing the team to then assess whether resources are available. Due to the limited time to complete the assessment (approximately 50 calendar days), we were able to identify only the most obvious resource and operational needs, such as staffing, technology, and crime analysis, but were not able to perform the depth of analysis preferred, in order to identify where the resources to address these needs could or should come from. Similarly, while we obtained a list of current grants from the WPD and learned about federal and state contributions to the City’s efforts through interviews, document reviews, and news article reviews, it is much more time consuming; and therefore difficult, in a short period of time, to identify possible funding sources and operational assistance that the WPD could leverage but may not be taking advantage of. Despite these limitations, we believe the analysis provided will be useful in assessing resource challenges and opportunities at a high level.

Personnel Budget
The WPD’s actual budget for the years 2013 to 2015 on average, comprises 37.8% of the City’s total budget. The Department has an authorized strength of 320 sworn (289 actual sworn) and 62 non-sworn positions. Table 1 presents the City and WPD budget for fiscal years 2013 to 2015. The Department’s overall $56.6 million Fiscal 2014 budget reflected a $2.5 million, or 4.6 percent increase when compared to its Fiscal 2013 total budget. However, the planned Fiscal 2015 WPD budget allocation of $54.2 million represents a 4.3 percent decrease as compared to the Fiscal 2014 amount, leaving the Fiscal 2015 budget at essentially the same level as it was in Fiscal 2013 and reducing the Department’s budget as a percent of the City’s overall budget by 3% from what it was in Fiscal 2014. However, as overtime funding is added to the WPD’s budget during the course of Fiscal 2015, it is possible that actual Fiscal 2015 spending will, by the conclusion of the fiscal year, increase these figures as it likely has in prior years as well. Thus, the figures below are starting point budgets and do not represent actual spending by the conclusion of the fiscal year.

In summary, according to the information we received, and not considering overtime funding that may have been or may be provided during the year, the WPD’s budget was reduced in Fiscal 2015, while the City’s overall budget increased. The Fiscal 2013 to 2015 budgets support an authorized strength of 382 full-time equivalent staff personnel.

2Source: General Ledger Reports-111 Report Provided by City Council Staff (via email 3/25/15)
Table 1. Wilmington City and Police Department Budget FY2013-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY2013 (Actual)</th>
<th>FY2014 (Actual)</th>
<th>FY 2015 (Approved budget)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>City Budget</td>
<td>$144,003,729.00</td>
<td>$146,026,679.00</td>
<td>$150,039,645.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPD Budget</td>
<td>$54,146,646.00</td>
<td>$56,657,818.00</td>
<td>$54,220,953.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPD Budget % of City</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Budget figures represent actual budgets and do not factor in any budget amendments made during the course of the year.

Using the Benchmark City Survey for 2013 (administered by the Overland Park, Kansas Police Department\(^3\)), the average police department budget represented 29% of the City Budget for the 30 agencies across the U.S. participating in the benchmarking survey. This provides somewhat useful point of comparison for the City of Wilmington’s expenditures on police services.

**Police Overtime**

Among the most critical issues related to the staffing budget in the WPD are the officer attrition and vacancy rates, and their subsequent impact on the Department’s overtime budget.

Vacancy rates and attrition have had an adverse impact on the WPD and its deployment of resources. With an attrition rate of almost 1 officer per month\(^4\), the WPD is not able to maintain their authorized strength numbers. Also impacting staffing at the WPD the lack of a general Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) for city employees and operating without a renewed labor contract since 2010. Understaffing (i.e., operating below the authorized level as a result of lagged hiring) is a persistent problem for the Department, which is made worse by attrition. Vacancies, attrition and other internal issues likely encourage officers to look elsewhere for employment, in addition to economic issues, i.e., officers choosing to separate from the department (either prior to or at retirement eligibility) to seek more lucrative job opportunities.

The Police Foundation (with support from the Delaware Criminal Justice Council) was able to collect data from regional law enforcement agencies to better understand hiring and compensation in the immediate Wilmington regions. We

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4 According to WPD personnel
examined salary scales from neighboring departments that would potentially attract WPD officers interested in lateral opportunities and within a reasonable commuting distance from the City of Wilmington (generally considered 30 miles). Our examination yielded that the WPD starting salary is $42,000, ranking in the top five of lowest paying agencies among regional competitors and below the starting salaries of 12 other agencies contacted, including New Castle County and the Delaware State Police. In addition, both of the latter agencies offer the benefit of take home cars, whereas WPD does not. (See: “Attachment: Agencies in the Region – Quick Facts”). The issue of ‘under compensation’ can generally be extrapolated beyond entry-level recruits and patrol officers to other ranks within the Department, creating and exacerbating conditions favorable to lateral moves, as well as having a significant negative impact on recruiting new officers to the WPD.

In light of the vacancy rates and the WPD’s projected attrition, the Fiscal 2015 budget includes funding for a WPD academy class of 30 recruits at a reported cost of $325,000 to support the goal of reaching the WPD authorized strength level of 320.

The current police strength of 289 officers, coupled with other factors such as paid time off (e.g., sick, annual leave), deployment approach and other factors has forced the Department to use overtime in order to maintain staffing levels across tours and to conduct any “surge” type efforts, such as Operation Disrupt. When paid overtime, officers receive 1.5 times their normal pay, plus an 11 percent shift differential for overtime. These overtime assignments are primarily funded from the General Fund of the police budget, although our analysis revealed that a substantial amount of overtime is also paid from federal and state grants. It is unclear to us if the grant-funded overtime is included in the City’s figures on overtime spending, but we suspect it is not including and therefore overtime spending is substantially higher than the City’s figures reflect.

Based on our review of the Fiscal 2013 to 2015 budgets, WPD seems to consistently underestimate its annual overtime budget needs. The approved overtime allocations have increased in the last three years. Table 2 shows the difference between actual overtime spending and the approved overtime budget between FY 2013 and FY 2015.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>FY 2013</th>
<th>FY 2014</th>
<th>FY 2015 (To Date)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approved OT Budget</strong></td>
<td>$1,639,800</td>
<td>$1,657,200</td>
<td>$1,876,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Actual OT Cost</strong></td>
<td>$2,086,390</td>
<td>$2,910,054</td>
<td>$2,629,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Dollar Increase</strong></td>
<td>$446,590</td>
<td>$1,252,854</td>
<td>$753,017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent Change (+/-)</strong></td>
<td>+27.2</td>
<td>+75.6</td>
<td>+40.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Overtime figures above does not reflect Special Events OT and Court OT; FY 2015 Actual as of 3/24/15.
Actual overtime totaled $2.9 million in Fiscal 2014 and, as of March 25, 2015, the actual amount of overtime has reached $2.6 million at a little over the halfway mark of the fiscal year. The significant increase in the Fiscal 2015 actual overtime expenditures are attributed to "Operation Disrupt", a three-phased public safety initiative targeting the recent violence in the City of Wilmington and was announced by the Mayor on January 26, 2015. This initiative includes a partnership with the WPD, New Castle County Police Department, and other law enforcement agencies that are focusing on gun violence and other major crimes.

To provide a better interpretation of the impact of the costs of overtime, we examined the FY 2015 costs (approved and actual) of overtime to determine how many additional officers could be added to increase the sworn strength of the Department if those costs were converted to represent new hires. Using a starting salary of $65,000 (including benefits) for a patrol officer, the conversion of the approved FY 2015 overtime budget would result in the hiring of 28 new patrol officers to the WPD. Even more striking, the conversion of actual overtime costs in FY 2015 (as of 3/25/2015) would result in an additional 40 new patrol officers. The conversion could also compensate for many of the recommendations provided to the Commission or building a state of the art crime analysis capability, improved victim services, or investments in community services.

Findings and Recommendations
In general, overtime, within limits, is an unavoidable cost of policing. As such, overtime costs cannot be eliminated altogether, regardless of the number of officers that are employed, because of shift extensions, court appearances, special and unpredicted events, meetings/trainings, and contract requirements. However, concerns about overtime usage should be addressed with managerial efforts focusing on controlling overtime. The National Institute of Justice published a Research in Brief in 1998 called "Police Overtime: An Examination of Key Issues." While written more than 15 years ago, the Report's discussion of management's role in overseeing overtime is still quite relevant and worthy of examination by WPD leadership and managers.

The Department's history of using overtime in order to maintain minimum patrol staffing levels indicates significant deployment or staffing issues, as well as lack of overtime monitoring by supervisors. In Fiscal 2014, the WPD's overtime costs were approximately 5.1% of the WPD's personnel budget. Referring again to the Benchmark City Survey for 2013, the average overtime cost of the 30 agencies who responded, overtime represents 3.5% of their Departmental personnel budgets. Our analysis of overtime expenditures indicates that over a 2-year period (FY 2013-2014) the Department’s overtime expenditures grew substantially, with the highest percentage growth between the approved budget and actual expenditures occurring in FY 2014. Given the amount of actual overtime expended so far in FY 2015, overtime spending will continue to be a significant issue and resource strain for the WPD.
Knowing where, when, and under what circumstances overtime was incurred is essential for police managers to justify its payment, and perhaps more important, to find ways to reduce the need for overtime expenditures. Supervision of overtime is the first-line defense against overtime abuses. However, based on our interviews with WPD personnel, there seems to be a lack of urgency with respect to managing overtime. Paying officer overtime is viewed as a routine solution to real or perceived personnel shortages. In most police departments, first-line supervisors (e.g., sergeants) formally approve or restrict the use of overtime. Our review revealed that currently within the WPD, lieutenants are tasked with approving overtime—oftentimes without knowledge of whether the overtime is justified for a particular officer because these lieutenants are not involved in enforcement supervision in the field. More importantly, we were advised that supervisors are not provided with adequate recordkeeping and analysis of overtime usage—a key tool that could be used to monitor overtime worked by officers. Factual information about overtime is required by supervisors to assist in controlling the usage of overtime.

Because overtime represents police work performed at premium rates (i.e., time and a half plus shift differential), the Department should conduct a thorough analysis of overtime expenditures to ensure that overtime is being used effectively, efficiently, and responsibly. The analysis should be conducted in a way that assesses both individual officer use and unit use, as a means to identify patterns of overtime spending. For example, large, undetected overtime earnings by individuals or units may indicate supervision deficiencies, including potential overtime abuses.

**External Funding Resources**
The WPD has a full-time sworn officer charged with seeking out grants. According to the WPD, the Department’s grants manager routinely seeks and receives grant funding, including state and federal funds, for the purpose of aiding the Department’s efforts in targeting crime problems, the purchase of equipment and supporting training for personnel. Additionally, the Department receives funds for specialized programs that can be used for overtime via state (Criminal Justice Council and State of Delaware) and federal grants and task forces such as the FBI Safe Streets Task Force Program.

For our review, we were provided with a list of active or still available grants that the Department received from state and federal funding sources (regardless of year awarded). Our assessment found that most of the resources sought were used for the procurement of equipment or to pay for additional overtime, as opposed to funding efforts that would increase the capacity of the Department over the longer term and improve policing strategies. Significant amounts were available through these grants, some of which are awarded annually to the City. The allowable uses of these grants, based on limited information available, including hiring, overtime, training, equipment, technology, flexible use, body armor, enforcement support (OT) and school safety (SRO) funding. Based on our review, and the information we were
provided, we identified more than $5 million in available state and federal funds from grants awarded mainly in prior years, including more than $2 million for technology-related purposes and nearly $1.8 million in broad purpose funding. This does not include all grants received, only those grants that remain active, according to the data we were provided. This also does not include reimbursement funding from federal agencies for overtime worked on federal task forces and investigations.

We also learned that the Wilmington Police Department is poised to receive additional federal resources through funding applications currently under consideration at the U.S. Department of Justice. These federal funding programs, Project Safe Neighborhoods, and the Smart Policing Initiative, appear to be strategically aligned with the needs of the WPD and will hopefully provide resources that will allow it to significantly enhance its technology and crime analysis capabilities in support of a renewed community policing emphasis, and put officers back into the communities where they are most needed, and in ways designed to reestablish community trust. It is encouraging to see thoughtful proposals being jointly developed with the research community, focused on capacity building within the Department and on building community trust through a research-based approach. In addition to these proposals, the City is eligible to receive additional funding in the late summer/fall of FY 2015 through the following annual Department of Justice programs:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Program Name</th>
<th>Amount of Eligibility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BJA's Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program</td>
<td>$20,379.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJA's Justice Assistance Grants Program (JAG)</td>
<td>$234,000 (est.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Findings and Recommendations**

The Department has been successful in obtaining state and federal funds to support the acquisition of equipment, training, and support personnel associated with specific enforcement programs, particularly those involving overtime. However, the Department does not appear to seek or receive strategic grant opportunities that would enable it to enhance its crime analysis capabilities and community policing activities or to enhance police-community strategies. Further, the WPD does not appear to actively engage in soliciting non-government (e.g., area corporations, businesses, and private foundations) sources of funding and other support as may or may not be legally permitted. The City of Wilmington is referred to as “The Corporate Capital of the World”, and as such there are opportunities for the Department to develop and build relationships with major area corporations and the local business community, and to seek their help to improve public safety. These major corporations, local businesses, and charitable foundations can provide resources for the WPD with respect to staffing for enforcement programs, training and education of officers, as well as the purchase of technology and equipment. Collaborative efforts that can leverage, for example, the analytic expertise and capabilities of the banking and finance community should also be pursued and at least one representative of these communities indicated during an interview that
this type of approach was certainly possible. Another possibility is the tremendous marketing and public relations capabilities of businesses and other organizations, which one noted could be leveraged to develop a communications strategy for the WPD to better engage the community and share positive stories of the contributions made by the rank and file on a daily basis. The WPD should develop a strategic plan that incorporates obtaining corporate and local business sources for funding and other types of in-kind support to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its public safety efforts. According to the City of Wilmington’s charter and code—

Section 8-204 – Acceptance of gifts or donations:

Every department, board and commission may accept on the behalf of the City unconditional gifts or donations of money, securities or other personal property which, or the income from which, shall be useful in connection with the work of the work of such department, board or commission. A department, board or commission shall not accept any gift of real estate or any interest in real estate or conditional gifts of money or personal property without specific authority from the council to do so.

Funding programs such as Byrne JAG funds are flexible annual awards that can be used over a period as long as five years, it is important to leverage these funds and others for the most strategic purposes. Although JAG funds have been used by Wilmington Police Department for a variety of uses, like equipment, training, body armor, and overtime, they can be used more strategically. For example, the JAG program funds could be used to hire additional crime analysts or community policing officers that could be sustained under this grant program for at 36 to 60 months. This would allow the agency the opportunity to hire officers or civilians regularly, to fill the vacancies created by attrition, or to secure an increase in authorized strength. In situations where attrition has been shown to be predictably consistent, such anticipatory hiring is quite possible. This approach is more strategic than relying on a 12 or 18-month grant to hire an analyst or officer, due to the requirement to sustain the position. Similarly, for example, it is not recommended to use JAG funding for purposes which another program exclusively addresses, such as the Bulletproof Vest Partnership (BVP) Program, which provides funding only for body armor. Unless BVP’s funding level cannot sufficiently provide the number of vests required in a given year, the most strategic decision for any agency eligible to receive any significant BVP funding is to rely on BVP as the primary outside funding source for armor or to at least make that the primary funding source. WPD participates in the Equitable Sharing Program administered by the U.S. Department of Justice, which is often less predictable and therefore creates a better opportunity for purchasing those things that do not require sustainability, such as equipment, training, and overtime. Discretionary grants with a strategic focus, such as Smart Policing, Project Safe Neighborhoods, COPS Community Policing Development grants or state funds to address crime reduction offer the best opportunity for an infusion of funding to support the development and implementation of a new approach or strategy. All of these grants represent a shorter project timeline, and often encourage a partnership with a local research
partner make these funds ideal for developing new policing strategies that are grounded by best practices and or evidence.

**Operational Resources from Federal, State, and County Agencies**

The Wilmington Police Department enjoys strong support from the New Castle County law enforcement neighbors and from the Delaware State Police through a variety of means, some of which are described below. Although not a new phenomenon, federal law enforcement agency support is present in the area and has substantially increased, particularly since Wilmington was designated as a participant in the Violence Reduction Network (VRN).

The New Castle County Police Department (NCCPD) currently provides support to the Wilmington Police through its supplemental Mobile Enforcement Team (MET) patrols that take place in Wilmington one day each week. NCCPD also participates in each Wilmington Police Department ‘Targeted, Analytical Policing System’ (T.A.P.S.) meeting which is designed to provide situational awareness and accountability for crime occurrences in the City. Through these meetings and the ongoing operational coordination efforts, information and intelligence is shared between the two agencies, which also work together on many of the regional task forces noted previously.

The Delaware State Police (DSP) also provides support to the Wilmington Police Department through participation in the T.A.P.S. meetings and the provision of general support through the Delaware Intelligence and Analysis Center (DIAC), the state’s criminal intelligence fusion center. These tactics and approaches are described in more detail in VRI’s report on police strategies.

Other state agencies, including the State Attorney General’s Office for example, are providing exemplary support to the Wilmington Police Department and to Wilmington communities directly. Through innovative approaches, such as the Crime Strategies Unit (clearly a best practice among American prosecutors), the Attorney General’s Office is providing enforcement, investigative, and even community engagement and problem-solving services and makes available criminal intelligence and information sharing, as well as engages in crime analysis discussions. Within the last few weeks, the WPD has begun participating in regular meetings with prosecutors to discuss open homicide cases and to plan investigative approaches, which is seen as an excellent step forward.

Similarly, state probation agencies often have unique information and abilities that can be used to prevent, deter, and solve crimes. For example, the High Point (NC) Police Department implemented a collaborative approach between probation agencies and community stakeholders to reduce group related violent gun crimes.  

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Crime analysis is used to map the location of offenses (e.g., Part 1 Crimes) to identify patterns or “hot spots” of activity. Police and probation officers review the data to identify known violent groups, areas of operations (“turf”), and individuals (i.e., been arrested for a violent crime, which group they are a member of, and the probation status of members within those groups) in those “hot spot” locations. Based on the review process, officers were deployed to the “hot spot” location to conduct probation checks and violations, and serve outstanding warrants as deterrence to acts of violence in that location. While the probation agencies participate in the WPD T.A.P.S. meetings, we observed that the level of collaboration and engagement in enforcement, problem solving, and information and intelligence sharing could be significantly improved between law enforcement and probation.

Federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI, DEA, ATF, and U.S. Marshals’ Service are all active in the City of Wilmington. At a recent hearing of the Senate Appropriations Committee’s Subcommittee on Commerce-Justice-State Appropriations, FBI Director Comey reported that the FBI has as many as 22 agents assigned to the Wilmington area. The DEA Administrator reported it is also supporting the VRN through its resources and the ATF has assigned additional agents to assist with homicide investigations and will focus its innovative ballistics technology and intelligence gathering on weapons traffickers and trigger-pullers. ATF is also providing WPD with a NIBIN Matchpoint machine to provide more rapid NIBIN results. In addition to these efforts, the Office of National Drug Control Policy recently authorized the creation of a new High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) focusing on Wilmington and the region, as a regional extension of the Philadelphia-Camden HIDTA. All combined, this represents a rare leveraging of support from the federal level. However, just as the assessment was initiated, we learned that the Wilmington Police Department had pulled back nearly all Wilmington officers assigned to these federal task forces. While we understand that this decision was made in response to the number of shootings that took place in January of 2015, and in an effort to increase police presence on the streets through a Departmental operation called “Operation Disrupt,” the decision is not sustainable for a variety of reasons. Intensive operations such as this have impacts on officers, potential negative impact on the community, and “opportunity costs” (e.g., pulling WPD officers from federal task forces) are all reasons this approach is not sustainable.

Findings and Recommendations
The Wilmington Police Department is fortunate to have some of the most capable and willing law enforcement and criminal justice partners in the region. The available resources are certainly sufficient, but at this point are not well coordinated and therefore are not as effective as they could be. We note that within the last two weeks, the WPD has initiated meetings with the state prosecutors office to discuss open cases. While it is remarkable to think that such coordination had not been

*Overview of the Model, University of North Carolina Greensboro: Center for Youth, Family and Community Partnerships.*
taking place, we applaud the WPD for establishing the collaboration. It appears, as was remarked during our interviews, that the Wilmington Police Department is in “response mode,” as a fire department responds to put out fires. It is essential that the City and the Department not only re-commit to true coordination and collaboration with these partners, but to also include them in developing comprehensive and strategically focused initiatives to address violent crime in the City. The WPD’s inclusion of these partners can serve to leverage the monetary and operational resources needed to address crime problems in the City. Fortunately, the Violence Reduction Network (VRN) provides the City with just such an opportunity and framework.

Identification of Resource Gaps
Although there was insufficient time to comprehensively assess the resources, expenses, and needs of the Wilmington Police Department, both VRI and the Police Foundation identified potential priority funding needs in order to improve public safety:

1. Crime analysis and technology capacity is sorely lacking within the Department, diminishing the Department’s ability to analyze crime and crime patterns effectively, resulting in missed opportunities to prevent and respond to crimes. In addition to adding at least one additional crime analyst, the WPD requires improved systems, substantial training, and technical assistance (e.g., advances in using GIS for crime analysis, the necessary hardware and software to conduct this analysis, more advanced statistical training, enhanced data interpretation skills). In addition to the recommendation regarding partnering with the business community to enhance WPD’s analytic capacity, a partnership with a local university to support the analysis and problem solving process should be explored. While the pending Smart Policing proposal, if funded by BJA, will start to address this need, additional resources and expertise are well advised. The funding for the Smart Policing Initiative will require the WPD to work collaboratively with a research partner and demonstrate that WPD has the ability to collect data, and incorporate meaningful performance measures to assess the effectiveness of its efforts.

2. Investigative tools, such as a limited number of license plate readers deployed in and around key crime hotspots to address drug markets, burglaries, auto theft, and other violent and property crimes, are needed. These devices can connect vehicles and persons to crime scenes and can assist in identifying regional criminal activity in support of longer-term investigations. Contrary to body cameras, these devices do not typically generate substantial cost for data storage or records requests, although the privacy considerations must not be overlooked and should be addressed before procuring the technology. Funding for these resources may be available from HIDTA and from the Department of Transportation’s Highway Safety Program.

3. While some in the community have encouraged the WPD to deploy body cameras on officers for improved accountability, our view is that a full deployment would
place additional resource strain on the WPD. It should be noted that the WPD only has 15 body cameras on hand, far less than the amount that would be required for a full deployment. Deploying the 15 they have is insufficient to cover all officers working at one time and would require additional resources even at this level, in order to provide appropriate video retention and to process the likely increase in open records requests for body camera video as has been seen in other places around the country, often requiring hundreds of hours of time consuming privacy reviews and redactions. Some departments have had to hire additional staff just to handle the significant increase in requests for video once launched. There are a small number of dashboard cameras in existence within the WPD and those units are currently deployed. Regardless of cost implications, there is an ongoing effort to develop consistent policies for body camera use across the state and any deployment will need to be considered after that process has been completed.
## ATTACHMENT: Agencies in the Region - Quick Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th># Sworn Officers</th>
<th>Population Served</th>
<th>Jurisdiction Size (sq. mileage)</th>
<th>Violent Crime (rate per 100,000)</th>
<th>Residency Requirement</th>
<th>Mandatory Retirement Age</th>
<th>Starting Salary (Post-Academy)</th>
<th>Take Home Cars for Patrol Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wilmington P.D.</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>72,630</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>1625</td>
<td>First 5yrs</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$42,000</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Castle County P.D.</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>549,684</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>$49,326</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delaware State Police</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>925,749</td>
<td>1954</td>
<td>491.4</td>
<td>Yes (Post-Academy)</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>$54,115</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>New Castle City P.D.</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5,385</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>352.8</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>30yrs of service</td>
<td>$49,326 (County residents only)</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University of Delaware Police</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>170.8</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>$50,000</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Middletown P.D.</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19,658</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>244.2</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$50,477.44</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware River and Bay P.D.</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Del. Memorial Bridge, 5 airports</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$45,948</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elsmere P.D.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$38,000</td>
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<td>Newark, Delaware P.D.</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>31,454</td>
<td>8.92</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$47,506</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Delaware City P.D.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,719</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>232.6</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$35,000</td>
<td>No</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia P.D.</td>
<td>6600</td>
<td>1,553,153</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>1099.4</td>
<td>Yes (upon graduation)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$46,412</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smyrna P.D.</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>3.68</td>
<td>629.5</td>
<td>Yes (After 6mos)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>$45,822.40</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camden P.D.</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>87,000</td>
<td>8.82</td>
<td>2241</td>
<td>Yes (1st year only)</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>$38,000</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
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* This information was collected through open source and confirmed by each department’s Human Resources Department, Recruitment Office, or Command.
* Newport PD did not respond.
The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

An Examination of Effective Public Safety Strategies In Other Jurisdictions
In order to formulate recommendations for the Wilmington Police Department (WPD), we have taken advantage of the research evidence\(^1\), but also include strategies and tactics utilized by other departments.

With this in mind, rather than focus only on other agency programs, we focus more broadly on four areas that align with WPD’s priority needs and have shown substantial impacts, according to the research literature, in addition to being utilized by many law enforcement agencies (in a broad sense) across the country.

The four key areas are:

- hot spot policing;
- problem-oriented policing (POP);
- community engagement/community policing; and
- crime analysis.\(^2\)

This approach will allow us to present specific recommendations against the backdrop of evidence-based research, while allowing the Wilmington Police Department some flexibility in tailoring their approach.

In addition to outlining the approach, we do provide specific instances of the practice in nearby and/or similarly sized agencies.

**Hot Spot Policing:**

Sherman and colleagues coined the term “hot spots” (as it applies to criminology) in the late 1980s through their work done on the concentration of calls-for-service (CFS) at specific addresses and intersections in Minneapolis, MN. Since then there have been various ways of defining hot spots of crime, but essentially the ratio has held in what Weisburd (2015) calls the “law of crime concentration.” In multiple cities of various sizes, including international locations, roughly five percent of a jurisdiction’s “micro-places” account for at least 50 percent of the crime.\(^3\)

The effectiveness of hot spot policing was first (experimentally) tested in Minneapolis (MN) in the early 1990s. By randomly assigning additional patrol to 55 crime hot spots (compared to the 55 “traditional” model of policing hot spots), Sherman and Weisburd (1995) demonstrated the impact additional police presence has on hot spots of crime. This

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\(^1\) Wherever possible, attempts were made to identify best practices within the region; however, if there were no best practices known within the region, we erred on the side of inclusion by pointing to best practices in other regions and in larger agencies, particularly given our focus on areas of high-priority need for WPD.

\(^2\) We realize these areas have some overlap. For example, crime analysis can and should be utilized to inform the other policing strategies, especially hot spot policing.

\(^3\) See the Crime Analysis and CAD Incident Analysis, Wilmington, DE (2010-14) for a hot spot analysis of Wilmington (DE)
result has been replicated in over 20 rigorous evaluations (see Braga, et al. (2013)). The National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Police Practices and Policies (2004) concluded that “studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provide the strongest collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available” (p. 250).

The use of hot spot policing is now widespread. For example, Weisburd et al. (2001) found that more than 70 percent of agencies with more than 100 officers report using crime mapping to identify hot spots. In addition, a 2008 PERF study found that 89 percent of police departments surveyed in 198 jurisdictions used hot spots enforcement as a (violent crime) strategy (Koper 2014). Practitioners have clear research evidence that focusing on high crime places is an efficient use of resources; however, there has been less guidance on what exactly agencies should do in those areas.

**Hot Spot Policing in Practice**

The “standard model” of hot spot policing usually realized through saturation patrols (i.e. inundating a high crime area with additional police presence, usually a specialized hot spot unit like Operation Disrupt). Particular tactics used within hot spot policing can range from the benign/neutral (mere police presence) to tactics that can negatively impact police-community relations, namely indiscriminate stop-and-frisk (see section on Community Engagement). It is safe to say the crime prevention benefits of hot spot policing should not come at the expense of public trust and satisfaction. Often hot spot policing strategies center on various crackdown activities (focused on particular types of crimes or behavior).

Evaluations of hot spot policing generally find support for crime reduction, but these effects are not long lasting, following what Sherman (1990) calls a pattern of initial and residual deterrence, followed by deterrence decay. Essentially, crime goes down while the hot spot policing takes place (initial deterrence); the reductions continue for a time after the extra patrol is removed (residual deterrence); and begins to rise after a time (deterrence decay). The “trick” of hot spot policing (by itself) is to utilize police presence in hot spots in a manner in which maximizes residual deterrence when their presence is removed.

Koper (1995) provided law enforcement with a means of maximizing these returns; however, it is only recently been formally tested. Koper examined the time to “next crime” observed in the Minneapolis Hot Spot study and discovered the optimal length of time patrol should spend in hot spots is between 11 and 15 minutes. Any additional length of time within the hot spots did not produce any additional benefit. This phenomenon has relatively recently been dubbed “The Koper Curve.”

Recently there have been a few studies that have tested the Koper Curve principle in both Sacramento (CA) and Seattle (WA). The Sacramento study (Telep, Mitchell, & Weisburd, 2014)\(^4\) demonstrated a 25 percent decrease in Part I crimes through hot spot policing.

\(^4\)This study is also noteworthy because it was conducted by Sacramento PD with limited involvement from the researchers at the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University in Virginia. The authors suggest that in an era of declining economic resources, police departments can take ownership of science and take control of their own evaluations of evidence-based interventions.
utilizing the Koper Curve, relative to a 27 percent increase in “traditional policing” hot spots. Initial assessments of Seattle have demonstrated crime reduction effects as well. Through data analysis and observation, the Camden County PD has derived their own Koper Curve principle. Their patrol officers are assigned a series of hot spots to cover during their respective shift. If an officer has not investigated a suspicious vehicle or person, or engaged with a member of the public within 14 minutes, he or she is instructed to proceed to the next hot spot.

The Koper Curve principle balanced with the knowledge that hot spots of crime are not “hot” all of the time provides evidence that hot spot policing does not require specialized units. Essentially through deployment, WPD can focus more officers at high crime times in high crime places. Research (and anecdotal) evidence also suggests that crime does not simply “move around the corner.” If anything, there is a diffusion of benefits to the surrounding areas (Braga, et al. 2013). As such, the increased presence of police within hot spots during high crime times produces crime prevention benefits that do not come at the expense of other areas of the jurisdiction.

Because of the ubiquity of hot spot policing as a deployment strategy (in its various forms), it is not productive to highlight particular agencies who have adopted the strategy.

Recommendations:

- **WPD should use crime analysis to determine precise hot locations, the specific nature of crime and times of crime, as well as conditions that may give rise to crime opportunities.** The Attorney General’s Crime Strategies Unit does much of this today to guide problem solving approaches.

- **WPD should utilize standard patrol officers operating under the Koper Curve to maximize police presence in crime hot spots at high crime times, rather than solely relying on specialized units.**

*Limits of Hot Spot policing*

The one noticeable drawback of hot spot policing is crime, once the patrol presence is removed, tends to creep back up (under deterrence decay). Although hot spot policing models are good at focusing efforts in the right place (i.e. hot spots), there is often little guidance on what to do while officers are in the hot spot places. One of the oft cited reasons for deterrence decay is that little is done to change the features of an area, or the behavior within an area, that make a particular hot spot conducive to crime. These factors will vary from place to place (and possible time to time) and require additional analysis and data on what is the crime generators or attractors within these high crime areas. This particular strategy embodies what has been termed Problem-Oriented Policing (see below).

*Problem-Oriented Policing (POP)*

Problem-oriented policing (POP) is an approach to policing in specific criminogenic areas, behavior, and people are analyzed in an effort to understand the issues in order to adopt a
strategy to correct it. POP looks at changes the factors that contribute to crime and extend beyond criminal justice agencies, often engaging community members and other stakeholders who are affected by the problem (Goldstein, 2001).

At its most basic, POP approaches rely on what has been labeled the “crime triangle.” The crime triangle (see below) is a convenient way to articulate how criminal events happen. Essentially a crime results when there is an intersection of a motivated offender, a vulnerable target in an unguarded place.\(^5\) The triangle has been expanded to include the elements necessary to negate criminal behavior in the form of (place) managers, (offender) handlers and (target) guardians. The presence of one or more of these reduces the likelihood of criminal behavior.

With this structure in mind, POP focuses on identifying those factors contributing to crime to come up with integrated solutions. The original method of structured problem solving was developed with Newport News (VA) PD and is called the SARA model. SARA stands for:

- (S)canning – represents identifying the recurring problems in an area and the consequences of those problems;
- (A)nalysis – identifying relevant data available (or data to be collected) and researching what is known about problem and how to address it (often utilizing crime analysis);
- (R)esponse – developing the intervention, outlining the response and developing the logic model for the intervention, culminating in carrying out the intervention, and;

\(^5\) http://www.popcenter.org/learning/pam/help/theory.cfm
• **Assessment.** – Evaluating the POP effort in terms of process (i.e. was it implemented properly) and outcomes. In the absence of an effective intervention, the current operation is open to tweaking to address any identified short comings.

Assessment is an often-overlooked element within POP (and many criminal justice endeavors). Rigorous evaluations are needed in order to demonstrate agency effectiveness and inform other agencies that are experiencing similar issues. Many interventions are assessed in the absence of a “counterfactual” (or what would have happened in the absence of the (POP) efforts. One thing to note about POP, because it takes time to diagnose the problems in the area and engage the appropriate stakeholders, results take longer to appear. In an experimental evaluation conducted by PERF of POP versus hot spot policing in Jacksonville (FL), hot spot policing produced immediate reductions in crime; however, those declines were lost due to deterrence decay. However, POP eventually demonstrated crime reductions that were more long lasting. The **Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office** incorporated the use of POP units as a long-term strategy. Because of the specialized nature of POP efforts, it is most appropriate to highlight POP efforts in nearby and/or similarly sized agencies.6 This list is not exhaustive (see footnote), but represents examples of successful POP efforts.

• **Alexandria (VA)**
  - Moped Registration Project to reduce moped theft.
  - Alcohol Interdiction Program to combat habitual drunkenness.

• **Bridgeport (CT)**
  - Anti-graffiti Initiative that included public education on graffiti, improving abatement referrals, and providing positive alternatives to graffiti offenders.

• **Dayton (OH)**
  - The Safe Delivery Project – program to reduce robberies of delivery personnel through collaboration between police and food delivery businesses to improve safety policies and procedures and provide safety training to delivery drivers.
  - Urban High School Disorder Reduction Project – establishing community meetings, identifying high-rate offenders, assigning school staff to monitor “hot spots” in an effort to reduce disorder around schools.
  - Safer Bars for a Safer Community – conducting nuisance abatement, community discussions, and educating current and future bar personnel to reduce the incidence of crime and disorder in bars and the surrounding area.
  - Metal Theft – reduce metal theft by changing regulations regarding scrap metal, using community and business contacts to identify suspected metal thieves, and establishing a full-time unit devoted to metal theft.

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6 The following represent POP efforts by agencies that were either finalists or winners of the Herman Goldstein Award for departments engaging in outstanding problem-solving efforts: http://www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein.cfm?browse=department
o Reclaiming the Corner of Chaos – a program to reduce crime and disorder at bus hubs through CPTED, enhancing police and transit personnel communication skills, and target high-rate offenders.

o Operation Registration – registration program to reduce bicycle thefts

o Department wide Community Oriented Policing – representing Dayton PDs philosophical change to embrace community policing to “win back the community.”

• Fayetteville (NC)
  o Reclaiming Neighborhoods Strategy – through forming community watch, demolishing substandard housing, home beautification and landscaping, and increased policing to reduce crime and fear of crime.

**Offender-focused strategies**

Just as there are high crime places (hot spots) there are also high crime people. Offender-focused strategies rely on the knowledge that just as a small number of places contribute to the majority of the crime, a small proportion of offenders commit most of the crime. In addition to identifying high crime places, crime analysis can identify high-rate offenders. Focusing effort on high rate offenders provides a more efficient use of resources.

Braga (2008) identifies the “pulling levers” strategy common to many offender-focused approaches as a specific example of POP.

> “In its simplest form, the approach consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as gun homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners; conducting research to identify key offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions (“pulling levers”) to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special attention (Kennedy, 1997, 2006)” (p. 332).

Offender-focused approaches became most prominent under the Boston Gun Project, which later became known as Operation: Ceasefire. Ceasefire was extended to 10 additional cities under the Strategic Approaches to Community Safety Initiative (SACSI). Since then, under the National Network for Safe Communities, Ceasefire efforts have been expanded to over sixty cities including the following nearby and/or similar sized agencies:

• Stockton (CA)
• Bridgeport (CT)
• New Haven (CT)
• Hartford (CT)
• Peoria (IL)
• Rockford (IL)
• South Bend (IN)
• Baltimore (MD)
• Kalamazoo (MI)
• Dayton (OH)
• Philadelphia (PA)
• Providence (RI)
• Charleston (SC)
• Madison (WI)

Additional effective pulling leverage approaches\(^7\) are the Highpoint Drug Market Intervention (DMI); Project Safe Neighborhoods; and the Comprehensive Anti-Gang Initiative.

DMI Cities\(^8\):
• Stockton (CA)
• Bridgeport (CT)
• Hartford (CT)
• New Haven (CT)
• Peoria (IL)
• Rockford (IL)
• South Bend (IN)
• Baltimore (MD)
• Kalamazoo (MI)
• Dayton (OH)
• Providence (RI)
• Charleston (SC)
• Madison (WI)

PSN Cities:
• Mobile (AL)
• Stockton (CA)

CAGI Cities:
• Tampa (FL)

Recommendation:
• **WPD should engage crime analysis to identify chronic high-rate offenders (and their offending networks)**
• **WPD in coordination with other criminal justice and community agencies should engage in a “pulling levers” approach to provide additional resources to address the problem of individuals contributing to most of the crime problem. This approach was reportedly implemented in Wilmington very successfully in the 1990’s and should be reconstituted.**

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\(^7\) [https://www.bja.gov/evaluation/program-law-enforcement/offender1.htm](https://www.bja.gov/evaluation/program-law-enforcement/offender1.htm)
\(^8\) [http://nnscommunities.org/impact/cities](http://nnscommunities.org/impact/cities)
The preceding reflects recommendations of policing strategies and tactics designed to enhance crime prevention and improve police-community relations. Some of the above can be accomplished in the short-term while others (e.g. POP) may take longer to achieve results. These recommendations were intended to highlight what the research evidence says about these four global yet specific overlapping areas. Some of these recommendations can be implemented without any additional cost (e.g. hot spot policing); however, others (e.g. crime analysis) may need significant investment to enhance capacity.

Community Engagement/Community Policing

Strong police-community relations are the backbone of a just society. A common refrain among police departments across the country is "We cannot arrest our way out of crime." In an interview with The Economist, Chief Thomson (CCPD) noted “[n]othing builds trust like human contact” and neighborhood residents are a great source of information about problems; however, "but that’s not going to happen without trust.” With recent events in Missouri, New York, and Ohio gaining national attention, the policing profession has often judged by departments that have lost the trust and satisfaction of the citizens they serve. In academic circles, this concept of public trust and satisfaction is articulated in the concept of legitimacy and a new yet old manner in which to enhance it is through procedural justice.

Procedural Justice & Legitimacy

We will begin with an explanation of legitimacy, as it applies to law enforcement in particular (and the CJS in general). "Legitimacy reflects the belief that the police ought to be allowed to exercise their authority to maintain social order, manage conflicts and solve problems in their communities" (PERF, 2014). Legitimacy is based on public trust and confidence in the police, reflecting the belief that the police are trying to protect their communities. The prime illustration of legitimacy is in the public’s deference to police authority, i.e. their sense of obligation to obey the law. A final element of legitimacy is the belief that police behavior is morally justified and appropriate. To the extent these elements are strained through inappropriate and/or biased behavior on the part of the police, community relations will suffer and over a prolonged period of time can exacerbate into civil unrest.

In 1990, Tom Tyler wrote a book called “Why People Obey the Law” where he outlines the tenets of legitimacy and procedural justice. Procedural justice is based on the interaction (in this case between officer and citizen) rather than the outcome (i.e. arrest, ticket, etc.). In a COPS Office sponsored podcast Tyler states “‘What are people looking for when they are thinking about or reacting to their experience with a police officer?’” He has broken these down into four elements of procedural justice:

1) **Voice:** People want the officer to give them a chance to explain their situation, to let them tell their side of the story before the officer makes some decision about what’s going to happen.

2) **Neutrality:** People want to see some signs that the police officer they’re dealing with is acting in an impartial way, so they’re not acting based upon prejudice, they’re following the law, they’re using consistent principles.
3) **Respect**: People want to be treated in a respectful way. People are very sensitive to discourtesy or a sense of dismissiveness on the part of the officer.

4) **Integrity**: People want to trust in the integrity of the officer. They want to feel that the person they’re dealing with is sincerely trying to do the right thing, trying to understand what’s appropriate in the situation.

These elements have been formalized into Procedural Justice training, most notably by [Chicago PD](http://nationalpoliceresearch.org/) (whose training was jointly developed with Tom Tyler and Tracey Meares). To date, well over 8,000 officers in Chicago PD have been trained in procedural justice. The trainers in Chicago PD have also been asked by other departments to conduct training for their officers.

Why is procedural justice important? Mazerolle et al. (2014) note that through the use of procedural justice principles, police can expect greater cooperation with the public; greater compliance with police directives; and the public has greater satisfaction and trust in the police. Tyler has also found that perceptions of racial profile are reduced when members of the public are treated in a procedurally fair manner.

Many departments do not specifically incorporate procedural justice “pillars” into their mission statement, but often have language consistent with procedural justice. Often there is a focus on trust, accountability, integrity, fairness, etc. However, interactions with the public should also be balanced with, what Dennis Rosenbaum calls, organizational legitimacy.

**Organizational Legitimacy**

In a National Institute of Justice seminar titled “Building Trust Inside and Out: The Challenge of Legitimacy for Law Enforcement,” Dr. Rosenbaum talked about the importance of interactions between police and the public, but also interactions within the department. Through “The Platform” they find that when officers are more satisfied with their work, they are more committed with the organization’s goals. From the figure below we can see this is a very strong correlation. As satisfaction goes up, so does organizational commitment. He and his colleagues recognized barriers keeping an organization from getting the best from their officers. Overall, they argue officers, like the public, are concerned with justice. Overall there were three main things officers wanted:

1) Want to be treated fairly and respectfully
2) Want input into decision making
3) Want to trust that management will make good decisions that are fair and equitable.

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9 Dr. Rosenbaum’s lecture was informed by his work with the National Police Research Platform ([http://nationalpoliceresearch.org/](http://nationalpoliceresearch.org/)). “The National Police Research Platform seeks to advance the science and practice of policing in the United States. This is achieved by introducing a new system of measurement and feedback that captures organizational excellence both inside and outside the walls of the agency. The Platform is managed by a team of leading police scholars from seven universities, supported by the operational expertise of a respected national advisory board.”
Rosenbaum offers the following conceptual definition of organizational justice:

“The perception held by employees that they are being treated fairly, respectfully, and compassionately by those in authority positions; that they have some input and control over decision making in their work environment; that they are kept informed of, and given explanations for, the decisions that affect their lives; and that they have opportunities for professional growth and job enrichment.”

To the extent that an organization can commit to these ideals, there will be greater satisfaction with the job and greater retention and productivity among an agency’s employees.

Community Policing

The preceding has provided a backdrop for how a department, overall can improve police-community relations (and enhance relations within the department). However, one of the best ways to engage the public is through the use of community policing. Community policing has been described and implemented as an organizational philosophy and a strategy of police-community problem solving. There are three primary components in its purest form: organizational transformation; problem solving; and community partnerships.10 “Community policing is a philosophy that promotes organizational

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10 The Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) has established a community policing self-assessment tool (CP-SAT) in order for departments receiving COPS Office funding to assess the extent to
strategies, which support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques, to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder, and fear of crime” (COPS, 2008). The COPS Office has funded community policing efforts in over 263 cities and counties. A Bureau of Justice Statistics census found that nearly 60 percent of police departments had full-time community policing officers, demonstrating how common a practice this is. Although community policing is intended to require an organizational transformation to accommodate this “new” style of policing, a frequent manifestation of community policing is the community policing unit or division. Other community policing efforts include the use of foot patrols in order to better engage community members and show presence, knock-and-talks, addressing quality-of-life and disorder to improve perceptions of public safety, and engaging community leaders and the general public. However, it should be noted that each of these tactics in and of themselves is not community policing; rather it is the coordination of these tactics with the specific goal of interacting with the public to engage in community-oriented place-based problem solving that defines true community policing.

Research on the effectiveness of community policing has produced mixed results (Mastrofski, 2006; Gill, 2014), in part because of the variability of community policing interventions and the need to engage with a community where often police-community relations have not been good. In general, community policing efforts do not show an impact on crime, but do show evidence for the reduction in fear of crime (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Braga and Weisburd (2007) note the available research demonstrates unfocused efforts at community policing do not show crime and disorder benefits (e.g. foot patrol, newsletters, and substations). However, focused efforts can produce both reductions in crime and fear of crime. These efforts also depend on the motivation of the officers involved (e.g. research on foot patrol).

Special focus on Foot patrol:

Ratcliffe et al. (2011), in the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment, demonstrated that foot patrol conducted in crime hot spots could produce benefits. A key feature for success seems to be the amount of time and motivation of the officers involved. Problem-solving and engagement will be more influential than merely “walking the beat.” However, in a recent evaluation of Philadelphia’s Smart Policing Initiative program comparing foot patrol, problem oriented policing, and offender focused strategies did not replicate the foot patrol result. In discussions of the two studies, Ratcliffe and his colleagues have determined that there were differences in the officers in the two experiments. Initially the officers were in the hot spot more and were highly motivated to engage in problem solving with the community. They developed relationships with the people in the area and knew many of them by name. In the SPI experiment the officers were less engaged and through the design of the study, spent less time in the hot spot areas.

It is essential to highlight the importance of establishing trust and maintaining relationships within the context of community policing. Community policing should be
considered a long-term strategy rather than a short-term tactic. Trust is built over time and cessation of community policing activities can damage those relationships.

*Technological Tools for Community Engagement/Policing*

With the expansion of social media, instant messaging, and texting, it has become much easier for departments to interact with the public and vice-versa. Departments can use their website, Facebook, Text alerts, and Twitter to disseminate information to the public and receive feedback from the public. In addition, social media outlets provide a safer, more anonymous means for the public to provide tips/information to police for either proactive or reactive deployments. While it may be dangerous for residents in high crime areas (at least initially) to interact with police (either within the neighborhood or at the station), anonymous systems (e.g. tip411 and others) provide citizens with a secure way to send actionable information to the police, while maintaining personal safety. Facebook also provides a vehicle for this kind of interaction.11

**CCPD** has engaged the community with a novel approach called the **Interactive Community Alert Network (ICAN)**. This program goes beyond merely offering community members a tip-line to report problems and information to the police. Residents must apply to the program and if selected have access to a web-based system where they can anonymously report crimes in their area. With access to the CCPD CCTV network, participants can direct CCPD to problem areas and crimes in progress in what has been labeled “collaborative policing.”

A final method of engaging with the public from an unlikely source has been through the use of ShotSpotter. Both the **South Bend (IN)** and CCPD have used ShotSpotter activations as a means of community engagement. Both departments, when responding to shots fired, in addition to looking for victims, guns, and shell casings, have used these opportunities to conduct door-to-doors. Officers and detectives uses these opportunities to address community safety concerns, explain what they are doing and how long they will be in the area, and hand out business cards to request information if a citizen is uncomfortable sharing information at the time. Because they go to every door in the immediate area, there is little risk to any single household in terms of retaliation.

**Recommendations:**

- **WPD should implement “Procedural Justice” training for all personnel in an effort to establish and preserve good community relations.**
- **WPD should reconstitute their community-policing unit.**
- **All potential community engagement activities should come with clear guidance to officers on the goal of said activity, i.e., what problem are we addressing, why and how.**

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11 Anecdotally, some former community policing officers have stated their personal Facebook accounts, in essence, became work-generating because their community members would send them messages.
• Community policing and patrol officers should have access to crime analysis in order to best focus efforts with the community and other stakeholders to address neighborhood problems.

• WPD should expand and create easier technological access (e.g. social media, texting, etc.) in order to provide community members with anonymous/confidential avenues to report crime tips/information, such as the approach taken in Atlantic City, NJ, which uses the Tip411 solution.

• WPD should generate more transparency with the community in terms of police activities, public relations, complaints, and investigations. WPD should also convey to the public that transparency cannot come at the expense of immediacy whereby certain investigations and operations take time in order to fully examine the facts.

• WPD, in an effort to enhance its own “organizational justice” should operate internally under the same principles it interacts with the community, namely transparency in the decision making process from promotions, policy changes, and technological acquisition and implementation. In addition, WPD should also be open to feedback from personnel directly affected by upper command decisions.

• Also related to organizational justice, WPD should establish performance measures whereby personnel can have a clear indication of their efforts (in terms of policing activities), which would also hold personnel accountable for low performance.

Crime Analysis:

"Generally, crime analysis involves the use of qualitative and quantitative methods to analyze crime and law enforcement information for the purpose of apprehending criminals, reducing crime, and evaluating organization procedures.” (Boba, 2001). Crime analysis is not a strategy in and of itself, but is a set of tools which provides the initial step in addressing crime or evaluating operation procedures. It is a fundamental tool in what has been termed “Intelligence-led policing:"

Intelligence-led policing is a collaborative enterprise based on improved intelligence operations and community-oriented policing and problem solving, which the field has considered beneficial for many years. To implement intelligence-led policing, police organizations need to reevaluate their current policies and protocols. Intelligence must be incorporated into the planning process to reflect community problems and issues. Information sharing must become a policy, not an informal practice. Most important, intelligence must be contingent on quality analysis of data. The development of analytical techniques, training, and technical assistance needs to be supported (BJA, 2005).
Crime analysis in practice is more than the compilation of statistics into weekly/monthly summary reports, but represents a systematic deconstruction of the available data in order to analyze trends, focus resources, and ultimate provide explanation of crime and police operations within a jurisdiction. There are many elements and technologies that can be utilized in crime analysis. We will highlight the key ones below.

**Crime Mapping**

Crime mapping may be one of the oldest methods of displaying crime. In the early days, crime mapping could be accomplished through the use of pushpins on a map of the city. Although decidedly low-tech, it is nonetheless an effective method. Technologically speaking, crime mapping has become a much more elaborate endeavor requiring a particular set of computational skills. Crime mapping through the use of computers; however, does allow an agency to be more creative in what they analyze. Law enforcement now has the ability to examine different types of crimes, by time of day, day of week, etc. At the same time, the use of mapping can inform the use of police resources. For example, **Camden County PD (CCPD)** has used crime analysis to identify high crime zones within the city and used their AVL system to maintain specific levels of patrol coverage within these zones.

Crime mapping is a useful tool by itself, but only represents the initial step. The use of crime mapping helps identify where and when crime occurs (and with the use of offender data it can provide information on who is committing the crime), but does not singly tell an agency why crime is happening at that particular place. Combating crime problems within a particular place requires an understanding of the crime attractors and generators within a given area.

**Data integration**

In addition to mapping, comprehensive crime (problem) analysis requires the integration of data from multiple sources in which to provide the fullest picture of what is going on in a jurisdiction. All agencies within the Criminal Justice System(CJS) (police, prosecution, probation/parole) can provide value-added to any crime prevention exercises by integrating the massive amounts of data each agency possesses. Crime within hot spots (discussed later) can be the result of a few high-rate (or chronic) offenders. Crime analysis using data from all areas of the CJS can identify these individuals and target them for specific action. The removal of these individuals can have a big impact on reducing crime; however, these individuals will one day return to the area. With crime analysis and specific targeting of resources, actions plans can be created in order to monitor crime hot spots for when these individuals return to the area. In addition, data from other city and community sources can be integrated. City housing can provide information on nuisance properties, abandoned buildings, etc. and through coordinated effort with police and prosecution, if these factors are crime attractors, focused efforts can be taken to alleviate these problems.\(^\text{12}\)

\(^{12}\) These examples are consistent with a process called problem-oriented policing, which will be discussed later.
Social Network Analysis

Although criminal co-offending has a long history in criminal career research (Reiss, 1986), recent advances in statistical analysis has made it possible to map out interrelationships among criminal offenders. Papachristos and his colleagues have looked at social networks using police data from cities such as Boston and Chicago. Although we have known for decades that a small percentage of offenders are responsible for the majority of crime, they have found that these offenders are often clustered in tight social networks. For example, in a forthcoming piece on gun injury, Papchristos, Widleman, and Roberto (2015) find, “[s]eventy percent of all nonfatal gunshot injuries during a six-year period occurred in co-offending networks containing less than 6 percent of the city’s population” (p. 147). Additionally, 89 percent of those victims were part of a single social network. Social network analysis can provide rich detail on offending within a jurisdiction. By examining the characteristics of the network, a tailored response can be developed (along the lines of offender-focused responses, see below). The structure of these networks are likely to reproduce themselves as more jurisdictions engage in this type of analysis.

Additional Technology:

WPD has access to additional technology that can influence patrol and investigations. Two prime examples are ShotSpotter™ and CCTV.

ShotSpotter™

ShotSpotter is an acoustic gunfire detection system spread throughout high crime areas of Wilmington. There are three initial things:

- Real-time access to maps of shooting locations and gunshot audio;
- Actionable intelligence detailing the number of shooters and the number of shots fired, and;
- Pinpointing precise locations for first responders aiding victims, searching for evidence and interviewing witnesses.14

ShotSpotter analysis, coupled with anecdotal evidence from departments, indicates that most gunshots are not reported to law enforcement. Four reasons for this discrepancy are what Chief Teachman of South Bend (IN) calls: recognition; redundancy; retaliation; and resignation. First, citizens may not recognize that a sound was a gunshot. Second, law enforcement responses to ShotSpotter activations are often so fast that citizens already see them on the scene. Third, many citizens in high (violent) crime areas fear retaliation if they do talk to the police. Finally, some citizens may become accustomed to living in high crime areas and take the sound of gunshots as part of day-to-day life.

When there is no identifiable victim on the scene of a ShotSpotter activation, law enforcement may classify the event essentially as a nuisance crime. However, anxiously,
departments (such as South Bend (IN)) indicate there is a greater likelihood of either a gun and/or shell casing recovery with ShotSpotter (especially coupled with a 911 call). In the absence of a shooter, it is difficult to tell if there was a violent altercation where the potential victim was missed by gunfire or if an individual was randomly shooting a firearm. However, in order to understand the complexities of gun violence, it is vital that all recovered weapons/shell casings are entered into the National Integrated Ballistic Information Network (NIBIN) in order to develop a profile of the weapon and ascertain if it has been used in other criminal events.

**CCTV**

Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) has been extensively researched. In a systematic review by the Campbell Collaboration finds only modest effects on crime.\(^{15}\) CCTV has been most effective in reducing thefts from vehicles in parking lots. The author’s find that CCTV works best when combined with other crime prevention interventions. Criticism of the use of CCTV centers on the ability of the camera system to increase the probability of detection and apprehension, particularly when the camera to operator ratio is high. Camera systems should be moved to a more proactive detection role, and balanced by a law enforcement response to ensure its deterrent value. For examples, forthcoming research by Piza et al. (forthcoming), conducted in Newark (NJ), indicates that CCTV coupled with hot spot policing generates greater crime control benefits than having “stand alone” camera deployment, “particularly in the case of street-level crime.” Hot spot policing is covered in more detail below.

As a reactive strategy, CCTV has the potential to aid investigations and should continue to be utilized in this manner. For example, Camden County PD (CCPD) uses their CCTV system, coupled with ShotSpotter activations to gain video of gunshot offenders and victims. In addition, we have seen cases where the CCTV system was able to track a fleeing vehicle and provide information on the make/model as well as direction of travel to responding officers.

Like most technology, the above examples should not operate in a vacuum. Each element will work best when integrated with other information sources and analyzed by individuals with the required expertise (i.e. crime analysts).\(^{16}\)

An exceptional (and local) example of the use of crime analytic technology and analysis is with the CCPD Real-Time Tactical Operations and Information Center (RT-TOIC). The RT-TOIC provides the technological hub for directing the activities of the CCPD officers and responding to citizen issues. The Center provides a venue to synthesize the information coming in from the monitoring of CCTV (both static mounted cameras and mobile “Sky Patrol” cameras); automatic vehicle location (AVL); ShotSpotter; and real-time input from citizens participating in the CCPD’s iCan program. Through integrated crime analysis (which has been outsourced), the city can identify high crime areas and ensure their officers provide near constant coverage within those zones.

\(^{15}\) [http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/news_/CCTV_modest_impact_on_crime_printer.shtml](http://www.campbellcollaboration.org/news_/CCTV_modest_impact_on_crime_printer.shtml)

\(^{16}\) The International Association of Crime Analysts (IACA) can provide more information on their certification standards and training: [http://www.iaca.net/](http://www.iaca.net/)
The RT-TOIC allows CCPD to monitor the “dosage” level their officers are providing to high crime zones. Personnel in the center get real-time feedback from their software indicating whether their pre-determined dosage levels are being met, or if they need to redeploy officer to accommodate. In addition, as discussed later, even high crime areas are not “hot” all of the time, and as Camden enters into high crime times (whether time of day, day of the week), CCPD can shift their officers to meet dynamic patterns. Through the RT-TOIC, Camden can coordinate their hot spot/hot zone efforts.

**Recommendations:**

- **WPD should move the Crime Analysis Unit out of Investigations and under the Office of the Chief or the recommended Deputy Chief of Operations.** Such a move would provide the benefit of crime analysis to the entire department.
- **TAPS meetings should be conducted in a manner consistent with New Castle County whereby crime/disorder outcomes are mapped onto WPD outputs in an effort to instill ownership and accountability in Wilmington crime and disorder issues.**
- **WPD should expand their crime analysis capability to include crime mapping, social network analysis, trend analysis and other statistical analyses.**
- **Crime analysis should be used to measure crime in addition to department efforts in an effort to analyze the impact WPD is producing.**
- **WPD should utilize ShotSpotter activations as an opportunity to collect evidence of illegal firearm behavior; collecting and processing all recovered shell casings, regardless of the presence of a victim, to identify crime guns.**
- **WPD should test the applicability of incorporating CCTV with hot spot deployment efforts.**
- **WPD should use its new AVL technologies to ensure sufficient patrol allocation time in hot spot areas.**
- **The State of Delaware should consider replicating the State of New Jersey's approach (New Jersey Public Law 2013, Chapter 162), requiring law enforcement agencies across the state to quickly (within 24 hours) process shell casings from crime scenes and recovered firearms, through a multi-step process, including use of eTrace, NIBIN, collection of various other forms of evidence so that critical leads can be provided to investigators to solve crimes quickly and to prevent retaliatory shootings. Retaliatory violence is clearly present in Wilmington, consistent with the community's explanation of what occurs here and consistent with data. If implemented, this approach would require all law enforcement agencies to submit more information to the State Police in a more timely manner, from an estimated “up to 10 days” to within 24 hours. No-cost technical assistance is available in developing this protocol.**
A 1997 review of crime prevention programs, by the University of Maryland, Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice submitted to Congress, concluded that many crime prevention programs worked, some did not, but most had not been substantially evaluated in order to draw conclusions about their effectiveness. The list of programs/strategies that “worked” would grow with the increased use of scientific evaluation. Since then there has been a broad push to evaluate new programs and synthesize what we know from previous research.

The Department of Justice hosts “CrimeSolutions.gov,” which provides a clearinghouse for criminal justice programs with a score of whether it worked, was promising, or showed no effects. The one drawback of this system is there is no measure for the quality of the evaluation, namely some research designs provide stronger evidence of a program’s impact than others. However, there are other sources that consider measures for scientific rigor include:

- Evidence-Based Policing Matrix (hosted online by the Center for Evidence-Based Crime Policy at George Mason University);
- The “Maryland Report” (Sherman et al. 1997) and its updates (Sherman et al. 2002; 2006);
- Campell Collaboration Systematic Reviews
A Report of Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington
A Report of Community Input on 
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

Introduction

The Police Foundation was tasked with collecting the community’s input into Wilmington’s public safety strategies.

Part I of this report provides a summary of the feedback we received by going into the community in coordination with key individuals and groups, to collect this feedback directly and proactively. This part also includes an analysis of an informal survey of community members with whom we met during our days in the community, which complements what we heard from community members in our open meetings and individual contacts. Many of the paragraph headings represent the community’s words or sentiment; therefore they are placed in quotations where necessary.

Part II of this report provides a summary of the community’s input provided during the Commission meetings.

Part III of this report provides a summary of input received from individual and group interviews with members of the business community.

Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

Part I: Input Collected in the Community

“We are tired of being studied we need action. There have been a hundred reports and nothing is ever done. We feel like Guinea pigs (Eastside Community Members, 2015)”

This section reflects the community’s sentiments concerning their perceptions of and interactions with the officers of the Wilmington Police Department (WPD). As in many communities in the United States, the poor and minority members of the community often feel disenfranchised and victimized by the police. Many of Wilmington’s community members seem to feel the same. One statement heard at every community meeting that we attended in regards to the relationship between the Wilmington Police Department and the African American community was “The police just don’t care.”

Community sentiment in the groups we interviewed was that they wanted to work with the Wilmington Police Department, but they perceived that the Wilmington Police Department
(WPD) did not want to work with them. The problems between the community and the WPD are deeply entrenched and most likely developed over a number of years. During one interview the interviewees advised that the cultural change began approximately fifteen (15) years ago and since then, they have been on a steady decline.

Community leaders described the Wilmington Police Department ‘as an island that refused to work with them - a castle protected by a moat and wall keeping the community out’.

The Police Foundation was tasked with collecting input from the community on the City’s public safety strategies as implemented by the Wilmington Police Department. Although the data here is limited to three (3) actual community meetings and forums, we were contacted via email and phone after each meeting by citizens who wanted to discuss their perceptions and the needs of their respective communities. These perceptions were identical to the survey responses we collected. In total, we surveyed one hundred and fifty (150) residents.

We also conducted interviews with government officials throughout Wilmington who represented the full spectrum of services within the criminal justice system.

The data was collected through formal community meetings, phone interviews, surveys, community “walk and talks,” and “chat and chews” (which are lunch or dinner settings).

In several of the small group meetings with community leaders, we were challenged as to our understanding of the problem. The primary concern from community members was that we report the information accurately, based on our understanding, and not alter the data in any way. This segment of the report will examine the community’s perception of the Wilmington Police Department, working relationships with other criminal justice partners, contributing factors to the epidemic of youth violence, and opportunities to begin addressing the problem.

COMMUNITY MEETINGS

We prioritized learning about what the community views as the three major crime issues, determining if the WPD and the community are disconnected, and looking at how the community views the WPD and how the WPD views the community. In each of the meetings there were two objectives: listen to the community members in an open forum while documenting their views and concerns, and asking community members to complete a seven-question survey designed to more systematically collect their perceptions.

The first meeting was held on February 21 at the Muslim Center of Wilmington (The Masjid), where approximately 30 people attended. A total of 25 survey responses were received as a result of this meeting. The feedback collected at this meeting is provided below. We attempted to avoid altering any views or input received, to ensure that the community’s views were heard, unfiltered. Subheadings presented in quotation below indicate a quote or key sentiment from one or more community members.

“Living in a Fish Bowl”

This location was selected, with the assistance of a WPD Captain, because residents of this neighborhood are reportedly the most affected by the high crime rate. More importantly, this area is reported to have the highest number of homicides where the suspects and victims are juvenile
African American males. The residents were informed about the meeting through a flyer, which was disseminated by members of the community door to door (see Attachment 1).

One resident’s statement provided insight into the community’s frustration and anger:

“Everyone wants to study us like we are in a fish bowl. Everyone says that they are here to help. Even the lady from Newsweek said she was here to help and what do we get, we get the title of the Murder Capital. Why aren’t our City Council people here? Why isn’t the Chief of Police here to hear us? Why isn’t the Mayor here? Why should we believe you, you aren’t from here - you are here to make money then you are gone? What I am saying is we are tired of being studied; we need action. There have been a hundred reports and nothing is ever done. We feel like Guinea pigs (Eastside Community Member, 2015)”

“Insensitivity” and “Trauma”

During the open forum the residents repeatedly stated that WPD was unresponsive to their needs. Many described homicide scenes where WPD officers were allegedly laughing and joking in front of the victims’ families. The residents also shared that they had heard officers state: “They are killing each other. Doing our job for us. All we have to do is wait - no need to solve the homicides.” The residents allege that some officers have used social media to devalue the homicide and shooting victims. The victim’s families also advise that WPD has not offered any kind of support or counseling, even though WPD has a program known as Child Development-Community Policing (CD-CP).

The WPD website describes the CD-CP program as:

*The Wilmington, Delaware CD-CP program was established November 1, 2005. It is a partnership between the City of Wilmington Police Department and the Delaware Division of Prevention and Behavioral Health Services (DPBHS). The Delaware Guidance Services for Children and Youth (DGS) is contracted by DPBHS to provide mental health treatment for identified children. The staff consists of master's level health professionals and case managers.*

*The goal of the Child Development - Community Policing Program (CD-CP) is to help heal the wounds that exposure to violence inflicts on children and families. The CD-CP program is a national model of a collaborative alliance between law enforcement, juvenile justice, domestic violence, medical and mental health professionals, child welfare, schools and other community agencies. The program provides a resource for first responders to violent or traumatic incidents to make immediate or follow up referrals to a trained trauma-focused clinician to begin the clinical healing process soon after the traumatic event has occurred. The CD-CP uses community-based counseling to help children and families cope, where life happens...in the home, in the community, in the school. Through education, coping skill building, collaboration, community connection and support, the CD-CP helps Wilmington’s children and families move forward after violence or trauma occur* (Wilmington Police Department, 2015).
“We Have No Value”

When the family members of homicide victims spoke they addressed three things concerning WPD: the agency’s failure to solve their family member’s homicide; the investigators’ failure to return phone calls regarding their loved one’s case; and the amount of time that investigators spend on the scene of a homicide, noting that two hours was maximum. Finally, the family members of the homicide victims stated unequivocally “Black lives don’t matter,” making the following points:

- If a victim is Caucasian, police will stay at the homicide scene for hours. They canvas the neighborhood knocking on doors up to 6 or 7 blocks away. In one instance the FBI had assisted in the canvassing. Why is the FBI involved? Is it because the victim was white and our kids are black? These homicide scenes are worked for several hours, as opposed to the two hours dedicated to the crime scenes where an African American child has been killed.

- When a police officer was shot in the City of Wilmington, the police were relentless in their efforts to apprehend a suspect. Their efforts lasted for several hours, included knocking on doors, talking to people on the street, and stopping and frisking anyone and everyone. Yet this never happens when it is one of us.

- The question asked: ‘Why are those people’s lives more valuable than our lives’?

In an attempt to curb the violence, one Captain of the Wilmington Police Department advised that he has met with the several of the most influential local Original Gangsters (OGs) and asked them to assist in curbing the violence. The OGs advised that they could not control those involved in the violence because they are without conscience; they also described them as “crazy.”

“We Have No Voice”

Another area of concern has been the community’s difficulty in filing complaints against police. Several of the attendees advised that they had made complaints against officers and never received a disposition of the complaint. The attendees stated that in order to file a complaint, they are required to go to WPD; and oftentimes while waiting, they encounter the officer that they are filing the complaint on. The attendees state that they feel intimidated. Some state that they left WPD without filing the complaint. Others allege that they believe that their statements and complaints are discarded. This has led to a sense of frustration and enhanced the deep-seated belief in the community as shared with us: WPD doesn’t care, can’t be trusted, and will do anything to protect their officers.

The second meeting was held on March 7, 2015 at the Hanover Presbyterian Church, where approximately 57 people attended. A total of 20 survey responses were received as a result of this meeting. The feedback collected at this meeting is provided below. We attempted to avoid altering any views or input received, to ensure that the community’s views were heard, unfiltered.

“Living in a Fish Bowl”

This meeting took place at a community event hosted by the Movement for a Culture of Peace and was advertised via the Internet and email blasts (see Attachment 2). The event was titled Violence Reduction in Wilmington: Connecting the Dots. It was an open forum and panel
participants were Chief Bobby Cummings, Wilmington Police Department; Doug Iardella, Wilmington Public Safety Liaison; Darryl Chambers, Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission; and David Thomas, Senior Research Fellow, Police Foundation. There were fifty-seven (57) attendees with at least one representative from twenty-two (22) community organizations.

The tone of this meeting was different because the residents were not from one specific community but from all segments of the Wilmington community. The attendees were focused on one goal, ending gun violence and deaths in Wilmington. The residents echoed many of the same concerns as in the first meeting. There were several prevailing themes as shared with us: community policing; diversity training for officers; failure of the agency to respond to victims of homicide; lack of support for families in the aftermath of violence; and the ease with which juveniles can access guns.

Again, residents addressed the fact that there has been study after study and expressed how frustrated they were that none had been acted upon. One such example was the State of Delaware Strategic Plan for Injury Prevention 2005 – 2010, which provides guidance and information to reduce the number of injuries and homicides by firearm in the state of Delaware.

**“Insensitivity” and “Trauma”**

Residents repeated the sentiments of the first forum – that WPD was unresponsive to their needs. There were a number of family members who had lost children to gun violence. One mother whose child was killed in February 2015 made an impassioned statement driven by fear, frustration, and anger. She described how detectives did not return her phone calls, how she lives in a constant state of fear knowing that the killer is still on the street and a juvenile, and how WPD officials have disregarded her fear and concerns to a point where she feels abandoned by the very system that is supposed to protect her. Chief Cummings was asked if WPD offers counseling services, and he discussed the Child Development-Community Policing Program (CD-CP), which is highlighted earlier in this report.

The attendees described their beliefs that WPD treats members of the African American Community without respect by being verbally abusive and using intimidation tactics. Chief Cummings was asked if WPD officers had received any diversity training. He assured the audience that they had recently been trained. The Police Foundation verified that Dr. Yasser Payne, from the University of Delaware, conducted training for the police department in April 2014, and those 325 officers received a 4-hour training, in groups of 30-50 officers. He provided a copy of his PowerPoint presentation, which we reviewed. A summary of the training content was provided by Dr. Payne via e-mail and is excerpted below:
Information about the training:

Walking With the Community is a racial sensitivity training designed to inform and equip community professionals about the culture of street identified Black populations involved with the criminal justice system. This workshop challenges dominant arguments by asserting the streets of Black (and Brown) America are in fact resilient. Much of their illegal behavior can be attributed to a historical and present entrenchment in structural inequality. The workshop ties the history of crime in the Black community to contemporary accounts. Also, this workshop focuses on the relationship between law enforcement (and other authorities) and low-income Black communities. Further, the workshop teaches participants how to develop activities to constructively work with and reach street identified Black populations as well as strongly encourage participants how to educate other community professionals to work with and reach street identified Black populations of color caught up in the criminal justice system.

Workshop

a. Session 1 (hour) – intersectionality
b. Session 2 (hour) – variation: applying intersectionality to the streets of Wilmington
c. Session 3 (hour) – community policing
d. Session 4 (hour) – unconscious bias

There is an overall sense from community members that the training has had little impact on officers’ actions in the African American community. The audience was quick to point out that all African American juveniles are treated as if they are suspects and not citizens of the community. The attendees also noted that when this happens, it furthers the divide between community and police. Police are viewed by segments of the community as enemies and as not to be trusted. The community described the tactics of WPD as “aggressive, racially motivated, insensitive to the needs of the African American community,” and ultimately “disconnected” from the community that they serve.

“We Have No Voice”

The final area of concern was the disposition of complaints made against officers. Several of the attendees, before and after the meeting, stated that they had filed complaints against officers and were never advised of the disposition of the case. Because the issue had become a recurring theme, the Police Foundation contacted the Commander of the WPD Office of Professional Standards regarding the agency policy and process for handling citizen’s complaints. The Commander advised that citizens must come to the department to file a formal complaint. He also advised that they do not use tracking numbers for all complaints, and that they use patrol supervisors to investigate some complaints. He confirmed “without witnesses the matter would be the complainant’s word against the officer’s and that there is no way that such complaints could be sustained.” The Commander also stated that all complainants are sent a letter advising them of the outcome of the complaint filed: unfounded, substantiated, unsubstantiated, unfounded, proper conduct, and policy failure (see Attachment 3 WPD Policy Directive 8.6: Authority and Responsibilities of the Internal Affairs Division and the letter sent to complainants).
Finally, in regards to complainants and their dispositions, the Commander advised that many complainants want to know if the officers received any disciplinary action. He stated that the department is prohibited by state statute from advising the complainant of anything more than the aforementioned dispositions, per Delaware State Statute 9200 entitled: Limitations on political activity; "law-enforcement officer" defined; rights of officers under investigation (Delaware State Legislature, 2015).

The third meeting was held on March 9, 2015 at the Westside Health Center, where approximately 18 people attended. A total of 12 survey responses were received as a result of this meeting. The feedback collected at this meeting is provided below. We attempted to avoid altering any views or input received, to ensure that the community’s views were heard, unfiltered.

This meeting was unique on two fronts. First, it was not the traditional neighborhood forum. The organization Westside Grows Together is a coalition of Wilmington's West Side residents, businesses, churches, and community groups working together to create a safe and prosperous environment for its residents. Second, the steering committee was present at this meeting and represented were eighteen (18) of twenty-five (25) member organizations.

Also in attendance at this meeting was Delaware Attorney General Matt Denn who discussed his Lifting Up Delaware’s Communities Plan, which is composed of three components: investing in people and neighborhoods, providing help with high poverty schools, and promoting affordable housing and development in economically impacted areas (see Attachment 4).

One community leader felt that the initiative did not go far enough because the $36 million was spread over too many programs to be effective. He suggested that all the money be spent on juveniles, by offering jobs, job training, and intervention and prevention programs. He argued that youth are the most disenfranchised, and if they continue to ignore them, the cycle of violence will continue.

In addition to focus group or town hall type discussions, we analyzed approximately 150 survey responses collected through various means, including in-person, U.S. Mail, and electronic delivery. The survey was disseminated by more than one community organization to solicit the input of the community. The responses to the survey’s open-ended questions are below.

SURVEY

The survey was designed with seven open-ended questions to allow the community members to express their perceptions, feelings, and observations in a short answer format. The responses for each question were categorized based on the most common topical areas response.

Survey Questions and Data:

1. What are the greatest challenges facing the community and the police?

The respondents (N=150) described the greatest challenges facing the police and the community with the following responses themes:
• **Lack Of Trust** - There is no trust between the community and the police.

• **Drugs** - The community has always had drugs. It began with “crack cocaine,” and those who did not use “crack” used prescription drugs. After the police came down hard on the prescription drugs, the drug of choice became heroin.

• **Gang Violence** - We never had a violence problem like we do today. Gangs began to rise after a huge drug bust. The problem that we have now is that it’s not the 26-year-old that will kill you, it is the 13-year-old on a skate board or bike. This group has no conscience and anyone can fall victim.

• **Murders/Shootings** - The fallout from the gangs are the murders and shootings between gang members. Central to the shootings are drugs.

• **School Bias/Unemployment** - Although gangs, drugs, and homicides are an Issue, other contributing factors are our school system and the biased suspension policy of the school districts that service our community (African America). In conjunction with the school policies is the fact that there are no jobs for our youth (African American). In fact, this summer the kids have to place their name in a lottery in hopes of being selected for a job with the city this summer.

• **Ineffective Policing Style** - The police ‘don’t have a style when it comes to policing. There is no consistency and until they get their house in order they are of little value’.

2. **How would the community describe the Wilmington Police Department’s policing style?**

   The respondents (N=125) provided responses along the following themes:

• **Irregular** – Respondents described WPDs policing style as ineffective, inconsistent, hands off and/or irregular. They were clear that WPD polices differently depending on the residents or side of town that they are working. The residents state that they have seen the police drive by areas where there has been violence and not stop to address people who are loitering. On the other hand there were many descriptions of officers stopping and harassing juveniles.

   The respondents described groups of juveniles who were walking and bothering no one, and officers will stop them, handcuff them, and then search them. If they don’t find anything they release them. Residents have classified it as “Walking While Black” and when they inquire about what is happening, they report that officers allegedly swear at them or threaten to arrest them.

• **Unapproachable and Isolated** – The respondents advised that the police are unapproachable. The respondents noted that when they have offered to help, the police have refused their help. One resident shared a story about a burglary where the suspect left his phone at the victim’s house. WPD’s Crime Scene Unit allowed the victim to take names from the suspect’s phone and the victim located the suspect online the same night.

   The suspect had taken pictures of the victim’s shoes that he had stolen as well as a watch. When WPD was contacted with the information, there was no response. It allegedly took over six months for a response and by that time the victim was frustrated and refused to
cooperate. This same frustration was reiterated by homicide victim family members during each meeting. They all stated that WPD refused to return calls.

- **Elimination of Community Policing** – Segments of the community had excellent relationships with their Community Police Officers, while others advised that they had not received the same level of service. Respondents felt that services are not equitably distributed, and if they are, there is no accountability. Those who had community police officers spoke very highly of them but wanted the WPD to stop changing them.

3. **Why is there a disconnect between community and the police in this community? Are there incidents which have caused the disconnect? If so what are they?**

Respondents (N=150) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Lack of Trust on Both Sides** – The respondents offered the following incidents as examples of a disconnect between the community and the WPD: The lack of follow up by the police department when it comes to their investigations, their failure to solve homicides and shootings, their use of social media and making of negative comments by the officers about the community, the tactics that some WPD officers employ, and the fact that the community believes that there are no consequences for the officers’ unprofessional behavior (the police shooting on Vandever Avenue where the community describes the story as changing multiple times), a refusal of the police to work with the community and accept citizen assistance, what the community perceives as some officers displaying poor attitudes towards the community.

- **The Chief of Police and the Command Staff** – Several respondents noted that WPD’s failure was due to the lack of leadership and discipline. They believe that the Chief and the command staff are aware of the problems but have failed to address the problem. The questions were asked: Why aren’t officers being disciplined for their behavior? One respondent noted that this disconnect did not happen overnight, that it is the culture of the department that has to change because it took years for the department to get this way.

4. **Identify and prioritize what you believe to be the top three crime problems that need immediate attention. If I were to ask law enforcement officials the same question do you believe that they would view them as the same?**

Respondents (N=150) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Community Priorities** – Although respondents were asked to prioritize the top three (3) crime problems, they listed five (5) from highest to lowest: guns, murder, drugs, gangs, robbery, child neglect, and a lack of funding for youth programs.

- **Police** – The respondents believe that police would prioritize the problems in order of highest to lowest as murder, guns, and drugs. Several noted murder and guns, but did not know what else the police saw as important, which is the same feedback we obtained from interviews of business leaders.
5. What are the resources you believe the agency should use to address the aforementioned problems?

Respondents (N=100) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Community Resources** - The respondents noted that they were frustrated because there are so many organizations that want to help; however, WPD has not taken any initiative to organize the groups or to address the problems. All mention that they have contacted WPD to offer assistance, but have gotten no response.

- **Deployment of Resources** - The respondents all noted that having more police on the street is essential and described policing styles that they believe to be effective: community policing, hot spot patrols, enforce curfew; advertising of their crime solving successes.

- **Investing in Youth** – The respondents would like to see WPD invest in youth by expanding PAL, and creating a Cadet or Explorer Program to cultivate productive citizens. It was noted that failure to invest in such programs does nothing but foster poor relationships and perceptions by both sides.

6. History shows us that police cannot solve the problem alone so, what will it take to get the community involved and to form partnerships with law enforcement?

Respondents (N=150) provided responses along the following themes:

- The respondents felt, as they noted in question 5, that WPD and the citizens should become partners working together to address the many problems, which means that there needs to be a fair and equitable exchange of information with both sides listening, the development of an effective community model, and participation by local businesses.

7. How does the community view the agency? How does WPD police personnel view the community they serve?

Respondents (N=132) provided responses along the following themes:

- **Community Views the Agency** – “WPD doesn’t care; nothing but broken promises, especially when it comes to the homicides and shootings; disparities and differences in how the blacks are treated, versus whites; officers are not invested in the black community; police are our enemy; they treat our kids as if everyone is a suspect; ineffective and untrustworthy.”

- **WPD View of the Community** – “The black community is the enemy; the black community is nothing more than criminals; they (the black community) are all drugs abusers and scum; and every kid is a suspect. The black community believes that the officers are sacred and don’t understand them and as a result the black community is treated with disrespect.”
MEETINGS WITH LOCAL RESEARCHERS

On February 19, 2015, the Police Foundation team met with researchers at the University of Delaware to learn about their work in studying and addressing the public safety issues in Wilmington.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the homicide and violence problem in Wilmington, questions were prepared in advance, to serve as a starting point for the conversation, and were based on our preliminary research and informed our subsequent discussion and findings. The questions revolved around getting a better picture of the nature of violent crime in Wilmington. In order to get this information, we posed questions about demographic of offenders and victims, such as age, sex, race, and relationships. We asked about gangs, seeking information about the geographic area that they claim, the names of the gangs, the age and race of the members, and if gang violence is related to the drug trade, and if the days when drugs were delivered corresponded to violence such as shootings and robberies. We also posed questions about the number of homicides and/or aggravated assaults, and how many of them were related to domestic violence.

Crime Data

The University of Delaware researchers advised us that there are gangs in Wilmington and that there were juveniles as young as thirteen (13) involved in the gang activity. In fact, they stated that the majority of the shooting incidents involved youth between thirteen (13) and seventeen (17) years of age. They noted that it is often predictable when a shooting is going to occur because the shooters have arguments on social media, that can be followed back and forth, until it reaches the point that a shooting is going to occur. Data supplied by the researchers shows the following:

- In 2009, 77.5% of all the shootings were perpetrated by black males against black male victims.
- From January 2014 through June 2014 most of the shootings occurred in neighborhoods or blocks which have a vacancy rate of 21% or higher.
- From January 2014 through June 2014, most of the shootings occurred in neighborhoods or blocks that have an unemployment rate greater than 15%.
- From January 2014 through June 2014, most of the shootings occurred in neighborhoods or blocks where the poverty rate is 21% or higher.

Contributing Factors to Violent Crime

In reviewing the data provided by the researchers, we discovered that the most prominent contributing factors to the homicides and violence are unemployment, poverty, and neighborhoods or blocks that have been abandoned. This data supports the arguments made by residents in the surveys and community meetings.

Source of Firearms

Since firearms are central to the majority of the violence in Wilmington and seem so readily available to juveniles, we inquired as to the source of the firearms. We were told that the firearms used are often straw purchases and bought in Wilmington locally. The buyer is usually a
single mother or drug addict who purchases the firearms for shooters in exchange for money, narcotics, or both.

**MEETINGS WITH GOVERNMENT & POLITICAL OFFICIALS**

The same questions were posed to various government officials within the criminal justice system. The officials confirmed that there were gangs, and that the primary motives are drugs and money. They also advised that they can see the trends and alliances, and have gained information from the juveniles in detention, but WPD does not take advantage of the resources or intelligence information.

**Source of Firearms**

These officials agreed with the researchers that most, if not all, of the firearms are the result of straw purchases.

**School Performance**

Many officials noted that many juveniles do extremely well in school during the time they are in detention. This observation is consistent with the suggestion of inherent bias in schools, as noted in the meetings with community members.

**Juvenile Aftercare**

One of the major faults of the juvenile justice system around the country has been a lack of aftercare (reentry) services and follow-up after release. It is the view of various government officials that this is the case in Wilmington as well. They acknowledged that this has been a longstanding problem. One issue with juvenile aftercare is that the system is designed as “one size fits all.” The difficulty with such this approach is that many juveniles have different needs and the system is not designed to address those needs so it focuses on what it can, such as drug treatment. Missing are programs that address employment skills, parenting skills, and educational needs.

**Perceptions of the Wilmington Police Department**

Various officials stated they have very little input into the police department. They believed that hiring and promotion practices were detrimental to the morale of the police department and that Chief Cummings is not being allowed to do his best. The attendees noted that morale is so bad WPD is losing officers at the rate of one (1) per month.

They alleged and then described in detail how citizens’ complaints against officers are never investigated by the Office of Professional Standards. Their views supported those of the community in that complainants encountered the officers that they were complaining against in the lobby of the police department and that the complainants felt intimidated and did not file the complaints. In regards to the complaints that are filed, they said complainants never hear back from the department and that they were aware of instances where supervisors were instructed to investigate the complaints and never made contact with the complainant. Because no tracking number is issued the complaints can easily be misplaced. They suggested moving the Office of Professional Standards from department headquarters might be a way to remedy this situation and provide complainants some degree of comfort when filing their complaints.
Another area of concern was duplication of services that takes money away from placing more officers on the street. There was some suggestions that the WPD Human Resources and the City Human Resources could be combined.

There was also a feeling that the procurement process is too lengthy, which delays the purchase and installation of much needed equipment. The example that they cited was the new Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) system and advised their belief that officers are out of the City on meal breaks, ‘sleeping on duty’, and parked under overpasses not patrolling. The implementation of the new CAD system was, in their view, to assist in eliminating the aforementioned problems because it has GPS. And non-working CCTV cameras has been a long standing issue. As an example they mentioned homicides, shootings, and drug deals occurring right in front of the cameras and when checked for data, they allege that nothing could be located.

Some officials mentioned the department losing access to valuable resources from the federal government when Operation Disrupt was implemented and Chief Cummings pulled all of his officers from Federal Task Forces to place more officers on the street. In addition, they felt that in the future other agencies would be reluctant to work with WPD because of its lack of commitment and willingness to stay the course. They describe WPD as fighting this battle alone - without support, without input from other agencies, and without the community.

Some members mentioned that there have been some successful efforts in bringing the neighborhood together by establishing neighborhood watch and block captains, by walking the community with the community police officers and knock on residents doors introducing the officers, and by hosting neighborhood events to engage juveniles as well as adults. Through these efforts she has seen total community buy in. This should be a model for the rest of the city.

**Quality of Homicide Investigations**

During each of the community meetings there were a number complaints regarding the clearance rate of homicides and shootings by WPD. Over the course of several meetings, it was revealed that there is a view that prosecutors and police apparently have differing views on case status and procedures. From media reports and professional contacts, the government officials we met with had formed views of the problems, including:

- Failure to process crime scenes and evidence appropriately (we received similar information from anonymous members of the community regarding mishandling of evidence and, in one case, contraband)
- Failure to adequately staff and process crime scenes, with some alleging that officers/investigators may spend as little as two hours at a scene instead of doing whatever it takes to process the scene appropriately. It was further alleged that the officers/investigators would return the next day with a team to follow up on the case
- Failing to canvas a neighborhood immediately after such an incident means that so much is lost even up to and including the intimidation of witnesses. (One community member advised that her son’s friend was murdered at the front door of his house. Concerned for the child and the mother the community member went to the victim’s house approximately two (2) hours after the homicide and noted that the house was dark, there was no police presence and no crime scene processing, and no detectives or officers were canvassing the neighborhood.)
“Lack of Collaboration”

Since the collection of evidence is key to the success or failure of any case we inquired if there were routine or ad hoc meetings between WPD and other criminal justice agency leaders where these concerns could be addressed. We were advised that one agency attempted to arrange regular meetings, but attendance ultimately dwindled until the meetings ended. Others we spoke with shared that they had offered to meet and work together but these offers were not responded to.

In the weeks since this data collection began, we are aware that WPD has begun reaching out to key partners such as the State Prosecutor’s Office and has since established regular meetings to review major investigations. We find this action to be highly encouraging.

“Failing the Community”

In every community meeting we met with a number of family members who lost loved ones and the plea was always the same. “WPD is doing nothing. My child has been murdered and they won’t even return my phone calls.”

In one of our “walk and talks,” an official noted that the term community was too broad and felt that police should be focusing their attention on neighborhoods. When provided with a map of the neighborhood with problems spots highlighted, it was interesting to note that each problem location was one with abandoned or rundown property. During our conversation the official provided a copy of a paper entitled: Safe Neighborhoods, which describes: community engagement, initiatives for African American Males, hot spot policing, the Broken Windows Policing Model, the use of technology, and justice reinvestment. We also discussed the concept of Community Court, which is designed to offer neighborhoods a localized method for problem solving (see Attachment 5).

RECOMMENDATIONS:

There are a number of proven programs that have been successful in researching the Wilmington Delaware Criminal Justice System; however, we did not locate many resources in the area of prevention and/or intervention when it comes to juveniles.

• Examine diversion programs as alternative sanctions and deferring prosecution for juveniles who commit misdemeanor violations. A civil citation program should also be explored. The programs that are established should be done so with the inclusion of a matrix evaluating what level of services the juvenile will need. The goals are twofold: prevention and intervention.

• In addition to the alternative sanctions, the schools should consider violence prevention programs that should be taught as part of the regular curriculum. Research shows that such programs should begin as early as elementary school.

• The Wilmington community has a number of organizations that want to assist in the reduction of violence. Although well intentioned they are disorganized. It is recommended that an organization or coalition take on organizing these resources in an effort to determine their capabilities, services offered, and funding sources. Once the
information is gathered a plan of action should be implemented, coordinating the services with each of the aforementioned partners. It is our belief that once this information is collected and the backgrounds of the members are known, that they could volunteer in schools, at WPD, and assist in any of the alternative sanction programs. This is a valuable untapped community resource.

- Wilmington Police Department should establish working relationships with all of the recommended partners: school districts, prosecutor’s office, Family Court, and Youth and Family Services. It has long worked in isolation, but to be effective it needs to establish partnerships.
- Wilmington Police Department should reestablish the Community Policing Program. This is one of the most valuable tools that it has and it has been abandoned. The failure to maintain such a program has an impact on their ability to solve the homicides.
- Recent renewed collaboration between the WPD and the State Prosecutor is highly encouraging and both entities should work together to continue these regular meetings where open cases are discussed, action steps (including outreach to crime victims) is determined and with regular follow-up to assess progress.
- WPD should re-examine its protocol for responding to major crimes, particularly homicides, to ensure that responsibilities to canvass the neighborhood and crime scenes processing requirements are spelled out.
- At every homicide the agency’s Victim Advocate should be called and considered a point of contact for family members when seeking information.
- WPD should re-examine is protocols that may impact conduct and professionalism while using social media and while on duty and particularly at crime scenes, so that conduct and statements to not exacerbate the trauma experienced by victims and family members.
- WPD and its partners should come to terms with the extent to which gangs and narcotics are driving violence in Wilmington. Although we initially heard that organized gangs were not present in Wilmington, substantial information from the community and from criminal justice agency partners and other researchers told a different story.
- Wilmington Police Department should establish a working relationship with Juvenile Probation at the leadership and working levels, and utilize its services to assist in preventing and solving crime.
- Wilmington Police Department has had diversity training with Dr. Yasser Payne from the University of Delaware. It is recommended that this process be completed annually or biannually.

**FACTORS IMPACTING CRIME THAT ARE NOT POLICE RELATED:**

During every interview and on every survey the respondents noted a number of other issues that they viewed as contributing factors to the crime problem, and each understood that it was beyond the scope of this report, yet we would be remiss if we did not list them.
• Potentially biased school disciplinary practices against African American students.
• Lack of employment for juveniles.
• Lack of job training programs for juveniles and adults.
• Lack of sufficient reentry programs for ex-offenders.
• Lack of or no aftercare programs for juveniles who have been released from juvenile detention.
• Neighborhood decay, abandoned properties and homes.
• Poverty.

We would recommend that local school officials expand efforts to collaborate with Family Court, the Prosecutor’s Office, Youth and Family Services, and the Police. The goal should be to use all available resources in the establishment of prevention and intervention programs.

CONCLUSIONS

If there is going to be change, old values of organizations have to be challenged. The only way to do that is through ownership, encouraging the employees to become change agents, and supporting these efforts, listening to employees throughout the organization and considering their views.

Relationships versus Partnerships:

In addition to the cultural change, every group all the way down to the 12-year-old juvenile stated that they wanted a relationship with WPD. The term relationships in policing is similar to one having an acquaintance where there is very little investment in the process. The term partnership by itself implies that there is unity and that all who buy in to the process have the same or similar goals. The key to a partnership is that there is trust and in this case that trust has to begin in the communities that WPD serves. In order to facilitate this partnership, the Community Policing Program needs to be reinstituted with an emphasis on every community that has an officer or team, meeting the residents.

Chief Cummings and the command staff do “walk and talks” all the time but they are not the officers the community deals with on a daily basis. It is suggested that these introductions be made to the residents with City Council Members by walking the Councilperson’s District, knocking on doors, and personally introducing the officer(s). With that said, the assignment to the Community Policing Unit should be viewed as a long-term assignment, a minimum of one (1) year. To change officers any sooner destroys the possibility of establishing meaningful partnerships. It is here where the information exchange begins regarding narcotics, shootings, and homicides. The Community Policing Units should have some autonomy and be allowed to organize neighborhood cleanups, sporting activities, tutoring, mentoring, and field trips as examples.

Mending Broken Partnerships with Criminal Justice Partners:

Some of the government officials within Wilmington’s criminal justice system described their relationship with WPD as being non-existent. Each noted a failure to use available resources to assist in solving cases. To repair these partnerships it will take meetings with Division
Chiefs/Directors and a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the organizations detailing expectations, roles, and responsibilities.

The history of WPD is such that its only engages in programs short term and has been described as reassigning officers frequently. Again, this investment is something that has to be long term because without such a commitment there is no continuity and a lack of trust by participating agencies.

Ultimately, to fix the problems it has to begin in the halls of WPD. It must examine its core values and mission. Internal culture, including how the rank and file is heard and responded to within the agency is critical to re-examine. WPD must and should reinvest in Community Policing. WPD must reestablish its credibility with its Criminal Justice Partners. Finally, when WPD makes a commitment it must understand the value of such assignments and allow officers to remain in those assignments. Anything less destroys the bond and successful partnerships.

Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington
Part II: Input Collected from the Community During Commission Meetings

The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission (“the Commission”) held five public meetings between February 10, 2015 and March 31, 2015. The first four of these meetings were public in nature and included cursory briefings from the Police Foundation and VRI as well as brief invited topical presentations. The bulk of the time in the first four meetings was dedicated to hearing from community organizations and entities (e.g., community organizations, business leaders, law enforcement, etc.) and members of the community. According to the Delaware Criminal Justice Coordinating Council, which staffed the Commission meetings, 277 individuals from the community attended the first four meetings, with 72 signing up to speak. Some citizens attended and spoke at multiple meetings and thus the attendance figure includes these “duplicate” counts. In addition to these public meetings, many individuals approached or contacted various members of the study team between the first meeting on February 10, 2015 and the last meeting on March 31, 2015. Despite very consistent and clear messaging that the community was “tired of being studied,” the team found the community to be very forthcoming and engaged, with some individuals even expressing disappointment about not being contacted or interviewed by the team.

The subheadings below are in quotations to reflect the fact that, in many cases, these are direct quotes from one or more community members who attended a Commission meeting.
“Establishing trust, especially between communities of color and police is as priceless and fragile as a Faberge Egg. Equally, it’s as hard to come by and easily shattered. But it is a prize worth working for. Let’s work with them and make it happen.”  

- Browntown Resident’s Comments Made at the March 10, 2015 Commission Meeting

“Return to true community policing”

As stated by a neighborhood association leader and dozens of other citizens and business leaders who spoke publicly to the Commission or in individual meetings with the consultants, “we need true community policing.” Of interest to the Police Foundation is that in many communities across America, members of the public often describe community policing by its tactics, without using the “community policing” terminology or knowing that it is community policing they are describing. In Wilmington, it was overwhelmingly the opposite, with citizens not only calling for community policing by name, but describing its features as if reciting a family recipe that they had become familiar with over many years of use. This was true nearly regardless of whom we spoke to in terms of affiliation or neighborhood. Some feedback to the Commission was very specific, for example, asking for “at least 30 dedicated community officers,” or stating, “officers that are empowered to solve problems is key.” Others spoke of the trust that is both necessary for community policing to be effective and an outcome of the approach when implemented successfully: “Trust itself evolves out of relationship of two parties relating to each other as a result of having consistent engagement over a protracted period of time. Hence, the vital nature and value of having a dedicated officer getting to know and becoming embedded into a specific geographical location. But solidifying that trust also means the community willingly [taking] the risk to stand in the gap for our CPU and vouch for them to the community. Some of us are willing to step up and take that chance in order to help build that bridge between residents and the police.” Those who spoke of problem solving as a key resource that community policing brings to the community, spoke of the importance of streamlining problem solving, sharing an example of an officer who could make a phone call from the neighborhood and have the Department’s Command Bus driven to the community where it was parked on the street to serve notice to residents and troublemakers alike of the police presence in the community or to have other steps immediately taken. Those who spoke of trust as a key factor often talked about specific individuals as examples, who have earned the community’s trust through their deeds. For example, one resident shared “There is something I fundamentally believe and often state. People trust what they know. Case in point – we in the 6th district know Corporal “V” (name withheld). We know as a community we can rely on him. We know we can partner with him to devise effective strategies to deal with the crime issues specific to Browntown and experience success with our collective ideas. We know he will take our concerns seriously and address them best he can. Most importantly, the community knows that we can safely pass sensitive information to our Community officer necessary for them to do the job they do without fear of our safety being compromised.” Others referred to selected commanders in the Department who have worked hard to establish such trust and many echoed this same sentiment for Chief Bobby Cummings, as was previously echoed in The People’s Report, prepared by Yasser Arafat Payne, Ph.D. of the University of Delaware, when Chief Cummings was then a Captain in the Wilmington Police Department. This echoed what Chief Cummings told us in our first discussion with him when he shared that his policing philosophy was built around community
oriented policing and “strong connections to the community” and is also consistent with what other leaders in law enforcement shared about the Chief in our discussions with them. In addition to underscoring the importance of community engagement, problem solving and trust, those encouraging the Commission to make recommendations for the restoration of community policing also underscored the importance of consistency in assignments. Numerous citizens spoke of the importance of having an officer assigned to an area and keeping that same officer assigned for an extended period of time, to allow the relationships and trust to grow, the problems and solutions to be identified, and to give the community a chance to breathe and grow. Another member of the community noted: getting back to community or neighborhood policing as a routine manner of operation is key and is currently happening in the Downtown/Riverfront area, “but why isn’t this taking place in the other communities where there is violence?”

“Implementation is the Challenge”

At the initial public meeting of the Commission on February 10, before the fifth speaker had come to the microphone to speak, a phrase was uttered that would be heard over and over again in nearly every corner of the community: “Implementation is the challenge.” Repeatedly, community members and professionals in Wilmington’s justice community commented that one of two things typically occur in Wilmington. Most frustrating to the community is that problems are studied and nothing is done to react or to implement the recommendations. At one meeting, a community member brought copies of four prior studies and asked the Commission how this process will be different. A member of the faith community commented at the March 10 meeting that “the answers are the same from all the studies, the question is, what are we doing about it?” The other scenario that community members and justice professionals said frequently occurs is where an approach is designed and implemented to address a particular problem, but not fully or properly implemented or implemented and then dismantled or disbanded within a short period of time, before the strategy has a chance to be effective. Some seemed to suggest that this was due to an event or spike in crime that causes a “knee-jerk” reaction in the leadership, believing that the strategy isn’t effective or quickly jumping to another strategy so as to appear to be doing something about the problem. Examples of this phenomenon include the implementation of the Boston Ceasefire Model, the Hope Outreach Experience, and the Drug Market Intervention or DMI, all of which were implemented to address a particular problem but ultimately “died.” One member of the community noted his concerns with a lack of support for Cure Violence in Wilmington, another evidence-based program that holds great promise for stemming retaliatory violence among youth, citing a lack of political, managerial and resource (e.g., job opportunities) support behind the program. As one community member shared at the March 10 Commission meeting “we’ve got to rally around things that work.”

“Not Everyone is a Criminal”

Many in the community passionately spoke to us about feeling as though the police often see everyone in the community as a criminal, a comment that was often emphasized with regard to African-American males, particularly the youth. A member of the faith community commented at the March 10 meeting that youth in the community don’t trust the police due to their lack of communication and the fact that they only come into the community when there is a problem.
Others commented about what they see as disrespect by the police towards youth generally and at times towards the community generally, with some noting observed apathy and an appearance of carelessness by law enforcement while at crime scenes or on personal social media where officers allegedly posted insensitive or disrespectful comments about events in the community. To be clear, while these comments were received from a variety of individuals in the community, we also received or otherwise observed many positive comments about Wilmington law enforcement officers and the WPD, including many unsolicited favorable comments. In fact, it was somewhat surprising to hear so many community members in Wilmington acknowledge that they understood the purpose and value of law enforcement in the community and supported law enforcement’s efforts, but urged it to be done fairly and respectfully, as if arguing for procedural fairness as a means to greater legitimacy within the eyes of the community.

“Anything Other Than a Comprehensive Approach Will Not Work”

Across all four Commission meetings and in individual discussions, community members pointed out that the City has many organizations doing great work and the work they do often addresses the root causes of the safety, economic and achievement issues, which is also critical for the success of the community. It quickly became obvious that Wilmington is fortunate to have many community assets and is likely well poised to establish a broader collective efficacy than many would expect, given the recent media coverage of Wilmington. Indeed, Wilmington has more than its fair share of great, committed and talented people who are willing “to roll up their sleeves” and make their communities safer in partnership with the Wilmington Police Department and other agencies that can contribute to public safety, at the City, County, and State levels. As community members and the business community pointed out, particularly at the March 10th meeting, insufficient effort has been applied towards organizing and supporting these groups, mobilizing and coordinating their resources to fill gaps. Should there be the need for any “army of occupation” in Wilmington, it should be this army, an army of the willing. Time after time, we heard stories of organizing efforts at the neighborhood level and witnessed individuals with strong leadership skills and charisma who could do so much more if supported and enabled through a strategic, neutrally-facilitated organizing effort that brings the power of the informal and formal community groups to the places that need them and helps to ensure that those in the community who need the services and supports know where to find the resources and ultimately reach them. Many community members raised questions about who resources have gone to in the community and questioned the wisdom of providing more funding for police overtime versus allocating those funds for root causes. As one public official noted, the Commission meetings raised awareness among many of the existence of some of these groups.

A variety of other themes emerged less consistently as we heard from citizens at the Commission meetings and in individual discussions.

These themes included the importance of engaging Wilmington’s youth in the discussions of crime and safety and more generally how to improve the community. As one community member stated at the initial public meeting, “we need to support the kids raising kids.” Without question, true community policing does engage the youth in the community, as they are a key part of the community and, they are the future of all of our communities. But what was encouraged by most was a broader effort to listen to the youth in the community and to engage
them in broader problem solving, as many feel, and likely so, as things have changed since any of us walked in their shoes.

Another theme that emerged in the Commission meetings and more so in individual meetings, was the need for transparency and accountability, not only within the Wilmington Police Department, but across City government. This issue was raised in a variety of contexts, including the need for more transparent police handling of complaints against officers from the community, budget and funding transparency for services and resources within the City, officer deployment, productivity, and staffing levels, and the operation and utilization of the City’s network of cameras, most of which are monitored by City personnel located within the Downtown Visions facility. In terms of accountability, one law enforcement leader noted, “in some cases, [the community] is right, and we need to do better.” In fact, Chief Cummings at the fourth Commission meeting made a point to say to the audience that he and the Department want change as much as everyone else. The specific concerns raised regarding accountability and transparency include a feeling from within the community that it is intentionally difficult and at times citizens are discouraged from making complaints against officers. Some noted that once a complaint is made, they rarely hear anything back from the Department regarding whether the complaint was looked into and whether the allegations were founded or unfounded. The specific concerns noted with regard to the cameras centered around whether the cameras were working and if they are being actively monitored. This latter concern is the subject of a separate document within the report to the Commission, due to its importance to the community.

Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

Part III: Input Collected from the Business Community

“The Commission should produce full disclosure on what’s being done by the City and the Police Department… lifting the veil on what’s being done. The secrecy has not been helpful.”

- Wilmington Business Leader via Individual Interview

Members of the corporate business community, representing thousands of Wilmington workers, were engaged through one-on-one interviews and through focus-group type discussions. Additionally, members of the business community were invited to the fourth Commission meeting to share their views with the Commission.

“Perception Becomes Reality”

Members of the business community stressed that the perception of crime and disorder in Wilmington is as harmful to them as the actual crimes taking place. Several members of the
business community pointed to the Newsweek and Wall Street Journal articles and the lack of positive or strategic messaging coming from the Wilmington Police Department and the City as being highly detrimental. Similarly, some commented on how stories of public order offenses and something as basic as the theft of an iPhone are like “fish stories” that grow bigger and bigger as they make their way from Wilmington to corporate headquarters and ultimately to the board room via official channels as well as the “company water cooler talk.” Many lamented about the media’s coverage of Wilmington’s crime and described it as slanted, unfair, and “glorifying” of those who commit gun violence within the City. The perceptions not only influence corporate decisions about their future in Wilmington, but impact the employees as well, with some noting that employees are “afraid to come outside.” When asked whether the business community had access to factual information from the Department and the ability to engage the Department in discussions of the crime issues, it was apparent that access was highly dependent on personal relationships as opposed to any process or mechanism of information sharing. When asked about the Police Advisory Council, Business Roundtable, or Security Advisory Committee, some in the business community were unfamiliar with those groups.

“The Police Department Doesn’t See Public Order Crimes as a Priority”

Citizens who attended and spoke at Commission meetings and business leaders who were interviewed seemed to agree that creating order in public places was a necessity. However, many believe that these offenses (e.g., public intoxication, aggressive panhandling, public indecencies, littering, loud music, etc.) are simply not a priority and that the Police Department doesn’t fully understand the impact of these crimes on employees, the business community, the perception of crime in Wilmington overall, and ultimately the economic basis of the City. Business leaders seemed to agree that there is “a big lack of visibility” by the Department and that community policing, and in particular, foot and/or bike patrols in the downtown areas were a much-needed tactic in order to address these issues.

Other issues, less consistently raised by the business community, included offers of assistance to the Police Department and/or the City from the business community and neighboring jurisdictions, which have reportedly been left unaccepted. Examples include a recent offer to provide analytic support that has not yet been followed up on and a donated substation within the LOMA area of downtown, which is “not used” according to the community. The study team did stop by this storefront during the daytime hours and found it unoccupied and having the appearance of never having been occupied. One business leader with a background in public relations did offer to provide assistance and expertise to the Police Department in terms of its communications and communications strategy. Another issue raised by members of the business community was that it is clear to them that morale within the Wilmington Police Department is very low. One business leader commented to us that good officers have left due to perceived lack of advancement and leadership and due to a perception that “if you are white, you don’t have a chance.”
"Chief Cummings is the Best Thing to Happen to That Police Department in a Long Time"

While business leaders expressed concern and frustration with what they regard as a lack of visible community policing and attention to public order in the downtown area, many business leaders, like community members, expressed strong views about what they described as very positive developments from the Police Department and from the State Attorney General’s Office. One business leader commented that “Chief Cummings is the Best Thing to Happen to That Police Department in a Long Time,” and another talked about how the WPD’s Sector Commander and the Crime Strategies Unit were working together with the business community on an effort called the Creative District Strategy, of the Wilmington Renaissance Corporation. This strategy involves reducing vacancy rates, creative place making, changing perceptions of place and engaging residents in a proactive way to improve the community and ultimately to reduce crime and improve safety. The business leader we spoke to described this as very good coordination and engagement by various members of the Wilmington Police Department and great collaboration across City and State agencies.

In addition to this positive support for the Wilmington Police Department and the State Attorney General’s Crime Strategies Unit, the business community was openly appreciative of the efforts of Downtown Visions, the management company for the Wilmington Downtown Business Improvement District (WDBID). In addition to its other roles and functions, Downtown Visions provides goodwill ambassadors in the downtown area and monitor and maintain dozens of cameras as well as supporting nearly 70 others within Wilmington. Many business leaders encouraged continued and expanded support for the work of Downtown Visions, which they say has made a tremendous difference in the downtown area.

REFERENCES


A Report of Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 1
YOU CAN'T BUILD PEACE WITH A PIECE.

ASK YOURSELF THESE TWO (2) QUESTIONS
If you could change anything about the Wilmington Police Department what would it be?
What do you want the Chief of Police and the officers to know about you and your community?

If your truly fed up with the senseless gun violence plaguing our City & KILLING OUR CHILDREN, PROVE IT!
join me
Saturday, February 21, 2015
10:00am—2:00pm
2102 Northeast Boulevard (The Masjid)
A Report of Community Input on
Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 2
MOVEMENT FOR A CULTURE OF PEACE

VIOLENCE REDUCTION IN WILMINGTON

...Connecting the Dots

Many new initiatives and programs seek to stem violence in Wilmington. How do they interact and overlap? What will our combined efforts look like going forward? How do we see this coming together?

PUBLIC PANEL AND OPEN DISCUSSION

BOBBY CUMMINGS, Chief, Wilmington Police Department
DOUG IARDELLA, Public Safety Liaison, City of Wilmington
DARRYL "WOLFIE" CHAMBERS, Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission
DAVID J. THOMAS, Senior Research Fellow, Police Foundation

SAT., MARCH 7 — 9:00 a.m. to 11 a.m.
HANOVER PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH
1801 N JEFFERSON ST, WILMINGTON, DE 19802

Info at: www.wilmingtonpeaceconcert.wordpress.com
Questions: (302) 656-2721
A Report of Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 3
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS DIVISION

Directive: 8.6

A. Authority

The Internal Affairs Division is a staff section which coordinates and exercises supervision over investigations and complaints or allegations of misconduct against members of the Department. Since discipline is a function of command, the responsibility for the conduct of such investigations normally rests within the chain of command. However, the Internal Affairs Division will be responsible for the following types of cases. (CALEA 52.2.4)

1. All allegations by citizens against departmental personnel.

2. All cases referred by the Chief of Police. (CALEA 52.2.4)

3. Any allegations against departmental personnel involving any violation of departmental rules, regulations, or orders, which are not suitable to the summary punishment process by nature of seriousness or other circumstantial considerations (CALEA 52.2.4)

This section applies to those instances where a violation meets the criteria for "elevation" in the classification of punishment. (See Section 8.2.)

B. Responsibilities

The Internal Affairs Division will:

1. Upon receipt of a complaint from a citizen, fully investigate the complaint.
a. All serious complaints will be recorded and subsequently transcribed verbatim in a standard typed form. (CALEA 52.2.4)

b. Once the serious complaint has been transcribed, the following paragraph will be inserted at the end of the last transcribed paragraph. (CALEA 52.2.4)

I ____________________,
of ____________________,
do solemnly swear/affirm that the information contained herein is accurate and true to the best of my knowledge. Further, I acknowledge receipt of a copy of this complaint.

c. The complainant will be given a copy of the complaint.

SEAL Signature of Complainant
Signature of Witnessing Official
Signature of Investigating Officer
Date ____________________

2. Enter all complaints in the Internal Affairs Control Log. Spaces will be provided for control numbers, departmental case numbers where applicable; name, rank, badge number, and assignment of the alleged violator, date and time complaint was received or investigation ordered by the Chief of Police; nature of the alleged violation; name of the reporting person, (if sworn, name, rank, and badge number of reporting officer); date and time of all reports submitted relative to the complaint; if suspended, date and time, date and time case is presented to departmental Complaint Hearing Board, date and time of any appeal action on the case. In addition, the Internal Affairs Division is required to document and maintain all disciplinary action by subject matter or charge. (CALEA 52.1.2)

3. Safeguard the Internal Affairs Control Log, files, and other records of the division. Access to inactive files shall be limited to the Inspector of Staff Inspections, the Chief of Police, The Director of Public Safety, and the City Solicitor. Physical control of inactive files shall be the responsibility of the Inspector of Staff Inspections. Access to active files shall be limited to the Chief of Police, the Director of Public Safety, the Inspector of Staff Inspectors, the Commander of Internal Affairs Division, Internal Affairs investigating officers, and the City Solicitor. Other persons may be permitted access to Internal Affairs records from time to time by order of the Chief of Police upon the advice of the City Solicitor. (CALEA 52.1.2)

4. Be responsible for the expeditious and timely investigation of all complaints.

5. Assist in preliminary investigations conducted by other units of the department:

a. Upon their justifiable request.

b. When Inspector of Staff Inspections concludes that the circumstances
warrant elevation in the classification of a violation (as per Section 8.2).

Conduct an investigation at the request of any member of the department, who
upon showing of justification, believes he is threatened by false accusation or
the complaint is contrived by ulterior motives. Such persons are permitted to
report their situations directly to the Inspector of Staff Inspections, without
prior knowledge or approval of their immediate superiors. Suspected criminal
activity or activity contrary to the regulations so stated in this manual shall be
reported in the above manner.

6. It will be the responsibility of the Commanding Officer of the Internal Affairs
Division, or his designee, to notify the Chief of Police, or his designee, as soon as
possible under the following circumstances: (CALEA 52.2.2, 52.1.3)

   a. Any incident where the possibility exists that an officer may face criminal
      prosecution.

   b. Any police action, where there is an allegation of misconduct which may result
      in public dissemination of the complaint and/or the possibility of public
      inquiry or discredit.

7. The Commanding Officer of the Internal Affairs Division, or his designee, will inform
the Chief of Police, or his designee, of all other complaints of police misconduct
through the normal chain of command. (CALEA 52.2.2, 52.1.3)

C. Review of Complaints (CALEA 52.2.8)

The Internal Affairs Division will review complaints and classify each complaint as
substantiated, unsubstantiated, unfounded, proper conduct, or policy failure according to the
following criteria:

**SUBSTANTIATED:** There is sufficient proof to confirm the allegation by a
preponderance of the evidence. In any case where a complaint
against an officer is not substantially refuted by opposing facts
or testimony and the Internal Affairs investigator determines
that conflicting versions of the allegations cannot be resolved
without resort to the taking of live testimony to test the
credibility of the witnesses, then the complaint shall be deemed
substantiated for purpose of referring it to a Complaint Hearing
Board for a hearing.

**UNSUBSTANTIATED:** There is insufficient proof to confirm the allegation.

**UNFOUNDED:** The allegation is either demonstrably false or there is no
credible evidence to support it.

**PROPER CONDUCT:** The officer is exonerated, since he conducted himself in the
manner alleged, but was within policy guidelines.

POLICY FAILURE: A review by the Internal Affairs Division will be made to determine if the policy is proper or improper, or if additional training is required.

D. Substantiated Complaints

After a complaint has been classified as "substantiated," the Internal Affairs Division will:

1. When the action recommended to the Chief of Police falls under the provisions of the Summary Punishment Section, the Internal Affairs Division will be notified in writing, and will inform the accused. From the time of his being informed, the accused will have twenty-four (24) hours to waive or exercise his right, in writing, to a departmental hearing.

2. Upon receipt of written notice from the accused that he is requesting a Complaint Hearing Board, a report will be forwarded to the Inspector of Staff Inspections requesting the convening of a Complaint Hearing Board.

3. Upon receipt of a written notice from the accused, that he is waiving this right to departmental Complaint Hearing Board, a report will be forwarded to the Inspector of Staff Inspections, with specific recommendations, for approval or revision. (See Summary Punishment Section 8.9)

E. All internal investigations of departmental personnel will be conducted in such a manner as to safeguard the rights of all parties involved.

F. When an internal investigation involves administrative issues related to duty performance, the employee(s) may, or may not, be required to participate in the following:

1. medical or laboratory examinations
   a. can be administered as per the substance abuse policy (Dir. 6.43)(CALEA 52.2.6)

2. photographs
   a. if a photo identification of an officer is needed, a photo book of all members of the Department is maintained in the Internal Affairs Division(CALEA 52.2.6, 22.2.7)

3. line up
   a. officers are not required to participate in a physical line-up(CALEA 52.2.6)

4. financial disclosure
officers are not required to submit a financial disclosure statement (Police Officers Bill of Rights) (CALEA 52.2.6)
A Report of Community Input on Public Safety Strategies in the City of Wilmington

ATTACHMENT 4
From: Denn. Matthew (DOJ)  
Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 3:58 PM  
To: Denn. Matthew (DOJ)  
Subject: Invitation to Members of the General Assembly

Dear Colleagues:

I am writing to invite you to participate with us at 11:30 on Wednesday, January 21 in the unveiling of an exciting proposal that will have a profound impact on some of our most economically distressed and crime-stricken communities. The event will be in the Carvel State Office Building auditorium (2nd floor).

As you may know, the U.S. Department of Justice and several state Attorney General’s offices (including Delaware’s) investigated wrongdoing by a number of banks that resulted in massive disruption to the nation’s financial markets and the 2008 economic recession from which we are still recovering. The settlement of those investigations and resulting lawsuits, in addition to providing direct relief to some homeowners and the state’s pension funds, has also resulted in the state having $36,615,801 that it is permitted to spend to (a) remediate harm the state suffered from the mortgage and financial crisis, and (b) improve housing. Given the nature of the settlement, the settlement funds are not meant to be used to simply supplant existing state programs or for programs that do not target economically impacted areas or individuals.

Although the Attorney General’s Office has, in the past, independently exercised its common law authority to distribute lawsuit settlement funds, we believe that given the unprecedented sum of money involved in this settlement, it is a sound practice to consult with the Governor and General Assembly regarding the expenditure of the funds. We have already consulted with the Governor and obtained his agreement regarding the use of the funds. We will next be seeking to enter into an agreement with the General Assembly’s Joint Finance Committee regarding that same use of the funds, before disbursing them.

The plan that we will be unveiling on Tuesday, which we have agreed upon with the Governor and will be presenting to the Joint Finance Committee in February, is called Lifting Up Delaware’s Communities. It consists of three components:

1. **Investing In People and Neighborhoods.** An investment of almost $16 million in programs to help youth succeed, provide treatment for Delawareans with substance abuse disorder, help inmates being released from our prisons to avoid re-offending and going back to jail, and fund a variety of policing and other
enrichment activities for economically impacted communities. Specifically, we are proposing:

a. **Substance Abuse Treatment.** We are proposing that $3 million be spent over a period of three years establish additional treatment facilities for persons suffering from substance abuse disorder or related conditions.

b. **After-School and Summer Programs.** We are proposing that $3 million be spent over three years for summer and after-school programs targeted at children from economically disadvantaged neighborhoods.

c. **Prison Re-Entry Programs.** We are proposing that $3 million be spent over three years to provide competitive grants to non-profit organizations that assist persons being released from correctional facilities in Delaware to avoid new criminal offenses.

d. **Community Policing and Community Support.** We are proposing that $5.9 million be allocated to the state's Neighborhood Building Blocks Fund, which can make grants for a broad array of government and non-profit efforts to support economically impacted neighborhoods. The fund currently has $1 million available from a prior bank settlement. One example of a potential use of these funds is the Wilmington neighborhood foot patrol initiative that the Department of Justice and the City of Wilmington are about to propose to the Fund. We are also proposing that $1 million of the funds be used to continue the existence of the Department of Justice's Crime Strategies Unit, which is designed to address underlying causes of crime in economically disadvantaged areas (such as abating nuisance properties).

2. **Providing Help to Our High-Poverty Schools.** We are proposing to invest almost $5 million in adding teachers and paraprofessionals for the 16 elementary schools in Delaware with the highest percentage of low-income students. Each of the following elementary schools would receive $300,000 over a three year period to hire additional teachers or paraprofessionals to provide additional assistance with their students:

i. Brimmerham Elementary (Cape Henlopen School District)
ii. East Dover Elementary (Capital School District)
iii. Towne Point Elementary (Capital School District)
iv. Bancroft Elementary (Christina School District)
v. Elbert Palmer Elementary (Christina School District)
Pulaski Elementary (Christina School District)
Snubbs Elementary (Christina School District),
Eisenberg Elementary (Colonial School District)
Colwyck Elementary (Colonial School District),
Dunbar Elementary (Laurel School District)
Highlands Elementary (Red Clay School District)
Lewis Dual Language Elementary (Red Clay School District)
Richardson Park Elementary (Red Clay School District)
Shortridge Elementary (Red Clay School District)
Warner Elementary (Red Clay School District)
West Seaford Elementary (Seaford School District)

3. **Promoting Affordable Housing and Development In Economically Impacted Areas.** We are proposing to invest almost $16 million in efforts to promote affordable housing and economic development in economically impacted areas of the state. Specifically:

a. **Foreclosure Prevention.** We are proposing to direct $1.5 million to the Delaware Mortgage Assistance Program to help Delaware homeowners prevent foreclosures on their primary properties.

b. **Affordable Housing.** We are proposing to dedicate over $10 million to the Delaware State Housing Authority's Strong Neighborhoods Revolving Housing Fund, which is dedicated to the creation of affordable housing in economically impacted areas.

c. **Economic Development in Low Income Areas.** We are proposing to devote almost $4 million to the Downtown Development Districts Program, half of which would be used to provide down payment assistance to homeowners willing to purchase homes in those districts.

We believe that this ambitious investment in Delaware's economically impacted communities has the potential to transform parts of our state. We hope that you can join us on Wednesday at 11:30 at the Carvel State Office Building auditorium to help unveil this proposal to use these settlement funds in a targeted way that will have a real impact on people in our state who desperately need help.
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Sent: Sunday, January 18, 2015 3:58 PM
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defendant in avoided victimization costs relative to similar cases processed in a traditional misdemeanor court. After factoring in the upfront costs of operating the Justice Center, total savings in 2008 were $6,852,477.

C. Wilmington Today

Demographics
According to 2010 U.S. Census data, the city of Wilmington, DE encompasses 17 square miles and is home to 70,851 individuals, a decrease of 2.5% compared to 2000. Census data also revealed that 23% of individuals fall below the poverty line and 21% of individuals over the age of 18 lack a high school diploma. As of August 2013, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that 10.7% of the population is unemployed.

Crime Rates and Quality of Life
In 2013, the Wilmington Police Department received over 80,000 calls for service. Of those, at least 25% involved low-level, quality of life matters such as disorderly conduct, drug possession, prostitution, shoplifting, and trespassing. In addition, during the first six months of 2013, Delaware 2-1-1 received over 14,000 calls from Wilmington residents in need of housing, food, and financial assistance.

In 2013, the Justice of the Peace Court surveyed 180 Wilmington community members at local community meetings and forums to gauge their perceptions of crime, public safety, and overall quality of life conditions. What follows is a summary of their responses:

- 36% rated the quality of life in their neighborhood as poor or very poor;
- Between 30-60% of respondents (based on the specific issue) view quality of life crimes, such as drug selling, loitering, theft, public drinking, pan handling, and vandalism as a big problem;
- 35% feel unsafe on the street and in local parks;
- At least a third reported neighborhood problems—such as needed street repairs, drug use, abandoned or rundown buildings, and littering—as big problems;
- 34% characterized the court system as ineffective in responding to community problems;
- The top five services requested by respondents include employment/job training, housing assistance, financial services, substance use and mental health services, and children and family services;
- Nearly half (47%) are in support of alternative sanctions.

Delaware Justice of the Peace Court Operations
The Justice of the Peace Court is Delaware’s entry-level court and is responsible for arraignment in the vast majority of all criminal cases. The criminal jurisdiction of the Justice of the Peace Court includes, but

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54 This data is not complete as it does not include crime data from the New Castle County PD or the State Police also involved in the City of Wilmington and northern New Castle County.
5. Accountability

Community courts send the message that all criminal behavior—even low-level “quality-of-life” crime—has an impact on community safety. By promoting community restitution and insisting on regular and rigorous compliance monitoring—and clear consequences for non-compliance—community courts seek to improve the accountability of offenders.

6. Outcomes

Community courts emphasize the active and ongoing collection and analysis of data—measuring outcomes and processes, costs and benefits. Dissemination of this information is a valuable symbol of public accountability.

II. Community Court Results

A growing body of research supports the effectiveness of community courts in reducing crime, changing sentencing practices and reducing jail time, improving public trust, increasing accountability, and saving money. What follows are highlights of some community courts’ success in meeting these goals.

• Reducing Crime and Recidivism
  o Midtown Manhattan New York street prostitution fell by 56%, illegal vending fell by 24%.
  o The crime rate in Melbourne, Australia was rate reduced by 12%, burglaries down by 26%, and motor vehicle theft down by 38%.
  o A recent impact evaluation of the Red Hook Community Justice Center in Brooklyn, New York found a 10% recidivism reduction compared to traditional courts.
  o Washington D.C.’s East of the River Community Court experienced a 42% reduced rate of recidivism.

• Increasing Accountability and Repairing Disorder
  o Midtown New York community service compliance rate is 85%, compared to 50% in the traditional system.
  o Use of community service sanctions in Red Hook and Midtown New York contributed 75,000 hours and $600,000 worth of labor per year.

• Changing Sentencing Practice
  o 7% of resolved cases at Red Hook resulted in jail sentences compared to 17% in the traditional court.
  o 75% of Red Hook dispositions involved the use of community and/or social services compared to 19% in the traditional court.

• Improving Public Trust
  o 62% of Red Hook residents feel safe on the street at night, up from 40%.
  o 85% of Red Hook defendants felt once handled fairly.
  o 57% of Midtown New York residents willing to pay more taxes for a community court; 94% of Red Hook residents approve of the court.

• Saving Money
  o For each of the 3,210 adult misdemeanor defendants assigned to the Red Hook Community Justice Center, taxpayers realized an estimated savings of $7,568 per
A. What is a Community Court?

Community courts are neighborhood-focused courts that attempt to harness the power of the justice system to address local problems. They can take many forms, but all focus on creative partnerships and problem-solving. Community courts strive to create new relationships, both within the justice system and with outside stakeholders such as residents, merchants, churches and schools. And they test new and aggressive approaches to public safety rather than merely responding to crime after it has occurred. Community courts employ the following six principles:

1. **Enhanced Information**
   Community courts are dedicated to the idea that better staff training combined with better information (about litigants, victims, and the community context of crime) can help improve the decision making of judges, attorneys, and other justice officials. The goal is to help practitioners make more nuanced decisions about individual defendants, ensuring that they receive an appropriate level of supervision and services.

2. **Community Engagement**
   Community courts recognize that citizens, merchants and neighborhood groups have an important role to play in helping the justice system identify, prioritize and solve local problems. By actively engaging citizens in the process, community courts seek to improve public trust in justice.

3. **Collaboration**
   Community courts engage a diverse range of people, government agencies, and community organizations in collaborative efforts to improve public safety. By bringing together justice players and reaching out to potential partners beyond the courthouse (e.g., social service providers, victims groups, schools), community courts improve inter-agency communication, encourage greater trust between citizens and government, and foster new responses to local problems.

4. **Individualized Justice**
   By using validated evidence-based risk and needs assessment instruments, community courts seek to link offenders to individually tailored community-based services (e.g., job training, drug treatment, safety planning, mental health counseling) where appropriate. In doing so (and by treating defendants with dignity and respect), community courts help reduce the use of incarceration and recidivism, improve community safety, and enhance confidence in justice. Linking offenders to services can also aid victims, improving their safety and helping restore their lives.
is not limited to, all criminal violations, low-level criminal misdemeanor cases, and violations of the County Code and other ordinances of municipalities.

**Caseload**

In 2013, there were over 30,000 cases filed in the Justice of the Peace Courts 10 and 20, of which more than a third were non-traffic case filings.\(^{21}\) Of those, 13% (or 1309) include low-level crimes, such as disorderly conduct, loitering, shoplifting, open container, underage drinking, and panhandling. The following chart illustrates the breakdown of charges currently being considered for the Justice Center:

**Disposition Rates and Sentencing Practices**

In 2013, 26% (or 2706) of all non-traffic cases were disposed of at Courts 10 and 20. The remaining 74% were transferred to a higher court. This begs the question: if the JP Court could offer additional sentencing options for cases within its jurisdiction, would the number of cases transferred decrease?

Of those cases disposed, 30% (or 815) were found guilty, of which the vast majority (83%) received a fine. The most common fine was in the $50 - $50 range. Unfortunately, this type of outcome tends to make little impact on defendants or the community and often times results in unpaid fines and outstanding warrants.

\(^{21}\) According to the Justice of the Peace Court statistical summary, out of 10,124 case filings in Court 10 and 20, there were 10,384 non-traffic offenses and 18,840 traffic-related offenses.
Summary Review & Findings: Wilmington’s Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System
Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission:
Summary Review and Findings:
Wilmington’s Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) System

Introduction
During the course of the Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission’s assessment period from February 2015 to March 2015, the topic of Wilmington’s CCTV resources and operations was repeatedly raised by nearly every segment of the community, both in Commission meetings and in individual discussions.

This report provides a discussion of the CCTV program, clarifies how the system is supported and operated, summarizes input from the community and Wilmington agencies, and offers findings and recommendations for further analysis and improvement in the effectiveness of the system.

Methodology
In addition to collecting feedback from the community via meetings in the community and Commission meetings, interviews were conducted with the business community and various agencies in Wilmington, including the Wilmington Police Department and the State Attorney General’s Office. The study teams from both VRI and the Police Foundation visited Downtown Visions and its camera operations center and interviewed the Executive Director on several occasions and reviewed selected Downtown Visions’ documents related to camera functioning.

Limitations
The most significant limitation encountered in this analysis was time. In order to fully assess the CCTV system and its potential for improving community safety in Wilmington, a more in-depth analysis and technical assistance effort would be required. This review attempts to raise issues for further consideration before additional investments are made and attempts to address the community’s concerns regarding the operation of the cameras.

The Use of CCTV to Improve Community Safety – What We Know
A growing number of cities in the U.S. have turned to CCTV to improve community safety, either by reducing or diffusing crime, reducing the fear of crime, increasing perceptions of community safety, and/or providing evidence needed to solve crimes that have occurred. This CCTV trend in the U.S. has leapt forward since 2001, purportedly in response to the terrorist attacks that occurred in that year. Ahead of the U.S. is England, which has a much longer history with CCTV and, naturally, with evaluating the impacts of CCTV on crime and safety. Considering the many evaluations and meta-analysis conducted in England and some conducted in the U.S., namely of New York and Los Angeles’ systems, we know from this research that CCTV has the potential to reduce certain property crimes (e.g., auto-related thefts, burglaries) but has had mixed reviews in reducing violent crime in any demonstrable, statistically significant way. Similarly, the data show mixed reviews about reducing the fear of crime and improving perceptions of safety, however
many feel that the deterrent effects of CCTV are yet to be truly tested or understood. In some studies, CCTV systems demonstrated reductions or diffusion of crime, but not always for all crimes and not always without displacement. Most importantly for Wilmington however, is the clear finding that the success of CCTV in reducing or deterring any crime and being useful in solving crimes is substantially dependent on a variety of factors, including:

- Camera placement
- Hotspot coverage
- Camera monitoring
- Control room operations
- Use of the video
- Technical capabilities
- Clear understanding of system goals and objectives

For an excellent overview of CCTV’s potential benefits and limitations in impacting community safety, including a review of major CCTV studies prior to 2006, see the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing’s Response Guide titled *Video Surveillance of Public Places* (2006), by Professor Jerry Ratcliffe. ([www.popcenter.org](http://www.popcenter.org))

**Downtown Visions**

According to its website, Downtown Visions was established as a non-profit organization in 1994 and “is the management company for the Wilmington Downtown Business Improvement District (WDBID), also known as an assessment or special services district, supported by mandatory assessments on real property and governed by a private-public Board of Directors. The BID encompasses 70 blocks and more than 730 properties.” According to Downtown Visions, it raised $800,000 to fund the purchase and installation of the first 25 Downtown cameras, as well as, the installation, service charges and service contracts required to support the operation of these cameras. Sometime after 2001, the system was transferred to the City of Wilmington. Downtown Visions agreed to provide at no-cost to the City, six staff to monitor the 25 cameras it turned over to the City. The City assumed the on-going system costs and began monitoring operations from within the Police Department. In the early 2000’s, the City added an additional camera outside of the Downtown area and the Wilmington City Council added several additional cameras within the City, which were connected to monitoring operations center within the Wilmington Police Department. At some point shortly thereafter, concerns about the Police Department’s monitoring of the cameras and staffing sufficiency were raised, at the same time the City Council was considering adding additional cameras around the City. The City Council and the Police Department then approached Downtown Visions and asked them to take over monitoring of the cameras and it agreed to do so, through a for-profit entity it created, called Clean & Safe Services (the non-profit component of Downtown Visions is limited to operating within the business improvement district). This was accomplished by contracting with the Wilmington Police Department. Reportedly, the Wilmington Police Department
contracted with Clean & Safe Services to facilitate and monitor the cameras, initially paying for nine staff to monitor the newly added neighborhood cameras, while the non-profit Downtown Visions continued to monitor the Downtown cameras without charge to the City or Police Department. Over time, additional cameras were added to the system, reaching 86 as of today, according to Downtown Visions, although there may be as many as 95 cameras throughout the City’s network if cameras belonging to agencies such as Public Works are included.

It was conveyed to us that the program was a significant success, resulting in the identification of criminal suspects and solving many crimes committed in Wilmington. At some point, like many other police agencies in the U.S., the Wilmington Police Department experienced a difficult budgetary environment signaled its intentions to end camera monitoring, to which City Council disagreed and required monitoring to continue, but reduced the number of staff involved in monitoring, effectively reducing the number of staff monitoring what was reportedly 70 cameras at that time from nine to two, causing an alleged significant reduction in arrests resulting from the cameras.

Camera Monitoring and Usage
Today, Downtown Visions employs six staff who monitor approximately 25 cameras within the Business Improvement District, seven days a week for at least 16 of 24 hours. The approximately 70 cameras placed outside of the Business Improvement District are supported by the City, through a contract with Clean & Safe Services, however this contract only pays for two staff to monitor the cameras five days a week. These two staff split shift to provide coverage for approximately 16 of 24 hours, which amounts to one person monitoring approximately 70 cameras during the times and days monitored. According to those we interviewed, at least 10 additional staff are needed.

Those we interviewed stated that the staff monitoring cameras have the ability to call the Wilmington Police Department’s dispatchers and have access to a Computer Aided Dispatch terminal. However, significant concerns were raised about what occurs from this point forward. Allegedly, very little use of the cameras is seen, and when those monitoring the system attempt to alert the Wilmington Police Department dispatch center to potential criminal activity spotted on the cameras, the calls are de-prioritized or not responded to until after the activity has ended. As stated to us, “for the most part, the technology goes unused” and there are apparently no protocols for how the cameras or recordings are to be used within the Police Department.

Community Concerns
In multiple interviews with community and business leaders and particularly at the March 10 and 17 Commission meetings, concerns were raised about the functionality of the cameras and in one particular incident, whether or not video of a homicide or homicide suspect was available. It was stated by a member of the community that a detective had informed them that the camera was not working on
the day of the homicide however other officials have said that the cameras were in fact working on that day. One community member stated that many in the community believe that the cameras often don’t work and that the absence of “a red light” indicated that the camera was not working. However, those operating the cameras indicated that there are no indicator lights of any color on the cameras they operate. It would seem unnecessary to have such a light, given that the camera operations center would clearly know if a camera was not functioning and there would be no need to indicate functional levels on the camera itself. In response to these concerns, the study team contacted Downtown Visions following the March 17 Commission meeting, which Downtown Visions attended as a member of the business community. We learned that Downtown Visions assesses all cameras it monitors and those that the City monitors within the Downtown Visions operations center at least twice every week, completing a Camera Status Report. It should be noted however that Downtown Visions does not currently own all of the cameras it supports through monitoring. Many cameras are owned by the City and others were purchased independently by community or business groups, but are “piped into” Downtown Visions to support monitoring. In these cases, Downtown Visions only monitors the cameras but does not provide for the general administration and funding of the camera’s operation.

We asked to review the most recent Camera Status Report and were permitted to do so. Our analysis shows that only 5 of a reported 79 cameras or 6% were not functioning to a degree that would likely impair their use entirely. Approximately 10 other cameras were reported to need adjustment in color, positioning or control, or in need of dome cleaning, but remained functioning. However, there are seven additional cameras in one area that had been shut off for some time by the internet service provider due to an administrative issue with the organization that purchased and installed the cameras (not Downtown Visions, Clean & Safe Services or the City). On the day we were provided with this information, the company that services the camera hardware was reportedly performing repairs.

On Tuesday, March 23, 2015, Downtown Visions allowed us to review a camera a status report for that day, in follow-up to our review of a prior report a week earlier. That report shows that three of the cameras in need of service the prior week were now reported in working order. The report also shows that seven of the 86 reported cameras (8%) were not operable on that day and a number of others in need of some kind of service, but still functioning. Of the cameras that were not operable, three had apparently remained out of service for the period of time since the prior report.

Our view is that the vast majority of cameras are operating, even if in need of service, such as cleaning, etc. We believe that it is reasonable to assume that operating a substantial CCTV network, particularly one with a combination of older and newer hardware, is costly and frequent repairs are often required, as the cameras are typically exposed to the elements and to intentional vandalism. With this in mind, and having reviewed the documentation provided by Downtown
Visions, we believe that Downtown Visions has appropriate internal controls and practices to properly and promptly identify and remediate camera malfunctions.

**Findings & Recommendations**

Wilmington is fortunate to have such an extensive system of cameras and two organizations (Downtown Visions and Clean & Safe Services) that are willing to support the system properly. However, without the necessary support from the City and the Wilmington Police Department, the system will never reach its fullest potential. The primary support needed includes a sustained and appropriate funding level and prioritization of CCTV system administration and use. While an appropriate funding level cannot be determined from this review, a proper analysis of the technology (software/hardware), operations and administration should be considered, in order to allow the development of a multi-year funding strategy and plan that is not subject to annual budget negotiations. Further, given the history of how cameras were added in piecemeal fashion to the system through the political process, it is essential that an assessment and planning process be considered to ensure that the factors critical for success have been taken into consideration. These factors include:

- Camera placement
- Hotspot coverage
- Camera monitoring
- Control room set up/operations
- Use of the video
- Technical capabilities
- Clear understanding of system goals and objectives

Many of these factors can become highly technical and quantified. For example, some studies have even considered factors such as camera saturation, exploring the ratio of cameras to desired coverage area, the ratio of cameras to staff, features to assist in keeping monitors oriented (e.g., maps, camera perspective/placement), etc.

As part of this review, which could clearly impact the funding needed to operate the system, it is important to also consider how the video is used within investigations for example, or whether the system is designed to deter crime, in addition to enabling crimes to be solved. If the system is designed to deter crime, Wilmington must come to terms with the fact that the entirety of camera locations is currently not something made public, which obviously diminishes the deterrence effect (see Ratcliffe, 2009). The City of Baltimore and many others around the U.S. currently publish geo-coded data on the locations of their cameras, permitting anyone to map their locations. It may also be important to identify a means of increasing transparency related to camera functioning, such as providing aggregate up time/down time statistics. Bringing the community into this review is strongly recommended.
The following recommendations are intended to serve as a starting point for improving Wilmington’s use of its CCTV network and to guide the use of existing resources that are reportedly available in the City and other possible resources:

City stakeholders should be engaged to ensure that the goals and objectives of the CCTV system are consistent with camera administration and with the research on the effectiveness of CCTV cameras in improving community safety.

Before making further investments in additional cameras, an analysis of Wilmington’s CCTV system should be undertaken to examine factors such as camera placement, hotspot coverage, camera monitoring, control room set up/operations, use of the video, and technical capabilities. It is understood that such an analysis is being undertaken, spearheaded by Attorney General’s Office and supported by the Violence Reduction Network (VRN).

An immediate increase of at least two Downtown Visions staff to monitor the 70 neighborhood cameras is needed, until the analysis previously recommended can be completed.

With an increase of staff, the cameras must be monitored seven days per week and should be monitored at least 16 hours each day.

The Wilmington Police Department should place a “light-duty” officer within the Downtown Visions camera control room to serve as the liaison between Downtown Visions and the Wilmington Police Department Dispatch Center while cameras are monitored.

The Wilmington Police Department should develop a protocol that describes how the CCTV system will be used within the agency, setting expectations and standards for interaction with Downtown Visions regarding the cameras, and requiring consultation with Downtown Visions regarding investigations and requiring that data be maintained within the CAD system to track calls or referrals from Downtown Vision camera operators to the Wilmington Police Department. This data should be reviewed monthly by the Police Department leadership in consultation with Downtown Visions leadership as part of a performance contract and frequently shared with City Council and the community.

Downtown Visions and the City should enhance transparency to address the community’s belief that the cameras don’t work, sharing data publicly as well as in regular reports to the City Council and other funding sources. A simple ratio of camera down time to up time published daily or weekly may suffice to reassure the community that their investment is working for them. Additionally, a broader transparency may have other benefits and may be worth considering, including potential crowdsourced video monitoring of IP-based cameras with partner organizations or the broader community.
The Wilmington Public Safety Strategies Commission

Guidance Concerning Violence Reduction and Patrol Allocation
Guidance on Violence Reduction

The following guidance is offered regarding violence reduction in Wilmington and should be read in conjunction with the first part of this report which addresses many of these areas.

Overview
Violence reduction requires the utilization of law enforcement and other government, private, and community organizations working in a coordinated effort.

An Intelligence led-Policing approach focusing on real-time crime analysis should be followed.

Data under Intelligence Led Policing needs to be constantly reviewed to engage in predictive policing and deploy resources based on the most current trends and patterns.

All supervisors and officers require the ability and knowledge to access and understand current crime analysis data allowing them to reduce crime and disorder, and importantly preventing crime through work with community members.

Proactive steps should be taken to address conditions at hotspots before crime occurs.

The resources, skills and ability of other law enforcement agencies need to be fully utilized. Considering that the City of Wilmington and New Castle County account for much of the criminal activity in Delaware, joint operations should be regularly conducted with the Delaware State Police, the New Castle County Police Department, and other law enforcement agencies.

Internal WPD Coordination

The Sector Captains should be recognized as having primary responsibility for reducing crime, planning, coordinating and addressing all conditions within their area of responsibility. The Captains need to work in unison focusing on the Citywide crime picture while coordination resources in their individual assigned sector.

The Sector Captains should plan and implement coordinated responses with all law enforcement and other strategic partners.

Sector Captains must consistently coordinate with their counterparts in the Drug, Organized Crime, and Vice Division and the Investigative Operations Division to ensure all appropriate information is being shared and coordinated plans are being implemented.

The Sector Captains should regularly meet with the Community Policing and School Resource Officers assigned to their Sector to discuss community concerns, crime trends, and other relevant information on crime preventative measures.

Sector Lieutenants should be reassigned to their prior positions as Platoon lieutenants. They should work the same hours and tours as their platoon and be responsible for coordinating and deploying resources in focused team led enforcement considering citywide crime issues and emerging trends.
Platoon lieutenants should work closely with the three sector captains to devise crime control strategies, and to identify and respond to current and emerging issues in each sector. This citywide approach, in the long term, should reduce the amount of overtime currently needed to provide minimum patrol coverage while more effectively addressing crime problems.

Platoons Lieutenants should have a citywide view concerning crime and have the capability to address emerging issues with existing patrols or by requesting specialized units be quickly deployed.

Platoon lieutenants and Sergeants should be responsible for the daily implementation of effective tactics which should include regular team lead enforcement to address drug markets and quality of life offenses.

Lieutenants should utilize patrol Sergeants and all available resources with a goal of making hotspot areas violence free. Drug arrests should be focused in areas prone to violence.

Once narcotics arrests have been made, preexisting plans need to be implemented to stabilize the area through visible uniformed presence.

Consideration should be given to assigning an officer to Downtown Visions during high crime times and special operations to utilize their cameras to identify the sellers and buyers of illegal drugs.

Gangs or crews engaged in illegal activity should be identified and prioritized with plans involving WPD, Federal, State, and County law enforcement agencies to dismantle them.

Supervisors must ensure officers maximize time on patrol and avoid administrative or other tasks that unnecessarily take them out of sector.

The Officers’ efforts must be specifically focused and directed toward violence reduction, quality of life issues and disorder that lead to crime and community concern, in addition to response to crimes or crimes in progress. To allow for maximum efficiency, adequate staffing levels must be maintained on patrol and excessive excusals are not to be granted.

Specific directions must be given to Officers concerning activities to be engaged in when not on radio-directed assignment. These would include parking and interacting with the community at specific locations within a hotspot. They should record these contacts with time noted on their daily activity sheets.

Community Policing Officers should focus efforts in areas prone to violence as part of a larger plan.

Canine and Traffic Officers assigned in cars should have at the Platoon lieutenants and Sergeants direction time on foot patrol and should focus their preventative and enforcement activities to violent hotspots, pedestrian corridors prone to robbery, and to the disruption of drug markets in hotspot areas. Consideration should be given to their deployment immediately after narcotics or other arrests are made to provide continued stabilization of the location.
Selected Officers should be assigned in unmarked cars to interdict crimes in progress and identify individuals carrying guns. The WPD should contract with a rental service agency to have a rotating number of rental cars.

The Department may consider initiating truancy enforcement in the early hours of the day to ensure youth understand the City’s commitment to education.

School resource Officers should be an integral part of Department efforts to reduce violence by participating in the education of students, addressing truancy, and providing a conduit for school-age youth to provide information on pending violence and illegal gun possession.

Officers should use a variety of tactics to address quality of life offenses from civil nuisance abatement, requesting changes in the structural environment, and enforcement efforts.

Officers should ensure accusatory instruments are immediately forwarded to the Attorney General’s Office to start nuisance abatement proceedings when appropriate.

Addressing quality of life issues should be a particularly high priority in the hotspot areas.

Detectives should debrief each person arrested to gain intelligence concerning homicides, shootings and other crime. The information can be entered into the State DELJIS system for future analysis and use in investigations.

Officers on patrol may also utilize the existing Field Service Report in the MDT's to enter information for further analysis.

Detectives should enhance felony arrests from within the hotspot areas to ensure maximum prosecution and to assist junior Officers’ learning to prepare the most prosecutable cases.

**Outreach**

Working groups that include members from other government agencies, business and the local community can assist through consultation, input, and a commitment to a coordinated violence reduction program.

The Chief should meet with the executives of in charge of Juvenile Probation to determine the most effective methods of coordination between agencies including possible assignment of a Juvenile Probation Officer to work with the WPD.

Regular public outreach should occur with business and community members, including informal unscheduled visits within the hotspot areas, to provide reassurance, inform parties of the policing efforts. Business size cards can be printed and carried by Officers for distribution to the public providing the number of a hotline where civilians may call with information about past crimes, suspects, and conditions requiring systematic evaluation and response.

Government, civic leaders, clergy, and community members may be invited to bi-weekly walk the streets with ranking Police Officers. These walks show unified support for corrective action and allow all stakeholders to offer their guidance concerning community and business concerns as well as the enforcement efforts of the WPD.
Consideration should be given to creating a not-for-profit Foundation that will assist the Department in obtaining critical resources including technology.

The Park and Walk program in which Officers exit their cars and engage the community should be made more robust with specific training given to officers on engaging the community. Consideration should be given to having Officers distribute pre-stamped postcards addressed to a WPD postbox to allow the public to offer comments on their encounter with officers and provide other information to the Police.
Patrol Allocation

Patrol allocation models address the number of calls for service that must be answered, the number of Officers required to answer them, and a determination of the amount of non-committed time available to Officers in which they may engage in proactive policing.

While we would have liked to consider a deployment model for each of the three sectors, the existing Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD’s) data available limited our efforts to an evaluation and creation of a patrol allocation model for the entire City. A new CAD system was being installed as we conducted our research and it may make such further analysis possible.

Several CAD’s data reports were provided by the WPD. The one with the largest number of calls for service indicates that in 2014 there were 101,553 calls for service. A close review suggests approximately 80,000 to 85,000 of these are actual calls for service with an additional approximately 20,000 cases involving other activity.¹

For purposes of modeling a response to calls for service, we adopted a larger number of 88,173 calls for service that is provided in separate WPD “Unit by Unit” CAD report. While this number probably over estimates the calls for service, using 88,173 should ensure adequate resources are available to answer all calls, provide for Officer safety, and also indicate whether additional time is available for proactive policing efforts.

Among the 88,173, variations in calls for service vary up to 30% monthly from a low 6,354 in February of 2014 to a high of 8,240 in August 2014. If, however, the six months of the year with the greatest number of calls for service are examined the furthest deviation is less than 11% with 7,446 vs 8,240 calls at peak month. Examining the six months with the most calls reveals a monthly average of 7,967 calls within an overall a 184 day period. We have again chosen the peak months to ensure adequate resources are deployed.

The above analysis reveals that during the peak six months of 2014, the Department averaged 260 calls for service daily or 11 calls per hour, were the calls evenly distributed. Available data indicate the highest distribution of calls occurred within the 8 hour period between 3 p.m. and 11 p.m. with 40% of calls or an average 15 calls per hour. An analysis of the busiest 11 hour period from 10 a.m. to 9 p.m. revealed considerable consistence ranging from 5.2% to 5.8% of the total calls for service each hour, and an average just under 15 calls per hour at 14.4. The two busiest hours from 3 p.m. to 4 p.m. and from 8

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¹ Although CAD’S data provided by the WPD indicates that in 2014 officers responded to 101,553 calls for service, a closer review suggests approximately 80,000 to 85,000 calls for service may be a more accurate number, with the additional 15,000-20,000 involving proactive policing. A review of the “Calls for Service by Call Type,” and discussions with WPD staff indicates that as is common in many Police Departments, the calls for service data has within it record-keeping concerning proactive policing. For example, the data indicate 5,677 Park and Walk (referring to events where officers exit their cars and walk among community members); 12,604 traffic stops; 3280 persons stopped. These numbers total over 20,000 of the calls for service. Our discussions with WPD personnel and our own experience in law enforcement suggest that the majority of these calls are self-initiated Police activity. Relying simply on the 5677 “park and walk” calls plus the 12,604 traffic stops, the calls for service data is reduced from 101, 553 to 83,272.
p.m. to 9 p.m. average 15.08 calls for service. (By comparison, the early hours of the morning have as little 3 to 5 calls per hour.)

Additionally CAD data indicate that the average time on a call for service during the last six months of 2014 was 20:28 minutes, with 19.06 on week days and 24:10 on weekends. The last six months of 2014 were considered since the current three sector deployment was in place.

We have made several calculations to ascertain the required patrol strength for deployment. First, recognizing that it is appropriate for officer and public safety to be cautious and assume the maximum time required for an average call for service, we have utilized the 24.10 minutes average on the weekend as a starting point for calculation. Put another way, we have assumed for our first calculation that 24.10 minutes average is the 7 day average, not just the weekend. We have rounded this to a call average time of .40% of a cars available time within one hour to answer one call for service.

Based on this calculation during the consistent period averaging 15 calls for service, 6 cars would be required were 100% of their time dedicated to call response. It is reasonable to assume however, that some calls require a response of two cars. Again, with attention to officer and public safety, we have assumed a high estimate that such a response is required in 33% percent of calls. At the same time we recognize that a second and even a third car often arrives on a scene to leave in short course. We have therefore assigned an average 12 minute time (.20 percent of their hourly time) to this second car being present. It is of course recognized that on some calls the second car will leave almost immediately (e.g., unfounded shots fired) and on others it will stay long periods of time (e.g., man actually shot). Statistically then, one additional car would be required for this function, assuming that backup were their only function and they respond to 33% of the calls as backup.

Based on this analysis, WPD would require 7 cars were the officer’s sole function radio call response and were calls evenly distributed during these peak times.

We are currently aware that the WPD has a 3 sector model with 3 patrol districts in each sector. They report they regularly deploy 3 cars with two officers to each of these sectors or 9 cars in total with 18 officers staffing them. They also deploy one person cars as available with a goal of three per sector or one per district. This full deployment requires a total of 27 officers although it is often not reached.

If 24 officers are working, the deployment of 18 officers to 2 person sector cars, with the deployment of an additional 6 officers to one person sector cars, will result in a radio call utilization rate of 46%. If 26 officers are working the utilization rate decreases to 41% during peak weekend hours. An analysis of weekdays during peak hours reveals a patrol utilization rate of 40% with 24 officers working and 35% with 26 officers working.

We recommend the assignment of at least 31 officers to each platoon. With 31 Officers, between 4 (12%) and 6 (19%) members of the platoon could be granted excusals at any given time, and the above utilization rates maintained during peak hours.

The above analysis does not include the role of other Police units that also should be handling some calls for service (e.g., canine, traffic, and community policing officers). It does assume that resources are being effectively managed and that when required cars are being assigned to respond to calls across sector boundaries. We further note that this model is further complicated in the WPD by the existence of a power tour to cover the peak hours and a smaller deployment that covers the early
morning hours. The resources to create each of these deployments are drawn from one of the two platoons that work on any given day. We do not have hourly breakdowns of average calls for service time to allow for adequate evaluation, but it is reasonable to assume that the power tour deployment would lower the utilization rate during given the busiest hours.

END
Example 7
Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses

Tailoring Law Enforcement Initiatives to Individual Jurisdictions
Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses

Tailoring Law Enforcement Initiatives to Individual Jurisdictions

A report prepared by the Council of State Governments Justice Center and the Police Executive Research Forum for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

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Acknowledgments

This report could not have been written without the leadership and support of the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice, particularly from Ruby Qazilbash, Senior Policy Advisor for Substance Abuse and Mental Health, and Rebecca Rose, Policy Advisor for Substance Abuse and Mental Health. They expertly guided this document from start to finish.

The law enforcement and mental health professionals involved in each of the site visits provided the substance and “lessons learned” that make this report of true value to the field. Their commitment to improving the law enforcement response to people with mental illnesses is tremendous, and their willingness to share their experiences has resulted in a practical and user-friendly publication. Thanks are due to all those who met with the Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center project staff on site, and provided feedback on the document during various stages of its development. Special thanks go to the representative from each jurisdiction who helped coordinate each visit and scheduled the interviews with local stakeholders:* 

- Victoria Cochran, Virginia State Coordinator for Criminal Justice and Mental Health Initiatives
- Deputy Chief Dottie Davis, Director of Training, Fort Wayne (Ind.) Police Department
- Captain Richard Wall, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department
- Sergeant Michael Yohe, CIT Coordinator, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

(A complete list of contributors, by jurisdiction, can be found in appendix A.)

There are also many agency representatives who participated in informative—and sometimes lengthy—phone interviews, providing project staff with details about how they tailored their law enforcement response program to often complex circumstances and demands. These initial interviews, involving key personnel from the following departments, provided a wealth of information, and assisted in the planning and conceptualization of the project.

- Baltimore County (Md.) Police Department
- Birmingham (Ala.) Police Department
- City of Lorain (Ohio) Police Department
- Fort Lauderdale (Fla.) Police Department
- Houston (Tex.) Police Department
- Jackson County (Mo.) Sheriff’s Office
- Jacksonville (Fla.) Sheriff’s Office
- Kansas City (Mo.) Police Department

*Representatives’ titles and agency affiliations reflect the positions they held at the time this document was published, which may differ from titles listed in appendix A.
• Lees Summit (Mo.) Police Department
• Lincoln (Nebr.) Police Department
• Long Beach (Calif.) Police Department
• Montgomery County (Md.) Police Department
• New London (Conn.) Police Department
• Portland (Ore.) Police Bureau
• Portland (Maine) Police Department
• San Diego (Calif.) City Police and County Sheriff’s Department

The authors thank Justice Center Communications Director Martha Plotkin, Director Mike Thompson, and Health Systems and Services Policy Director Fred Osher for their insights in helping shape the scope and direction of this publication. Communications Deputy Director Regina L. Davis also contributed her well-honed editing skills. In addition, the authors appreciate the ongoing support that the Police Executive Research Forum’s Executive Director, Chuck Wexler, has lent this project and so many that affect the most vulnerable individuals who come into contact with law enforcement.
A growing number of law enforcement agencies have partnered with mental health agencies and community groups to design and implement innovative programs to improve encounters involving people with mental illnesses. These “specialized policing responses” (SPRs) are designed to produce better outcomes from these encounters by training responders to use crisis de-escalation strategies and prioritize treatment over incarceration when appropriate.1

Effective SPRs share many common features, but programs also differ in some important ways. These programmatic variations generally stem from a community’s unique needs, opportunities, and limitations. For example, officers in rural areas may have difficulty connecting people to a full range of mental health services, whereas officers in large urban areas may spend hours out of service trying to transport people to mental health facilities through traffic-congested areas. Some jurisdictions may spend tremendous resources responding repeatedly to a small number of locations or individuals. Other communities may face significant concerns about responding appropriately to particular groups of individuals, such as people with mental illnesses who are homeless.

Two of the most common law enforcement-based specialized response programs are the Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model and the co-responder model. Each program model was developed based on a jurisdiction’s unique circumstances, reflecting the need for a flexible decision-making process.

Memphis (Tenn.) police leaders, mental health professionals and advocates, city hall officials, and other key stakeholders were spurred to action following a tragic incident in which an officer killed a person with a mental illness. In response, the Memphis Police Department established the first law enforcement-based CIT in 1988, which was designed to improve safety during these encounters by enhancing officers’ ability to de-escalate the situation and providing community-based treatment alternatives to incarceration.

Los Angeles and San Diego (Calif.) initiative leaders recognized that officers encountered many people with mental illnesses who were not engaged with treatments and services. To address this problem, law enforcement agencies collaborated with the mental health community to form teams in which officers and treatment professionals respond together at the scene to connect these individuals with community-based services more effectively.

1. There has been a trend toward categorizing any response in which law enforcement plays a central role in addressing people with mental illnesses as a “crisis intervention team (CIT)” approach. To avoid confusion, this publication refers to all law enforcement-based responses as “specialized policing responses” or SPRs (pronounced spurs). The term encompasses both “CIT” and “co-responder” approaches. Those terms can then be preserved to describe accurately the scope and nature of those models.
Law enforcement agencies have identified a variety of ways to respond that recognize the unique opportunities and limitations presented by each of their jurisdictions. Some agencies have replicated existing models from other jurisdictions—such as the Memphis CIT Model—to improve their responses to people with mental illnesses. Other agencies have determined that specific community characteristics and law enforcement resources (for example, the lack of a single mental health facility or the tremendous size of a policing agency) require adaptations and additions to existing models—such as implementing a mental health outreach team in addition to an existing CIT program.

To determine the best possible response model that will meet local needs, each jurisdiction should work through a program design process. This is not to say that they should reinvent the wheel, but rather they should not skip the critical program planning and development steps that ensure a program will reflect their unique community characteristics. Program design decisions should be made in the context of a collaborative planning process that includes a wide variety of stakeholders—a practice that most communities committed to specialized responses undertake. Beyond a commitment to collaboration, however, little is known about the steps law enforcement professionals and community members take to tailor other jurisdictions’ models to their own distinct problems and circumstances. This publication addresses that gap and provides guidance for jurisdictions that want to improve their law enforcement interactions with people who have mental illnesses.

About this Report

This report is the result of a project supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA), U.S. Department of Justice. It explores the program design process, including detailed examples from several communities from across the country. It is meant to assist initiative leaders and agents of change who want to select or adapt program features from models that will be most effective in their communities. To ensure that this material has practical value, staff members from the Council of State Governments (CSG) Justice Center and the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) visited four jurisdictions with extensive experience with SPRs to examine their decision-making and program development processes (selected based on a range of characteristics such as diverse objectives, jurisdiction size, and program model type). During each visit, project staff interviewed relevant stakeholders and observed

2. Throughout this document, the term “stakeholders” is used to describe the diverse group of individuals affected by law enforcement encounters with people with mental illnesses, such as criminal justice and mental health professionals; myriad other service providers, including substance abuse counselors and housing professionals; people with mental illnesses (sometimes referred to as “consumers”) and their loved ones; crime victims; and other community representatives.

3. The examples included in this guide reflect various types of efforts that involve partnerships, programs, or practices for other communities to consider as they develop responses to people with mental illnesses. By highlighting this sampling of approaches, however, the authors are not necessarily promoting them as “best practices.”

4. For information on when the site visits were conducted and the personnel interviewed, see appendix A. This document also includes program examples from several other jurisdictions interviewed but not visited for this project, as well as several communities that have received grants through BJA’s Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program (JMHCP). See www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/grant/JMHCprogram.html for more information about JMHCP.
initiative activities. The four jurisdictions selected were Akron, Ohio; Fort Wayne, Ind.; Los Angeles, Calif.; and New River Valley, Va.

This report is divided into two sections: 1) Step by Step: The Program Design Process, and 2) From the Field: Program Design in Action. The first section articulates the seven steps involved in shaping a program that best address a jurisdiction’s distinct resources and needs, and within each step provides questions to help guide the planning process. This section is

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**SPOTLIGHT About the Four Sites**

**Akron (Ohio)** provides an example of a program that has remained true to the Memphis model of a Crisis Intervention Team (CIT), transplanting it to a new jurisdiction. This agency has collected a substantial amount of data, which has shown this program to be an effective solution to its jurisdictional needs. Agency representatives identified the need to augment CIT with follow-up program activities to address a broader range of problems in their jurisdiction.

**Fort Wayne (Ind.)** operates a traditional CIT program with a focus on schools and juveniles. School Resource Officers (SROs) are trained to recognize and respond to a range of self-destructive behaviors (such as self-mutilation), and CIT officers coordinate with school administrators to identify youth who would be best served by mental health services rather than the juvenile justice system. Data collection processes are advanced and thorough, which allows program policymakers to evaluate the initiative’s progress.

**Los Angeles (Calif.)** has implemented a wide variety of adaptations to address the unique needs of its jurisdiction, focusing on a co-responder model, while incorporating elements of the CIT model into patrol operations, as well as creating a new program focusing on a priority population. Their experience illustrates the difficulties some large jurisdictions have had in implementing the CIT model citywide. Due to its sheer size, both in area and in population, the CIT approach alone did not effectively address the community’s problems. In response, the department believes it developed a more robust and multifaceted strategy.

**New River Valley (Va.)** represents a rural, multi-jurisdictional CIT program that includes fourteen different law enforcement agencies contained in four counties and one city. The challenges facing these non-urban communities and the state law requiring that law enforcement take custody of a person meeting the criteria for an emergency mental health assessment have led to the need for several adaptations to the CIT model.

For more information on how these sites were selected, see appendix B.

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5. Some practitioners are concerned that law enforcement not just conduct “programs” that are a discrete set of activities, instead stressing that agencies should develop broader “initiatives” in which an agency engages in a comprehensive effort that includes meaningful partnerships with the community and other agencies. Because practitioners in the field used these terms interchangeably in interviews, this report also uses both to refer to efforts to improve responses to people with mental illnesses and instead qualifies or describes the level of agency engagement and commitment from a community.

6. The fourteen law enforcement agencies that comprise the New River Valley (NRV) CIT are the Blacksburg Police Department, Christiansburg Police Department, Dublin Police Department, Floyd County Sheriff’s Office, Giles County Sheriff’s Office, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office, Narrows Police Department, Pearsburg Police Department, Pulaski Police Department, Pulaski County Sheriff’s Office, Radford City Police Department, Radford City Sheriff’s Office, Radford University Police Department, and Virginia Tech Police Department.
most useful for policymakers and practitioners interested in learning how to design or revise a program—whether it is a CIT, a co-responder model, or some combination or variation of these models—that takes into full account the specific factors that drive their jurisdiction’s problems associated with law enforcement interactions with people who have mental illnesses.

The second section provides two overview charts—one about problems that affect program design and the other about jurisdiction characteristics that can affect initiative plans. It also provides specific examples that illustrate how program design processes are translated into activities in the field, drawing on information provided during interviews and site visits. It describes how program elements are tailored to a jurisdiction’s problems and specific characteristics when implemented.

The information collected from the four sites reveals a blurring of the two main models. In some cases, it is not possible to use the terms “CIT” or “co-responder” to describe the entirety of a jurisdiction’s responses; communities are now implementing a combination of both approaches. This section will help individuals interested in learning more about how other agencies throughout the country have navigated the program design process to develop these evolving initiatives.

As discussed more fully below, this report delves into some of the other ten “essential elements” of a successful SPR to people with mental illnesses that are identified and outlined in a previous publication. Whenever applicable, references to these elements are highlighted in the text. The material that follows also includes sidebar articles on related topics that often include references to additional sources of information.

Related Resources

This publication is just one in a series that addresses how law enforcement responds to people with mental illnesses. The Justice Center, in partnership with PERF and with support from BJA, has developed a collection of resources for law enforcement practitioners and their community partners.8 The centerpiece of the Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses suite of materials is the publication, The Essential Elements of a Law Enforcement-Based Program.9 The other documents build on this essential elements publication. For example, one of the ten essential elements describes the need for specialized officer training that is tailored to the law enforcement audience. It is a very concise description of why training is needed and highlights some key challenges to overcome. Another publication, Strategies for Effective Law Enforcement Training, explores these training issues in greater depth and

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7. Readers are encouraged to review Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses: The Essential Elements of a Specialized Law Enforcement-Based Program to better understand how program design and decision making fit within a broader context. To download a copy, visit www.consensusproject.org/issue_areas/law-enforcement.

8. The project and publication were completed as part of BJA’s Law Enforcement/Mental Health Partnership Program. The resources developed as part of this suite of materials are available for free download at the law enforcement issues page on the Justice Center’s Consensus Project website (www.consensusproject.org).

9. The ten essential elements presented in this document are Collaborative Planning and Implementation; Program Design; Specialized Training; Call-Taker and Dispatcher Protocols; Stabilization, Observation, and Disposition; Transportation and Custodial Transfer; Information Exchange and Confidentiality; Treatment, Supports, and Services; Organizational Support; and Program Evaluation and Sustainability.
Introduction

This document’s focus on tailoring specialized responses provides a similar level of discussion and guidance for readers who want to drill down to the details and implementation options for the essential element that encourages thoughtful, collaborative program design. These written materials are complemented by web-based information on statewide efforts to coordinate law enforcement responses and by an online Local Programs Database.\textsuperscript{10}

\textbf{Program Design}\textsuperscript{11}

The planning committee designs a specialized law enforcement-based program to address the root causes of the problems that are impeding improved responses to people with mental illnesses and makes the most of available resources.

\textsuperscript{10} The Local Programs Database, formerly referred to as the Criminal Justice/Mental Health Information Network (InfoNet), was made possible through the leadership, support, and collaboration of key federal agencies and private foundations, including the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) and the National Institute of Corrections (NIC). The database was created to foster peer-to-peer learning among agencies across the country. The database is interactive and entries include contact information to facilitate information sharing, as well as easily searchable fields on key topics. The database is available through the Consensus Project website at www.consensusproject.org and can be searched for information on other programs or accessed to create a new program profile.

\textsuperscript{11} This and other elements reflect a consensus of experts, including a broad range of policymakers, practitioners, advocates, and researchers, whose recommendations are captured in the \textit{Essential Elements} report.
Designing a program specific to a community’s unique needs is a complex process. Identifying and implementing a collaborative partnership is the first hurdle, but once stakeholders are involved and committed to the issue, the question remains, “What next?”

It is critical that a planning committee (and its program coordination group) develop a strong level of collaboration among stakeholders, yet the process can be fraught with significant challenges. Personnel from the four featured sites shared how they have successfully engaged people who are vested in the outcomes of law enforcement interactions involving people with mental illnesses and established lasting frameworks to maintain their programs’ integrity. The keys to their success include the following:

• Gain the support of law enforcement leaders through the involvement of other law enforcement leaders. In deciding whether to participate in the New River Valley CIT program, the Chief of the Pearisburg (Va.) Police Department was influenced by both the chief law enforcement executive in Radford (Va.) and Major Sam Cochran, the former CIT Coordinator for the Memphis (Tenn.) Police Department, who were each able to explain—from one law enforcement official to another—the importance and benefits of specialized responses to people with mental illnesses.

Collaborative Planning and Implementation

Organizations and individuals representing a wide range of disciplines and perspectives and with a strong interest in improving law enforcement encounters with people with mental illnesses work together in one or more groups to determine the response program’s characteristics and guide implementation efforts.

Keys to Collaboration

The planning committee is composed of leaders from each of the stakeholder agencies who have operational decision-making authority and community representatives. This executive-level committee should examine the nature of the problem and help determine the program’s objectives and design.

The program coordination group is made up of staff members from stakeholder agencies. This group should oversee officer training, measure the program’s progress toward achieving stated goals, and resolve ongoing challenges to program effectiveness.

In some jurisdictions, the two bodies may be the same—particularly those with small agencies, in rural areas, or with limited resources.
• Develop a subcommittee structure within the larger planning committee or program coordination group to support targeted issue areas and make collaboration more efficient. In addition to their participation in a multidisciplinary coalition in the New River Valley CIT program, initiative planners developed a “Law Enforcement and Mental Health Services Coalition,” which meets quarterly to discuss mental health issues related specifically to law enforcement. In Fort Wayne (Ind.), a subcommittee composed of individuals from law enforcement, mental health, and advocacy meets separately to focus on training development and then to prepare and host training sessions several times each year. The training committee in Akron (Ohio), which meets twice yearly, manages the iterative process of refreshing the curriculum to ensure it reflects the most current policies and procedures.

• Designate staff members to focus on accountability and to maintain connections among stakeholders in the collaboration. The planning committee can designate staff members in the program coordination group to manage the logistics of partnerships. Identified personnel can ensure that there is an emphasis on collaboration from the start of the program.

• Exchange meaningful information to measure outcomes and foster necessary program changes. Stakeholders will be more likely to maintain their involvement if they find the meetings provide meaningful information and accomplish specific tasks. In Los Angeles, the police department shares information with its mental health advisory board about their use-of-force trends and reports, for example.

What Next, After Collaboration?

This section outlines seven key steps involved in the collaborative program design process. Each step includes a series of questions designed to help planning and coordination groups structure their discussions and advance their thinking about related issues.12

Step 1: Understand the problem
Step 2: Articulate program goals and objectives
Step 3: Identify data-collection procedures needed to revise and evaluate the program
Step 4: Detail jurisdictional characteristics and their influence on program responses
Step 5: Establish response protocols
Step 6: Determine training requirements
Step 7: Prepare for program evaluation

In each of the four jurisdictions—Akron, Fort Wayne, Los Angeles, and New River Valley—initiative leaders found that the challenges their community faced were inter-related, multilayered, and required similarly complex and nuanced responses. In addition, those

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12. For a worksheet that provides the questions that guide the design process without the narrative explanation, see appendix C.
Step by Step: The Program Design Process

who had created programmatic responses found that it was an iterative process, rather than a simple linear approach. Accordingly, the steps recommended in this guide are designed to be revisited as needed to fine-tune efforts and remain responsive to conditions and resources in a jurisdiction. Program design does not end when the seven steps are complete, but rather requires an ongoing effort to evaluate and adjust program responses as the community’s landscape changes.

Step 1: Understand the problem

Program development is often initiated in reaction to a terrible tragedy in the community, impending litigation, or another event. Partners involved in the collaboration should start the program design process by researching and then moving beyond the initial impetus to develop a common and comprehensive understanding of the legal, clinical, and community circumstances that make it so challenging to effectively respond to people with mental illnesses encountered by law enforcement officers.

It is important to stress from the outset that research does not support the stereotype that people with mental illnesses are more violent than individuals in the general population. Accordingly, police use of force is usually not needed. Yet even though the occurrence is infrequent for there to be law enforcement shootings involving people with mental illnesses, the impact of such events on the officer, the individual’s family, and the community—and even on other communities not directly involved—is profound and

We ask ourselves, and other agencies ask, too, would these terrible incidents have happened [where someone is shot and killed] had this program been in place at that time? We paid a terrible price. Why would an agency choose to do otherwise? How could they see what has happened here and in LA County and knowingly choose not to do this program? It makes no sense to me.”

—Assistant Chief Earl Paysinger
Director, Office of Operations, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

13. Gary Cordner’s report “People with Mental Illness” also emphasizes the need for decision-makers to understand the problem in their local community to design an effective response strategy. He provides detailed questions that planners should ask to better understand the impact of incidents, stakeholders, victims, offenders, and locations/times. Gary Cordner, “People with Mental Illness,” Problem-Oriented Guides for Police Problem-Specific Guides Series, Number 40, U.S. Department of Justice (Washington, DC: Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, 2006), www.popcenter.org/problems/mental_illness.

far-reaching. The following questions can prompt planners to investigate the scope and nature of the challenges officers face in incidents involving people with mental illnesses and design appropriate responses.

**Question 1: What forces are driving current efforts to improve the law enforcement response to people with mental illnesses?**

Stakeholders should contribute their individual perspectives to answer this question. Law enforcement line staff may voice concern about the many challenges they face during encounters involving people with mental illnesses—many agree that these calls are often time-consuming and frustrating. Patrol officers may spend long periods of time attempting to link a person in crisis to an appropriate mental health resource, and also may find themselves responding repeatedly to the same individuals without seeing any improvement in the outcomes. From another perspective, consumers of mental health services and their families might identify the need for change because of the limited treatment and response options for people with mental illnesses at risk of criminal justice involvement. They may not have any other options when a loved one is in crisis, but are disappointed by the results of law enforcement engagement. Both stakeholder groups would likely agree that the person's mental health and related calls for service are not improved through the more traditional interactions with police. It is important both to recognize the legitimacy of each argument and the need to reach consensus around the issues influencing the reasons for change. (Section II of this report provides more detail about the specific problems and the contributing factors that various jurisdictions have encountered.)

**Question 2: What data can planning committee members examine to understand the factors influencing law enforcement responses to people with mental illnesses?**

Effective program design hinges on accurately identifying the causes of the problems communities face. For example, if a community is responding to a tragic incident, stakeholders must explore the circumstances that led up to and occurred during the incident. They will also want to look for more systemic issues that go beyond those involved in the particular incident. This exploration may include interviews with the involved parties and a review of law enforcement and mental health system protocols and procedures (including response practices and training), as well as an assessment of resource gaps that may be hindering better responses to people with mental illnesses.

Among the law enforcement data that should be considered when defining the scope and nature of the problem are the number and types of calls related to people with mental illnesses, duration of the responses, and related use-of-force information. It may be important to note whether officers are responding repeatedly to the same individuals and locations to determine if interventions are needed to produce better results. One option is to examine computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data. If possible, efforts should be made to understand outcomes of calls for service through forms used to track the disposition of calls.
Step by Step: The Program Design Process

Valuable information should also be gleaned about the mental health system response. For example, planners can review the number and type of admissions at the receiving psychiatric facilities, and gather feedback on this process from officers, mental health professionals, family members, and consumers that has been collected through focus groups, surveys, or interviews.\textsuperscript{15} Data should be collected on how long officers spend at the mental health facility and problems experienced in transferring custody as well. It is also important to catalog the types of services provided by community mental health centers and other providers, their availability, and their capacity to address the individuals’ needs. Together, this information can then inform needed changes in responses.

(Problems that are related to community and agency characteristics, such as lack of mental health resources uncovered by cataloging the number and kind of available providers and their admission criteria, are addressed in Step 4: Question 2.)

**Question 3: What are the data limitations, and how can they be overcome?**

Stakeholders should identify the limitations of various data sources, such as the scant reporting on perceived mental illness in CAD databases or the failure of mental health intake records to account for the involvement of law enforcement. Law enforcement and community stakeholders should explore why officers may not be reporting encounters they resolve at the scene, what system limitations there are that make it difficult to capture relevant information when clearing a call or ending a field interaction, and other problems with gathering information on these interactions. Efforts should be made to resolve these issues and gain a better understanding of whether repeat calls for service, or particularly difficult incidents, center on a particular subgroup of individuals, such as people in a particular beat, men with substance abuse problems, or women who are homeless.

A critical component of the program design process is to ensure that goals, objectives, policy and practice reforms, and measures of success are all data-driven and tailored to a particular jurisdiction’s distinctive needs. Because of problems with underreporting and other collection barriers mentioned previously, data should be interpreted with these limitations in mind. They are, however, still useful sources of information that provide a starting point for program design. To enhance the reliability of the information, stakeholders should consult multiple sources of data.

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\textsuperscript{15} “Receiving psychiatric facilities” include all medical facilities that will receive, assess, and treat someone in a mental health crisis, including hospital emergency rooms, psychiatric hospitals, and crisis drop-off centers. Most medical information is protected under federal and state privacy laws. If stakeholders wish to examine protected health information during this process, they should take into account laws governing this information exchange. For an overview of the federal laws, see John Petrila, “Dispelling the Myths about Information Sharing between the Mental Health and Criminal Justice Systems,” National GAINS Center for Systemic Change for Justice-Involved People with Mental Illness (February 2007). Petrila also participated in a webinar, “HIPAA: Myths, Facts, and Cross-systems Collaboration” (March 23, 2009). The associated presentation is available at www.consensusproject.org/features/hipaappt.
**Step 2:**

**Articulate program goals and objectives**

Once the collaborative planning group has a firm grasp on the challenges facing the community, they should establish the program's goals and objectives. Program goals capture the “big picture” of the good that the effort is meant to achieve, whereas objectives outline program activities that, if achieved, would meet those goals. A shared statement of the program goals will advance the discussion around program design. The objectives will not only detail the mechanisms for achieving a program goal, but will also provide a framework for developing evaluation measures. Program planners should articulate realistic goals and objectives, and avoid terminology that suggests problems will be “eliminated” or that all individuals will benefit from improved responses. It is advisable to establish both short- and long-term goals and objectives to help ensure early successes and sustainability.

**Question 1: What are the program’s overarching goals?**

The program's goals reflect the desired outcome of the initiative on the primary problems identified by the planning group and other stakeholders in the community. For example, if the community is responding to a tragic incident involving law enforcement and a person with mental illness, the program goals might include improving officer and community safety. The goals should be well-articulated in writing and shared among all partners and the community, and should be reviewed periodically.

Other goals might include reducing arrests for minor offenses, lowering the number of repeat calls for service involving people with mental illnesses, decreasing the use of force by law enforcement, incurring fewer injuries among all involved at the scene, increasing the numbers of people diverted to mental health treatment when warranted, or cutting law enforcement agency costs.

**Question 2: What are the program’s objectives?**

Objectives capture the specific program activities needed to achieve the stated goals. For example, if stakeholders identify improved safety as the program goal, providing effective agency training on de-escalation will be a key program objective. Objectives should be as specific as possible. In this example, the objective could be to train a certain proportion of the primary and secondary responders or a particular subset of individuals. If the goal is to address strains on law enforcement resources, one objective might be reducing the amount of time officers spend attempting to link people with mental illnesses to mental health services to a target number (for example, 15–30 minutes).

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16. Examples that include specific numbers or percentages included in this section are not intended as recommendations, but are included only to highlight the value of setting specific goals within the agency to monitor improvement and to evaluate the extent to which the program is implemented.
Identify data-collection procedures needed to revise and evaluate the program\textsuperscript{17}

Once program goals and objectives are set, law enforcement and their partners can use them to identify what information they should collect and how they should collect it.\textsuperscript{18} Data collection practices should take into account both process and outcome measures. Evaluating a program’s process will allow coordinators to assess whether the proposed activities are being carried out (how many individuals were trained, how many calls were answered by an officer with training, and more) so planners can revise day-to-day program functioning and the reach of the initiative. It is also critical that the evaluation determine whether the activities are having the intended outcome (that is, the impact that planners hoped to achieve for people with mental illnesses, officers, and the community)—information needed not only to assess true advances, but also to secure funding and ensure program sustainability over time.

**Question 1:** What data will be collected to measure whether goals and objectives have been achieved?

Once goals and objectives have been articulated clearly, determining what information is required to measure them will be generally straightforward. For example, if a goal is to increase safety, an agency would want to collect data on injuries or deaths, use of force, and citizen complaints to see if that has been attained. If a related objective is to train all recruits, the agency or its partners will need to track the number of recruits who complete the curriculum or successfully pass a test. Most initiatives will want to address many of the issues raised previously that relate to using scarce law enforcement resources to better identify and safely serve people with mental illnesses—particularly those who should appropriately be diverted to the mental health system. Accordingly, the collaborative planning group and other stakeholders will want to collect data such as the frequency of calls for service involving people with mental illnesses, including how many are to the same individuals or locations; the types and frequency of disposition decisions; the percentage of calls that specially trained personnel handle and the portion that involve routine responses, and the duration of those responses; and any injuries or fatalities suffered during law enforcement encounters involving people with mental illnesses.


\textsuperscript{18} Law enforcement agencies may want to partner with a local college or university to assist with identifying what data to collect. Academic partners should be included from the beginning of the planning stages to provide guidance during this step.
**Question 2: What data collection strategies will be used?**

Many existing data sources—such as CAD data, Emergency Medical Services (EMS) logs, and Emergency Room records—can provide useful information. These data systems typically were designed, however, to capture information for purposes other than law enforcement/mental health program improvement or evaluation. As a result, specialized law enforcement-based programs almost always require collecting new information, and often from different sources or in novel ways.

Collecting the necessary information has proven difficult for many agencies. Each of the four agencies featured in this report had varying levels of success capturing data consistently from both law enforcement officers and mental health providers. The two major limitations are 1) inconsistency in call identification and 2) paperwork noncompliance. Most agencies do not have a reliable method to label calls for service involving people with mental illnesses at the time of dispatch, nor an ability to update the codes in the CAD system retroactively to reflect new information relating to mental health status. In terms of noncompliance with record-keeping or reporting practices, law enforcement officers have an enormous amount of paperwork to complete for all incidents, particularly those involving serious crimes or arrests, and may feel that the time needed to complete an additional form is in conflict with their other policing duties. Both of these factors can result in missing or incomplete data in law enforcement systems. Mental health providers may also experience problems with trying to maintain updated, accurate information in their systems given their often overwhelming caseloads. Departments must be creative and persistent in overcoming these challenges.

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**PROGRAM EXAMPLE: Addressing barriers to data collection, Philadelphia (Pa.)**

In 2006, Philadelphia received a Justice and Mental Health Collaboration Program (JMHCP) grant from the Bureau of Justice Assistance. Initiative leaders decided to use this funding to plan and implement a CIT program in the Philadelphia Police Department—pilot-testing the program in a single division and addressing any challenges before expanding it department-wide.

According to coalition members, one of the main difficulties the planners faced was obtaining information directly from the CIT officers about their encounters with people with mental illnesses. In response, they decided to change their data-reporting system from a paper-based system to a call-in system. At this writing, officers call the CIT coordinator to complete the necessary form by phone, and then the coordinator collects and files the reports.

For more information about Philadelphia’s program, see the program entry in the Local Programs Database available at www.consensusproject.org.

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19. The majority of police action related to people with mental illnesses in the four sites studied was based on responding to calls for service rather than incidents observed during the course of routine patrol.
**Step 4:**

**Detail jurisdictional characteristics and their influence on program responses**

For this discussion, “jurisdictional characteristics” refers to those aspects of a community that are difficult to change, often requiring long-term efforts. Based on information gathered during the site visits, project staff found these characteristics fall into four categories relating to 1) the law enforcement agency, 2) the mental health system, 3) state laws, and 4) geography and demography. Each of these categories should be considered when designing a program.

**Question 1:** What characteristics of the law enforcement agency are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?

The planning group and stakeholders should consider the following during the design stage:

- **Agency resources**, which include staffing levels, data management structures, training expertise and capacity, and availability of less-lethal technologies.

- **Relevant policies and regulations**, such as use-of-force guidelines, discretion in making arrests, policies on diversion, reporting requirements, information-sharing policies, and requirements for handcuffing during custodial transport.

- **Leadership styles**, which may dictate the number of officers a program seeks to train, either focusing on a small self-selecting group or providing training to an entire department. Some law enforcement executives believe a subset of officers must become “specialists” who are dedicated to particular areas of expertise (such as domestic violence) because the additional information they obtain will help them respond to those situations more effectively. Other chiefs or agency executives believe all officers should be prepared to respond to all situations they will encounter. Leadership must believe there is a compelling need to prioritize limited resources to address this issue. And they must be willing to designate someone within the agency to help provide oversight and support to the effort, to work collaboratively with the mental health community, and to garner support among policymakers to ensure sustainability. The agency should have leaders who are willing to even reconsider officer evaluation criteria that is

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I talk about the three Cs of program success: compassion, constitutionality, and consistency. Compassion is brought by people who want to be [in a specialized assignment]. Constitutionality and consistency are greatly enhanced when the department provides resources.”

—Chief William Bratton
Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

—Officer Forrest Kappler
CIT Officer, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

Working on the CIT Outreach Team provides great satisfaction, but it should remain voluntary—it requires a certain kind of officer who is internally motivated.”

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more in keeping with community policing principles—in which officers are reviewed for their problem-solving and de-escalation skills instead of the number of arrests they make.

**Question 2: What mental health system characteristics are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?**

As part of the program design process, stakeholders should catalog available mental health resources in the community, identify the criteria for or any restrictions to accessing them, and describe their capacity and availability. For example, if there are no twenty-four-hour facilities to receive people with mental illnesses except emergency rooms, and officers are required to wait hours with the individual to be seen, alternatives can be explored. And if facilities will only accept individuals who meet specific eligibility criteria, such as only individuals not under the influence of drugs or alcohol, it becomes clear that other options must be indentified to support officers when they encounter these individuals.

The planning group and relevant stakeholders should then identify service gaps. Community mental health resources might include emergency departments, inpatient and outpatient treatment programs, crisis response services, emergency receiving centers, family support programs, telephone hotlines, clubhouses and other peer-to-peer supports, and ancillary services such as housing assistance and income and entitlement support. Throughout this review, the planning group should work with policymakers and other key groups to examine the structure of the mental health system and understand variations in catchment areas (municipal vs. county) and revenue sources (private vs. public). These variations may affect law enforcement responses by impacting where officers can transport a person in crisis.

Beyond identifying available mental health resources, stakeholders should become familiar with the avenues available to law enforcement officers to access these services (whether in person, by telephone, or through a referral mechanism), understand the requirements for medical clearance, and clarify existing protocols or procedures for voluntary and involuntary admissions for mental health evaluations and assessments.

**Question 3: What state laws are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?**

State laws can address a range of issues relating to the law enforcement response. For example, they can mandate law enforcement training and dictate the criteria that must be met and the protocols that must be followed for an emergency mental health evaluation. Local law enforcement officers can play a critical role in this process. In Nebraska, for

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20. According to the International Association of Clubhouse Development, a clubhouse is “a community intentionally organized to support individuals living with the effects of mental illness. Through participation in a clubhouse people are given the opportunities to rejoin the worlds of friendships, family, important work, employment, education, and to access the services and supports they may individually need.” More information is available at www.iccd.org.
example, a sworn law enforcement officer is required to determine if a person meets the criteria for involuntary emergency evaluation, to maintain custody of the person, and to transport the person to the mental health receiving facility. In other states, a magistrate or clinician might be required to make the commitment determination. States may have outpatient commitment laws that can be enforced prior to consumers becoming dangerous to themselves or others. Consumers may develop advance directives that provide instructions for how they wish to be treated if they decompensate. These mandates and regulations can present both an opportunity and a burden on law enforcement officers, and should be considered fully by planners.

**Question 4:** What demographic and geographic community characteristics are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?

A jurisdiction’s population, population density, land area, and crime patterns can present important constraints or benefits to developing specialized response programs. For example, a jurisdiction whose only emergency mental health resources are located far from particular law enforcement beats or districts will require officers to spend long periods out of service transporting individuals, particularly if they have to pass through densely populated, traffic-congested areas. Rural and urban areas may have very different problems that will affect dispatch and response times. Some rural areas may be dependent on only phone access to mental health professionals who can direct emergency evaluations. Further, an area that is populated primarily by seniors may have very different needs than those that are generally young families with children, or that have a large number of homeless individuals. Although jurisdictions of every size can struggle with inadequate resources (especially when budget cuts directly impact state and community mental health services), these considerations should be addressed carefully when shaping a law enforcement initiative.

**Step 5:**

**Establish response protocols**

At this stage of design, the planning group will understand how law enforcement, mental health, and other community-based providers are currently responding to people with mental illnesses who are at risk of criminal justice involvement. Based on the community’s characteristics, it should be possible to see how these can be better integrated and shaped to address identified problem areas and service gaps. Program development decisions at this point in the process should focus on which law enforcement and mental health responses are needed, both individually and collectively, and what resources are needed to support them.

**Question 1:** What law enforcement responses are necessary?

There are three main categories of law enforcement first-responder activities that require consideration and planning—call-taker and dispatcher protocols; on-scene activities
(stabilization, observation, and disposition); and transportation and custodial transfer.21 Planners must decide which personnel will serve as primary responders to scenes involving a person in a mental health crisis, and how they will be dispatched. Based on the review of the law enforcement/mental health problems and community characteristics, they may choose to train a subset of officers for this responsibility, train all officers, or pair officers with mental health clinicians or caseworkers. In addition to these activities, planners may also choose to involve law enforcement officers in follow-up activities not generated by a call for service.

**Essential Element 4—Call-Taker and Dispatcher Protocols**

Call takers and dispatchers identify critical information to direct calls to the appropriate responders, inform the law enforcement response, and record this information for analysis and as a reference for future calls for service.

**Essential Element 5—Stabilization, Observation, and Disposition**

Specialized law enforcement responders de-escalate and observe the nature of incidents in which mental illness may be a factor using tactics focused on safety. Drawing on their understanding and knowledge of relevant laws and available resources, officers then determine the appropriate disposition.

**Essential Element 6—Transportation and Custodial Transfer**

Law enforcement responders transport and transfer custody of the person with a mental illness in a safe and sensitive manner that supports the individual’s efficient access to mental health services and the officers’ timely return to duty.

**Question 2: What mental health system responses are necessary?**

Mental health personnel may be involved in a variety of ways, including providing information to dispatchers, co-responding to calls for service involving a person with mental illness, acting as a remote resource if no on-scene professional can be available, helping to train or cross-train personnel, and coordinating a follow-up effort, particularly with people

> There are immeasurable benefits to officers who travel with mental health professionals on the SMART teams both for the officers and the clinicians in terms of information exchange and awareness.”

—Commander Harlan Ward
Assistant Commanding Officer of Valley Bureau, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

21. Each of these three categories represents one of the ten elements in *The Essential Elements of a Specialized Law Enforcement-Based Response*. For more information, see http://consensusproject.org/jc_publications/le-essentialelements.pdf.
identified as high utilizers of emergency mental health services. Collaboration for certain activities may be best achieved through co-location of law enforcement and mental health coordinators or such mechanisms as merged or integrated databases that are consistent with privacy laws.

As the Justice Center’s Essential Elements publication indicates, individuals with mental illnesses often require an array of services and supports, which can include medications, counseling, substance abuse treatment, income supports and government entitlements, housing, crisis services, peer supports, case management, and inpatient treatment. Planners of the SPR program should anticipate the treatment needs of the individuals with whom law enforcement will come in contact and work with service providers in the community to ensure these needs can be met and coordinated.

Because many individuals with mental illnesses who come into contact with law enforcement have co-occurring substance use disorders, the availability of integrated treatment approaches is essential to achieve clinical and public safety objectives. Accordingly, stakeholders should consider how the program can help connect individuals with co-occurring disorders to integrated treatment and should advocate for greater access to this and other evidence-based practices. Histories of trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder are common in criminal justice-involved populations. As such, both the on-scene response of law enforcement and subsequent clinical responses must be trauma-informed. Planners should pay special attention to the service needs of racial and ethnic minorities and women by making culturally competent and gender-sensitive services available to the extent possible.

Stakeholders should also identify ways to improve the efficiency of access to needed services. This may entail broader system changes and agreements, such as streamlining the custody transfer process at a mental health intake facility through memoranda of agreement (MOAs) and revised protocols. Law enforcement should have within easy reach twenty-four-hour drop-off facilities or emergency room(s) designated to expedite the transfer of custody to ensure the individual receives swift mental health services and allow officers to return quickly to duty.

We need to create drop-off stations at the hospital to receive people in crisis. This requires not only trained law enforcement staff, but also an appropriate space—a space where we can safely manage the behavior of people who are out of control.”

—Marie Moon Painter
Clinical Team Leader for CONNECT, Carilion St. Albans Behavioral Health, Virginia


**Question 3: What other responses or resources are necessary?**

While law enforcement agencies and mental health professionals can provide the majority of responses that the planners will prioritize, other partner organizations and their resources may be required to address the problem faced by the community. For example, consumer- or advocate-led organizations, such as clubhouses, can provide essential support to people in crisis and supplement limited mental health resources. Non-law enforcement criminal justice professionals, such as judges, magistrates, and jail personnel, can play an important role in identifying and assessing individuals who may be in need of emergency mental health evaluations.

The planning committee also should identify the availability of community and government resources that focus on critical issues that disproportionately tend to affect people with mental illnesses (such as housing, employment, education, substance abuse treatment, and veterans’ services). An assessment of their accessibility in the community should be part of the planning process.

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**SPOTLIGHT Systemwide Solutions**

The 2002 landmark *Consensus Project Report*—written by Justice Center staff and representatives of 100 leading criminal justice and mental health policymakers, practitioners, and advocates from across the country—provides policy guidelines and practical recommendations for improving the criminal justice system’s response to people with mental illnesses. The policy statements and recommendations span the entire criminal justice continuum, from the law enforcement encounter, through court involvement and incarceration, to the individual’s reentry into the community. The success of recommended efforts is dependent on collaboration and partnership among the full range of criminal justice agencies and their community partners. It recognizes that law enforcement, courts, or corrections officials’ actions have ramifications for the rest of the criminal justice system.

This interconnectedness highlights the value of creating a systemwide commitment to change, in which reforms at each point of contact between the individual with mental illness and a different criminal justice agency are woven together. There is a wide variety of program models that focus on a different point of intercept in the criminal justice system, including the following:

- **Law enforcement specialized responses**, which use specially trained law enforcement officers to de-escalate incidents involving people with mental illnesses and divert them to services when appropriate.

- **Mental health courts**, which are specialized dockets that link defendants with mental illnesses to court-supervised, community-based treatment in lieu of traditional case processing when warranted.

- **Post-booking jail diversion programs**, which screen and assess people with mental illnesses in the jail, and divert them to community-based services when suitable.

- **Specialized probation caseloads**, which integrate community corrections supervision strategies with community-based mental health treatment and services through a variety of methods.

For more information on the Consensus Project report and the many program models, see www.consensusproject.org.
Step 6: Determine training requirements

Once planners determine which types of responses are best suited to their local needs and resources (such as a specially trained unit, co-responder model for a subset of officers, or all officers who respond with special unit backup), the group can begin developing a training curriculum and schedules. Both law enforcement and mental health agencies or providers will have concerns about their ability to afford and prepare quality training, including how to address such issues as compensation for trainers, continued education accreditation, and covering shifts for officers in training or fitting it into already packed recruit training schedules. These concerns need to be factored into decisions about how many and how often first-responders are trained.

Question 1: How much training will be provided and to which law enforcement personnel?

How much training is not only a question of hours spent in the classroom, but also of the number of officers trained and of how often training is held. Many agencies with specialized law enforcement-based response programs require that 20 percent of the department’s officers receive forty hours of training. However, there are other approaches that planners can consider, including increased training on mental health issues for recruits or ongoing education requirements for all officers. Dispatchers and call takers will also require training on the program model, to help them identify calls for service that may involve a person with mental illness and then to dispatch the correct personnel to the scene. They may also be able to ask questions that can help officers who arrive at the scene, and to collect information about

Specialized Training

All law enforcement personnel who respond to incidents in which an individual’s mental illness appears to be a factor receive training to prepare for these encounters; those in specialized assignments receive more comprehensive training. Dispatchers, call takers, and other individuals in a support role receive training tailored to their needs.

Some law enforcement agencies only send officer volunteers to attend the training, while others send all officers. There are always some officers at the training who don’t want to be there. After a day or two, though, even reluctant officers understand that this program is about officer safety.”

—Patrick Halpern
Executive Director, Mental Health Association of the New River Valley, Inc., Virginia

24. The CIT Center at the University of Memphis has released the “Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements” (available at http://cit.memphis.edu/CoreElements.pdf), which outlines their suggestions for length of training (forty hours) and the number of officers trained within an agency’s patrol division (20 to 25 percent). The guide provides detailed information about the Memphis CIT Model.

25. To learn more, download Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses: Strategies for Effective Law Enforcement Training from www.consensusproject.org/issue_areas/law-enforcement.
the disposition of calls involving people with mental illnesses to help administrators determine the number and effectiveness of specialized responses.

**Question 2: What topics should training cover?**

Training curricula should be geared toward the particular law enforcement personnel (line-level, special teams, dispatchers) and include information specific to the jurisdiction (for example, state commitment laws and local resources). Although there is no single curriculum that will address the needs of all jurisdictions, several training topics form the foundation of a comprehensive training program. These include understanding mental illness, statutory authorities governing law enforcement responses, the law enforcement response to calls for service, community policing/problem solving, and use of force.\(^{26}\) The training is not intended to turn law enforcement officers into diagnosticians, but rather to train them to look for behaviors associated with mental illnesses and determine the best way to address those behaviors. Specific skills training may include a combination of verbal de-escalation techniques and suicide prevention methods.

**Question 3: Who will provide the training?**

Training for law enforcement officers on effective responses to people with mental illnesses must draw on a diverse range of expertise and perspectives to cover a broad range of topics, from recognizing signs of mental illness to understanding the state’s emergency evaluation laws. Many of these topics may be better taught by experts from disciplines other than law enforcement. For example, signs of mental illnesses may be taught by a psychiatrist or mental health clinician, whereas de-escalation techniques may be best taught by a seasoned law enforcement officer who can provide real-life examples. Consumers and family members can provide a face and a voice for people struggling with mental illnesses, and they are uniquely qualified to promote a compassionate response from officers who often see people with mental illnesses only when these individuals are in crisis. Training coordinators might not know who would be a good fit to teach all modules, so it is important that coordinators reach out to community partners to collaborate on identifying trainers or facilitators.\(^{27}\)

\(^{26}\) This list is drawn from *Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses: Strategies for Effective Law Enforcement Training,* “Appendix B: Suggested Training Topics,” page 41.

\(^{27}\) For more information on how to identify trainers, see “Chapter 1: Identifying Trainers” on page 8 of *Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses: Strategies for Effective Law Enforcement Training.*
**Question 4: What training strategies will be employed?**

Effective training strategies are critical to a specialized law enforcement-based program. These strategies may include short lectures that focus on behaviors and plain language rather than diagnoses and medical terms; site visits to some of the mental health facilities where they will do custodial transfers or refer individuals for treatment or support; role plays to engage officers in real-life interactions that can be acted out and corrected in a safe environment; and question-and-answer sessions to prompt officers to consider and discuss their own experiences, preconceptions, and concerns. Traditional classroom-style training is invaluable, but as a supplement, many agencies have started to develop e-learning platforms to engage personnel who work nontraditional hours and to increase access to specialized training topics.28

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**Step 7:**

**Prepare for program evaluation**

It is not enough to simply identify what information will be collected (as outlined in Step 3) to ensure effective evaluations will be conducted. It is important for planners to prepare for a program evaluation as part of the design process. As previously mentioned, the program evaluation should contain both a process assessment as well as an assessment of outcomes. This evaluation will be needed to make revisions to the activities that may be experiencing difficulties and to enhance those that are effective, as well as to provide proof of the program’s success to foster sustainability.

**Question 1: What resources need to be set aside or identified for an evaluation?**

A thorough program evaluation will require the allocation of resources to analyze the data collected. Agencies with planning and research divisions may want to identify department staff and allocate a percent of their time during the program design phase to coordinate or conduct these evaluations. Agencies without research capacity may benefit from outside assistance in aggregating, deciphering, and interpreting the data to determine program effectiveness. Because of the challenges associated with data collection, as well as the difficulties in analyzing often incomplete data, many law enforcement agencies partner with a local college or university to assist with this process. Academic partners may require compensation for which law enforcement agencies may need to find sources of support,

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28. For more information on training strategies, see “Chapter 2: Effective Training Techniques” on page 22 of *Improving Responses to People with Mental Illnesses: Strategies for Effective Law Enforcement Training*.  

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*We trimmed the forty-hour training curriculum by determining what course content the officers really needed. We had a four and one-half-hour block on psychopharmacology, and while it is important to understand what these drugs are, the reason the police officer is there is because the person is NOT taking their medications. We now tell officers what these medications are, what they do, and give them a card to refer to.”  

—*Dr. Luann Pannell*  
Director of Police Training and Education, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department
including submitting joint grant proposals. If the department chooses to engage an external research partner, these outside teams will need to work closely with law enforcement and their collaborators during the evaluation process, and this staff time commitment should be considered at the planning stage.

**Question 2: Are there individuals designated to oversee the evaluation?**

Law enforcement agencies should designate a staff person who will work with a subcommittee on evaluation issues. In addition to helping to ensure that all agencies that are contributing data are using sound and accurate collection and reporting practices, this group can determine how the evaluation results will be used, how they will be disseminated, and who should be brought to the table during the evaluation process to review interim reports and the interpretations of the data.

**Conclusion**

The seven steps to program design summarized in this section may seem straightforward. They are not. Law enforcement agencies and their community partners are struggling to navigate the many issues that are involved in making the proper decisions at each stage in the process. And as new information is made available, it is necessary to revisit previous steps. To fully grasp the challenges in following these design steps, policymakers and planners interested in exploring a specialized policing response to people with mental illnesses must operate within a framework defined by two complex forces—the nature of the problem and the jurisdiction’s distinct characteristics.

Though the problem frequently relates to safety concerns and strains on police resources that do not result in good outcomes for law enforcement, the individual, or the community, jurisdictions may find that data and discussions lead them to other issues or sub-issues that need particular attention. Crafting the solutions to these problems—including changes to law enforcement training, policies, and procedures—cannot be shaped in a vacuum. Training officers on diversion and other strategies, for example, will be ineffective if mental health resources in the community are not available or lack the capacity to support increased referrals and placements. Accordingly, jurisdictions will be limited by the resources they have or believe they can create or expand.

The following section explores how various problems and community characteristics have shaped responses in the agencies studied and how other jurisdictions might expect these factors to influence their own program design and enhancements.
Section II

From the Field: Program Design in Action

This section provides practical advice on how to consider common problems as experienced by the four sites studied. It also considers various law enforcement, mental health, and other community characteristics, and their relative impact on program design. Examples from the field are included to illustrate how these problems and characteristics are reflected in program implementation.

Tailoring Specialized Policing Response Programs to Specific Problems

The three most commonly encountered problems found in the four communities studied were unsafe encounters, frequent arrests of people with mental illnesses and the strains on law enforcement resources, and high utilization of emergency services. It is important to note that this separation of problems into distinct categories is somewhat artificial, as they often overlap and relate to one another. Other communities may find their data lead them to identify different problems beyond these three types. The chart that follows provides an overview of how the four sites tailored their responses to their community’s problems.

If you want it to be collaborative, you need to be flexible and adapt this program to your local community.”
—Sgt. Michael Yohe
CIT Coordinator, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

CIT is a godsend. The community of people with mental illnesses was getting badly treated and CIT has been an undisputed success. There are very few situations where the response is poor.”
—Tom
Consumer, Carriage House (Fort Wayne, Ind.)

It may well take a tragedy to mobilize the resources….”
—Assistant Chief
Jim McDonnell
1st Assistant Chief, Chief of Staff, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

I feel that CIT changed our understanding of what the police officers are capable of doing with de-escalation and compassion.”
—Jim Randall
President, NAMI–San Fernando Valley (Calif.)

29. Cordner’s guide, “People with Mental Illness,” outlines a variety of response strategies that decision-makers can consider when choosing how to best respond to the problem they are facing in their local community. These response strategies are also summarized in a table that presents the response type, how it works, when it works, and additional considerations to take into account.
## The Impact of Problem Type on SPR Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Type</th>
<th>Jurisdictions</th>
<th>SPR Program Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Unsafe Encounters</strong></td>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif. Akron, Ohio Fort Wayne, Ind. New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>Officers trained on mental health issues respond to the scene when dispatched. (In the LAPD, a call can also be triaged to dispatch a special co-response unit. See box below.) Related issues are addressed during training for officers on mental health topics. Training is provided for dispatchers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Frequent Arrests and Strains on Police Resources</strong></td>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif. Akron, Ohio Fort Wayne, Ind. New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>Co-responder teams are dispatched to the scene when requested by a first-responder. Crisis mental health clinicians also respond to the scene. Additional dispatch capability is used to “triage” incidents requiring the co-response team. Related issues are addressed within the forty hours of training for officers. Emergency psychiatric facilities streamline intake procedures for law enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>High Utilization of Emergency Resources</strong></td>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif. Akron, Ohio</td>
<td>Follow-up teams of law enforcement personnel and mental health clinicians work on case management for referred cases, including cases brought to their attention by involved stakeholders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"Relatives of consumers are now less reluctant to involve the police because family members realize that a compassionate officer will respond to the call. Consequently, families do not wait until the situation has escalated, and officers now respond to less threatening calls. This allows them to intervene at an earlier point. No CIT officer has been injured when responding to a person with mental illness."

—**Lieutenant Mike Woody (ret.)**
Law Enforcement Liaison, Ohio Criminal Justice Coordinating Center of Excellence

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30. Many of the “SPR Program Activities” listed here address more than one problem. In practice, these responses often straddle the goals of improving safety, reducing frequent calls for service, and decreasing the use of emergency resources.
**Problem:** Unsafe outcomes of encounters between law enforcement and people with mental illnesses

When communities experience a tragedy related to a law enforcement encounter involving a person with mental illness, there is often a flurry of activity to determine what factors contributed to that outcome and to ensure it will not happen again. Several factors seem to affect safety at the scene. Many community members interviewed for this project noted that when consumers have had previous negative encounters with law enforcement, they become fearful and distrusting during subsequent interactions. A person’s fear can then be exacerbated by the officer’s uniform and an authoritarian approach. Even individuals in crisis with no previous contact with officers may have extreme reactions to being crowded or subjected to officers’ commands.

Community members interviewed also recognized that traditionally trained law enforcement officers often lack information about mental illnesses, particularly information about strategies to calm crisis behavior and avoid use of force. Without adequate training, officers may also be fearful of individuals with mental illness and may misperceive them as more dangerous, affecting officer posturing and reactions. It is important to recognize that much of an officers’ academy training is oriented toward taking control of a situation and resolving it as quickly as possible—which may run counter to specialized response strategies. These factors, together with dynamics such as the level of access to mental health supports, guidelines on less-lethal weaponry and tactics, and whether the individual is taking medications or is abusing drugs or alcohol, can all contribute to concerns about the safety of all those involved in these encounters.

**Tailored Responses**

Based on the sites visited and related project research, programs designed to respond to safety concerns during these encounters were found to be aimed primarily at officer education and quick, on-scene de-escalation of crisis behavior. Other responses include the training on and use of less-lethal weapons, helping call takers and dispatchers get the best possible information to the

“One of the largest complaints by NAMI and other advocates was the lack of understanding by the officers of how to communicate with people with mental illnesses.”

**COMMANDER HARLAN WARD**
Assistant Commanding Officer of Valley Bureau, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

“There are times when the police must run from call to call. But there will come a time when an officer’s compassion will be necessary to resolve a situation, and the officer will need to step up and come through.”

**BERNIE**
Mental Health Consumer (Akron, Ohio)

“Injury on the job could lead to job loss—therefore, any opportunity to learn additional officer safety techniques is a plus.”

**OFFICER LORI NATKO**
CIT Officer, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

“CIT provides the opportunity to really sit and listen more than talk. Usually we just tell people what we are going to do. I plan to try to volunteer for as long as I can—I see different things all the time.”

**OFFICER MARK BIEKER**
CIT Officer, Fort Wayne (Ind.) Police Department
Akron Tailors Response to Safety Concerns and Repeat Calls for Law Enforcement and Mental Health Services∗

Quick Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Government type</strong></th>
<th>Municipal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jurisdiction type</strong></td>
<td>Urban</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Population in 2007</strong></td>
<td>207,934 (estimate)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Area of Akron in square miles</strong></td>
<td>62.4</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Number of sworn personnel in 2006</strong></td>
<td>451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of civilian personnel in 2006</strong></td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program name</strong></td>
<td>Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Program start date</strong></td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overview

The Akron (Ohio) Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) was one of the first agencies to replicate the Memphis CIT Model. Although this community maintains fidelity to the model, they have made several adjustments to the core elements. For example, CIT Officers in Akron have access to four emergency resources, rather than the single point of entry available in Memphis. This adaptation was made to ease the burden on any single mental health facility. Akron has also modified the CIT training to include a segment about being a CIT officer, including safety issues, duties, and officers’ experiences.

Tailored Responses

Once CIT was implemented, Akron stakeholders determined the need for a supplemental program to address the needs of their “at-risk” population—those individuals who are repeat clients of both the criminal justice and mental health systems and who often fall through the systems’ cracks. The “CIT Outreach Program” consists of a group of officers who team up with an outreach worker from Community Support Services (CSS). Officers in uniform ride together with a CSS worker in a marked cruiser to contact referrals and attempt to engage people in services. Akron reported that pairing a law enforcement officer with a case worker to conduct follow-up can also facilitate information sharing, locating individuals, and increasing the safety of encounters.

Outreach teams can refer individuals to mental health and other services, such as elder care and drug addiction services. When the team encounters someone who does not qualify for an involuntary commitment order, they are often able to persuade the person to voluntarily go to CSS, where they are welcomed in the back door with dignity and discretion.

Unique Program Features

The CIT program coordinator in Akron maintains his patrol duties, which lends credibility to the program and assists in soliciting officer involvement. When the outreach team transports an individual in a marked cruiser, he or she rides without handcuffs in the back seat with the mental health case manager. The person may meet criteria for emergency mental health evaluation, but the officer allows the person to ride without handcuffs when the situation is under control. If the person is at risk of harming him- or herself or others, or attempts to leave, the police will then use handcuffs and transport as needed.

∗ Dates and figures in this sidebar are consistent with the most recent information available at the time of this writing.
Fort Wayne Tailors Response to Safety Concerns and Problems in Schools

Quick Facts

- **Government type:** Municipal
- **Jurisdiction type:** Urban
- **Population in 2007:** 251,247 (estimate)
- **Area of Fort Wayne in square miles:** 79.12
- **Number of sworn personnel 2006:** 435
- **Number of civilian personnel 2006:** 100
- **Program name:** Crisis Intervention Team (CIT)
- **Program start date:** 2001

Overview

Fort Wayne (Ind.) operates a traditional CIT program. Law enforcement plays a primary role in the program, but it is also shaped by mental health consumers, available resources, and a strong NAMI presence. Fort Wayne made several adjustments to the traditional CIT model. CIT officers in Fort Wayne have access to two hospitals and a transitional care center, where Memphis has only a single point of entry to mental health emergency services. This change broadens the range of services available to CIT officers, and the hospital and transitional care center staffs assist in transporting consumers to the hospital where they may have received services in the past. Fort Wayne also added training topics on problems of concern that were not required in the Memphis curriculum, such as a unit on autism.

Tailored Responses

After implementation of the CIT program, Fort Wayne identified several problem behaviors among middle and high school students. In some cases, self-mutilating behavior was detected, and in other cases, schools were struggling to manage the behavior of “bad kids.” Their only option at that time were to expel these students or have police arrest them for such acts as vandalism.

To address these school problems, CIT program planners began providing CIT training to all of the School Resource Officers (SROs). In addition, a CIT-trained officer has helped identify high school students who might benefit from mental health services. This officer’s training enabled him to recognize that some students were not simply acting out, but may have serious mental health problems. On more than one occasion, this officer used his training to gain a student’s trust, so the student could talk openly about what was happening in his or her life and get help.

Unique Program Features

Fort Wayne is fortunate to have the extensive involvement of a judge who reviews all civil commitment hearings and participates in officer training. Their program also uses a “stat sheet” to collect information on the number of calls the police get, how many are diverted at the scene, how many are brought to the hospital for twenty-four-hour observation, and how many are kept for seventy-two-hour holds. The form also collects data on the presence of weapons and whether the case involved a suicide attempt. This stat sheet then follows the consumer through the mental health system. If he or she is brought to the emergency room and a need for detention is identified, the stat sheet becomes the “face sheet” for the seventy-two-hour hold and is faxed to the judge for review. All face sheets are retained in the police department’s records, are analyzed on a monthly basis to track program responses, and are reviewed by the Judge and CIT Sergeant for accuracy. Summary data are shared appropriately to keep all stakeholders routinely informed about program progress.

* Dates and figures in this sidebar are consistent with the most recent information available at the time of this writing.
officers suited to address the situation, developing means for capturing information that will improve safety for repeat calls for service, and involving a secondary mental health response.

Programs that respond to safety concerns emphasize specialized training on policies and practices designed to help law enforcement officers take adequate time and steps to identify the signs and symptoms of mental illnesses. These programs reflect the understanding that these behaviors may be the result of an illness, draw on effective communication and behavioral strategies, and familiarize officers with less-lethal force options. Training includes the opportunity for role-play scenarios that enable officers to practice and hone their skills in addressing “real-world” crises before applying them in the field. These skills include those involved in maintaining the safety of all involved and determining whether the person meets the criteria for emergency mental health evaluation. Specially trained law enforcement officers apply their new skills in the field to determine if the situation involves a person who may have a mental illness. If it does, officers are trained to de-escalate the person’s behavior and to connect him or her to treatment when appropriate. When safety concerns involve educational institutions, additional personnel may receive specialized training. In Fort Wayne, for example, the department requires that all school resource officers (SROs) attend CIT training.

Specialized training for call takers and dispatchers is critical to officer and consumer safety. This training provides tools for call takers to identify calls that may involve a person with a mental illness, gather important information about the situation from the caller (for example, when possible, the person’s previous reactions to law enforcement, the person’s medication status, any history of violence) and provide that information to responding officers. Dispatchers follow specific protocols to help ensure that specially trained officers respond quickly to incidents they believe may involve a person with a mental illness.

Call takers clear calls and make notations in the CAD system about the involvement of weapons or violence to enhance safety should this location draw future calls for service. For example, in Akron, dispatchers...
review incident reports and flag locations relating to a person with mental illness, focusing on the presence of a weapon or specific strategies that may have proven successful in de-escalating an encounter with the subject of the call for service. This information can be used to improve the dispatching and response of officers for any future calls to that location.

When tailoring a response program to safety concerns, the interviewed sites only included on-scene mental health experts as a secondary response. For example, in the agencies studied, a mental health professional might come to the scene, but only after the

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**New River Valley Tailors Response to Safety Concerns in Rural and Small Communities**

**Quick Facts†**

**Government type:** County, Municipal  
**Jurisdiction type:** Rural, multi-jurisdictional  
**Population in 2007:** 172,255 (estimate)  
**Area of New River Valley in square miles:** 1,469 (estimate)

**Program name:** New River Valley Crisis Intervention Team  
**Program start date:** 2002

**Overview**

In response to growing concerns about the number of people with mental illnesses in the criminal justice system, program planners in New River Valley, Va., developed a multi-jurisdictional CIT that involves fourteen different law enforcement agencies within four counties and one city in a largely rural area. These agencies have found it difficult to implement state mandates that people with mental illnesses who qualify for emergency assessment must remain in the custody of law enforcement officers until an emergency service clinician can complete the assessment, and if necessary arrange for mental health services. Prior to the site visit, law enforcement custody could last up to four hours and individuals could not be placed in jail. (Legislation in 2008 increased the mandatory custody up to six hours to provide sufficient time for the provision of medical clearance.) Mental health resources are limited and the rural nature of the community requires emergency service clinicians and law enforcement officers to travel long distances to conduct assessments and then transport individuals to available inpatient facilities. The Mental Health Association (MHA) in Blacksburg, Va., funds a CIT coordinator, whose responsibilities include arranging for CIT training.

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* Dates and figures in this sidebar are consistent with the most recent information available at the time of this writing.  
† Population and area figures of the New River Valley are aggregate numbers for the jurisdictions that make up the “valley.” Montgomery County, Pulaski County, Floyd County, Giles County, and the independent City of Radford. Given the multi-jurisdictional structure of the region, data were not available on the number of law enforcement personnel.

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“People were going to jail when they should not have. If you are mentally ill, jail is not the solution.”
—Amy Tyler  
Director of Behavioral Health, St. Joseph Hospital (Fort Wayne, Ind.)
Tailored Responses
The New River Valley CIT brought together fourteen jurisdictions that all fell within one of Virginia’s mental health catchment areas. The goal of bringing the smaller, rural communities together was to capitalize on shared resources. For example, agencies created agreements to allow officers to cross jurisdictions and serve each other’s residents, and developed a plan to provide CIT training to approximately 25 percent of the total number of patrol officers from the combined forces to have sufficient coverage of shifts and locations.

To address the burdens placed on law enforcement and emergency service clinicians who must travel long distances and spend hours maintaining custody of people who are in crisis, program planners also intend to streamline procedures so that law enforcement officers can take a person in crisis to a mental health facility and transfer custody to another designated law enforcement officer stationed at the hospital. The hospital would then arrange for appropriate assessment and placement if needed.

Unique Program Features
Stakeholders in the New River Valley note the profound impact the Virginia Tech shooting in April 2007 had on mental health resources, particularly on inpatient hospitalizations. According to the director of the New River Valley Community Services, there was a 99 percent increase in hospitalization rates for children and youth after the shooting incident. Another significant outcome of this tragic event was the enactment of new legislation that increased—from four to six hours—the amount of time a person in mental health crisis could be detained. To offset the demand this placed on law enforcement, the new legislation also allows “trained security officers” to accept people who have an emergency custody order and to do paperwork for emergency custody orders.

Due to differences in staffing and leadership styles, the participating law enforcement agencies vary in their perspectives about how many—and which—officers in their agencies should get CIT training. Consequently, the MHA trains some officers who do not volunteer for the assignment and trains all officers from some of the agencies. The MHA director notes that although some participants appear reluctant at the outset of training, two strategies tend to transform them. First, even people who don’t want to participate in the CIT program have a very different attitude about mental health consumers once they have been to the site visits, where they meet with people who have mental illnesses who are doing well. Second, information that stresses the impact of the CIT approach on officer safety can change the minds of trainees who are otherwise disinclined to support a SPR.

“The biggest problem with small departments is if we get taken on a call where the person needs placement in a hospital, the officer will be off-road for a whole shift. Oftentimes, we may only have a total of two or three officers on a shift.”

—Officer Danny Ratcliffe
CIT Officer, Pearisburg (Va.) Police Department (NRV)
person’s behavior is stable and the officer is in control of the situation. Typically in these response models, officers will transport the person to a mental health facility where mental health experts can conduct further assessment if needed. Individuals interviewed in the studied sites underscored that it is essential that these facilities allow law enforcement officers efficient access to a wide range of services.

Problem: Frequent arrests of people with mental illnesses and strains on police resources

Officers typically have three options when they encounter someone with a mental illness whose behavior is erratic—they can arrest the person if there is evidence a crime was committed, transport the person to a mental health facility in accordance with applicable legal mandates, or stabilize the situation and leave the person at the scene. Community members in each of the four sites identified several problems related to the limited options available for officers when encountering people with mental illnesses. Some stakeholders believed officers arrested people with mental illness who had committed minor offenses much too frequently. In most of these cases, individuals reported that the person’s behavior may have been too disruptive for the officer to leave him or her alone at the scene, and the officer did not have adequate information about—or efficient access to—available mental health resources.

In other communities, stakeholders noted problems that occur when an officer must either remain with the person in crisis until a mental health professional arrives to conduct an assessment or transport the person to an emergency room, where they may spend additional hours waiting for the assessment to take place.

Tailored Responses

Programs developed in response to inefficient access to mental health resources use strategies to make these facilities more “officer-friendly.” In Fort Wayne, for example, the receiving facilities’ administrators adapted their procedures to prioritize intake for consumers who officers bring to the facility, allowing the officers to complete paperwork quickly and return to other

“Law enforcement officers felt isolated from other service providers before CIT, and their knowledge of available resources was limited.”
—Sgt. Michael Yohe
CIT Coordinator, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

“Before CIT, officers were frustrated they had to wait a long time before transferring custody. With CIT, they could drop their paperwork off and scoot.”
—Amy Tyler
Director of Behavioral Health, St. Joseph Hospital (Fort Wayne, Ind.)

“Our CIT program has diverted a fair number of people from jail to the mental health system, which is improving the balance between the legal system and the mental health systems.”
—Deb Richey
Nursing Director of Emergency Services, Parkview Hospital (Fort Wayne, Ind.)

“Since CIT was implemented, fewer people are going to jail. The contacts are better and there are fewer arrests.”
—Andy Wilson
Executive Director, Carriage House (Fort Wayne, Ind.)
duties. In addition to minimizing the strain on law enforcement time and resources, these efficiencies can decrease the number of people who may otherwise be taken to jail for minor offenses. When coupled with officer training on local mental health resources and de-escalating behaviors that might otherwise result in more serious charges against the individual, these changes can improve outcomes for the person with mental illness and the law enforcement first-responders.

Law enforcement responses that address poor knowledge about and limited access to mental health resources can also pair a law enforcement officer and mental health service provider to respond together to calls involving someone with a mental illness. In most cases, co-responder teams are dispatched as a “secondary” response. For example, in Los Angeles, patrol units are dispatched to calls based on priority, as is the usual practice. Once the patrol officer gets to the scene, he or she will make a determination about whether mental illness may be a factor and if the co-response team is needed. When the co-responder team arrives, the initial responding patrol officer manages safety concerns. The co-response team—both the law enforcement officer and the mental health clinician—focuses on the person with mental illness, making decisions about an assessment, referral for service, and placement.

In Los Angeles, an additional layer of dispatch is in place to facilitate this model. Law enforcement first-responders can ask patrol dispatchers for a Systemwide Mental Assessment Response Team (SMART); the dispatchers then route their call to the “Triage Center” of the Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU), where an officer assesses when to send out teams. This triage officer can access the MEU database to gather information on the criminal justice history for the subject of the call for service. The forensic nurse, who is co-located in this unit, can access the Department of Mental Health (DMH) records. Both

31. When a call for service involves a person or place that has generated a high volume of previous police responses, the dispatch system flags any mental health issues and the dispatcher shares that information with the responding officers.

32. The Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health not only coordinates response teams with the Los Angeles Police Department, but also with agencies in Long Beach and Pasadena.
sources of information can guide the triage and ensure the responding team will have a more comprehensive history on the individual. When SMART is dispatched, the first-responder officers stay at the scene until the person in crisis has been stabilized. This provides support and backup to the SMART officer and the mental health clinician.

Even in agencies where there is no co-location of law enforcement and mental health personnel, co-responder teams can improve linkages to mental health or substance abuse treatment. Because the mental health professional has access to the person’s mental health history, the team may be able to reconnect the person to a clinician who has previously treated him or her. In addition, mental health professionals working with law enforcement are knowledgeable about a wider range of services and supports, so they can find the most suitable mental health approach to the individual’s needs. According to those interviewed for the project, co-responder teams can also assist in transportation to a mental health facility for a greater range of situations than law enforcement could alone. For example, the team may have more time to transport people who meet the criteria for involuntary evaluation to the mental health facility, which frees the first responding officer to return to patrol. In addition, because of the involvement of a mental health professional at the scene, co-responder teams may be able to transport people voluntarily to services and supports that would otherwise rely on a family member or public transportation.

**Problem: High utilization of emergency resources**

Many communities experience a large number of law enforcement calls to the same locations, involving the same people with mental illnesses without positive effect. Many of these same individuals have been found to also repeatedly need emergency medical services. This small group of consumers, often referred to as “high utilizers” of emergency services, typically represents people who are difficult to keep connected with nonemergency services, including continuous treatment that is effective in relieving their symptoms. In some cases, these individuals have co-occurring substance use disorders, are homeless, or both. They may cycle in

“Law enforcement leadership must know how to apply the necessary resources to solving crimes [and disorder]. The best way to apply limited resources is to focus on the 10 percent of the population that uses the greatest amount of resources.”

—Chief William Bratton
Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

“One challenging population is [the group of individuals] who are drug- or alcohol-dependent. They are only at our hospital for a short period of time and a large group does not follow through with treatment recommendations. This can result in a revolving door. The officer goes to the scene, brings the person in, we end up admitting them, and discharge them two to three days later. When they do not follow through with treatment, they will be back.”

—Patsy Hendricks
Director of Clinical Services, Parkview Behavioral Health (Fort Wayne, Ind.)

“I believe it is in part because of our CAMP program that L.A. hasn’t had [a mass shooting incident]. Once we identify someone who has mental illness [that puts them at risk of criminal justice involvement] and put them in the CAMP program, we monitor them to make sure they get medications, have housing, go to work, and can take care of themselves.”

—Captain Ann Young
Commanding Officer, Detective Support and Vice Division, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department
Los Angeles Tailors Response to Safety Concerns and High Utilization of Emergency Services

Quick Facts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government type: Municipal</th>
<th>Program names: Systemwide Mental Assessment Response Teams (SMART) and Case Assessment Management Program (CAMP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisdiction type: Urban</td>
<td>Program start dates: 1993 and 2005, respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population in 2007: 3,834,340 (estimate)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area of City of Los Angeles in square miles: 498.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of sworn personnel: 9,883</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of civilian personnel: 3,263</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Overview

Los Angeles has implemented several complementary program responses to address the complex needs of the jurisdiction. Los Angeles was one of the first communities to develop the police/mental health co-responder teams (SMART) in 1993. This program was designed to better link people with mental illnesses with appropriate mental health services. When the department came under a U.S. Department of Justice consent decree in 2001, one provision directed the agency to improve safety for all involved in officer encounters with people with mental illnesses. At that time, the department also began implementing a CIT program in pilot locations. However, due to its sheer size, both in area and in population, training the recommended 20 percent of its officers in CIT protocols could not effectively cover rapid responses. As a result, department leaders chose to prioritize CIT training for officers most likely to come in contact with people in a mental health crisis, although the training is not limited to these officers.

Tailored Responses

After implementation of CIT training and the SMART teams, a serious problem remained. A group of people with mental illnesses who called the police repeatedly, or were the subject of many calls for service, were costing the city millions of dollars in emergency resources. Further, a large percentage of SWAT call-outs involved someone with a mental illness. The police department developed the Case Assessment and Management Program (CAMP) to identify and track the subjects of these repeat calls, and construct customized responses to their problems. The program co-locates a police detective with psychologists and social workers from the county mental health agency in the police department facility. This team develops long-term solutions to an individual's needs on a case-by-case basis. In particularly complex situations, team members have conducted home visits on a daily basis, linked a person to service provision in his or her home, provided transportation assistance, or made appointments for services or treatment. The team members focus on developing trusting relationships with people in need and few resist the help.

The CAMP program receives referrals from both SMART officers and mental health professionals. When CAMP receives a referral, the psychologist reviews the information, accesses the Department of Mental Health (DMH) records, and reviews the person's history with the police. The psychologist makes the determination about whether the person qualifies for CAMP. For example, someone may qualify if incidents with the police have been high profile, if the person is accessing more than three emergency resources, or the person has a large number

continued on next page

* Dates and figures in this sidebar are consistent with the most recent information available at the time of this writing.
and out of treatment, and many do not follow through with treatment plans independently, including taking prescribed medications.

**Tailored Responses**

In Los Angeles, repeat calls for service led to the creation of the Case Assessment and Management Program (CAMP), which is a response strategy that focuses on proactive efforts to resolve the issues that generate repeat calls to police and others, including mental health case management and rigorous follow-up. CAMP teams include detectives from the police department and mental health clinicians, who work together to create customized plans for identified individuals. The CAMP team, which is located in the MEU area of the police department, receives referrals from many sources, including SMART officers, the Los Angeles Fire Department, school police, other city police officers, other LAPD detectives/investigators, and from mental health department personnel.

**Unique Program Features**

The department formed the “Mental Evaluation Unit (MEU)” to oversee all of these programs and manage points of intersection. The MEU contains a triage unit that fields calls from patrol officers who have questions about what to do in certain situations involving people with mental illnesses. In these circumstances, the triage officer consults the MEU database (separate from the CAD system and protected from access outside the unit) to learn this person’s history with the police. A triage mental health nurse sits alongside this officer and can check the DMH databases to determine the person’s case manager, psychiatrist, or treatment centers. The triage staff determines together whether to send out a SMART team or have the officer take the person directly to a mental health facility. If the triage unit determines that this person has repeatedly contacted police (or been the subject of frequent calls for intervention), they will refer the person to the CAMP coordinator for follow-up.

**Los Angeles continued**

of calls to the police over a short period. CAMP cases are worked by the psychologist, a detective, and a police officer. At this initial stage (level 1) the team develops and implements a plan for mental health treatment and strategies for managing services. When the person stabilizes (level 2), the case shifts to periodic monitoring. For example, the detective may contact some clients every week to check in, or stop by once a month. If the person remains stable and the family does not need help, the case becomes inactive (level 3) and is filed.

The outreach team allows officers to see people when they are not in crisis—to see them as people. It also allows the consumers to have a positive and compassionate experience with the officers.”

—HELEN REEDY

Member, NAMI-Ohio

“"There is pressure to handle a high volume of calls for service, and short-term fixes are often a reality. The outreach team follow-up with a consumer allows the police to start implementing longer-term solutions.”

—Sgt. MICHAEL YOHE

CIT Coordinator, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

From the Field: Program Design in Action
In Akron, a similar experience with “repeat callers” prompted the creation of CIT Outreach Teams, which consist of a law enforcement officer who partners with a mental health case manager to conduct follow-up with consumers in the community. This is not a routine assignment for the officers; they must choose it as an off-duty assignment. Outreach Team assignments come from referrals from mental health service providers, probation officers, and from law enforcement officers who identify individuals who would benefit from follow-up visits. The CIT coordinator at Community Support Services (CSS) prioritizes the referrals based on mental health and criminal justice history. A list of repeat call locations is also provided for follow-up and prevention efforts. Follow-up visits can result in a transport to CSS, where psychiatrists or case workers can provide additional treatment and support, or directly admit the individual to a hospital.

**PROGRAM EXAMPLE: Responding to homelessness, Fort Lauderdale (Fla.)**

Given that a large number of homeless individuals suffer from mental health issues, Fort Lauderdale (Fla.) created a Homeless Outreach Unit to bring shelter, assistance, and understanding to the homeless population. The outreach team includes an officer and a mental health worker who try to address the myriad needs of the “homeless mentally ill population.” The officer’s assignment is voluntary because participating in the program requires a sincere compassion and commitment to assist people in crisis. The team’s officer confirmed that “these people have complex problems, they need medications they cannot afford, and the team needs to empathize with them.”

The team gets referrals from law enforcement officers, but also establishes a pick-up location for three hours each day to assist people who are homeless or have just been released from long-term programs. The officer interviews them and tries to link them with social services and shelters.33

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I have responded to fewer CIT calls over time because of the positive effect of the outreach teams in decreasing repeat callers.”

—OFFICER LORI NATKO
CIT Officer, Akron (Ohio)
Police Department

The outreach teams served as a natural complement to the CIT program. Referrals did not only come from mental health service providers, but also from officers who identify individuals that would benefit from follow-up visits.”

—RAGAN LEFF
CIT Coordinator, Community Support Services (Akron, Ohio)

CAMP team members develop responses on a case-by-case basis, and they range considerably. For complex cases, we conduct home visits—as often as daily—to link the person to services, in their home if needed, and obtain consent for our clinicians to speak to the person’s psychologist to check on whether the person is making and keeping appointments.”

—DETECTIVE TERESA IRVIN
CAMP Coordinator, Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

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33. The information presented in this program example was developed based on a phone interview conducted during the information-gathering phase of this project. For more information about the Fort Lauderdale Homeless Outreach Unit, see the profile available on the Local Programs Database at www.cjmh-infonet.org/main/show/2071.
## The Impact of Jurisdictional Characteristics on SPR Programs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Specific Jurisdictional Characteristics</th>
<th>Jurisdictions</th>
<th>SPR Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Law Enforcement Agency</strong></td>
<td>Leadership style is consistent with “specialist” approach</td>
<td>Akron, Ohio; Fort Wayne, Ind.; Los Angeles, Calif.; New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>A subset of self-selected law enforcement officers are assigned to teams.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leadership style is consistent with “generalist” approach</td>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif.; New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>All officers receive training in basic de-escalation and recognizing mental illness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) are used broadly as part of departmentwide use-of-force protocols</td>
<td>Akron, Ohio</td>
<td>Only CIT officers are provided with CEDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conducted Energy Devices (CEDs) are used infrequently as part of departmentwide use-of-force protocols</td>
<td>Fort Wayne, Ind.</td>
<td>CIT officers are not provided with CEDs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mental Health System</strong></td>
<td>Medical clearance is required before admission to a mental health facility</td>
<td>Fort Wayne, Ind.</td>
<td>Hospital emergency room protocols provide quick medical and mental health assessments in a secure area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mental health resources are extremely limited/inaccessible</td>
<td>New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>Officers are trained to identify better those in need of emergency mental health assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>State Laws</strong></td>
<td>Involuntary emergency mental health assessment requires extended police custody</td>
<td>New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>Officers are trained on de-escalation to enable them to manage safety concerns during custodial period.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Law enforcement officers can be stationed at an emergency psychiatric facility to receive custody from patrol, freeing them to return to routine duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Demography and Geography</strong></td>
<td>Large, urban jurisdictions</td>
<td>Los Angeles, Calif.</td>
<td>SMART units are assigned specific areas of responsibility and work in conjunction with the more than 800 officers who receive some mental health training to provide citywide coverage. All officers receive some online training.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Small, rural jurisdictions</td>
<td>New River Valley, Va.</td>
<td>The forces of multiple jurisdictions are combined to increase the number of trained officers who can respond to a large area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Medium, urban jurisdictions</td>
<td>Akron, Ohio</td>
<td>Department trained 19 percent of total sworn personnel in the department to respond.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fort Wayne, Ind.</td>
<td>Department trained nearly 20 percent of total sworn personnel in the department to respond.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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34. Although accurate at the time of the interviews in 2007 and 2008, both the Akron Police Department and Fort Wayne Police Department have since revised their respective policies on CEDs. See page 35 for more information about the evolution of these changes.
Tailoring Specialized Policing Response Programs to Jurisdictional Characteristics

As distinct from the previous discussion about problems and their impact on the specialized response program, jurisdictional characteristics are largely static features in a community or agency, which policymakers and planners must consider in program design and implementation. (These are reviewed briefly in Section I.) The following discussion examines how the jurisdictional characteristics, such as those outlined in the summary chart on the previous page, shaped program responses. These factors include law enforcement agency characteristics (such as leadership and use-of-force protocols), mental health system characteristics (such as resources and medical clearance requirements), state law (such as those regarding emergency custody orders), and demographics and geography.

Jurisdictional characteristic: Law enforcement agency leadership

The predominant law enforcement agency characteristic that affected program development in the four studied sites was leadership style. According to those interviewed at the study sites, at the foundation of these preferences are law enforcement chief executives’ opinions about the necessity of particular personality traits among personnel for carrying out specific tasks. For example, many in the field report that there are senior law enforcement officials who believe that officers trained for the specialized response, particularly special units, should be volunteers, self-selected to have compassion for people with mental illnesses. Others may feel that all first-responders should be educated about mental illnesses and trained to de-escalate crisis situations using appropriate procedures. Still others believe that some basic training for all first-responders is in order, with more intensive preparation for voluntary special unit personnel. Though concerns about training budgets, priorities for limited resources, size of jurisdiction, and other factors may be considered in determining who is trained and dispatched, many of the individuals interviewed in the study sites felt that the perspective of the agency’s leaders largely determined how the response would be shaped.

Tailored Responses

Each of the four jurisdictions developed training approaches that were consistent with the agency leader’s style. This was most notable in the regional New River Valley CIT program, where variation exists among the police leadership in the fourteen jurisdictions involved in the program. Each jurisdiction determines which and how many of its officers will be trained, resulting in differences among them. Leaders in the Los Angeles Police Department.”

Not all officers can be CIT officers, because it requires a personal commitment and compassion that cannot be taught or forced. Still, because the skills are so generalizable, they can be applied, in part, on calls such as responding to people with mental retardation and developmental disabilities, domestic violence calls, or people who are intoxicated—all officers should have a basic understanding of them.”

—Lt. Richard Edwards
Public Information Officer, Akron (Ohio) Police Department
Department chose to provide some training on mental health issues to all patrol officers (twenty-four hours) because all officers must be prepared to handle the wide range of calls to which they respond. This agency also provides a full forty hours of “specialized” training to officers involved in its MEU, SMART, and CAMP strategies, and officers who receive CIT training for use in designated areas of the city.

**Jurisdictional characteristic: Law enforcement agency use-of-force protocols**

Department policies and practices on the use of force, particularly less-lethal technologies, also can play a role in program design. Police agencies must develop policies on how and when officers use a range of force options through a complex and careful process that takes into account factors such as officer training and the circumstances during the encounter. Many communities are grappling with the use of conducted energy devices (CEDs), such as Tasers™ during encounters with people with mental illnesses as a way to reduce the likelihood of serious injury or death during these incidents.

**Tailored Responses**

These policies differed significantly across jurisdictions visited for this study. For example, at the time of the site visits, the Akron Police Department provided CEDs only to CIT-trained officers, and the Fort Wayne Police Department never provided them to CIT officers. These policies have since changed, but the thinking behind these early policies on CEDs can be instructive for other agencies. Akron believed that the training provided to CIT officers uniquely positioned them either to use the device very judiciously or to de-escalate a situation so that a CED would not be needed. (Since the time of the visit, Akron has extended the use of CEDs to other officers with proper training.) In contrast, Fort Wayne believed that officers trained in CIT would be the least likely to need the device due to their training in de-escalation and that backup could be provided by another patrol officer on the scene. Fort Wayne Police Department leaders have since decided that Tasers™ are critical to the success and safety of CIT. Although applying CIT knowledge and communications skills are highly effective at de-escalation, no technique is 100 percent reliable. Having a less-lethal option available to CIT officers is an obvious way to increase everyone’s safety in handling many crisis calls. This is especially true considering that a significant number of these calls involve suicides-in-progress, and Tasers™ may provide one of the few options to safely stop individuals from harming themselves. The conversation about less-lethal devices must be tied in with the CIT conversation.”

—Sgt. Michael Yohe
CIT Coordinator, Akron (Ohio) Police Department

“Though the Fort Wayne Police Department did not prioritize Tasers™ for CIT officers, in part because they could be provided backup by other officers, they now have the same opportunity to request and train for the use of these less-lethal devices.”

—Deputy Chief Dottie Davis
Director of Training, Fort Wayne (Ind.) Police Department
CIT training will not be a determining factor when selecting who in the department will be issued a CED.

If a department’s leadership team decides that CEDs can make situations involving people with mental illnesses safer for all involved, law enforcement should work with their partners to develop protocols and policies, appropriate training, and supervision.35

**Jurisdictional characteristic: Mental health resources**

Specialized policing response programs hinge on the availability of mental health resources to serve as an alternative to criminal justice system involvement when warranted. Although some communities manage to increase the available mental health resources, or shift them, many communities must work with what resources are available in their jurisdiction. As a consequence, stakeholders must develop strategies to manage increases in volume that result from law enforcement transports or referrals. Among the issues to be considered are whether any changes can be made in triaging to ensure the highest levels of care match those most in need, evaluating admission criteria and accessibility issues, easing contact and increasing efficiency for law enforcement personnel, and addressing any commensurate increases in costs related to caring for people with mental illnesses at risk of continued criminal justice involvement, many of whom are uninsured.

**Tailored Responses**

In Los Angeles and New River Valley, specialized policing response programs reduce some demands on limited mental health resources by relying on

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well-trained officers and effective information-gathering to help properly assess individuals’ need for emergency evaluations, and whenever possible, connect people with care providers outside of the emergency response networks. As mentioned previously, in Los Angeles, the SMART officers work with their triage unit to access a database with an individual’s history while the forensic nurse in this unit can access the mental health records. In the New River Valley, CIT officers are trained to screen people for the need for hospitalization, so fewer people are taken into custody. In both jurisdictions, law enforcement is working with the mental health community to make the most of limited resources.

In one hospital in Fort Wayne, the volume of mental health patients increased significantly as a result of the implementation of the CIT program. The number of twenty-four-hour mental health assessment holds brought to the hospital by police doubled—from 600 in 1998 to 1,200 in 2007. The stakeholders in this community also eventually determined that a subgroup of people had been invoking a seventy-two-hour hold repeatedly when they did not have a mental illness. These individuals had primary substance abuse issues and many were attempting to avoid arrests for DUI. The facility arranged with the judge who oversees the commitment hearings to limit the number of times a person could be admitted consecutively based on an emergency custody order to eliminate those who were not in need of mental health treatment. This resulted in increased availability of services for those who appropriately needed mental health care.

To manage costs, the inpatient mental health providers in Fort Wayne have developed a mechanism to enroll people in benefit programs, such as Medicaid. The hospital contracts with a for-profit business that charges a fee to enroll qualified individuals in Medicaid programs. The contractors working at Parkview Behavioral Health have converted 52 percent of the people who were admitted without insurance to become covered by Medicaid, which has significantly reduced the hospital’s burden of providing uncompensated care.36

Clinicians now recognize the CIT officer and take more stock in what a CIT officer is saying. The clinicians also recognize the added benefit that the officer provides by de-escalating the situation before the clinician gets there.”

—Deputy Chip Shrader
Montgomery County (Va.) Sheriff’s Office (NRV)

The biggest fear was that this was going to cost more money. Parkview became creative with funds and implemented programs—with social workers getting . . . Medicaid for clients—to get the ball rolling.”

—James White
Service Coordinator/Security Lead Staff, Park Center Inc. (Fort Wayne, Ind.)

The other issue that providers need to be aware of is that this will impact their payer mix—many people in this population are underinsured or not insured. If you are using the ER as the access point, this can be costly.”

—Chuck Clark
Executive Director, Parkview Behavioral Health (Fort Wayne, Ind.)

36. For more information about connection to federal benefits, particularly for people with mental illnesses who are returning to the community from prison or jail, see www.reentrpolicy.org/issue_areas/reentry_federal_benefits.
Although the communities visited were not able to create entirely new mental health resources, they were successful in maximizing the use of existing resources through two particular strategies: First, planners stretched resources by training officers and others to identify more accurately those people who needed emergency mental health services. Second, planners developed strategies to enroll qualified individuals in benefits programs to improve payment of needed mental health services. In the New River Valley, law enforcement agencies also shared resources throughout the region, making it easier to access and sustain them.

**Jurisdictional characteristic: Medical clearance requirements**

In the New River Valley and in Fort Wayne, mental health system stakeholders were hesitant to accept someone into a mental health facility who might have a medical condition that requires priority treatment. This concern is shared by many communities across the country, and program models typically require law enforcement officers to transport the person in mental health crisis first to a hospital emergency room for medical clearance. In these cases, mental health services are provided after a physician determines the person is well enough for psychiatric assessment.

The necessity of medical clearance requires program planners to develop procedures to guarantee a safe and timely medical assessment, to ensure the safety needs of other patients and staff, and to create a smooth transition to the appropriate mental health resource.

**Tailored Responses**

In Fort Wayne, law enforcement officers bring the person in crisis to the emergency room of the local hospital through the ambulance entry to one of three secure rooms. This allows privacy and security. The individuals in the care of officers get priority treatment and officers talk directly with the mental health counselors. Once the physician determines the individual’s medical condition is stable, the mental health clinicians assess the needed level of care.

To enable officers to return to other duties, the hospitals in Fort Wayne employ security staff to monitor the patient’s safety and the safety of others in the emergency room. The hospital worked with their legal counsel to develop clear guidelines on holding, restraining, and detaining patients, and to make sure that hospital security is not held liable for injuries that may result. Although the goal in these hospitals is to err on the side of protecting patients from harming themselves or others, their care, dignity, and privacy were considered in developing these guidelines.

**“The biggest challenge is bringing all the people in through the ER. The ER was identified as the access point for all psychiatric patients; it is expensive and not best for patients to have to wait three or four hours for an assessment.”**

-Chuck Clark
Executive Director, Parkview Behavioral Health (Fort Wayne, Ind.)
Requirements in state laws regarding law enforcement officers’ role in emergency mental health evaluations must be addressed in designing and implementing specialized policing responses. These laws may affect program design by mandating certain types or the scope of training. They can also spell out under what circumstances officers are permitted to transport or take into custody individuals with mental illnesses who meet specific standards (such as imminent harm to themselves or others).

Among the many state mandates that can affect program design, the one that was most at issue in the four-site study involved officers taking custody of individuals with mental illnesses for emergency evaluation. As described, in Virginia, for example, a law enforcement officer is authorized to determine if a person meets the criteria for an “emergency custody order” (ECO) without taking the person in front of a magistrate. The ECO lasts up to six hours (previously mandated at four hours), and state law requires that the officer maintain custody of the person with mental illness while they wait for a mental health crisis worker to arrive and complete a mental health assessment, and find a treatment bed if needed. Officers may not detain the person in jail during this time, which means law enforcement agencies must designate a place where the officer can stay with the person in crisis until a clinician arrives. Oftentimes, this space becomes a multipurpose room (the same area may serve as a waiting area for a person who has been served a warrant and for someone who has come to the department to report a crime). If the six-hour period elapses without an assessment or an available place for treatment, the person must be released.

During the ECO time period, crisis workers assess the person’s status, gather collateral information, and decide if the person meets the criteria to be committed. If the criteria are met, the clinician tries to facilitate an admission to an inpatient facility—either into a public or private facility—or diverts the individual back to the community to receive services and supports. The majority of the calls are handled within the six-hour period.

**Tailored Responses**

One goal of the New River Valley CIT program is to address the strain on law enforcement personnel created by this law. At this writing, there is legislation in place in Virginia that would allow for a CIT officer to be stationed in the hospital emergency room to accept custody of the incoming person in mental health crisis, and allow the transporting officers to return to patrol. Alternatively, if the hospital has a police or security department of its own,

In 2008, hospitals were faced with national patient safety goal #15, which requires a system for screening patients for suicide risk. They must be screened appropriately and the hospital must provide ‘continuity of care’ so that when the person returns to the community it must be with a safety net in place.

"Mental health clients are no longer what we do at the end of the day when we are done with everything else. This hospital is now making psychiatric services a priority and we are committed to quality services.”

—Deb Richey
Nursing Director of Emergency Services, Parkview Hospital (Fort Wayne, Ind.)
the new legislation allows “willing and able” hospital security staff to extend their duties to include managing the ECO process.37

For law enforcement officers in Fort Wayne, the ECO under state law has been limited to a twenty-four-hour hold and it has been an effective tool for reducing the time officers spend waiting at community facilities with people who need a mental health assessment. This statute was originally underutilized because officers were not comfortable making decisions regarding mental health assessment criteria. Now that they have received specialized training on the issue, they are more likely to invoke the ECO law that authorizes them to transport that person to the emergency room without the officer needing to retain custody. Although this ECO is designed primarily for medical observation, it can be converted into a seventy-two-hour commitment for mental health evaluation upon judicial order.

PROGRAM EXAMPLE: Working collaboratively to meet legal guidelines, Lincoln (Nebr.)38

In Nebraska, law enforcement and correctional officers are the only authorities who can take people into emergency protective custody (EPC) for involuntary mental health evaluation. Within thirty-six hours, a county attorney will determine whether to proceed with the involuntary commitment process. Nebraska is divided into six regions, each of which has a dedicated facility to receive people placed into EPC by law enforcement. Police officers in the City of Lincoln have round-the-clock access to mental health professionals in their region to assist them in deciding whether the person warrants custody or to determine an appropriate alternative. The Lancaster County Mental Health Agency, which serves Lincoln, is available 24/7 either by phone, in-person in the field, or at the police station. The officer can also take individuals directly to the mental health agency during business hours.

The City of Lincoln has also created a new process that has reduced by half the number of EPC orders officers do in a year. The key is to provide information to officers in the field about consumer involvement in programs like Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) to maintain their connection to these programs. Consumers can sign a waiver to put their participation in ACT in a police database. When officers conduct a routine warrant search, they get a message to contact the person’s case manager, rather than taking the person into the emergency mental health system, where they will have to start over.

37. At press time, this legislation had been passed and the leadership in New River Valley were working toward implementing this practice.

38. The information presented in this program example was developed based on a phone interview conducted during the information-gathering phase of this project. For more information about the Lincoln Police Department’s efforts, see the profile available on the Local Programs Database at www.cjmh-infonet.org/main/show/2103.
**Jurisdictional characteristic: Demography and geography**

A jurisdiction’s population size and density, land area, traffic patterns, and crime problems present important constraints on specialized responses. Jurisdictions of all sizes, particularly those at either end of the range, struggle with the adequacy of community-based resources, the ease of accessing them, and the allocation of officers to work with them.

**Tailored Responses**

In Los Angeles, one of the strategy impetuses was concern over safety for all individuals involved in police encounters, which resulted in recommendations to implement CIT. However, the size of the police department limited the agency’s ability to train the recommended benchmark of 20 percent of the officers to work full time on crisis intervention calls. The jurisdiction’s large geographic area also made deploying the CIT-trained officers difficult. They found during pilot testing in one area that the 20 percent of the officers they were able to train in just that district still were only able to respond to 20 percent of the calls involving people with mental illnesses. In large part, this occurred because transportation to psychiatric emergency centers kept CIT officers in the hospital for three to four hours, unable to respond to other mental health calls.

In response, LAPD tailored its strategy to focus on the co-response model—increasing the number of personnel assigned to SMART and expanding the hours of operation. The co-responder teams are assigned to patrol areas with overlapping response protocols, which ensures citywide coverage. The linchpin to this strategy is the MEU “triage desk,” with staff that provides advice to primary responders, dispatches SMART units, controls the flow of individuals who have received law enforcement responses to county psychiatric emergency departments, and maintains a database of law enforcement contacts. In addition, Los Angeles decided to train all officers with twenty-four hours of online training on crisis intervention tactics, and the department offers a CIT course each quarter that is open to all first-responders, although priority is given to those officers most likely to encounter people with mental illnesses. This training

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39. The recommendation to train 20 to 25 percent of a law enforcement agency is proposed by the CIT Center at the University of Memphis in the “Crisis Intervention Team Core Elements,” http://cit.memphis.edu/CoreElements.pdf.
is a key component of LAPD’s strategy because any officer may encounter someone whose mental illness is a factor in the call for police involvement. The department’s leaders believed all officers would benefit from knowledge of these techniques. So the LAPD based its decisions to build a multi-tiered response model on the size of the jurisdiction, data that identified a particular geographic area that generated repeat calls for service, leadership style, and many of the other characteristics discussed previously.

The New River Valley CIT brought together fourteen jurisdictions in its area because they all fell within one of Virginia’s mental health catchment areas. The goal of bringing the smaller, rural communities together was to capitalize on shared resources. For example, agencies created agreements to allow officers to cross jurisdictions and serve each other’s residents, and planned to train 25 percent of the total number of patrol officers from the combined forces to have sufficient coverage of shifts and geography.

In New River Valley, these communities have focused on developing better relationships between law enforcement and consumers of mental health services. Because of the CIT program and officer training, stakeholders note that consumers are less reluctant to interact with law enforcement officers, are less fearful of officers, and even recognize CIT officers as helpful. Although this improved relationship may not change the fact that law enforcement must stay with the person for up to six hours, and may not have a nearby facility to take them, it does help officers communicate with consumers and understand how to resolve problems. According to those interviewed in the study site, the improved rapport and trust between officers and clinicians, consumers, and citizens who call for assistance has also boosted the credibility of law enforcement observations in the eyes of mental health professionals.

One of the advantages to large jurisdictions is that there are many resources to tap and many community members to assist and many officers committed to working with this population.”

—Chief William Bratton
Los Angeles (Calif.) Police Department

The very nature of the rural community creates challenges—the distances are long and there is almost no public transportation [to help people access services easily].”

—Harvey Barker
Director, New River Valley (Va.) Community Services (NRV)

It used to be mental health on one side, law enforcement on the other. They looked at us as yanking people out, and we looked at them and thought: I’ve had to fight this guy to get him to the department and you want to be all touchy feely. The trip we all took to Memphis brought us together and created a lasting bond. We gained a lot of respect for each other during that time.”

—Deputy Chip Shrader
Montgomery County (Va.) Sheriff’s Office (NRV)

40. Because mental health services are organized along different geographic lines than law enforcement services, it can be difficult to develop coordinated service delivery strategies. Jurisdictions need to consider their respective catchment areas when setting up collaborative initiatives.
**PROGRAM EXAMPLE: Tailoring to a large rural region, Piscataquis County (Maine)**

Piscataquis County (Maine) is the only “frontier county” east of the Mississippi. According to Sgt. Robin Gauvin of the Portland, Maine, Police Department, this equates to a population density of less than one person per square mile. This county has three municipal police departments that determined a need to improve their response to people with mental illness in this rural area. This program has focused on creating force multipliers to boost the law enforcement response capacity.

For example, in 2003 the law enforcement agencies began partnering with Emergency Medical Services so that ambulances co-respond with police on situations involving someone with a mental illness. When an area has only one deputy in charge of 400 square miles, this agreement translates to the addition of three or four emergency medical technicians who can be called upon to assist. The involvement of the ambulance staff assists with de-escalation and transportation. The officer can arrive at a scene within ten minutes and an ambulance can arrive in twenty to thirty minutes, but mobile crisis workers would take more than an hour to reach most areas. Call takers and dispatchers are also part of expanding capacity to respond. They are now trained to ask for more information, give options to help, and ask questions once thought dangerous to ask a caller expressing thoughts of suicide.

**Conclusion**

SPR program development should be guided by both the problem in the community and the specific characteristics of the jurisdiction. There is no “one-size-fits-all” response that will work in every community. It is vital that leaders in law enforcement, mental health, and consumer advocacy understand what obstacles there are to providing sensitive and appropriate responses to people with mental illnesses, and then assess what resources and agency strengths can overcome them.

The program activities presented in this guide hint at the efforts being made around the country to improve law enforcement responses to people with mental illnesses. They should not be considered a complete catalog of all possible options, but rather are included to highlight common themes and promising approaches to problems faced by agencies with varying demographics. The examples from the sites, and the discussions of selected problems and factors that should influence program planning, are provided to underscore the need to truly understand what responses will make the most sense in a particular jurisdiction. It is hoped that policymakers and planners from any agency can use this guide as a starting point to design or enhance a SPR program that will result in better outcomes for people with mental illnesses, a more effective and rewarding use of law enforcement resources, and improved safety of all involved in these encounters.

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41. The information presented in this program example was developed based on a phone interview conducted during the information-gathering phase of this project. For more information about the Piscataquis Sheriff’s Office Crisis Intervention Team, see the profile available on the Local Programs Database at www.cjmh-infonet.org/main/show/3137.
Appendix A

Site Visit Information

Titles and agency affiliations reflect the positions held at the time the interviews were conducted.

Akron (Ohio)

Site Visit Dates: December 5–7, 2007

Interviews Conducted

- Chief Michael Matulavich, Akron Police Department
- Lieutenant Richard Edwards, Public Information Officer, Akron Police Department
- Lieutenant Mike Woody (retired), Law Enforcement Liaison, Ohio Criminal Justice Coordinating Center of Excellence
- Sergeant Michael Yohe, CIT Coordinator, Akron Police Department
- Officer Lori Natko, CIT Officer, Akron Police Department
- Officer Forrest Kappler, CIT Officer, Akron Police Department
- Ms. Lorie Witchey, Dispatcher, Akron Police Department
- Dr. Mark Munetz, Chief Clinical Officer, Summit County (Ohio) Alcohol, Drug Addiction and Mental Health Services Board
- Kim Shontz, Director of Outpatient Services, Community Support Services
- Joan “Ragan” Leff, CIT Coordinator, Community Support Services
- Ron Rett, Member, NAMI–Ohio
- Mel and Helen Reedy, Members, NAMI–Ohio
- Bernie, Consumer

Fort Wayne (Ind.)

Site Visit Dates: February 20–21, 2008

Interviews Conducted

- Deputy Chief Dottie Davis, Director of Training, Fort Wayne Police Department
- Officer Mark Bieker, CIT Officer, Fort Wayne Police Department
- Teresa Hatten, President, NAMI–Indiana
- Jane Novak, Member, NAMI–Indiana
- Deb Richey, Nursing Director of Emergency Services, Parkview Hospital (Fort Wayne)
- Marcy Malloris, Transitional Care Services Manager, Park Center Inc. (Fort Wayne, Ind.)
- James White, Service Coordinator/Security Lead Staff, Park Center Inc. (Fort Wayne, Ind.)
• Chuck Clark, Executive Director, Parkview Behavioral Health (Fort Wayne)
• Patsy Hendricks, Director of Clinical Services, Parkview Behavioral Health (Fort Wayne)
• Amy Tyler, Director of Behavioral Health, St. Joseph Hospital (Fort Wayne)
• Joe Louraine, Assessment Specialist, St. Joseph Hospital (Fort Wayne)
• Andy Wilson, Executive Director, Carriage House (Fort Wayne)
• Tom, Consumer, Carriage House (Fort Wayne)
• John, Consumer, Carriage House (Fort Wayne)
• Joe, Consumer, Carriage House (Fort Wayne)

Los Angeles (Calif.)

Site Visit Dates: December 11–14, 2007

Interviews Conducted
• Chief William Bratton, Los Angeles Police Department
• Assistant Chief Jim McDonnell, 1st Assistant Chief, Chief of Staff, Los Angeles Police Department
• Assistant Chief Earl Paysinger, Director, Office of Operations, Los Angeles Police Department
• Commander Harlan Ward, Assistant Commanding Officer of Valley Bureau, Los Angeles Police Department
• Captain Ann Young, Commanding Officer, Detective Support and Vice Division, Los Angeles Police Department
• Lieutenant Rick Wall, Mental Evaluation Unit, Los Angeles Police Department
• Lieutenant Michael Albanese (ret.), SWAT Commander, Los Angeles Police Department
• Detective Teresa Irvin, CAMP Coordinator, Los Angeles Police Department
• Dr. Luann Pannell, Director of Police Training and Education, Los Angeles Police Department
• Dr. Tony Beliz, Deputy Director, Emergency Outreach Bureau, Department of Mental Health, Los Angeles County
• Linda Boyd, Manager of Law Enforcement Mental Health Programs, Department of Mental Health, Los Angeles County
• Nancy Carter, Executive Director, NAMI–Urban Los Angeles
• Jim Randall, President, NAMI–San Fernando Valley
• Mark Gale, Member, Board of Directors, NAMI–California
New River Valley (Va.)

Site Visit Dates: March 6–7, 2008

Interviews Conducted

- Victoria Cochran, Chair, State Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse Services Board
- Chief Jackie Martin, Pearisburg Police Department
- Chief Gary Roche, Pulaski Police Department
- Lt. Brad St. Clair, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office
- Deputy Chip Shrader, Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office
- Officer Danny Ratcliffe, CIT Officer, Pearisburg Police Department
- Patrick Halpern, Executive Director, Mental Health Association of the New River Valley, Inc.
- Dr. Harvey Barker, Executive Director, New River Valley Community Services
- Marie Moon Painter, Clinical Team Leader for CONNECT, Carilion St. Albans Behavioral Health
This document was developed based on information gathered in several communities throughout the country, which were selected to represent a range of characteristics—diverse objectives, jurisdiction sizes, and program models. The site selection process began with an in-depth review to identify jurisdictions with an active law enforcement-based specialized response program—including mining the Local Programs Database, examining literature published on existing programs, and consulting with national experts. Once a comprehensive list was compiled, programs were screened for inclusion based on three important features—the program had to be law enforcement-based, in existence for at least five years, and designed independently based on the jurisdiction's specific circumstances.

Why these three characteristics?

1) Many communities have developed teams of community mental health professionals, such as mobile crisis or assertive community treatment teams, to assist officers at the scene. Although these models are undoubtedly a valuable resource for many communities and departments, they do not require significant policy and procedural changes in the law enforcement agency, and therefore are not law enforcement-based and are not within the scope of this document.

2) Anecdotal evidence suggests that during the first five years of an initiative, program practices and policies undergo an iterative process of development, building on the program's successes and failures over time. Based on this finding, jurisdictions needed to have an operational program for at least five years to be considered.

3) Several state governments have coordinated efforts to proliferate a specific model throughout jurisdictions in their state. These states should be applauded for these efforts, but jurisdictions that selected and implemented a program based on state policymakers' influence did not go through an independent program design process. Because the intention of this report is to identify and describe the various methods of program design, only jurisdictions that designed the program based on specific circumstances and characteristics were included.
The initial screening process left a short list of jurisdictions that fit the three primary criteria. Interviews were conducted with representatives from the remaining programs, and were centered on four main questions:

1. How was the program developed?
2. Is there a priority population involved in the strategy?
3. What is the nature and strength of the criminal justice/mental health collaboration?
4. How are data collected and analyzed?

Information gleaned from these telephone interviews was considered in the context of remaining selection criteria: variation in program model and jurisdiction type (e.g., demographic features and geography), mental health delivery styles, field familiarity (e.g., highlighting less-known programs), and usefulness and applicability to the field. Based on this review process, Akron (Ohio), Fort Wayne (Ind.), Los Angeles (Calif.), and New River Valley (Va.) were selected to be visited for this report.
Appendix C

Program Design Worksheet

Step 1: Understand the problem

1. What forces are driving current efforts to improve the law enforcement response to people with mental illnesses?
2. What data can planning committee members examine to understand the factors influencing law enforcement responses to people with mental illnesses?
3. What are the data limitations, and how can they be overcome?

Step 2: Articulate program goals and objectives

1. What are the program’s overarching goals?
2. What are the program’s objectives?

Step 3: Identify data-collection procedures needed to revise and evaluate the program

1. What data will be collected to measure whether goals and objectives have been achieved?
2. What data collection strategies will be used?

Step 4: Detail jurisdictional characteristics and their influence on program responses

1. What characteristics of the law enforcement agency are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?
2. What mental health system characteristics are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?
3. What state laws are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?
4. What demographic and geographic community characteristics are relevant in planning a specialized response to people with mental illnesses?
Step 5: Establish response protocols

1. What law enforcement responses are necessary?
2. What mental health system responses are necessary?
3. What other responses or resources are necessary?

Step 6: Determine training requirements

1. How much training will be provided and to which law enforcement personnel?
2. What topics should training cover?
3. Who will provide the training?
4. What training strategies will be employed?

Step 7: Prepare for program evaluation

1. What resources need to be set aside or identified for an evaluation?
2. Are there individuals designated to oversee the evaluation?